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GREEK SYNTAX

WITH

A RATIONALE OF THE CONSTRUCTIONS.

BY

JAMES CLYDE, LL.D.,

DOLLAR INSTITUTION.

AUTHOR OF 'ROMAIC AND MODERN GREEK, COMPARED WITH ONE ANOTHER AND WITH ANCIENT GREEK.'

PREFATORY NOTICE

BY

JOHN S. BLACKIE,

PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

EDINBURGH: SUTHERLAND AND KNOX.

LONDON: SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, AND CO.

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PREFATORY NOTICE

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JOHN S. BLACKIE

PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

I think it right to say a single word by way of preface to this book, not from the conceit that a work from the pen of the author of the admirable treatise on 'Romaic and Modern Greek'*, requires any recommendation from me; but because, the work having been undertaken at my request, and for the use of my classes in the University, it seems natural that I should state my reasons for having wished its production, and the manner in which I intend to use it.

The natural method of learning languages is by *hearing* and *speaking*, which the invention of letters, and the multiplication of books, have supplemented by *reading* and *writing*. The best method of acquiring a foreign lan-

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* I am glad to see that Lord Broughton, in the last edition of his Travels in Albania &c. (vol. 2. p. 477), speaks of this work in the following terms of well-deserved eulogy: "Professor Blackie's lecture, amongst other benefits conferred upon the students of Greek literature, has given occasion to a treatise, which appears to me to contain, on the whole, more valuable information and sound criticism on the subject in question, than any which has hitherto come under my notice. The title-page of the pamphlet is as follows: 'Romaic and Modern Greek, compared with one another, and with ancient Greek, by James Clyde M. A.'"

guage, whether dead or living, will of course be that, in which the greatest amount of hearing, speaking, reading, and writing can be compressed, in well graduated lessons, into a given amount of time. Some minds will profit more by one of these elements of complete indoctrination, and others by another; but the greatest progress will unquestionably be made by him, who knows to avail himself of the resources of all the four.

In our schools and colleges, from causes that cannot be detailed here, the important exercise of speaking Latin and Greek has fallen into disuse, and, till that be resuscitated, the importance of the element of writing, which supplies its place, can scarcely be over-rated. Writing indeed, even if the practice of speaking were in full play, could in no wise be dispensed with; for, though inferior to speaking in ease and flexibility, it is superior in accuracy, and architectural massiveness. As matters now stand however, writing must be plied with double vigour; otherwise the learner will never get command of the language in a masterly way, as a fencer has command of his foil, but can only know it passively, as brutes stand in relation to sensuous impressions, which they receive and recognise, but cannot use.

How then is the writing of language to be practised? Plainly as speaking is practised in the natural method; and, as this proceeds on the foundation of *hearing* — of which indeed it is but the reflection — so writing must be conducted by a well-calculated application of the materials presented by *reading*. Now, in the 'exercise-books' often used by teachers, for inculcating the elements of Greek and Latin composition, this very obvious

principle is disregarded. The learner reads one thing in a book, and in another book writes another and an altogether different thing. The evil consequences of this are manifest. The great mass of the materials, presented by the reading, lies as a dead store never called into service, and the scholar, knowing that he will never again have to employ what he reads, gets into the habit of passing it over in a perfunctory way, and throwing it aside, as a lawyer does those facts of the case he is pleading today, which contain no principle bearing on the case he may be pleading tomorrow; while the written exercises present a wholly new set of words, phrases, and instructions, which are either given into the learner's hands without any demand on his memory, or contain problems too difficult for solution by a tyro of the most limited experience.

The proper course to be taken, instead of this slovenly and insufficient method of 'exercise-books', is quite obvious. The teacher must himself write out exercises formed upon the model of the reading-lesson, so that whatever is read today will certainly be required tomorrow, or next day, for the performance of the written exercise. This is the way in which I have always proceeded in my junior class; and, in order to make the original impression, received from reading, be repeated as frequently as possible — in the frequency of which repetition the great trick of learning languages consists — I have insisted that the exercise, after having been made by the student, and corrected publicly by the Professor, be carefully transcribed into a book, subject to the inspection of the Professor, or the class-tutor.

In such exercises, there are obviously two things to be attended to, viz. the mere furniture of words, and their scientific disposition, or Syntax. The first presents no difficulty. That teacher must be extremely dull and stupid, who cannot take the materials presented by the reading, and put them into some new shape, that shall try at once the memory, and the wit of his scholars. But the management of the Syntax is more delicate. The mere words may be used as they occur, but the Syntax should be proceeded with in an orderly fashion, so that the progress may be, as much as possible, from the simple to the complex, from the obvious to the subtle. The teacher must therefore take special care not to confuse his scholars, by giving sentences implying a curious knowledge of the respective functions of the subjunctive and optative for example, before the formation of the simple independent sentence has been mastered; and he ought to make notes, in the margin of his book, of the points of construction which, as they occur, he helps the scholar gradually to evolve from his reading. Afterwards, to nail the whole down surely, he may compose notes, and dictate them to the students, with distinct reference to the several exercises, by which the most important principles of Syntax are gradually worked into the living consciousness of the learner.

It is manifest however that, with the greatest care, it will be difficult for the teacher to elicit a systematic whole of syntactical doctrine merely out of the materials presented by the reading, especially if, as in the meagre way of the Scotch universities, he sees the greater part of his students only for one short campaign of five

months. To remedy this defect, it seems expedient that he should have at hand a good manual of Syntax, concise, but scientific and complete, to which he may constantly refer the student, and which, in point of bulk, shall be so manageable as to be easily mastered by a diligent youth in the course of a single session.

Not finding any work of this kind that exactly suited my views, I might have been forced to put together something of the sort for my own use; but, having happily met, in Mr. Clyde, with a gentlemau in whom, from his skill as a teacher, and his habit of philosophical analysis, I had the greatest confidence, I have been enabled to get the want supplied without interrupting the course of more important studies.

I have only to add that, though I read a considerable part of the manuscript, I am not entitled to the slightest degree of praise for any of the good things that this work will be found to contain. As little can I be blamed for whatsoever spots the sharp-eyed critic may discover in a body otherwise fair. Had I not known, from the most sufficient experience, that Mr. Clyde is a man able to fight his own battles against any grammarian in Christendom, I should never have asked him to do the work.

EDINBURGH 1. September 1856.

JOHN S. BLACKIE.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

In opposition to the German school of philosophizers upon Greek Syntax, founded by Hermann, and continued by Matthiæ, Buttmann, Thiersch, Krüger, and Kühner, has arisen of late years the Danish school of positive canonists, with Madvig at its head. With these the pendulum is now oscillating towards the other extreme; for, while the Germans, with boundless daring, undertook to explain everything, the Danes, as if in scientific despair, explain almost nothing.

In the following work, I have endeavoured to steer a middle course, not only classifying, but, wherever it could be done with any probability, accounting for the facts of Greek Syntax; the object being to furnish the student, not only with a *vade mecum* of rules, but also with a guide to principles. As *cram* is to culture, so are rules to principles; and it is only when the rationale of phenomena, whether in language or in nature, is inquired into, that the study of either becomes an instrument of culture; for culture, in so far as it affects the relation of the mind to objects of thought, may be said to consist in the continual elimination of the accidental from the necessary, and to result in the reconciliation of all things by the discovery of a few first principles. Besides, the manifold character of Greek constructions, arising from

the preservation of ancient synthesis, by an extensive inflection of the declinable parts of speech, on the one hand, and from the admission of modern analysis, on the other, by an extensive use of the article, and of prepositions, renders an investigation of principles peculiarly necessary, and peculiarlyi nstructive in Greek.

To enumerate all the works, which I have consulted in the preparation of my own, would look like parade, for, great and small, they number about a score: but I have derived so much assistance from Jelf's edition of Kühner, from Madvig, and from Asopios *περὶ Ἑλληνικῆς Συντάξεως, Περίοδος Πρώτη, ἐν Ἀθήναις*, 1853, that I cannot forbear mentioning them. These authors, and many others, are referred to throughout the work, wherever I have borrowed from them anything important, or when they furnish details, the statement of which did not comport with my plan; and the frequency of these references may be taken as the measure of my obligations to each, except in the case of Asopios, to whom I have not referred at all, because there is probably not a copy of his work in this country, besides my own, and that in the Library of Edinburgh University. I take this opportunity therefore of stating that my obligations to him are great, as elsewhere, so particularly in regard to the classification of verbs, according to the case or cases which they govern respectively.

In one respect, I have derived exceedingly little assistance from any quarter, viz. in the illustration of Greek idioms by modern instances. These however lie on the surface, patent to every observer; and they have been admitted into the present work — to what

extent, may be judged from the enumeration under the word 'Parallels' in Index I — because, in actual teaching, I have found them to be not less useful than interesting to the learner. The saying, 'that is Greek to me', used of what is hopelessly unintelligible, often exercises so depressing an influence on the mind of the English student, that he does not even *try* to enter into the spirit of the Greek idiom, when different from his own; at best he tries to remember its dead form. Now this abject renunciation of the highest endeavour is fatal to success; but I have always found it yield to the charm of a modern parallel. If such can be found in our own language, so much the better: if not, then the less removed from our own, by time and place, the more effectual; for place, as well as time, is an element of strangeness, and a cotemporary illustration from Paris begets more courage, and lets in more light than a cotemporary illustration from Athens. Even when the learner is ignorant of the language referred to, the mere enunciation of the fact, that living men in a neighbouring country use an idiom coincident with the Greek, reconciles the mind to its strangeness, and removes that prejudice which, by stopping sympathy, prevents understanding. Another important object will be gained if, by these parallels, it appear that the study of the modern languages, instead of being, as many presume, antagonistic, is auxiliary to that of the ancient.

I have not hesitated to supplement, in several instances, the history of classic forms and constructions by reference to Romaic and Modern Greek: because, if the past shed light upon the present, it is equally true

that the present reflects light upon the past, and it seems unreasonable to ignore either.

Wherever, in parts II and III, the rationale is not added to a rule, it is either because the rationale will readily occur to the student, who has mastered the principles developed in part I, or because I had no probable explanation to offer. In many cases, the rationale is assigned conjecturally, as appears from the language employed; and wherever my statements are not exhaustive, I have endeavoured to make them at least suggestive, knowing that the clear exhibition of a problem, even without a solution, is an important service rendered to the student.

As the examples, adduced in the following work, were not selected from the originals, but from grammars, I felt bound to verify the references; and, in doing so, I have not unfrequently been obliged, in order to get a true reference, to take a new example. In a very few instances of false reference, I have allowed the example first selected to remain, because I could not meet with another equally suitable, but have in that case given merely the *name* of the author. Examples of Greek constructions form, to a great extent, a common stock, on which all grammarians, from Copenhagen to Athens, draw; and, even if every writer were to go through the drudgery of verification, some of the numbers might still be falsified by misprints: the author's *name* however may always be depended on. It has been a still greater disappointment that, in the case of abnormal constructions, where indubitable authority is most desiderated, many examples are rendered suspicious by various

readings. It is of course a question for critics whether, in such cases, the various readings are to be ascribed to the abnormal construction, or the abnormal construction to the various readings. Two instances of this kind are noticed, §. 44. † §. 56. Obs. 2. *. For the sake of those who are not yet familiar with Greek, all the examples have been translated, and that as literally as consisted with intelligibility.

The indexes are intended to serve the double purpose of aiding those, who may wish to consult the work on any particular subject, and of enabling the student to examine himself on its contents.

As the whole work in general, so especially the Greek Appendix has been drawn up at Professor Blackie's request, for the purpose of assisting those, who may wish to make the experiment of conducting the grammatical analysis of Greek authors in the Greek language. Within these narrow limits at least, it is quite possible for teacher and pupils to converse in whatever language they may be studying together;* and the advantages of a worthy attempt, which can hardly fail to be successful, are very great. It is not the acquisition of a Greek terminology which is important, but the inwrought con-

* The actual limits are wider, viz. the extent of the reading lessons. Provided these are of moderate length, and at first they can hardly be too short, there is nothing to hinder the teacher and his pupils from talking together every day, on the matter, and in the words read; and, by judiciously mingling repetitions of the old with the new lessons, a perfect command may thus be acquired over a whole book. The Greek language has been so taught for years in Dr. Hauschild's Gesammt-Gymnasium, Leipsic, where also the grammatical analysis of Greek authors is conducted in the Greek language.

sciousness of *the power of lingual forms*, obtained by the employment of them for the expression of living thought, and obtainable, easily and surely at least, in no other way. An uneducated foreigner who, by residence in England, has acquired the faculty of expressing himself intelligibly in English, is nearer the heart of the English *language*, however distant from the penetralia of its *literature*, than the foreign scholar who, by reading, has mastered the literature of England, but to whom nevertheless the expression of a single thought in English, except in the way of quotation, would be a laborious process, instead of a spontaneous act. This however is precisely the sort of phenomenon presented by our students of Greek; for although, on leaving the University, they are acquainted with the grammar, and with certain authors, those namely which they have been required to *get up*, and although, as is often the case, they may be able to pass an examination on these with more *éclat* than even the cotemporaries of the Greek authors themselves could have done, who spoke the language of the originals, but had not made of them a special study, yet, from having written Greek little, and never spoken it at all, they have *no power over the language itself*. It may be doubted whether, with this merely theoretical knowledge of the language, any honest admiration of Greek literature as such i. e. in respect of its Greek form, can be felt. Most probably it is the thought translated into English, and not the Greek expression of the thought, which is admired; and if this be so, then are the best means of acquiring a practical familiarity with Greek of the last importance. Since the thought of the Greek

writers in its essence is accessible in translations, and since an equally good formal culture can be had by studying other languages, it is manifest that, professional aims apart, the peculiar claims of Greek to stand in the programme of a liberal education, are now restricted to that one particular, in which it is confessedly preeminent, viz. the æsthetic. This however is precisely the element which, because it defies expression in a formula, eludes both the grammarian and the lexicographer. The language must *live* for him who would appreciate its beauty: but it cannot live *for* him, unless it live *in* him i. e. unless he use it for the expression of his own living thought. In this regard, speaking is even a more important exercise than writing; for, as in reading the student is chiefly passive, so in writing he is only mediately active, now seeking an example, now calling to mind a rule by which he may be guided, but in speaking he is, at all events *by speaking* he *becomes* directly active, sending forth his thought completely equipped at once in the foreign garb. To the writing exercises then, which are already practised in our best schools, it is proposed to add the speaking of Greek; and it is hoped that those, who may be willing to make a beginning, by conducting the parsing lessons in the Greek language, will find the requisite materials in the Greek Appendix to this work.

Let me briefly state on what principle this Appendix has been composed; for it is simply impossible that a modern, faithful to his own thoughts, should write on Greek Syntax, as an ancient grammarian would have done.

To the general difficulty of fitting any foreign, and particularly any ancient language to one's own ideas and thoughts — a difficulty which is realised just in proportion to the æsthetic susceptibility of him who encounters it — is to be added here the particular difficulty, arising from the fact, that Syntax is precisely that department of grammar, which the ancient, and even the mediæval Greeks almost entirely neglected. An ancient nomenclature, therefore, suited to modern syntactical doctrine, is simply not extant;* and it becomes absolutely necessary to draw from quite recent sources. In the Modern Greek work of Asopios already mentioned, I found a nomenclature suited to my purpose, and I have adopted it the more readily because, instead of being invented by him, or by any individual, it has grown up gradually, as the genuine Greek expression of the modern *ἐνδιάθετος λόγος*, on the subject of Syntax. At the same time, whoever may take the trouble of examining the Appendix minutely, will find very few words indeed used in a sense, or rather with a reference, not justified by *Stephani Thesaurus*. A consideration then of what an ancient Greek, not with his *ἐνδιάθετος λόγος*, but with mine, would have written, is the principle on which I have proceeded: for the

* To take only one example; until quite recent years, all Greek grammarians followed the ancients in regarding the parts of speech as eight, viz. *ὄνομα*, *ῥῆμα*, *μετοχή*, *ἄρθρον*, *ἀντωνυμία*, *πρόθεσις*, *ἐπίῤῥημα*, *σύνδεσμος*, the substantive and adjective being comprehended under *ὄνομα*, the relative pronoun under *ἄρθρον* (§. 4.*), and the interjection under *ἐπίῤῥημα* (§. 52.). To present the parts of Greek speech under this classification to British students, would merely be to introduce confusion, where order previously existed.

rest, I have aimed at perspicuity and grammatical correctness.

In connexion with the final revision of the Appendix, I have much pleasure in mentioning the name of Aristides Kyprianos, who was my fellow-student at Athens under Asopios in 1853, and has since amply fulfilled the promise of distinguished scholarship which he then gave. His suggestions were such as to diminish both the monotony, which besets the grammarian's style in general, and the modernisms which beset mine in particular. Had I adopted all his suggestions, not a single Neo-Græcism would have remained: but I deliberately prefer a Neo-Græcism short and perspicuous, to an archaism cumbrous and hardly intelligible; and I hesitated the less, on account of the conviction already announced, and which my consultations with Cyprianos only confirmed, viz. that to express modern thought regarding Syntax in pure ancient Greek, without intolerable circumlocutions, is impossible.

The very favourable anticipations, which Professor Blackie has been pleased to express, in his Prefatory Notice, regarding the execution of this work in general, I cannot hope to have fulfilled: I have endeavoured, however, according to my ability, to meet them. It is indeed by a consciousness of this, and by a persuasion that the matter contained in the following pages, would have been both instructive and stimulating to myself, when a student on the benches now occupied by those, for whom this work has been primarily composed, that I am emboldened to commend it to the favourable consideration of the learned.

EDINBURGH 1. September 1856.

JAMES CLYDE.

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ERRATA.

PAGE	LINE	
12.		last for 'he' read 'the'
58.	12.	for 'Thus,' read 'Thuc.'
61.	5.	for 'me' read 'we'
92.	3.	of §. 48. for '*οὐδείς, μηδείς*' read '*οὐδέ, μηδέ*'
110.	1.	for '*ἡγοῦμαι ὁρῶν*' read '*ἡγοῦμαι· — ὁρῶν*'
115.	2.	for '*χρημάτων μεταμέλει*' read '*χρημάτων· — μεταμέλει*'
128.	5.	of Obs. 2. for '*βαλβερὸν*' read '*βλαβερὸν*'
136.	12.	of Obs. 1. for 'himselfs' read 'himself'
150.	4.	for '*ἔνι*' read '*ἐνί*'
192.	9.	from end, for 'II'. read 'III'.

GREEK SYNTAX

WITH A RATIONALE OF THE CONSTRUCTIONS.

INTRODUCTION.

§. 1. **Definition of the Subject.** Language is the articulate expression of mind; and, as the furniture of the mind consists of *ideas*, combined, according to the relations perceived to exist among them, into *thoughts*, so the materials of language consist of *words*, combined into *sentences*. The object of this work is *to investigate the laws which regulate the combination of words into sentences, so as to express thought, in the Greek language.*

Obs. 1. **The Simple Sentence.** The student is supposed to know that the simplest *thought* involves two *ideas*, viz. a subject and a predicate, and that it consists in the mental reference of the latter to the former (§. 56): consequently, that the simplest sentence must express, or at least involve, two *words*, viz. a subject and a predicate, and, in addition, some lingual contrivance by which the latter is referred to the former. This lingual contrivance is also often a separate word, as in 'Crœsus was rich', where *Crœsus* is the subject, *rich* the predicate, and *was* the copula, i. e. the word referring the predicate to the subject. In Greek, as in English, the substantive verb is generally the copula (§. 54), and, when so used, all the persons of the pres. indic. of *εἰμί*, except the 2d pers. sing., may be enclitic.* When, however, the predicate itself assumes the

* The difference between *εἰμί* as a verb denoting existence, and as a mere copula, appears markedly in (Soph. Oed. Col. 393) *ὅτ' οὐκ ἔτ' εἰμί, τηνικαῦτ' ἄρ' ἔἰμ' ἀνήρ*= 'When I no longer *exist*, then forsooth I *am* a man'.

verbal form, the copula is involved in the termination of that verbal form, as in the Greek of the above *Κροῖσος ἐπλούτησε*. All three indeed may be involved in a single verb, as *πλουτῶ* = 'I am rich'; the subject, as well as the copula, being here implied in the verbal ending, while the body of the word supplies the idea of the predicate.

Obs. 2. **The Compound Sentence.** When there is but one finite verb in a sentence, it is called *simple*, when there are several, *compound*; and the simple sentences, which make up the compound one, are called its *clauses*. Thus 'Crœsus amassed riches, that he might secure happiness' is a compound sentence consisting of two clauses. In this example the second clause, being *final*, is *subordinate* to the former: but in the following, 'Crœsus amassed riches, and lived to see the vanity of them', the second clause is *coordinate* with the former; and, as there are many forms of coordination and subordination among clauses, so there are various kinds of compound sentences (§. 83.). In sentences, whether simple or compound, the subject and predicate are seldom stated alone. Even in the simple sentence any amount of descriptive matter may accompany the subject, provided it be conveyed by adjectives or adjectival phrases; and not only may the verbal predicate be accompanied by an object similarly described, but any amount of circumstantial matter, for instance as to time, place, and manner, may be grouped around it. The simple sentence is not therefore necessarily short, nor the compound necessarily long; but, whether long or short, a sentence is simple if there be but one finite verb in it, compound if there be more than one.

§. 2. **Method of the Work.** The laws of Syntax are commonly divided into those of Concord, and Government. But it is important to observe that Government is not here *opposed* to Concord, as if it implied a discord: on the contrary, Government in Syntax is a form of Concord. Thus in *ἀπέχομαι οἴνου* = 'I abstain from wine', *ἀπέχομαι* is said to *govern οἴνου* in the genitive: in reality however *ἀπέχομαι* is attended by the genitive because of a *congruity* subsisting between the force of the genitive case-ending (which denotes the relation *from*), and the meaning of *ἀπέχομαι* (I keep myself *from*). Sometimes the underlying congruity cannot be so distinctly traced as in the above instance, but it must ever be presumed to exist; and not till it has been traced, is the principle of a construction discovered. The Syntax

of a language being thus dependent on the inherent powers of words, and of their grammatical forms, it is proposed to review these before investigating the laws of Syntax themselves, which will be treated of separately, as they relate to words, and as they relate to sentences. The whole work therefore is divided into three parts viz. Part I. The Materials of Syntax. Part II. The Syntax of Words. Part III. The Syntax of Sentences.

Obs. 1. **Irregularities in Greek Syntax.** Although the preliminary review above announced will illustrate the rationale of most Greek constructions, the student must not expect that it will solve every difficulty. The analysis of language proceeds on the supposition that it is the articulate expression of mind; but then it is an *imperfect* expression: thought is often too subtle, passion too strong, conversation too rapid for language; and hence its ellipses, idioms, and manifold departures from the norm, which are often only confessions of weakness, or actual down-breakings on the part of language in its attempt to render fully, or to keep pace with thought. In other words, the metaphysical, though the chief formative and conservative element in language, is not the only one to be taken into account: the rhetorical and euphonic*, for example, have also their part; and indeed, to express the whole truth at once,

* A familiar instance of the power of mere sound, in determining the use of lingual forms, is the *me* of the Scotch dialect for *I* emphatic, or the *moi* of the French for *je* emphatic. Thus 'Moi! je ne ferai rien de la sorte' = 'Me! I' ll do nocht o' the kin'. The corresponding forms *moi* and *me*, in these examples, are not copies of each other: both have come into use as emphatic nominatives, because the ordinary nominatives, from their mode of pronunciation, —*je*, and the Scotch *I* being both obscure short sounds — were incapable of receiving and transmitting the full volume of sound required by emphasis. Accordingly in English, German, and Italian, where the ordinary nominatives *I*, *ich*, *io*, are so pronounced as easily to admit of vocal emphasis, no forms are used parallel to the French *moi* and the Scotch *me*. It thus appears what a petty matter in its origin classicism sometimes is: that which is classical in French and Scotch is unclassical, and in fact ungrammatical in English, simply because kindred forms happen to be pronounced *ore rotundo* in England, and between the teeth in France and Scotland. For an example in Greek see §. 40. Obs. 2, and in Romaic §. 15 *.

the language of a people at any period is the product of the national history, in the widest sense of that term, not alone of the national mind. Accordingly, syntactical irregularities occur in all languages; and, from special causes, they are particularly numerous in Greek. From the variety of dialects, and the long duration of the classic era, throughout which the analytic forms of language were growing up by the side of the synthetic, without however supplanting them, the *totality* of Greek appears not so much a continent of fixtures, as an ocean of moving forms: and even in one dialect, and at one period of its history, that rigid uniformity of construction, which the Latin observed, is not found in Greek. This comparative lawlessness seems to have arisen partly from the liberty of the individual who, in endeavouring to translate his own mind into language, did not so much conform to an objective model, as obey the formative powers within him; and partly from the agility of the Greek mind, which regarded itself, in respect to the same operation, now as receptive, now as active, and in respect to the same event, now as an immediate witness, or even a participator, and now as a distant reporter. It is impossible however, by means of these, or of any other considerations, to explain all anomalies. Under §. 832 Jelf justly remarks in regard to some of Kühner's explanations of the optative with ἄν: "In this, as in many, if not most constructions in Greek, it seems to be unreasonable to try to bind down writers to laws, for which no reason can be given, and which they evidently did not always observe. It could hardly fail to be more profitable if, admitting the exceptional passages, we endeavour to catch the shades of meaning which are conveyed by the more or less usual construction".* The distinct statement of these more or less usual

* Whoever believes in absolute laws, or expects uniform practice in language, must be prepared for continual disappointment and perplexity, unless indeed he be fanatical enough not to perceive the discordance of facts with his theory. Let the following sentence from Macaulay's letter of resignation, addressed to the citizens of Edinburgh from London, on Jan. 19. 1856, serve as an illustration: "Had even a small number of my constituents hinted to me a wish that I would vacate my seat, I should have thought it my duty to comply with that wish." The *would* in this sentence has been found fault with; and a great deal might be said for and against it, canonical grammar favouring the Aristarchs, rhetoric and euphony the retiring legislator. But the pertinent reflection is, Why should scholars, who have no absolute code for the use of certain verbal forms in their own living language, insist on framing one for the use of all verbal forms in a phase of Greek which has long since passed away? The very pretension to universality would

constructions is what the student has a right to require; and he must remember that the *prevailing* usage in any construction is an absolute law to foreigners, particularly learners.

Obs. 2. **Order of Review.** In reviewing the materials of Syntax, the usual classification of the parts of speech into the Article, Noun, Adjective, Pronoun, Verb, Adverb, Prepositon, Conjunction, and Interjection, will be followed. Not that this classification is perfect; for, however sharply distinguished from one another these different parts of speech at first sight appear, they do nevertheless imperceptibly pass into one another. Thus the noun passes into the adjective (§. 20), and the adjective into the noun (§. 6, b); and indeed almost every part of speech into several others. But the common classification is probably not more imperfect than any other that might be invented, since in thought, as well as in language, there are no boundary lines, but only border-territories; and it has the great advantage of *prima facie* fitness, whereby it maps out at once to the student's eye the whole region of the grammarian's investigations.

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be a ground for suspecting limited observation, and hasty generalisation.

PART I. MATERIALS OF SYNTAX.

THE ARTICLE.

A weak demonstrative Pronoun.

§. 3. Ὁ ἡ τό **Demonstrative.** In English *the* is only a weaker form of *that*, its demonstrative power being quite perceptible in such phrases as, "thou art *the* man". It is also well known that the numerous forms of the definite article in the Romanic languages of Europe are all derived from the Latin demonstratives, *hic* and *ille*. In Homeric Greek ὁ ἡ τό was so strongly demonstrative that it can seldom be regarded there as an article at all, and is consequently much more sparingly used than in Attic Greek, where its character, as an article, was fairly established. In particular, it was demonstrative when followed by the particles γάρ, γέ, μέν, δέ, as (Il. I. 55.) *Τῷ γὰρ ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη* = 'For the white-armed Juno put it into his head', where *Τῷ γάρ* = *Τούτῳ γάρ*.* This Epic use of ὁ ἡ τό with the above particles survived in Attic, particularly in ὁ μέν — ὁ δέ = *hic* — *ille*, and in a few set phrases without particles, as τὸ καὶ τό = 'this and that', πρὸ τοῦ** = 'before this'

* When *τούτῳ*, though translated substantively, and *τῷ* are called *demonstratives*, that word is not taken in the limited sense of *demonstrative adjective* pronouns, but in the general sense in which Donaldson declares *all* pronouns to have been originally demonstrative, i. e. "indicative of particular positions". (New Cratylus, p. 216.)

** Exactly so in German ehedeſſen, and ehedem = 'ere now, formerly.'

(time), *διὰ τό* = 'for this' (reason), and adverbially *τῇ* = 'in this way'. *Ὁ ἡ τό* demonstrative does not occur in the style of the New Testament itself; but the quotation from Aratus (Acts XVII. 28.) *τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν* = 'for we are his offspring', is an example of it; *τοῦ* = *τούτου* (*τοῦ θεοῦ*).

Obs. 1. *Ὁ ἡ τό* **in Homer.** In reading Homer the student must not connect *ὁ*, even when unaccompanied by a particle, with a noun, whenever he can: on the contrary, he must presume on its demonstrative force, and translate it independently if he can. Thus in (Il. I. 488—9) *Αὐτὰρ ὁ μήνιε νηυσὶ παρήμενος ὠκυπόροισι, Διογενὴς Πηλέος υἱός, πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς* = 'But, sitting by the swift-sailing ships, *he* nursed his wrath, Achilles swift of foot, Jove-descended son of Peleus', — *ὁ* is not to be referred to *Ἀχιλλεύς* as an article, but to be translated independently as an anticipatory nominative, according to our conversational and ballad style, as when we say, 'He was a great poet, Milton', instead of at once 'Milton was a great poet', or,

"When he sank in her arms, the poor wounded Hussar". (Campbell)

Οὗ, οἷ, ᾧ, μίν are used in the same anticipative way; but this usage is rare in post-Homeric writers. Farther, as the article proper is not Homeric, neither are the distinctive forms dependent on its use. Hence, as in Latin, the context alone can guide the student in translating *video regem* 'I see *a* king', or 'I see *the* king', so in Homer the context alone determines whether *ἄλλοι* should be translated 'others', or as in Attic *οἱ ἄλλοι* = '*the* others' i. e. 'the rest'. In such phrases as *ἄλλοι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες*, where the Homeric *ἄλλοι* = *οἱ ἄλλοι* in Attic, Zenodotus proposed to read *ὠλλοι*, but this, being pure Ionic, is not allowed by critics. (§. 29. b.)

Obs. 2. *Ὁ ἡ τό* **Demonstrative in Attic.** *Ὁ μέν, ὁ δέ* are used not only in opposition to each other, but independently, in the sense of 'and he', or in the beginning of a sentence, *ὁ μέν* = 'Now he', and *ὁ δέ* = 'but he'. With *καί* however the article is used only in the oblique cases, as *καὶ τόν* = *et eum*, the form *ὅς* being employed to denote persons in the nominative, as *καὶ ὅς* = 'and he'. The form *ὅς*, which is that of the relative, and the form *ὁ* are supposed to have been originally the same, and Donaldson ingeniously suggests that *ὅς* became *ὁ* by dropping its sigma in such combinations as *ὃ(ς) ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ*, to avoid the repetition of the sibilant, just as in similar combinations conversely the German *adjective* drops its termination, while the definite article retains it; as guter Mann, but der gute Mann = 'the good man'. (§. 28. Obs. 1.) The remarkable Attic formula, which Herodotus also uses, *ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι* = 'among them first' i. e. 'first of all', may be

noticed here. It may have arisen from the ellipsis of a participle, as (Thuc. I. 6. 3.) *Ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τόν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο* = 'And the Athenians were the *first of all* (the Greeks) to lay aside their arms' i. e. 'to give up wearing them daily', where the insertion of *καταθεμένοις* after *τοῖς* would complete a regular construction. This formula however became merely adverbial, *ἐν τοῖς* = *πρὸ πάντων*, for it remains the same in whatever gender and number *πρῶτος* may follow. Thus, (Thuc. III. 81. 6.) *Οὕτως ὠμὴ ἡ στάσις προὐχώρησε καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο* = 'The sedition went on thus cruelly, and seemed to be the more cruel, because it was the *first of all*'. In Thuc. III. 17. 1. *ἐν τοῖς* occurs with *πλεῖσται*.

§. 4. *Ὁ ἡ τό* **Relative.** From the demonstrative force of *ὁ ἡ τό*, its use as a relative naturally springs. In our own language uneducated persons, particularly in continuous narrative, make a comparatively sparing use of the relative proper, supplying its place by a demonstrative, which is generally introduced by a copulative conjunction. The relative is indeed always = *et is*; and its advantage consists simply in marking the *subordination* of its clause to another, whereas a demonstrative clause is in form *coordinate* with the principal one. This coordination *in form* of sentences *logically* subordinate is the primitive structure of language (§. 51), and abounds in Homer. Thus (Il. XV. 553), *Ναῖε δὲ παρὰ Πριάμῳ· ὁ δέ μιν τίεν ἶσα τέκεσσι* = 'And he lived with Priam, *who* honoured him as a son', but literally *ὁ δέ* = 'and he': again (Il. VI. 147—8) *φύλλα τὰ μέν τ' ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει, ἄλλα δέ θ' ὕλη τηλεθύωσα φύει· ἔαρος δ' ἐπιγίγνεται ὥρη* = 'the wind indeed scatters one set of leaves upon the ground, but the greening wood puts forth another, *when* the season of spring arrives': in the Greek, however, the definition of time is added not subordinately by *ὅτε*, but coordinately by *δέ*. This primitive construction is also common in the loose style of Herodotus. But, just in proportion as men perceived the logical subordination of the demonstrative clause, would the demonstrative word acquire a relative force, and, when this perception became distinct and permanent, the relative force

of the demonstrative word would be established. Thus the English demonstrative *that* has come to be also an English relative. In Homer it is often indifferent whether ὁ ἡ τό be translated by the demonstrative, or by the relative as (Il. I. 324—5) *Εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώῃσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕλωμαι Ἐλθὼν σὺν πλεόνεσσι· τὸ οἳ καὶ ῥίγιον ἔσται*, = 'And if he give her not up, I myself will come with a more numerous following, and take her, *which* will be even worse for him'; or, pausing at *her*, and making the last clause independent,—'*that* will be even worse for him'. The Ionic and Doric writers generally, as well as Homer, use ὁ ἡ τό as a relative, but in Attic this usage is confined to the tragedians; and they use it only in the oblique cases, and chiefly in the neuter gender. Thus (Soph. Oed. T. 1378—81) *οὐδὲ δαιμόνων ἀγάλμαθ' ἱερά, τῶν . . . ἀπεστέρησ' ἐμαυτόν* = 'nor sacred images of gods, *whereof* . . . I bereft myself'.*

§. 5. Ὁ ἡ τό **as Definite Article.** The more or less demonstrative force of the article is indicated by its very name as the *definite* article. It is so called because it either introduces a specification which *defines* the prin-

* How nearly related the primary functions of the article and the relative are, even when their forms differ, appears by the comparison of such phrases as *ἐκεῖνος ὅς ἐστι γνωστός*, and *ἐκεῖνος ὁ γνωστός*. This affinity is accurately marked by the language of the ancient Greek grammarians, who called both of them ἄρθρα = *articuli* = 'joints', because both serve *εἰς συνάρθρωσιν λόγου* i. e. for the compacting, as by joints, of discourse. To distinguish them, the article was called ἄρθρον προτακτικόν, and the relative ἄρθρον ὑποτακτικόν· but the position of the article is a mere accident. In Danish, and indeed in all the Scandinavian dialects, the article is post-positive: but the most interesting illustration is furnished by the Italian and Wallachian languages. The article in both is derived from the Latin *ille*, and, as in Latin the position of *ille* was indeterminate, *ille homo* and *homo ille* being equally admissible, it has so happened that the article is praepositive in Italian, after the model of *ille homo*, and post-positive in Wallachian, after the model of *homo ille*.

cipal noun, as *Σωκράτης ὁ φιλόσοφος* = 'Socrates *the* philosopher'; or, when prefixed to the principal noun itself, alludes to a specification understood by the parties speaking, or prepares for one that is about to be mentioned. The understood specification, according to its nature, either *individualises* or *generalises* the idea of the substantive. Thus if I say *ὁ βοῦς* = 'the ox', it cannot be known, either in Greek or in English, whether I mean some ox in particular, or oxen in general; because, though the article points to a specification of some sort, it does not declare wherein that specification consists. That must be made out from the nature of the whole statement. Thus in *ὁ βοῦς ζῶον χρησιμώτατόν ἐστι* = 'the ox is a most useful animal', the understood specification is shewn by the import of the sentence to be, *the animal so called:* on the other hand, in *ὁ βοῦς ἐσφάχθη* = 'the ox has been killed', the understood specification must be *the one we have been talking about*, at all events, *the one you and I know about in some way*. This latter specification, which individualises the idea of the substantive, is often expressed by a relative clause, as: 'The ox, *which you sold me*, has been killed'; and, where not expressed, it must be such as the context, or the circumstances of the discourse easily suggest, otherwise the whole sentence is ambiguous.

Obs. 1. **More or less frequent Use of the Article.** The most attentive student of English literature would find it impossible to give rules for the use of *the* in detail, because, as the style of composition rises, its use becomes more sparing, and the practice of authors even in the same style differs. In general, it may be said that, since its function is to *define*, it is seldomer required in compositions which aim at a moral impression, than in those which abound in logical distinctions. It is equally impossible to give rules for the use of *ὁ ἡ τό* as article, the Greek usage being even more inconstant than the English. Besides the considerations mentioned in §. 2. Obs. 1, it is evident that Greek writers were, in regard to this matter, urged by opposing influences, the prestige of ancient example, on the one hand, inviting them to omit the article where it *might* be used, and the tendency of the language towards analytic development, on the other hand, inviting them to use it, where it *might* be

omitted. In general, the later the author and the less poetic the style, the more frequent is its use; and, not till the influence of the ancient classics upon the general Greek mind decayed i. e. not till after the classical era, did the article come to be used indiscriminately as in the Greek of the present day, and in French.

Obs. 2. **The Article with Singular Nouns.** The use of the article to *individualise* its substantive, i. e. to introduce or allude to a specification shewing what particular individual, or individuals are meant, is precisely the same in Attic Greek as in English: but not so its use in *generalising* the substantive. In English, classes are denoted, or, to speak more accurately, the *type* of a class is signified, by prefixing the article to the singular substantive, as 'the fox', 'the lawyer' &c. with the single exception of *man*, who, in his singularity among living beings, is regarded as one; and hence we say 'man', not '*the* man', just as we say 'God', not '*the* God'. In Greek this exception does not exist; and, to express such generalisations, the article *may* always be used before the singular noun, but often is not. Thus we find in Plato, *ἐπειδὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας* = 'since man partook of a divine element'; and again *ἄνθρωπος θειότατον ἡμερώτατόν τε ζῶον γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ* = 'man is naturally the divinest and gentlest of animals'.

Obs. 3. **The Article with Plural Nouns.** With plural nouns the Greek article, when not referring to an *individualising* specification, has a decided power of expressing the *sum total* of the entities indicated by the substantive. Thus *οἱ ἄνθρωποι* = 'men' universally, whereas *ἄνθρωποι* = 'some men'. The English article has this power only with adjectives, as 'the rich' = *οἱ πλούσιοι*. Hence the use of the Greek article with nouns of multitude, as in English, *ὁ δῆμος* = 'the people'.

Obs. 4. **The Article with Proper Names.** Proper names, as denoting individuals, do not require the article, not even with the demonstrative (§. 7, a.) as *Οὑτοσὶ Ἀπατούριος* = 'this Apaturios here'. Accordingly, it should not be prefixed to them, except when the bearer of a particular name is to be distinguished from all his namesakes, either as being in himself pre-eminent, or as having been previously mentioned. Thus *ὁ Σωκράτης* is admissible, either as referring to the famous sage, as we say '*the* Chisholm', to distinguish the head of the clan; or as denoting some particular Socrates already spoken of.* Sometimes however proper names are accom-

* The force of the article with proper names may be illustrated by the German usage, according to which the definite article is prefixed to the names of inferiors, whose position in the household is well known, as Der Johann ſoll das Pferd bringen = 'John is to bring the horse'; but in German the article alludes to the understood specification *who is our coachman*.

panied by the article without any particular emphasis, which is only one example of the law by which lingual usages extend, in the course of time, beyond the cases to which they are logically appropriate. The summing-up power of the Greek article (Obs. 3) holds with proper names also as *οἱ Ἕλληνες* in opposition to *οἱ βάρβαροι*.

Obs. 5. **The Article with Quasi-Proper Names.** There are many nouns, such as names of striking natural objects, of occupations, arts, and sciences, of virtues and vices, of near relatives, and of familiar places, the ideas expressed by which are either peculiar to one object, as the sun, or capable of being personified, and so regarded as one agent, as in the case of the virtues and vices. All such nouns become for the nonce proper names, and, like them, *may* be used without the article, particularly when governed by a preposition, the prepositional construction being favourable to the omission of the article. Most of these usages are paralleled in English. Thus the English poet can sing of "ocean's roar", and of "sun, moon and stars" without the article; and we may ask a child, 'What does father say to this?' *father* being, in the child's language, not the name of a class, but the name of an individual, i. e. a proper name. So also we talk of a man being 'on 'Change', or 'at church', or 'in town', which are precisely parallel expressions to the Greek *ἐν ἄστει, ἐν ἀγορᾷ κ. τ. λ.*

Obs. 6. **Formulæ for the Noun and Article in Concord.** *a*) When the article and the noun are unaccompanied by any attributive, the article precedes the noun (§. 4*.), and may be separated from it only by a particle. *b*) When the article and noun are a specification in apposition, they may either precede or follow the principal substantive, as *Σωκράτης ὁ φιλόσοφος*, or *ὁ φιλόσοφος Σωκράτης*. But, in the case of rivers, the name and the designation are usually put together after the article, thus *ὁ Εὐφράτης ποταμός* = 'the river Euphrates'. *c*) When several substantives are connected by *καί*, the first only *need* have the article, unless each is to be made emphatic; as *οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ λοχαγοί* = 'the generals and captains'. (§. 8. Obs. 3.)

Obs. 7. **Modern Parallels.** *a*) The German definite article has, at the present day, the same three-fold use as the Greek: thus Der (article) Menſch, den (relative) ich befreundete, Der (demonstrative) hat's gethan = '*The* man, *whom* I befriended, *he* has done it'. *b*) The pronominal force of *hic* and *ille* survives in the definite articles of the Romanic languages; *le, la, les,* for example, in French, meaning *him, her, it, them,* as well as in other connexions *the.* *c*) The ancient three-fold use of *ὁ ἡ τό* has been preserved in Modern Greek: as an article proper, *passim;* then as a demonstrative, e. g. *Εἰς τὸν ὅστις θελήσῃ* = 'To *him* who shall be willing'; and as a relative, in antiquated expressions, borrowed from the Romaic or vulgar dialect, as *τὰ φέρνει ἡ ὥρα, ὁ χρόνος δὲν*

τὰ φέρνει* = '*What* an hour brings, a year may not'. Compare this with (Il. I, 125) τὰ μὲν πολίων ἐξεπράθομεν, τὰ δέδασται = '*What* we pillaged out of cities has been distributed'.

Obs. 8. **Greek Substitutes for the English Indefinite Article.** There is no indefinite article in Greek. Like the definite article, the English indefinite sometimes generalises, and sometimes individualises its substantive, but both indefinitely i. e. it defines neither the extent of the generalisation, nor the exact reference of the individualisation. Thus in the sentence '*A* woman can often do what *a* man cannot', the indefinite article generalises the substantives, and in Greek may be either translated by the definite article, or not translated at all. Again in 'Who told you this? A woman', the indefinite article individualises its substantive, and must be rendered in Greek by the enclitic τίς, as, Τίς σοὶ εἶπε τοῦτο; γυνή τις, '*a* woman' here meaning '*a certain* woman'.

§. 6. **Substantival Phrases formed by the Article in Concord.** The Greek article converts *a*) the infinitive into a noun, which is translated by the English gerund, as τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν = 'sinning'. Exactly so, in Italian, 'il peccare'. *b*) Also adjectives and participles, as οἱ πολλοί = 'the many', οἱ ὀλίγοι = 'the few' i. e. in political language, 'the mobocracy', and 'the oligarchy', οἱ ἔχοντες = 'the rich': and, whereas this usage is confined to the plural in English, it extends also to the singular in Greek, as ὁ πλούσιος = 'the rich man', ὁ βουλόμενος = 'whoever will'. Hence βασιλεύων ὁ Κῦρος = 'Cyrus, when he was king', the anarthrous participle retaining its verbal force; but Κῦρος ὁ βασιλεύων = Κῦρος ὁ βασιλεύς = 'Cyrus the king'. By the article with the *neuter* singular, *absolute* ideas are expressed, as τὸ καλόν = 'the beautiful', whereas τὰ καλά = 'beautiful things';** and, by an idiom peculiarly Greek, collective

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* Φέρνει is Romaic for φέρει: and δέν is the Romaic negative corresponding to οὐ; it is a truncation of οὐδέν used adverbially.

** In German, precisely as in Greek, adjectives and participles are taken substantively with the article, as Der Gute = 'the good man', Die Reiſenden = 'the travellers', Der Getödtete = 'the person killed', Das Gute = 'the good' absolutely, Das Geſchehene = 'what has happened'.

nouns are formed in the same way, especially from adjectives in *ικός*, as *τὸ ἐναντίον* = 'the enemy', *τὸ πολιτικόν* = 'the citizens', *τὸ ναυτικόν* = 'the naval force'. *c*) Adverbs, mostly in the plural, as *οἱ πάνυ* = 'the élite', *τὰ ἐνθάδε* = 'the affairs here'. *d*) Prepositional phrases, as *τὸ ἐπ' ἐμοί* = 'what is in my power', *οἱ περὶ Ἀλέξανδρον* = 'Alexander and his suite', *οἱ ἀμφὶ Πλάτωνα* = 'Plato and his school'; but sometimes, Plato alone, and sometimes his disciples alone. *e*) Whole sentences, as, *ἓν ἔτι λείπεται, τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς, ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι* = 'one thing still remains, viz. *to persuade you to let us go*'. (§. 54. Obs. 1.)

Obs. 1. **The Substantival Infinitive.** The infinitive with the article becomes a noun, only in so far as, by the declension of the article, it may represent any case: it still retains its regimen as a verb, as *τὸ ἐπιστολὴν γράφειν* = 'the writing a letter', and any quality or circumstance attributed to it must be expressed not adjectively, but adverbially. Without the article it may be used substantively in the nominative as *Οὐχ ἡδὺ πολλοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἔχειν* = 'It is not agreeable to have many enemies', and so in all phrases with the copula expressed or understood, where idiomatic English would require the impersonal form *it is* to be used: hence with all impersonals as *δεῖ λέγειν* = 'it is necessary to say': also in the accusative as *ἀναβάλλομαι ἀποκρίνεσθαι* = 'I delay answering'; for the infinitive really answers here to the question *what?* and is the logical object of *ἀναβάλλομαι*, though the true nature of this construction is commonly lost sight of in the general rule that one verb governs another in the infinitive. But the infinitive must have the article in order to represent the genitive or dative; and no infinitive without the article can represent a case dependent on a preposition. The only preposition ever used with the anarthrous infinitive is *ἀντί*, and that by Herodotus alone (I. 210. 8.) *ἀντὶ δὲ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων, ἄρχειν ἁπάντων* = 'instead of being ruled by others to rule over all'.

Obs. 2. **Substantival Phrases formed by the Article in Regimen.** The plural masculine of the article, with the genitive of a proper name, sometimes forms a new substantival notion, as *Οἱ Μένωνος* = 'Menon's people', or 'troops'; and far more frequently the *neuter* plural of the article with the genitive of a noun, whether proper or common, is used to describe comprehensively all that pertains to that noun, as *τὰ τῆς τύχης* = 'the dealings of fortune', *τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων* = 'the affairs', or 'interests of the Athenians':

also (Soph. Phil. 497) *τὰ τῶν διακόνων* = *οἱ διάκονοι*, for *ποιούμενοι* follows it in apposition.

Obs. 3. **Adverbial Expressions formed by the Article.** By its power of imparting a substantival character to words, the article has aided in the formation of a multitude of adverbial expressions. Such are:

τὸ πρῶτον = for the first time
τὸ δεύτερον = for the second time
τὸ τελευταῖον = lastly
τὸ ἀρχαῖον, *τὸ παλαιόν* = of old
τὸ ὅλον, *τὸ ξύμπαν* = on the whole
τὸ ἐπίπαν = in all
τὸ λοιπόν, *τὰ λοιπά* = for the future
τἄλλα = for the rest
τὰ πολλά = plerumque
τὸ πλέον, *τὰ πλείω* = for the more part
τὸ μέγιστον = for the greatest part
τὰ μάλιστα = in the highest degree
τὸ ἐμοῦ, *τὸ ἐπ' ἐμέ*, *τὸ ἐπ' ἐμοί* = for my part
τὸ καθ' ἑαυτόν = for his or one's own part
τὸ πρίν = of yore
τὸ πρὸ τούτου = in former times
τὸ νῦν or *τὰ νῦν* = now
τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε = from this time forth.

§. 7. **The Article with Pronouns.** *a*) When the demonstratives *οὗτος*, *ἐκεῖνος*, *ὅδε*, are accompanied by nouns, these nouns take the article in Attic prose; but they are frequently found without it in the poets, particularly after *ὅδε*. The article sustains the demonstrative force of the adjective pronoun, but *belongs to the noun*, for the order is *ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος* or *οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, the article being prefixed to the noun, and the demonstrative either preceding or following both. When however an adjective or adjectival expression accompanies the noun and article, the adjective or adjectival expression is commonly included between the article and the demonstrative, the noun coming last, as *ἡ στενὴ αὕτη ὁδός* = 'this narrow way': but the article and demonstrative may keep their normal position too, as *αὕτη ἡ στενὴ ὁδός*, or *ἡ στενὴ ὁδὸς αὕτη*, the adjective and the noun being regarded as making one complex notion. *b*) The article frequently accompanies the possessive pronouns, as in Italian, an idiom introduced for the sake of emphasis, but which ultimately became a mere usage. Thus *τὸ σὸν μένος* = 'la tua ira', as if *illa tua ira* =

'that wrath of thine'. The formula ὁ πατὴρ ὁ σός is also used (§. 26.); and in both this and the preceding example it may be noticed, from the collocation of the words, that the article belongs to the possessive pronoun rather than to the noun. *c*) The article also accompanies the interrogative adjective pronouns, when the question regards something, which has been already mentioned, as τὰ ποῖα = 'what'? i. e. 'of what sort are the things you have just mentioned', as we say '*the* what'? in requesting the repetition of a word which we have not distinctly heard, or in reprobating something which has just been said by another. Here also the article belongs to the pronoun, and immediately precedes it. *d*) Prefixed to τοιοῦτος, τοιόσδε, τοσοῦτος, τηλικοῦτος, τηλικόσδε, the article mingles the demonstrative with the qualitative or quantitative meaning of these words. *e*) Etymologically αὐτός = αὖ τός = 'again he'. Homer uses it in the sense of both *ipse* and *idem* without the article: but in Attic Greek, these two senses are distinguished by the collocation of the article with it, thus: ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος = 'the *same* man', but αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος = 'the man *himself*'. *f*) Πᾶς and its compounds with the article denote a sum total (all, whole); without it, their force is distributive (every, each). Thus ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν = 'every day', but ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ἡμέραν = 'the whole day': πάντα δέκα = 'ten of each', but τὰ πάντα δέκα = 'ten in all'. In the plural however, even when the sum total is meant, the article is often omitted. The usual formulae of collocation are πᾶσα ἡ πόλις, and ἡ πόλις πᾶσα; but πᾶς, and still more frequently ὅλος, take also the ordinary collocation of the attributive adjective, as ἡ πᾶσα Σικελία. So also ἄλλος, ἡ ἄλλη χώρα meaning 'the rest of the country', whereas ἄλλη χώρα = 'another country'. *g*) The article intensifies the distributive force of ἑκάτερος and ἕκαστος, the latter of which however is often found without it. *h*) It is also usually joined with ἄμφω and ἀμφότεροι.

Obs. 1. **Demonstrative Pronouns without the Article.** The demonstrative pronouns, when used substantively, or in apposition to a substantive following, do not take the article, and the exactness of translation sometimes depends on a perception of the difference. Thus *τούτῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ χρῶνται* = 'they have this teacher', where the demonstrative, being joined attributively to the noun, is accompanied by the article; but *τούτῳ διδασκάλῳ χρῶνται* = 'they have this man *as* a teacher', where the demonstrative stands substantively in apposition to the noun, and therefore wants the article. So *ταύτῃ ἀπολογίᾳ χρῆται* = 'he uses this *as* an excuse', the demonstrative being attracted into the gender of the substantive with which it stands in apposition, although, from its expressing a general notion, we might have expected it to be in the neuter (§. 54, b.).

Obs. 2. *Ὁ ἡ τό* **Englished by Possessive Pronouns.** The Greek article supplies the place of the English possessive pronoun, wherever, from the nature of the statement, or from the context, the possessive reference is already obvious. Thus *οἱ γονεῖς στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα* = 'parents love *their* children', *ὁ βασιλεὺς σὺν τῷ στρατεύματι* = 'the king with *his* army'. Had the children not been the parents' own, or the army not the king's own, then a possessive pronoun, or some other phrase must have been used to indicate whose they were. The French idiom agrees with the Greek to a considerable extent, particularly in respect to parts of the body, as: 'I gave him *my* hand' = 'je lui donnai *la* main': *ἄλγῶ τὴν κεφαλήν* = 'j'ai mal à *la* tête'.

Obs. 3. **Distributive force of the Article.** The Greek article has itself a distributive force, like the definite article in German and Italian, and sometimes in English; but the English idiom generally prefers the indefinite article. Thus *δὶς τοῦ μηνός* = zweimal den Monat = 'due volte *il* mese' = 'twice *a* month'.

§. 8. **The Article with Attributives.** *a*) The commonest formula is strictly attributive, and corresponds to the English, *ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ* = 'the good man'. * Agreeably to this formula, whatever words intervene between the article and its noun are to be held as attributive; and, in this way, adverbs and prepositional clauses are converted by the article into adjectival phrases, as: *ὁ τότε βασιλεύς* = 'the *then* king', which

* Without the article the adjective, whether before or after the substantive, is strictly attributive, as *μέγας φόβος*, or *φόβος μέγας* = 'great fear'; but the adjective is more emphatic when placed first.

we also can say; but in Greek *any* adverb or adverbial expression, of time or place, may be so treated, as: ἡ ἥδη χάρις = 'the *present* favour'; ὁ μεταξὺ τόπος = 'the *intermediate* place'; ἡ πρὸς Ἀθήνας ὁδός = 'the way to Athens'. *b*) Another and especially in Attic rarer formula emphasizes the adjective, ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός:* this is appositive, and here the article before the noun is often omitted, and we find ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός (§. 9.). This appositive formula is most frequent, when the subjoined specification consists of more than a single word, as (Thuc. II. 71. 3.) ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ προθυμίας τῆς ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς κινδύνοις γενομένης = 'on account of the valour and zeal displayed in those dangers'.

Obs. 1. **Formulæ for Substantives and Substantival Pronouns in Regimen.** *a*) The genitive of the noun is really attributive (§. 21.), and the formulæ for it with the article are the following, ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς οἰκία, the most common; ἡ οἰκία τοῦ πατρός, also common; ἡ οἰκία ἡ τοῦ πατρός, less common; and τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ οἰκία, used only when the genitive is emphatic. Between the article and the principal substantive a great many attributive genitives may stand, and thus several articles referring to these may succeed one other, as: ἡ τῶν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα πραττόντων ἀρετή = 'the virtue of those who manage the affairs of the state'. *b*) So also the genitive of a substantival pronoun represents an adjective pronoun in concord (§. 26.). The formulæ for personal pronouns are ὁ πατήρ μου and μοῦ ὁ πατήρ; for demonstratives used substantively and reflexives, ὁ ἑαυτοῦ πατήρ, ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ἑαυτοῦ, and ὁ πατὴρ ἑαυτοῦ.

Obs. 2. **The Article as Substitute for a Recurring Noun.** In a sentence, when different compound notions are formed by attaching different attributives to the same substantive, that substantive requires to be only once mentioned, the article representing it elsewhere, as: Πολὺ κρείττων ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ὁ τοῦ σώματος ἔρως = 'The love of the soul is much superior to *that* of the body'. Here the demonstrative power of the article clearly appears. (§. 3.)

Obs. 3. **Repetition of the Article.** Two specifications may be attached to one substantive, either together under one article, as:

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* The German has also this appositive formula, but only in poetry, as An's Vaterland, an's theure ſchließ dich an = 'Cling to thy dear fatherland'.

Μέμνησθε τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι πρὸς τὸν Πέρσην ναυμαχίας; or separately with an article to each, as: *Μέμνησθε τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τῆς πρὸς τὸν Πέρσην ναυμαχίας* = 'Remember the naval engagement at Salamis against the Persians'. Of course the latter formula is to be preferred, when the two specifications are of coordinate importance, and it is wished to represent them as such. (§. 5. Obs. 6, c.) The pronoun *ἄλλοι* is almost always made a separate specification, as: *οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ παρόντες τῶν στρατιωτῶν* = 'the rest of the soldiers, viz. those who are present'. Rarely, yet sometimes, one of the specifications follows the principal noun, without the article being repeated with it, as (Thuc. I. 18. 1.): *μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος* = 'after the destruction of the tyrants out of Greece'.

§. 9. **The Article as distinguishing Subject from Predicate.** Generally the subject in a sentence has the article, and the predicate not. Thus, *βασιλεὺς ἐγένετο τὸ πτωχάριον* = 'the wretched beggar became a king', not *vice versâ*: so (John I. 1.) *Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*, where *ὁ λόγος* is the subject, and *Θεός* the predicate. Hence *ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἀνήρ* or *ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός* (mark the difference between these and the formulae in §. 8.) are complete sentences, the copula *ἐστί* being understood, and signify 'the man *is* good'. Both subject and predicate *may* be without the article, according to primitive usage, as: *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος* = 'man is the standard of all things'; or both *may* have it, as: *τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας* = 'thou confoundest the wise with the simple'. In this latter case, and sometimes also in the former, the object is to represent the convertibility of the terms of the proposition. When the predicate has the article, and the subject not, the article is often not properly such, but a strong demonstrative, as (Herod. I. 68. 15.): *συνεβάλλετο τὸν Ὀρέστην.... τοῦτον εἶναι* = 'he concluded this to be *the* (i. e. that long-sought for) Orestes'. When the subject is a demonstrative pronoun (§. 7. Obs. 1.), as in this example, or a personal one, it seldom has the article, but the predicate often.

Obs. 1. **Anarthrous Subject.** Of course, if the subject is

definite in itself, as proper names, (§. 5. Obs. 4, 5.) the article need not, and, if intended to be indefinite, may not accompany it.

Obs. 2. **Kinds of the Predicative Formula.** The student must beware of confounding the predicative (§. 9.) with the attributive (§. 8.) formulæ. Thus, not only in *οἱ λόγοι ψευδεῖς εἰσι*, but also in *οἱ λόγοι ψευδεῖς ἐλέχθησαν*, and *ὁ μάντις τοὺς λόγους ψευδεῖς λέγει*, the adjective *ψευδεῖς* is predicative, and must be regarded as making up one notion with the verb. By pausing after the noun, and pronouncing the adjective and verb in one breath, it is easy to enter into the Greek idiom. These are the examples given by Donaldson (Greek Grammar §. 404.) of what he calls *primary*, *secondary*, and *tertiary* predicates respectively, the *primary* being those in which the adjective occurs in the nominative with the copula; the *secondary* those in which it occurs in the nominative with passive verbs; and the *tertiary* those in which it occurs in the accusative with a transitive verb.

Obs. 3. **The Predicative Formulæ in Oblique Cases.** *a*) Here the adjective, except when, as in Donaldson's *tertiary* predicate, it makes up one notion with a transitive verb, acquires a participial force, and indicates the ground or reason. Thus *ἥδομαι ἐπὶ πλουσίοις τοῖς πολίταις* = 'I rejoice over the citizens *when*' or '*in that* they are wealthy' (as if *πλουσίοις οὖσι*), whereas *ἥδομαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πλουσίοις πολίταις* = 'I rejoice over the rich citizens'. The latter, which is the attributive formula, denotes a particular class of citizens, consequently a *permanent* distinction: the former, which is the predicative formula, denotes a particular condition of the citizens in general, consequently a *temporary* distinction; and just because a *temporary* distinction may not be taken for granted, but must be affirmed, the predicative formula is used. Similarly (Thuc. I. 49. 5.) *Οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι.....ἐνέπρησάν τε τὰς σκηνὰς ἐρήμους κ.τ.λ.* = 'For the Corcyreans both set on fire the tents *which were* deserted &c.' (as if *ἐρήμους οὔσας*). Had a *permanent* or *essential* quality been mentioned, an attributive formula must have been used. *b*) Here belong also those descriptive clauses in which some feature or circumstance is assumed as belonging to the person, and a quality is predicated of it, as: *ἔχει τὸ στόμα μέγα* = 'he has a big mouth'. Here *μέγα* really belongs to *ἔχει*, and *ἔχει μέγα τὸ στόμα* would mean the same thing; i. e. either of the predicative formulæ may be used. So also *ἔχει τὸν ὀξὺν πέλεκυν* = 'he has the sharp axe' (distinction of axes); but *ἔχει ὀξὺν τὸν πέλεκυν* = 'he has his axe sharp' (distinction of conditions in the same axe). These are all instances of Donaldson's *tertiary* predicates. In such descriptions the English idiom requires the possessive pronoun (§. 7. Obs. 2.), or the indefinite article to be used; but the Italian agrees with the Greek, as: 'egli ha *la* vista acuta' = 'he has *a* quick eye'.

Obs. 4. **The Predicative Formulæ with Participles.** Because

the participle implies the copula in the participial form, whereas in ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός it is understood under the form ἐστί, the predicative formulæ with participles, e. g. ὁ ἀνὴρ παρών or παρὼν ὁ ἀνήρ, do not make a complete sentence, unless indeed the participle have become in any case a mere adjective, as happens so often in English. In oblique cases the force of the participle coincides with that of the adjective in the predicative formulæ (Obs. 3, a.).

Obs. 5. **The Superlative Absolute, when Anarthrous.** As in English, so in Greek, the article does not accompany the superlative of eminence; but neither does it accompany the superlative absolute in Greek, when that superlative is either the predicate or part of the predicate, which is contrary to the English idiom. Thus ἀνδρὶ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ ἐργασία κρατίστη ἐστὶ γεωργία = 'agriculture is the best employment for a gentleman'. So (Thuc. I. 1.) *Κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο* = 'for this was indeed the greatest movement to (among) the Greeks'; where αὕτη stands substantively (§. 7. Obs. 1.) as the subject, and κίνησις μεγίστη is the predicate.

Obs. 6. **Idiomatic Use of the Predicative Formulæ.** The predicative formulæ are also used with certain adjectives denoting position, when *one part of a thing* is to be distinguished from *another part of the same*. Thus ἔσχατον τὸ ὄρος = 'the *utmost part* of the mountain'; ἡ ἀγορὰ μέση = 'the *middle part* of the marketplace'; ἄκροις τοῖς ποσίν = 'on tiptoe'; παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν χύτραν ἄκραν = 'along the very edge of the pot'. In the attributive formulæ the adjective would distinguish, not the part from the whole, but one whole from another, as ἡ μέση ἀγορά = 'the middle marketplace', in opposition to another that might be situated at the end of the town. In Latin this distinction cannot be made by means of the adjective alone, so that *forum medium* answers to both senses. It will be observed that in such phrases the English idiom requires the Greek adjective to be translated by a noun.

SUBSTANTIVES.

The noun or substantive denotes an entity, real or ideal.

§. 10. **Number of the Substantive.** The dual, which existed in the Sanscrit and Gothic, and in the personal pronouns of the Anglo-Saxon, as well as in Greek, and survives in the Lithuanian and Icelandic dialects, is nothing but an older form of the plural. The dual

and plural of *οὖ*, *οἵ*, *ἕ*, differ from each other not more than equivalent forms often do in kindred dialects; and it is remarkable that, whereas the *plurals* of *ἐγώ* and *σύ* contain no trace of *nos* and *vos*, these Latin forms are very discernible in the Greek duals *νώ* and *σφώ*. The original plural was probably of a dual nature, denoting *I and you*, or more generally *the me and the not-me.** (§. 55. Obs. 2.) In Greek the dual denotes properly two making a pair, as the hands, but may denote any number of individuals, provided their division into two, or twos, be implied. The same remarks apply to the dual of verbs.

Obs. 1. **The Collective Noun, when construed as Singular, when as Plural.** A collective noun, when the individuals forming the whole are contemplated and not the whole formed by the individuals, is plural in sense, though singular in form, and is construed as a plural. So in English we say: 'The multitude *is* great' i. e. 'the whole formed by the individuals'; but, 'The multitude *are* ignorant' i. e. 'the individuals forming the whole'.

Obs. 2. **Plural for Singular.** In poetry the plural is sometimes used, for the sake of dignity, of single persons, just as *we* constantly use the 2d pers. plur. in addressing a single person. Thus (Eur. Hec. 403.) *τοκεῦσιν* for *μητρί*. For still greater dignity the masculine gender is used, even when the single person indicated by the plural is a female. Neuters plural are also applied to single persons in poetry as (Soph. Phil. 434.) *Πάτροκλος ὃς σοῦ πατρὸς ἦν τἀ φίλτατα* = 'Patroclus who was *the darling* of thy father'. But in prose the plural is used for the singular, only when a writer speaks of himself as author.

Obs. 3. **The Plural of Abstract, Proper, and Material Nouns.** The plural of these nouns denotes *instances* or *kinds* of the person or thing in question, as we say 'Shakespeares' i. e. 'poets like Shakespeare'; 'kindnesses' i. e. 'instances or acts of kindness'; and 'wines' i. e. 'kinds of wine'. But the Greek usage in this respect was more extensive and bolder than the English, particularly in Homer: as *ἱπποσύνης ἐκέκαστο* = 'he was distinguished for horsemanship', as if 'for feats of horsemanship'; *ἀφραδίῃσι νόοιο* = 'in senselessness of mind', as if 'repeated acts of senselessness';

* For an ingenious hypothesis as to how certain antiquated forms came to be restricted to the dual sense, see the article entitled 'Dual Number' in the Penny Cyclopædia.

αἵματα = 'deeds of blood'; *ἀνδρίαι* = 'deeds of valour'; *εὖνοιαι* = 'marks of favour'; *μανίαι* = 'fits of madness'. The plural of material nouns sometimes denotes a great quantity, as *πυροί*, *κριθαί* = 'wheat, barley in masses'.

Obs. 4. **Number of the Descriptive Accusative.** When several *persons* are characterised with reference to one particular, as a faculty of the mind, or part of the body, Greek usage hesitates between the singular and plural for the particular in question: but usage rather favours the plural. Thus you may say either *κακοὶ τὴν ψυχήν* or *κακοὶ τὰς ψυχάς* = 'bad at the heart' or 'bad in their hearts'; the English idiom preferring the singular with the article, and the plural with the possessive pronoun. The same holds good of *things* so characterised (§. 17, c.).

§. 11. **Cases of the Substantive.** The case-endings denote *relations* of the entity expressed by the substantive. Neither the vocative, nor the nominative denotes any relation, and they are therefore not properly cases. The relations of *place*, as being the simplest and most obvious, were probably the first observed, and the first expressed; and to the principal of these the three Greek cases, in most of their applications, correspond, the Genitive denoting '*from* what place', the Accusative '*to* what place', and the Dative '*at* what place'. Accordingly these cases are capable of expressing the relations of place, without the aid of prepositions. Thus the genitive and accusative may accompany any verb of motion to indicate, the former *whence*, and the latter *whither* the motion proceeds; and the dative may accompany any verb whatever to indicate *where* the operation goes on. That such is the primary force of the Greek case-endings clearly appears from the meaning of the prepositions which are construed with each case exclusively. Thus *ἐκ* and *ἀπό* bring out the *from* relation of the genitive, *εἰς* the *to* relation of the accusative, and *ἐν* the *at* relation of the dative; and it is important to remark that in prose, where greater precision is required than in poetry, the local *whence* is generally accompanied by a preposition, the local *whither* always, and the local *where* almost always. The finest illustration of the primary local force

of the Greek cases is furnished by the triple construction of παρά, the radical meaning of which is *beside:* thus παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως = '*from* beside the king'; παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα = '*to* beside the king'; παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ = '*at* beside the king'.

§. 12. **Development of the Original Case-Relations.** Since there are a great many local relations besides those of *from*, *to*, and *at;* and since the relations of place were transferred to those of time, cause, persons, and in fact all entities whatsoever, it is evident that the case-endings, on being consolidated into a determinate system, must have denoted a great variety of new, derived relations (§. 14. Obs. 2.), and that prepositions would be more than ever wanted to define them. Farther, duplicates or triplicates for the same derived relation are sometimes obtained by development from different primary ones, so that the same relation may be denoted by different case-endings, and different prepositions (§. 16. Obs. 1.). Thus ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ, ἐς ἀριστερήν and ἐπ' ἀριστερά are all good Greek for *on the left.* Our own language contains a similar variety of expression; for we can say that one object is situated *on* the left, *at* the left, or *to* the left of another. What the new relations are is often indicated by the prepositions peculiar to the several cases, or by their change of signification according to the case which follows them: for prepositions were attached to the several cases, not arbitrarily, but because of a correspondence between the relations expressed by them, and the relations expressed by the case-endings respectively. It is proposed then to seek for the manifold force of the case-endings, which a multitude of causes have mutilated as to both form and emphasis, in the manifold force of the prepositions affecting them respectively.

Obs. **The Cases in Sanscrit.** Another aid in this investigation is derived from the cases of the substantive in Sanscrit, the mother-tongue of the Indo-European languages. According to Orientalists they are eight viz. Nominative, Accusative, Instrumental, Dative,

Ablative, Genitive, Locative, and Vocative. It would appear that language did not commence with a determinate number of cases, but that significant particles were appended to nouns for the purpose of denoting relations, just as they occurred and solicited expression, and that these were gradually consolidated into a case-system, more or less extended in different dialects. The Sanscrit case-system is valuable as shewing that several relations, which once had distinct lingual forms, came to be comprehended under one in both Greek and Latin. The grammarian is thus warned to seek the rationale of case-usage, not always in the development of one radical relation, known to be involved in a case-ending, or clearly expressed by a characteristic preposition, but sometimes also in the coalescing of kindred forms originally expressive of distinct relations. How far, and in what combinations the Sanscrit cases have coalesced in the Greek and Latin respectively, is shewn by the following table: *

Greek	Latin
Nominative	Nominative
Genitive, Ablative	Genitive
Dative, Instrumental, Locative	Dative
Accusative	Accusative
Vocative	Vocative
	Ablative, Instrumental, Locative.

§. 13. **Genitive and Ablative.** According to the above table, the Greek *genitive* is also *ablative*. In the absence of all trace of a separate *ablative* form having ever existed in Greek, this coincidence is sufficiently accounted for by the fact that the *of* and *from* relations are in their own nature intimately connected. Thus the *from* relation, assumed as the radical one, naturally divides itself into a *from of connection*, and a *from of separation*: for, when one thing proceeds *from* another, that other — the origin or source *whence* — may be regarded either as having possessed it, or as now deprived of it; and the former view implying *connection with*, gives rise to the *possessive* genitive (of, or belonging to), as 'the son *of*' i. e. '*from* a father'; while the latter, implying

* In this table the case-names are used, not in their conventional sense, which varies with every language, according to the development of the case-system in each; but in their strict etymological sense.

separation from, gives rise to the *privative* or *ablative* genitive.* It is important to observe that the *from of separation* appears chiefly in *accidental* or *temporary* processions, as when a tile falls *from* a house-top; whereas the *from of connection* obtains in all the great processions of nature, as, the rain falling *from* heaven, the wind blowing *from* the north, the stream flowing *from* the lake, the fruits growing *from* the earth &c. In all these cases the *from* of observed procession implies, and is indeed the only evidence for the *of* of origin; so that the rain, which falls *from* heaven, is also, and for that reason, the rain *of* heaven &c. Accordingly, in some languages, the *of* and *from* relations are confounded in one word, as in the French *de*, and the German von. Neither in Greek are they distinguished by separate prepositions any more than by separate cases; ἐκ and ἀπό, which are the proper expletives of the genitive case-ending, answering sometimes to the one, and sometimes to the other. Thus (1. John 2. 19.) ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐξῆλθον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν = 'they went out *from* us, but they were not *of* us'. Sometimes also in English, *of* = *from* even in a strictly genitival sense as γεννηθεὶς ἐκ Διός = 'born *of* Jupiter'.

§. 14. **Development of the Genitive.** The genitive has received various names, according to its various applications, as the *possessive*, e. g. ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι = 'to be his own master', the *material*, e. g. ἔκπωμα ξύλου = 'a drinking cup *of* wood', the *privative*, e. g. ἐλεύθερος φόβου = 'free *from* fear', the *partitive* (Obs. 1.), the *local* (Obs. 2.) and the *temporal* (Obs. 3.). Farther, procession or origin *from* is clearly akin to the *cause whence* (ἐκ), or *on account of which* (οὕνεκα, χάριν); hence the

* The student must familiarise himself with the derivation even of *opposite* relations from the same radical one; and he may illustrate to himself the process by the history of particular words. Thus συμφορά = 'a concurrence', hence either 'a disaster' or 'a success'. Similarly in Italian *fortuna*.

causal genitive (Obs. 4.), under which may be classed the genitive of the *agent*, interpreted by ἐκ, διά, παρά, πρός, ὑπό. The *from* of connection is also generalised into the genitive of *concern*, interpreted by περί, as: (Demosth. p. 19. 5.) τούτων οὐχὶ νῦν ὁρῶ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ λέγειν = 'I do not see the present to be an opportunity for speaking *of these things*' = *de his*. As this genitive is chiefly used with adjectives and verbs denoting mental affections (§. 60. *d.* §. 64. *d.*) it may be called the *metaphysical*. Finally there is the *comparative* genitive under various modifications, as the genitive of *superiority* or *inferiority* interpreted by πρό, ἀντί, the genitive of *equivalence* interpreted by ἀντί, and the genitive of *congruity* interpreted by πρός (Obs. 5.). Neither ἐκ nor ἀπό is ever found with these comparative genitives, and the radical meaning of πρό, ἀντί, πρός, which are found with them, would indicate that the *from* notion had here passed into that of *in front of*. These relations are naturally connected; for, when one object is *in front of* another, it is not supposed to be in contact with, but at some distance *from* that other object. Thus, in single combat, the parties move *from*, in order to take up positions *in front of* each other; and, for illustration's sake, the relations of comparison may be paralleled with those of combat, since they decide the same results viz. superiority, inferiority, or equality.

Obs. 1. **Partitive Genitive.** The case-ending of the partitive genitive answers exactly to the French *du*, *de la*, *des*, as ἐσθίει κρεῶν = 'il mange *de la* viande' = 'he eats (*some*) meat'. With substantive verbs this genitive is usually preceded by ἐκ or ἀπό, as ὁ θάνατος (ἐκ) τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν ἐστί = 'death is (one) of the greatest evils'.

Obs. 2. **Local Genitive.** The *where* of an object as well as the *whence* (§. 11.) is denoted by the local genitive. If an object move away *from* my right, its direction is given, and I know that it is now somewhere *on* my right. Accordingly δεξιᾶς, and similar adjectives, agreeing with χειρός expressed or understood, are so used with or without ἐκ. It may seem strange that a case-ending, which properly denotes *whence*, should have come to mean *where;*

but this is neither more nor less strange than that *where* in English should have come to mean *whither* (§. 76. Obs.). The fact is that, apart from the looseness of popular usage, position *where* may be indicated both by the direction *whence* = *from there to here*, and by the direction *whither* = *from here to there*. As in Latin *ab oriente* = *versus orientem* = 'in the east', so in Greek *πρὸς νότου* = *πρὸς νότον* = 'in the south'; and these two constructions are interchanged even in the same sentence (Herod. II. 121. 5, 6.). The transition of the *whence* into the *where* relation appears on a large scale in the use of the local adverbs with the *whence* suffix *θεν*, for the corresponding adverbs with the *where* suffix *θι*.* The numerous pronominal genitives in Greek, which became adverbs of *where*, as *οὗ*, *ποῦ* (§. 49.), shew that the power of expressing that local relation was early conceded to the genitive; and accordingly, not only such genitives as *δεξιᾶς*, in which the transition from *whence* to *where* can be traced, but words, defining place however exactly, even names of towns were so used: as (Od. XXI. 108.) *οὔτε Πύλου ἱερῆς, οὔτ' Ἄργεος, οὔτε Μυκήνης* = 'neither at sacred Pylus, nor at Argos, nor at Mycenae': this use of the genitive however is chiefly poetic. When the place is not a spot but a district, the genitive of *where* is better translated by *over* than *at*, as (Il. IV. 244.): *πολέος πεδίοιο θέουσαι* = 'running *over* a great plain': (Acts 19. 26.) *οὐ μόνον Ἐφέσου, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν πάσης τῆς Ἀσίας* = 'not only *at* Ephesus, but *over* almost all Asia'.

Obs. 3. **Temporal Genitive.** *a*) The relations of place are naturally transferred to time, as appears from the frequent interchange of *where* and *when* in English, and from the Latin *ubi* and the Greek *ὅπου* denoting both *where* and *when*. Accordingly the temporal genitive denotes the *whence* of time as (Herod. VI. 40.) *τρίτῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔτεϊ τούτων Σκύθας ἔφευγε* = 'for in the third year *from* this he (Miltiades) fled from before the Scythians', in which passage the years are counted backwards, so that '*from* this' = '*before* this'; but the years might be counted forwards, and then '*from* this' = '*after* this'. Also the *where* of time i. e. *when*, as: *τοῦ ἔαρος* = 'in the spring-time' (§. 18. Obs. 5. f.): and the *how long* of time, corresponding to the *over* of place, as *ποίου χρόνου*; = 'how long?' *οὐ μακροῦ* = 'not a long time'; (Plat. Symp. 172. c.) *πολλῶν ἐτῶν* = 'during many years' (§. 18. Obs. 5. g.). *b*) Traces of the genitival origin of expressions for time *when* are found in most

* The same thing is illustrated in Italian, whenever the prepositions *di* = 'of', and *da* = 'from' denote position *where*. as: '*di* là' or '*di* quà del ponte' = '*on* this' or '*on* that side of the bridge'; '*da* lungi' = '*at* a distance'; '*da* me' = '*at* my house'.

languages, as: *νυκτός* = *de nocte* = *di notte* = *de nuit* = nachts = 'by night'. So in English, '*of* late', '*of* old', and the vulgarism '*of* a night', which however is no modern innovation, but a genuine Low-German equivalent for the High-German expression 'eines Abends'. There are similar traces of the genitival *how long*, as in old English, '*of* a long time', and in German, seit langer Zeit = 'for a long time', where, though with a different case, yet time *how long* is expressed by *since* i. e. by the *from* relation. The *from* indeed suggests not only a *starting-point* in time, but *continuance* after it, as may be seen in the English phrases *from the first*, *from the beginning*, which do not express simple *time when*, like the Italian *da prima* = '*at* first', and the Greek *ἀρχῆς* = '*at* the beginning', but time extended indefinitely from a given origin. *c*) The genitive of time *whence* is generally accompanied by *ἐκ* or *ἀπό*; and of time *when* or *how long* by *ἐκ*, *ἀπό*, *διά*, or, with proper names, by *ἐπί*, as *ἐπὶ Κύρου* = 'in the time of Cyrus'.

Obs. 4. **Causal Genitive.** *a*) In English, *from* denotes only the *antecedent* cause, as: '*From* what I learn, we had better &c.' But in Greek, particularly in Attic with negative infinitival clauses, the genitive denotes also the *final* cause, or aim, and even the simple result. The natural connection between the aim, and the result appears from their coincidence in the Latin *ut*, and the Greek *ὅπως* = 'in order that' (aim), and 'so that' (result). Thus the antecedent cause, as *σὲ εὐδαιμονίζω τῶν λόγων τῆς δυνάμεως* = 'I congratulate you because of the power of your words': the final cause or aim, as (Il. XIII. 252.) *ἦε τεν ἀγγελίης μετ' ἔμ' ἦλυθες*; = 'or hast thou come to me for the sake of some announcement' i. e. 'to tell me something'? as if '*from* that as a spring of action'; (Mark. 4. 3.) *ἐξῆλθεν ὁ σπείρων τοῦ σπεῖραι* = 'the sower went out to sow': and the simple result, as (Rom. 7. 3.): *ἐλευθέρα ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν μοιχαλίδα* = 'she is free from the law, *so that she is not* an adulteress'. * — *b*) The genitive of the *agent* comes under the head of the *causal* genitive, because the agent is just the personal cause, or the cause personified, as: *μεθυσθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος* = 'intoxicated *by* nectar': (Soph. Phil. 3.) *κρατίστου πατρὸς Ἑλλήνων τραφείς* = 'reared *by* the mightiest sire among the Greeks'. Of the prepositions enumerated in §. 14. as accompanying the genitive of the agent, *ὑπό* is the one most commonly used.

Obs. 5. **Comparative Genitive.** *a*) The genitival origin of

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* In accordance with a Hebrew idiom, the genitive of the article with the infinitive is frequently used in the Septuagint and New Testament, where neither design nor result is decidedly expressed as (Acts XXVII. 1.): *Ὡς δὲ ἐκρίθη τοῦ ἀποπλεῖν ἡμᾶς* = 'And when it was thought good that we should sail'.

the comparative formulæ appears more or less in some modern languages, as: Ὁ οἶκος οὗτος καλλίων ἐκείνου ἐστί = 'this house is more beautiful *than* that' = 'questa casa è più bella *di* quella' in Italian. So in French, 'plus *de* cent livres' = 'more *than* a hundred pounds'. *b*) The genitive of equivalence is often called the genitive of price, as: πόσου τιμᾶται; = 'what is it worth?' πέντε δραχμῶν = 'five drachmæ'. Hence such phrases as ἐλάττονος ποιεῖσθαι 'to esteem less'. *c*) The genitive of congruity or propriety occurs in such constructions as: οὔκ ἐστιν ἀνδρὸς καλοῦ κἀγαθοῦ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν. Such phrases have been explained, in both Latin and Greek, by the supposition of a noun omitted; but the fact, that πρός was frequently prefixed to this genitive, shews the supplementary idea in the Greek mind to have been that of a mere relation viz. congruity, or likeness, as we ourselves may say, translating the above — 'to do such things is not *like* a gentleman — not what might be expected to come *from before* him', that being the radical force of πρός with the genitive.

§. 15. **Radical Force of the Dative.** The *at*, expletive of the radical force of the dative, implies *conjunction with*, not however in the sense of inherent connection, like the genitival *of*, but in the sense of accidental and temporary juxtaposition, so that it is opposed to the genitival *from* i. e. to the *from of separation* (§. 13.). The relations expressed by *whereat*, *wherein*, *wherewith*, *whereby* pass into one another, when transferred from external objects to metaphysical discourse: thus a man's attention can be engrossed *in* a thing, *with* a thing, or *by* a thing, and this interchangeability may have aided in the coalescing of the instrumental and locative cases with the dative in Greek (see Table §. 12. Obs.), supposing that in Greek, as in Sanscrit, there were once separate forms for these. The more numerous the original case-endings, the more nearly would some of them resemble others, and the more easily would such coalesce on euphonic grounds alone.* The Sanscrit locative in *i*,

* The influence of mere sound on the usage, and even the existence of cases appears very clearly in Romaic. The peritosyllabic form of nouns having become obsolete, nothing distinguished the dative from the accusative but the final *ν* of the latter. In mediæval Greek however that consonant ceased to be

for instance, might easily coalesce with the Sanscrit dative in *ai*.

§. 16. **Development of the Dative.** *At*, which implies juxtaposition, representing the radical force of the dative, that case is used to denote *a*) any circumstance whatever accompanying a transaction, and is then called the *circumstantial* dative. The circumstance, expressed by the dative, may be of any nature whatever: e. g. the circumstance of *difference* is put in the dative as: ὑποδεέστερος ὀλίγῳ = 'inferior by little'; ὅσῳ μεῖζον τοσούτῳ χαλεπώτερον = 'the greater the more difficult'; and therefore the rule which says that "the cause, manner, and instrument are put in the dative", includes only the principal uses of the circumstantial dative. To this dative the prepositions ἐν, ἐπί, σύν, ἅμα are occasionally prefixed (Obs. 1.). *b*) When the circumstance is one of place, then the dative is *locative*; but its power is restricted to denote the place *where*, as Ἀθήνησι = 'at Athens'. This dative is sometimes accompanied by ἀνά and μετά in poetry; and very generally in prose by one of the following ἐν, ἀμφί, περί, ἐπί, παρά, πρός, ὑπό. When locality is defined with relation

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pronounced, just as, even before the classical era, it had ceased to be either pronounced or written in the accusative of most perittosyllabic nouns (for *ν* is understood to have been the primitive termination of all accusatives singular in Greek); and just as the corresponding *m* dropped out of mediæval Latin, whence arose the all but universal termination of Italian adjectives in *o*. When the dative and accusative thus became undistinguishable by the ear in mediæval Greek, the dative, as the less indispensable case of the two, slipped out of use altogether. But the most curious result is that, although generally the dative so lost was resolved into εἰς with the accusative, the established habit of using a dative case sought satisfaction in the use of the genitive, particularly of pronouns, in a datival sense. Thus τοῦ εἶπα ταῦτα = 'I told *him* these things', is good Romaic. These pronominal genitives are universal in Romaic for the dative of general reference; and were not altogether unknown in the ancient language (§. 59. Obs. 4.).

to persons, the dative is best rendered by *among*, as *ἐν ἀνθρώποις* = 'among men'. *c*) The *where* of place becomes the *when* of time; and the dative is the proper case for a *point* of time. In the genitival expression of time *when* there is an element of duration, witnessing to the primitive *whence* relation — from there to here —, as *νυκτός* = 'by night': therefore in precise definitions of time *when*, the dative must be used, as *τῇ τρίτῃ ὥρᾳ* = '*at* the third hour', and even *τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ* = '*on* the third day'. Frequently in poetry, and generally in prose *ἐν* is prefixed to this dative; sometimes also *ἐπί* and *ἅμα*. *d*) *At where*, considered in relation to persons, and when the object is not to designate locality by means of them, naturally gives rise to what has been called the dative *of general reference* (Obs. 2.) as: *τί δέ μοι* = 'what is it *to* me?' i. e., in the most general sense, 'in relation to me'. What is related to me however may be either beneficial or injurious, and hence the dative of *advantage* or *disadvantage*. *e*) The dative proper, or *transmissive* dative is merely a particular case of the general reference, as *διδόναι τί τινι* = 'to give something *to* some one'. Between *to* and *at* there is a marked distinction in English usage, though in some cases they are equivalent, as in the phrases *at the left*, and *to the left:* but the transition from the one to the other is not so much as felt in those languages which express both by one preposition, as the German by zu, the French by *à*, the Latin by *ad*, and the later Greek by *εἰς*; and it must be remembered that kindred relations coalesce more readily in case-endings than in prepositions, the former belonging to the synthetic or pregnant, and the latter to the analytic or expanded state of a language, in which everything is sacrified to precision.

Obs. 1. **Instrumental Dative.** The instrumental dative affords several illustrations of the remark in §. 12. that the same relation may be denoted by different case-endings. Thus the material, *of* which anything is made, may be regarded as the instrument, and is accordingly sometimes found in the dative, just as in English we say

'a wall built *with* bricks', as well as 'a wall built *of* bricks'. So the price may be regarded as the instrument of purchase, as well as the equivalent of the thing purchased, and is then put in the dative. Again, the cause may be regarded as the instrument as *κάμνειν νόσῳ* = 'to labour under a disease'; and this construction is sometimes extended even to the personal cause, or agent, particularly when the agent is represented by a pronoun, as: *ταῦτα μοὶ λέλεκται* = 'these things have been said *by* me', as in French 'c'est bien dit *à* vous' = 'it is well said *by* you'. After verbals in *τέος* the agent is always in the dative (§. 72, d.).

Obs. 2. **Dative of General Reference.** *a*) The dative of general reference is common with personal pronouns, particularly those of the first and second persons, to denote the party principally concerned in any transaction, as (Soph. Aj. 1128.) *τῷδε δ' οἴχομαι* = 'but I am gone *so far as he is concerned*'; (Aristoph. Ran. 1134.) *ἐγὼ σιωπῶ τῷδε*; = 'shall I hold my tongue *to please this fellow?*' *ὦ τέκνον ἦ βέβηκεν ἡμῖν ὁ ξένος* = 'O child, has *our* guest departed?' *ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅτι ευήθης ἐστίν* = 'one must suppose, *in regard to such a one*, that he is silly'; *ἡ μήτηρ ἐᾷ σὲ ποιεῖν ὅ,τι ἂν βούλῃ, ἵν' αὐτῇ μακάριος ἦς* = 'your mother allows you to do whatever you please that you may be *her* happy son'.* In offers of meat and drink this dative is used to indicate politely the pleasure which the acceptance of the offer would give to the offerer as (Hom.) *ἀλλά μοι ἔσθιέμεν καὶ πινέμεν* = 'but do, *I pray you*, eat and drink'. *b*) Here belong the da-

* There being no English form which exactly represents this peculiar use of the Greek dative, it is often rendered, as in this example, by a possessive pronoun. It must be observed however that this rendering is merely a do- no- better, and does not accurately represent the Greek dative. Thus '*her* happy son' is tolerable merely because the party concerned happens to be the mother; but the Greek dative does not imply a relation so intimate as that of maternity or possession in any sense, and would be employed even were the parties no otherwise connected than by the one deriving enjoyment from witnessing the happiness of the other. The only English idiom which approaches the Greek is the use of 'for you', in the sense of 'you being judge', or 'I warrant you', which the Germans express, like the Greeks, by the simple dative, as Das war Ihnen ein Spaß = 'That was fun *for you*', Da gab es Euch ein Spektakel = 'There was a row *for you*'. The German use of the dative, to denote the party chiefly concerned, runs parallel with the Greek in nouns as well as in pronouns. See T. H. Weisse's admirable little German Grammar p. 54. Edinburgh, Thomas Constable & Co. 1855.

tives of participles expressing *will, pleasure, hope,* and the adjective *ἀσμένῳ,* with the substantive verbs *εἶναι, γίγνεσθαι,* denoting that something is an object of will, pleasure, or hope to the party named in the dative. Thus (Il. XIV, 108.) *ἐμοὶ δέκεν ἀσμένῳ εἴη* = 'to me it would be welcome'; (Thuc. II, 3, 2.) *τῷ γὰρ πλήθει τῶν Πλαταιῶν οὐ βουλομένῳ ἦν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφίστασθαι* = 'for the mass of the Platæans were not disposed to secede from the Athenians': hence *εἰ σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστί* = 'if you please'. The dative participles *συντεμόντι, συνελόντι,* with or without *εἰπεῖν* following, to denote 'in brief', probably belong here, as if 'for' or 'with reference to one cutting short, abridging'. So also the adverbs *ἑκοντί* = 'willingly', *ἀκοντί* = 'unwillingly'. *c*) This dative of general reference is also used with participles in defining the situation of an object, as when it is said that any object is situated *ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ ἐσπλέοντι* = 'to the left as you sail into (the harbour)', literally 'with reference *to* one sailing &c.'

§. 17. **Development of the Accusative.** *a*) *To where* is the primary local force of the accusative, as (Soph. Oed. Col. 643.): *τί δῆτα χρῄζεις; ἢ δόμους στείχειν ἐμούς;* = 'what dost thou wish then? to go *to* my palace?' (§ 11.). But the relation *whither*, developed into *from here to there*, gives the idea of extension; and hence the accusative is also used to denote *how far* in space, as *Ἔφεσος ἀπέχει ἀπὸ Σάρδεων τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν* = 'Ephesus is distant from Sardes three days' *journey*'; and, by analogy, *how long* in time,* and *how much* in quantity. It thus appears that the value of a thing may be put in any one of the three Greek cases; in the genitive, when regarded as a price given in exchange, in the dative when regarded as the instrument of purchase, and in the accusative when regarded simply as a quantity: thus *πόσας μνέας δύναται τὸ τάλαντον;* = 'how many minæ is the talent worth?' Place *where* and time *when* are sometimes denoted by the accusative, but with an element of extension in the one case, and of duration in the other, as (Soph. Oed. R. 1134.): *ἦμος, τὸν Κιθαιρῶνος τόπον* =

* With an ordinal number in a definition of time, the accusative denotes how long *ago*, as (Aeschin. III. 77.) *ἐβδόμην δ' ἡμέραν τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτῷ τετελευτηκυίας* = 'his daughter having died *seven days ago*'.

'when, *in* the region of Cithæron', i. e. 'wandering *over* it' as shepherds do: so in definitions of time *when*, with reference to a *space*, not a *point*, of time, as *παλαιὸν χρόνον* = 'anciently'. *b*) The *to where* force of the accusative marks it out as the *objective* case i. e. the case in which the *immediate* object of all transitive verbs must stand; for transitive verbs may have a remote or secondary, as well as an immediate object. Thus in *δὸς δύο δραχμὰς τῷ παιδί* = 'give two drachmæ to the lad', the thing to be given is in the accusative, and the dative denotes merely the personal *at where* of the giving, not therefore the proper object of the verb at all. *c*) The accusative is a frequent accompaniment of intransitive as well as transitive verbs, and of adjectives, not however to designate the *object* properly so called, but to describe the *scene* of the verbal operation or quality. This is called the *descriptive* accusative, and may be accounted for partly by the idea of extension which pervades the accusative, and partly by its adverbial character in the neuter (§. 18. Obs. 1. b.). Thus in *καλλιστεύει τὰ ὄμματα* = 'she has particularly beautiful eyes', the accusative describes the scene of the beauty's manifestation. This accusative may follow even transitive verbs in addition to the accusative of the object, as *μὲ ἔπληξε τὴν κεφαλήν* = *il me frappa la tête* = 'he struck me *on* the head'. (§. 10. Obs. 4.)

Obs. **Prepositions defining the Relations of the Accusative.** To the temporal accusative of *how long* the prepositions *διά*, *ἀνά*, *κατά*, *ὑπό* are frequently prefixed. In exact definitions of *how much* *παρά* often precedes the accusative: in approximative *εἰς*, *ἐπί*, *ἀμφί*, *περί*, *κατά*, *πρός* are used. The descriptive accusative is usually explained by *κατά* = 'as to'; and not only *κατά*, but *εἰς* and *πρός* also are actually found with it. Whenever it occurs however without a preposition, the student is not to suppose that one of these has slipped out; on the contrary, whenever they are expressed, he is to consider them as mere expletives of a relation already indicated by the accusative, and most frequently conveyed in classic Greek by the accusative alone. To this descriptive accusative explained by *κατά* may be referred such adverbial accusatives

as *τὴν ἀρχήν* = 'at first'; *τέλος* = 'finally'; *τὴν ταχίστην (ὁδόν)* = 'the quickest (way)' i. e. 'as soon as possible' (§. 49.).

§. 18. **The Genitive Absolute.** The genitive is pre-eminently the absolute case in Greek, i. e. the case for the absolute construction of a noun and participle in apposition. As this construction is employed to introduce some influential circumstance, the genitive was probably adopted because of its causal force, as (Thuc. VII. 13. 2.): *Τὰ δὲ πληρώματα διὰ τόδε ἐφθάρη . . . τῶν ναυτῶν τῶν μὲν διὰ φρυγανισμὸν . . . μακρὰν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυμένων* = 'The crews perished from the following cause . . . . *from the sailors being cut off* by the cavalry when at a distance for fire-wood', where it will be observed that the genitive absolute is expletive of *διὰ τόδε*, a truly causal phrase. But other circumstances may be expressed by the genitive absolute, as time, *ἐμοῦ ζῶντος* = 'in my lifetime', or a condition, *θεοῦ θέλοντος* = 'if God will'. To bring out the peculiar force of the case absolute various words are employed, as with participles in general (§. 47. Obs. 1.). Note particularly the use of *ὡς* with the genitive absolute for an indicative clause with *ὅτι* as (Xen. An. I. 3. 6.) *ὡς ἐμοῦ ἰόντος, ὅπη ἂν καὶ ὑμεῖς, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε* = 'be well assured *that I go*, wheresoever you do'. The genitive absolute so used always precedes the principal verb; and this use of it is most frequent before *εἰδέναι, ἐπίστασθαι, νοεῖν, ἔχειν γνώμην, διακεῖσθαι τὴν γνώμην, φροντίζειν*, more rarely before *λέγειν*.

Obs. 1. **Other Cases taken Absolutely.** *a*) The Greek dative, being the circumstantial case, is also sometimes used in the absolute construction as: *Κῦρος ἐξελαύνει συντεταγμένῳ τῷ στρατεύματι παντί* = 'Cyrus was marching *with his whole army drawn up in order*'; chiefly however in definitions of time, as: *περιϊόντι τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ* = 'with the returning year'; *τελευτῶντι τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ* = 'with the ending year', i. e. 'at the return', 'at the end of the year'. *b*) The accusative absolute is to be explained by the semi-adverbial character of that case in the neuter gender. Donaldson suggests that, *things* being naturally regarded not as subjects, but as objects, there is properly no nominative neuter at

all; and accordingly he explains the *Schema Atticum* (§. 56. Obs. 1.) *τὰ ζῶα τρέχει* by *curritur quoad animalia*. It is safer however to remark that, the nom. accus. and voc. neuter being always the same in form, the neuter gender is nearer the indeclinable state in Greek, than is the masculine or feminine. Accordingly most adverbs are formed from it, and from that form of it which is common to these three cases (§. 6. Obs. 3.). Now, when it is considered that the accusative absolute occurs only in the neuter gender, that the subject, when the participle has one, which is seldom, is of the most general kind, and that this construction occurs only in Herodotus, and the Attic writers, not at all in the more ancient, it seems allowable to regard it as an instance of that tendency to indeclinability, which is one feature of a language's transition from the synthetic to the analytic state — a transition which belongs to the destiny of all languages, but which the Greek was privileged to undergo with unexampled slowness. Examples are *ταῦτα δὲ γενόμενα* = 'these things having taken place', *κυρωθὲν δὲ οὐδέν* = 'nothing having been determined': *δόξαντα ταῦτα*, and also *δόξαν ταῦτα* = 'these things having been decreed': but they are most common in impersonal verbs, perfects passive, and the substantive verb, as: *ἐξόν* = 'it being lawful', *παρέχον* = 'there being an opportunity', *εἰρημένον* = 'it having been said', *αἰσχρὸν ὄν* = 'it being base'. *c*) Even the nominative is sometimes found in the absolute construction, as (Aristoph. Pax 934.) *ἵν', ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὥς χρὴ πολεμεῖν λέγων τις, οἱ καθήμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους λέγωσι κ.τ.λ.* = 'in order that, *if any one says* in the Assembly that we ought to go to war, the audience may say' &c. But this is probably nothing but colloquial irregularity invading written composition.

Obs. 2. **Peculiarities of the Case Absolute in Greek.** The Greek genitive absolute differs from the Latin ablative absolute in the following respects. *a*) The noun is sometimes omitted, but only when it can be easily supplied from the context, or when, if the participial were changed into the indicative construction, the subject would not, or at least need not be expressed (§. 56. Obs. 6.), as *οὕτως ἐχόντων* = 'such being the case', *προϊόντων* = 'as they advanced', *σαλπίζοντος* = 'the trumpeter trumpeting', *ὄντος* = 'it raining'. *b*) The participle of the substantive verb is hardly ever omitted, as in Latin it necessarily always is: hence *te puero* = *σοῦ παιδὸς ὄντος*. *c*) In consequence of the Greek verb possessing active participles of past time, the absolute construction is less frequently employed than in Latin: thus, 'Cyrus *Croeso victo* Lydos sibi subjecit' = *ὁ Κῦρος τὸν Κροῖσον νικήσας κατεστρέψατο τοὺς Λυδούς*. *d*) The noun in apposition with the genitive absolute may be also the subject of the principal sentence, as *ταῦτ' εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ἔδοξέ τι λέγειν τῷ Ἀστυάγει* = 'when he had so spoken, he seemed to Astyages to say something worth while'.

But this is rare, and not to be imitated. (Curtius' Greek Grammar §. 585.)

Obs. 3. **The Cases without an accompanying Participle used Absolutely.** That the construction of all the oblique cases, without any accompanying participle is often really absolute i. e. independent of any other word, may be seen at large in Obs. 5. The nominative too, sometimes stands isolated from the general syntax, merely to bring into prominence the main subject of discourse, as (Il. VI, 395.) *Ἀνδρομάχη, Θυγάτηρ μεγαλήτορος Ἠετίωνος, Ἠετίων ὃς ἔναιεν κ. τ. λ.* = 'Andromache, daughter of the great-hearted Eetion, *Eetion* who dwelt' &c. And the construction of the vocative, for which the nominative is often used, is, from the very nature of the case, absolute.

Obs. 4. **Summary of Case Development.** The following table represents at one view the development of the cases, with the prepositions most characteristic of their several applications. These prepositions do not always accompany the cases; and in regard to them, as in regard to the article (§. 5. Obs. 1.), it holds that, the later the author and the less poetic the style, the more frequently are they used. When no preposition stands opposite a case-development, it is because, *pro hâc vice*, no preposition is used with the case in classic Greek.

Genitive (whence):

Possessive	
Material	*ἐξ, ἀπό*
Privative	
Partitive (§. 14. Obs. 1.)	*ἐξ, ἀπό*
Local (§. 14. Obs. 2.)	*ἐξ, ἀπό, διά*
Temporal (§. 14. Obs. 3.)	*ἐξ, ἀπό, διά*
Causal (§. 14. Obs. 4.)	*ἐξ, ἀπό, διά, ὑπό*
Metaphysical	*περί*
Comparative	*πρό, ἀντί, πρός*

Dative (where):

Circumstantial (§. 16. Obs. 1.)	*ἐν, ἐπί, σύν*
Local	*ἐν, ἐπί, περί, παρά, πρός, ὑπό*
Temporal	*ἐν, ἐπί*
General reference (§. 16. Obs. 2.)	
Of advantage or disadvantage	
Transmissive	

Accusative (whither):

Local	*εἰς*
Temporal	*διά, ἀνά, κατά, ὑπό*
Quantitative	*παρά, εἰς, ἐπί, περί, κατά, πρός*
Objective	
Descriptive	*κατά, πρός, εἰς.*

Obs. 5. **Formulæ of Specification.** The results of this investigation, so far as regards the absolute or adverbial use of the cases are here subjoined for the practical guidance of the student:

a) *Place where*, by the dative with *ἐν*, sometimes without *ἐν*, particularly of the Attic demi: by the accusative with *κατά* in some phrases, as *κατ' οἴκους μένειν* = 'to remain in the house': by the genitive in the older poets (§. 14. Obs. 2.). The correspondent adverbial forms are old datives as *οἴκοι** = 'at home', *Μεγαροῖ* = 'at Megara', old genitives as *ἀλλαχοῦ* = 'elsewhere', and those with the suffix *θι*, as *αὐτόθι* = 'there'.

b) *Place whence*, by the genitive with *ἐκ* or *ἀπό* in prose, and in the older poets by the genitive alone. The correspondent adverbial forms take the suffix *θεν*, as *οἴκοθεν*, *Ἀθήνηθεν*.

c) *Place whither*, by the accusative with *εἰς*, *πρός*, *ἐπί* in prose, and in poetry by the accusative alone. The correspondent adverbs take the suffixes *σε*, *ζε*, *δε*, as *ἐκεῖσε*, *χαμάζε*, *πεδίονδε*.

d) *Place through* or *over*, by the genitive with *διά* in prose, and by the genitive alone in the older poets; by the accusative with *κατά*, as *κατὰ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν* = 'by or over sea and land'.

e) *Place how far*, by the accusative.

f) *Time when*, by the genitive for *general* specification, such as are the natural divisions of time, as *νυκτός* = 'in the night-time', *χειμῶνος* = 'in the winter-time': by the dative for *precise* specifications, as *μηνὸς ἕκτῃ φθίνοντος* = 'the 24th or 25th of the month', according as the month is hollow or full: ** by the accusative sometimes as *τρίτην ἤδη ἡμέραν* = 'the day before yesterday' i. e. 'three days ago' (§. 17. *): by the accusative with *περί*, *ἀμφί*, when the definition of time is merely approximative, as *περὶ δείλην* = 'about dusk', *ἀμφὶ μέσας πω νύκτας* = 'somewhere about midnight'.

g) *Time how long*, by the accusative, of an action which has lasted all the time as *πολὺν χρόνον ἐνήστευσα* = 'I have fasted a long while': by the genitive with or without *διά*, or by the dative with *ἐν* of an action which has or has not taken place at some time *within* a period, as *πολλοῦ γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐχ ἑώρακά πω χρόνου* = 'I have not seen them for a long time'.

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* The dative singular of *οἶκος* must have been written *οἴκοι* till about B. C. 450—400, when *ω* was introduced into the Attic alphabet. The *post*scription of final *ι* too is of course more ancient than its *sub*scription, which latter could not have arisen till final *ι* in the dative of parisyllabic nouns slipped out of the pronunciation.

** The use of the cardinal *μία* in the New Testament to denote the *first* day of the week (Mark. XVI. 2.) is a Hebraism.

h) *Quantity*, by the accusative, as appears in the *how much* of place and time: by the dative for the *how much* of difference, as ἐνιαυτῷ πρεσβύτερος = 'older by a year': by the genitive for the *how much* of price: by the adverbs ἅπαξ &c. and those ending in άκις, when *how much* = *how often*.

i) *In what respect*, by the accusative with or without εἰς, πρός, κατά, as δεινὸς μάχην = 'dreadful in battle': by the dative when not the scene but the *means* of a quality's manifestation are in question, as ἄμαχοι καὶ πλήθει καὶ πλούτῳ = 'unfit for war in respect of both men and money'.

j) *Cause*, by the dative alone; the final cause by the dative with ἐπί, as οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ = 'not with a view to the craft, but with a view to culture, you have learned to be an architect'; also by the accusative with πρός, and the genitive with χάριν, ἕνεκα; the impelling cause and the agent by the genitive with ὑπό, as ὑπὸ λύπης ὑβρίζειν = 'to be insolent from grief', κακῶς ἀκούειν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν = 'to be ill spoken of by the citizens.'

k) *Manner*, by the dative alone, or with ἐν, and by the accusative with κατά, as καθ' ἡσυχίαν = 'quietly'.

l) *Instrument*, by the dative alone or with ἐν, and by the genitive with διά.

§. 19. **Rhetorical Use of Substantives.** *a*) The part is often put for the whole, as ἀκτίς = 'ray' i. e. all the sun's rays, or the sun itself; στάχυς = 'ear of corn', for harvest: and, even in prose, πλίνθος = 'brick', for bricks in general, as we say 'a wall of brick'; ἡ ἀσπίς = ὁπλῖται; ἡ ἵππος = 'cavalry', as we say *the horse*; ὁ Πέρσης = 'the Persians', as we say 'the Frenchman', for the French in general. *b*) The whole is more rarely put for the part, as βοῦς = 'ox-hide'. *c*) The abstract is used for the concrete, as ὄλεθρος = 'destruction' for destroyer, as we say of a bad statesman, 'He is the *ruin* of the country'. *d*) The name of a thing stands for the place where it is carried on, manufactured, or sold, particularly the last, as ἄγων = 'game', for the circus where games were held; σίδηρος = 'iron', for the iron-mart. *e*) The name of a place is put for the persons occupying it, as θέατρον = 'theatre', for the spectators, or the name of a town for its inhabitants, just as we say 'telling the country' i. e. the inhabitants

of the country. *f*) The name of the producer for the produce, as *μέλισσα* = 'bee', for honey.

§. 20. **Substantives used Adjectively.** *a*) Many substantives convey an adjectival meaning, because the entities expressed by them are, or ought to be preeminent for certain *qualities*. Hence some of them are even compared, as *βασιλεύς* = 'king', *βασιλεύτερος* = 'more a king' i. e. 'more kingly'. The words *Ἕλλην* (masc. and fem.) and *Ἑλλάς* (fem.) are frequently used as adjectives, particularly the latter with *γλῶσσα*, or *φωνή*, as *τὴν Ἑλλάδα φωνὴν ἐξέμαθον* = 'I learned the Greek language'. *b*) In poetry the attribute of a person is often expressed by an abstract substantive, the name of the person being in the genitive, as *Ποσειδῶνος κράτος* = 'Neptune's might' i. e. 'mighty Neptune'.* Our own phrases, 'Your Majesty', 'Your Grace' &c. are founded on the same principle of sinking the real in the ideal; they belong however only to the style of etiquette, whereas the corresponding Greek idiom belongs to the style of poetry. *c*) By a still bolder figure, the noun may represent even a participle, as (Soph. Oed. Col. 1069.): *πᾶσα δὲ .... πώλων ἄμβασις* = 'all who are mounted on steeds', as if *πώλων ἄμβασις* = *πώλους ἀναβάντες*.

ADJECTIVES.

Adjectives denote some quality, or other circumstance, as belonging to an entity.

§. 21. **Adjective = Genitive of Noun.** The force of the adjective as such being the same as that of the

* Compare with this the following New Testament expressions, where also the *principal* substantive is in the genitive (1. Tim. VI. 17.) *ἐπὶ πλούτου ἀδηλότητι* = 'in deceitfulness of riches' i. e. 'in deceitful riches': (Rom. VI. 4.) *ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς* = 'in newness of life' i. e. 'in a new life'.

genitive, *in so far as the genitive is not ablative*, viz. *of* or *belonging to*, it follows that the adjective may often be interchanged with the genitive of a cognate noun. Thus ὁ *βασιλικὸς κῆπος* = ὁ *τοῦ βασιλέως κῆπος*, *ὁμόφρων εἰμί* = *τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης εἰμί*, *ξύλινον ἔκπωμα* = *ἔκπωμα ξύλου*, as in English, 'the royal garden' = 'the king's garden'; 'I am like-minded' = 'I am *of* the same opinion'; 'a wooden drinking-cup' = 'a drinking-cup *of* wood'. This interchange may take place with the genitives of possession or property, and of material; for, material being regarded as the *matrix* of the thing made, the material genitive is not *ablative*, but truly *genitive* in its nature. In the poetic style this interchangeability is carried very far in all languages; so in Homer, *ἐλεύθερον ἦμαρ* = 'free day' i. e. 'day of freedom'.

§. 22. **Greek Adjective = English Adverb.** Adjectives denoting *order* or *sequence*, as *πρότερος*, *πρῶτος*, *ὕστατος*, *τεταρταῖος*, *inclination* as *ἑκών*, *contentment with a thing* as *ἄσμενος*, *multitude* or *vehemence* as *ἄφθονος*, *μέγας*, *πολύς*, *ταχύς*, when in apposition to the subject, or, but more rarely, to the object, must be translated into English adverbially, as *τεταρταῖος ἀφίκετο* = 'he arrived *on the fourth day*'; *ἑκόντες ἁμαρτάνετε* = 'you *willingly* err'; *ἄσμενος ὑμᾶς εἶδον* = 'I saw you *with pleasure*'; *κρήνη ἄφθονος ῥέουσα* = 'a fountain flowing *abundantly*'. So also *ἄπρακτος ἀποχωρῶ* = 'I depart *without having accomplished anything*'.

Obs. 1. **Greek Personal Construction = English Impersonal.** To these may be added the adjectives *δῆλος*, *φανερός*, *δίκαιος*, *ἄξιος*, *ἐπίδοξος*, *δυνατός*, *ἀμήχανος*, *χαλεπός*, as: *δῆλός εἰμι τὴν πατρίδα εὖ ποιῶν* = 'I am *manifestly* benefitting my country'. But these cannot always be translated adverbially; and the English idiom, by which they may always be rendered is the impersonal *it is*, as: *δῆλός εἰμι τὴν πατρίδα εὖ ποιήσας* = '*It is manifest* that I have benefitted my country'; *ὁδὸς ἀμήχανος εἰσελθεῖν στρατεύματι* = 'a way (by which) *it is impossible* for an army to enter'. (§. 55 Obs. 1. d.)

Obs. 2. **Caution.** The adjective agreeing with the subject does not always give the same meaning as the adverb qualifying the

verb. Thus *μόνος ἔγραψα τὴν ἐπιστολήν* = 'I alone wrote the letter' i. e. 'I and no other', but *μόνον ἔγραψα τὴν ἐπιστολήν* = 'I only wrote the letter' i. e. 'I did nothing else'.

Obs. 3. **English Parallels.** The English word 'darkling' = 'in the dark', might illustrate the adverbial use of Greek adjectives, as *σκοταῖος ἦλθεν* = 'darkling he came', like "ibant obscuri" in Virgil; but *darkling* is called an adverb (Latham's Eng. Lang. §. 316.). Grammarians say that the English adjective ought never to be used adverbially; in point of fact however it often is, precisely as in Greek; thus 'how slow he walks' = *πόσον βραδὺς περιπατεῖ*; (§. 49. *)

§. 23. **Comparative Absolute.** Where no standard of comparison is mentioned, and we use *too* or *rather* with the positive, the Greeks employed *a*) the comparative absolutely, as: *ἐδόκεε ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἐλευθερωτέρη εἶναι* = 'the answer seemed to be *rather free*', or '*too free*'. In both the Greek and the English, reference is really made to a standard of comparison in the mind: thus *ἐλευθερωτέρη* = 'more free *than was fitting*', or 'too free, *as compared with the mental standard*', whatever it be. *b*) Sometimes again the Greeks contented themselves with the positive, where we also might, but more generally insert *too* or *rather* before the adjective, as: *ὀλίγοι ἐσμὲν ὥς ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι αὐτῶν* = 'we are (too) few to master them'; *τὸ ὕδωρ ψυχρόν ἐστι ὥστε λούσασθαι* = 'the water is (too) cold for bathing' (§. 60. Obs. 2—9.).

Obs. 1. **Comparative for Positive, and vice versâ.** In other cases the Greeks used the comparative, where our idiom requires the positive. This occurs with neuter comparatives, chiefly of *goodness* and *badness*, as *βέλτιον, χεῖρον, κάλλιον*, also *νεώτερον*, and chiefly with a negative, as (Plat. Phæd. 105. A.): *Πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμνήσκου· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν* = 'Once more remember; for it is not a *bad* thing to hear often'. * In the New Testament on the other hand *καλόν* is followed by *ἤ*, which necessitates our translation of it by the comparative, as (Mark. IX, 43) *κα-*

* It is one of Dr. Hodgson's many acute observations that *better* in the Scotch dialect is, in regard to health, equivalent to *well;* 'he is *better* now', said of one who has been ill, meaning not simply, as in English, that he is *better* now than he was some time ago, but that he is now *well.* The phrase 'He is *quite*

λόν σοι ἐστί .... ἤ κ. τ. λ. = 'it is better for thee .... than &c.' (§. 60. Obs. 3.)

Obs. 2. **Augmentatives of Comparative and Superlative.** The comparative is intensified by μᾶλλον, πολύ, πολλῷ; and the utmost force is given to the superlative by prefixing to it ὡς*, ὅτι (= quam in Latin) as: ὡς ἄριστος = 'the best possible'; ὅτι μάλιστα = 'the most possible'. A word denoting possibility is sometimes interposed, as ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα = 'the most I can'; ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστον = 'the very best possible'. The singular phrase ἐν τοῖς (§. 3. Obs. 2.) may also be regarded as an augmentative of the superlative: also εἷς ἀνήρ as τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους πλεῖστα εἷς ἀνὴρ δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν = 'able to be of more service to the contending parties than any other man'. (§. 28. Obs. 2.)

PRONOUNS.

Pronouns indicate allusively entities (personal pronouns), or descriptive matter (adjective pronouns).

§. 24. **Personal Pronouns.** *a*) The personal pronouns ἐγώ, σύ, αὐτός, as subjects of the verb, are generally omitted, when not emphatic. In hypothetical sentences with ἄν, σύ is sometimes understood indefinitely, as φαίης ἄν = 'you' i. e. 'any one would say'. *b*) The dissyllabic forms of the oblique cases of ἐγώ are always emphatic in prose, and generally in poetry; the monosyllabic forms are generally enclitic. In like manner, the oblique cases of σύ are emphatic when accented, unemphatic when enclitic. *c*) The pronouns of the first and second persons are used also reflexively, but without emphasis in this sense, as δοκῶ μοι οὐκ ἀπαράσκευος εἶναι = 'I seem *to myself* not unprepared'.

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better again = 'He is *quite well* again', puts this beyond a doubt.

* This use of ὡς is explicable only by the ellipsis of a verb, the substantive verb or δύναμαι, both of which are often expressed. The use of ὡς with adverbs even in the positive degree is to be similarly explained, as ὡς ἀληθῶς = 'really'; ὡς ἀτεχνῶς = 'straightway'; ὡς πάνυ, ὡς μάλα, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ = 'for the most part'.

For *αὐτός* reflexive see §. 25. In Epic and Ionic *οὗ* is both personal and reflexive; but in Attic only *οἷ* and *σφίσι* occur in the personal sense; sometimes also *σφεῖς*, but never in the first clause of a sentence.

Obs. *Αὐτός*. In apposition with other words the function of *αὐτός* (§. 7. e.) is to emphasize their force, as *τοῦτ' αὐτό* = 'this *very* thing'; *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν* = 'beauty *itself*': hence the reflexive forms *ἐμαυτοῦ*, *σεαυτοῦ*, *ἑαυτοῦ*, which are sometimes resolved into their elements *ἐμοῦ αὐτοῦ κ. τ. λ.* When however *αὐτός* precedes the personal pronoun, the compound is not reflexive, but merely emphatic, as *αὐτὸν μὲ ὕβρισε* = '*me* he insulted' i. e. 'me and no other'; and, as denoting the exclusion of others, *αὐτοί* is in some phrases equivalent to *μόνοι*, as *αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν* = 'we are (by) ourselves' i. e. 'alone'.* In *πέμπτος αὐτός* and the like, *αὐτός* usually distinguishes the most important of the number; and in that case the above phrase means, not simply 'he with four others', which it always must, but 'he with four subordinates'.**

§. 25. **Reflexive Pronouns.** *a*) The nominative of *οὗ* reflexive, supposed to have been *ἵ*, is supplied by *αὐτός*, as *αὐτὸς ἔρχομαι* = 'I myself come'. Homer indeed uses *αὐτός* as reflexive in regard to all the persons, and even in the oblique cases (Jelf. §. 656. 1.). *b*) Properly the reflexive pronoun refers to the subject of the verb in its own clause, but in dependent clauses it may refer to the subject of the verb in the principal one. *Ἔφη τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἑαυτοῦς ἀδικεῖν* is an example of the former; *Ἔφη τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν* of the latter: if *αὐτόν* were substituted for *ἑαυτόν*, the

* The Greek and English phrases here are exact parallels as to their principle of formation. If, literally taken, 'we are ourselves' be meaningless, 'we are by i. e. near ourselves' is equally so. In both cases the meaning is derived from the implied negative 'ourselves *and no other*'.

** Plato uses a singular expression *σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἓκ τρίτων* = 'you too are at one with us, you *out of three*', or '*yourself the third*' i. e. '*you and two others besides*'. Notice also *τρίτον ἡμιτάλαντον* = 'two talents and a half'. We have lost this idiomatic use of the ordinal number, for it existed in Anglo-Saxon; but the Germans have preserved it, as dritthalb Thaler = 'two thalers and a half'.

meaning *might* be the same, but the infinitival clause would then be framed from the Athenians' point of view, not from the speaker's. *Οὗ* is most frequently an indirect reflexive, i. e. refers not to the subject of its own, but to that of the principal clause. *c*) The plural of *ἐμαυτοῦ*, *σεαυτοῦ*, is formed by decomposing them into their elements, as *ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κ. τ. λ.* The plural of *ἑαυτοῦ* may be formed in the same may, *σφῶν αὐτῶν κ. τ. λ.* but it has also a regular plural *ἑαυτῶν κ. τ. λ.* as if *ἕ* were alike applicable to both numbers. This seems indeed to have been the case, for (Il. I. 236.) we read *περὶ γάρ ῥα ἕ* = 'for round *it* (the sceptre)', and also (Hymn to Venus v. 267.) *τεμένη δέ ἑ κικλήσκουσιν* = 'but *these* they call temples'. Farther, *ἑαυτοῦ*, particularly in the plural, is used for the reflexive of the first and second persons, as well as of the third, as if originally *οὗ* had had a *general* reflexive power, the precise *personal* reference of which was to be gathered from the context. The great resemblance between the duals of *σύ* and *οὗ* countenances this supposition; and *σφίσιν* is actually used for *ὑμῖν* by Homer (Il. X. 398.), *σφέας* for *ὑμᾶς* by Herodotus (III. 71. 24.). The form *εἷο* = *οὗ* is also found for *ἐμοῦ* (Apoll. Rhod. II. 635.). (§. 26. Obs. 1.) *d*) The plural of the reflexive pronouns is sometimes used for the reciprocal *ἀλλήλων*, precisely as the French reflexive in 'ils *se* donnent la main' = 'they shake hands', literally, 'they give *to themselves* i. e. *to one another* the hand'. Even *ἡμᾶς* is so used, as (Dem. 30. 7.) *ἐπράξαμεν ἡμεῖς κἀκεῖνος πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἰρήνην* = 'we and he made peace with *one another*'. (§. 31. Obs. 3.)

§. 26. **Possessive Pronouns.** The dual possessives *νωΐτερος*, *σφωΐτερος* are found only in the Ionic dialect; and *ὅς* = 'his' is not used in Attic but by the poets, and that rarely, the genitive of *αὐτός* being used in its stead. In like manner the genitives of all the personal pronouns, in the possessive sense, are much more com-

mon than the possessive pronouns themselves, except ἡμέτερος and ὑμέτερος, which are not so often replaced by ἡμῶν and ὑμῶν. Thus σοῦ ὁ υἱός or ὁ υἱός σου is much more common than ὁ σὸς υἱός, or υἱὸς ὁ σός.* The possessive pronouns are throughout a commentary on the interchangeability of the adjectival form with the genitive of a cognate substantive (§. 21.); as τὰ ἡμέτερα ὅπλα = τὰ ὅπλα ἡμῶν. Accordingly they too are interchanged, as (Soph. Trach. 485.) κείνου τε καὶ σὴν .... χάριν = 'for his sake and thine own'; and even in the same clause combined, as τἀμὰ δυστήνου κακά = 'the ills of unfortunate me'. By *syntactical attraction*** possessives are sometimes used for the genitive of the personal pro-

* Those who pronounce Greek according to the accents, as the ancients did, are at no loss to perceive the euphonic reason, which led the Greeks to avoid ὁ σὸς υἱός and the like, and yet allowed them to say ὁ ἡμέτερος υἱός and the like.

** When a certain construction has been established on natural grounds for a particular part of speech in a great majority of instances, it becomes the normal construction for that part of speech universally, even where no natural ground for it exists. For instance, since κτίσις, like all nouns in ις, retains the transitive notion of the verb, *logic* would require an accusative after it, as after the corresponding infinitival substantive in τὸ κτίζειν τὴν πόλιν: but, because the transitive notion takes a perfectly substantival form in κτίσις, its construction is that of substantives generally; and this conformity to the norm, not on logical grounds, but for mere conformity's sake, is what is meant by *syntactical attraction*. The English termination *ing* being not peculiarly substantival, primarily indeed verbal, words in *ing* hesitate between the substantival and verbal constructions: thus we can say either, 'The building that house', or 'The building *of* that house ruined the man', where *of* expresses no relation, but is merely the sign of the substantival construction. But in Greek ἡ κτίσις and the like, being in a specially substantival form, always follow the substantival construction; while τὸ κτίζειν and the like, being in a specially verbal form, always follow the verbal construction. In like manner, the possessive pronoun and the genitive of the personal being, in the great majority of instances, equivalent, they are sometimes interchanged even when not really convertible in sense.

noun, even when that genitive is not at all possessive, as (Od. XI. 202.) *σός τε πόθος . . . Ὀδυσσεῦ* = 'longing for thee . . . O Ulysses', and (Thuc. I. 33. 3.) *φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ* = 'through fear of you'; where the person, so far from being the possessor of the desire or the fear, is the object of both. Sometimes, but more rarely, the possessive pronoun is put even for the dative of the personal, as (Soph. Oed. Col. 1413.) *τῆς ἐμῆς ὑπουργίας* = 'from your good offices *to me*'. In tragedy, and occasionally in prose, a neuter possessive pronoun with the article has a personal force, denoting a comprehensive *ego*, as *τὸ ἐμόν* or *τἀμά* = 'I and all belonging to me'.

Obs. 1. *Οὗ* **of all Persons.** In confirmation of §. 25, c it may be stated that *ἑός, ὅς* and *σφέτερος*, the possessives from *οὗ, σφεῖς*, also occur in the sense of *mine, thine, our, your* (New Cratylus pp. 237—8. Jelf §. 654, 2. e.). Also, the dual possessive *σφωΐτερος* refers generally to the second person, but sometimes to the third.

Obs. 2. *Σφέτερος* is exclusively reflexive, and, like the personal reflexives, refers either to the subject of its own, or to that of the principal clause. Thus in *λέγουσιν ὡς οὐ δίκαιον τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους ὑμᾶς δέχεσθαι* = 'they say that it is not right for you to receive *their* allies', *αὐτῶν*, substituted for *σφετέρους*, would not necessarily imply that the allies are those of the speakers, which *σφετέρους* does.

Obs. 3. **Emphatic Formulæ.** The genitive of *αὐτός* is sometimes added to the possessive pronouns, to intensify the reference. Thus *ὁ ἐμὸς αὐτοῦ* and *ὁ σὸς αὐτοῦ* are sometimes found in the sense of *ὁ ἐμαυτοῦ, ὁ σεαυτοῦ*: and this usage is frequent with the reflexive *σφέτερος* as, *αὐτῶν γὰρ σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο* = 'for by their own follies they perished'; so in Latin '*sua ipsorum* temeritate'.

§. 27. **Demonstrative Pronouns.** The personal predilection of the Greek demonstratives is shewn in the accompanying table. Just as an Italian would call the city where he writes, *questa città* (city of the *ego*), that where

1st pers.	*ὅδε**	= hic	= questo
2d „	*οὗτος*	= iste	= cotesto
3d „	*ἐκεῖνος*	= ille	= quello

* *Ὁδί* and *οὑτοσί* are forms more intensely demonstrative than *ὅδε, οὗτος*: they are frequent in comedy, and were doubtless borrowed from the colloquial style.

a friend addressed resides, *cotesta città* (city of the *tu*), and that where some third party resides, *quella città* (city of the *ille*): so in Greek a man may say of himself (Eur. Or. 380.) ὅδ' εἰμ' Ὀρέστης = '*here* (demonstrative of the *ego*) I Orestes am'; of another who is addressed, οὗτος τί ποιεῖς; = '*you there* (demonstrative of the *tu*) what are you doing?' * and of any third party ἐκεῖνος (demonstrative of the *ille*). Hence at the bar ὅδε or ὅδ' ἀνήρ = 'the pleader and his client', οὗτος = 'the opposite party'. So also (Soph. Antig. 43.) εἰ τὸν νεκρὸν ξὺν τῇδε κουφιεῖς χερί = 'if, along with *this* hand (*of mine*), thou wilt raise the corpse'. More generally ὅδε points out what is immediately under one's eye bodily or mental; οὗτος what is not so directly in view, as at the side or behind one; ἐκεῖνος what is far removed, out of sight as it were. Hence in a discourse ὅδε generally refers to what is about to be said, as δι' αἰτίαν τήνδε = 'for the *following* reason', οὗτος to what has just been said already: and the same distinction holds between τοιόσδε, τοσόσδε, τηλικόσδε, on the one hand, and τοιοῦτος, τοσοῦτος, τηλικοῦτος on the other; as also between the adverbs οὕτως and ὧδε. Of οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος the former generally denotes the nearer, or, failing that, the more important object; the latter the remoter, or, failing that, the less important object. In combination with one another, as τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο, τόδ' ἐκεῖνο, they indicate a double reference viz. an immediate and a remote: thus, introducing a proverb ἐκεῖνο means 'that proverb which you all know', and τόδε 'that proverb which I am going to mention'. So (Soph. Oed. Col. 138.) ὅδ' ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ = 'Here I am (ὅδ' ἐγώ), the very man you have been talking about' (ἐκεῖνος), said by Oedipus to the wondering chorus.

* Hence οὗτος, rarely αὕτη, came in Attic Greek to be used as a vocative, or rather as a mere interjection, like the Latin *heus*, as (Soph. Aj. 89.) ὦ οὗτος, Αἴας, δεύτερόν σε προσκαλῶ = '*Holloa*, Ajax, a second time I call thee'.

Obs. **Demonstratives as Antecedents.** Ὅδε is seldom the antecedent to a relative, οὗτος often: but the demonstrative antecedent is frequently omitted, especially when it would stand in the nominative or accusative. It is by a similar omission of the demonstrative antecedent that our *what* has become a compound relative = 'that which'; and in all such cases of omission, the Greek relative is, for the nonce, as truly compound as our *what*.* Thus (Xen. Conv. 4, 47.) *Οἷς γὰρ μάλιστα τὰ παρόντα ἀρκεῖ, ἥκιστα τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὀρέγονται* = '*They*, *who* are most content with what they have, are least desirous of other men's goods'. The omission of the demonstrative in the phrase *ἔστιν οἳ* = *sunt qui*, resulted in the indefinite *ἔνιοι* = 'some'; so *ἔστιν ὅτε* became *ἐνίοτε* = 'sometimes'. But it is quite classical in Attic to write *ἔνιοι* in its original elements throughout all cases, as (Thuc. III, 92, 5.) *πλήν γ' Ἰώνων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν καὶ ἔστιν ὧν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν* = 'except Ionians and Achæans, and *some* other nations'. A preposition may intervene as (Thuc. I, 23, 3.) *ἔστιν παρ' οἷς* = 'with some'. This decomposed form is sometimes interrogative (Jelf §. 817, 8.).

§. 28. **Relative Pronouns.** The relative construction is in its nature attributive, being really equivalent to an adjective or participle in concord with the antecedent, as *πᾶς ὅστις πλουτεῖ ἄδικός ἐστι* = *πᾶς πλούσιος ἄδικός ἐστι* (§. 4.*). *a*) Ὅς and ὅστις are frequently interchanged, yet there are differences between them. Ὅς properly refers to a *definite* antecedent, as *Ζεὺς ὃς ἐφορᾷ πάντα* = 'Jupiter who beholds all things'; ὅστις to an *indefinite* antecedent, as *μακάριος ὅστις οὐσίαν καὶ νοῦν ἔχει* = 'happy he who has means and mind'. From such phrases as these, where the relative clause defines the antecedent, and gives it all its importance, instead of merely adding an accidental circumstance, may have arisen the power of ὅστις with future indicatives, to express fitness, or the party whose *business* it shall be to do a thing as (Xen. Anab. I. 3. 14.) *ἡγεμόνα αἰτεῖν Κῦρον*

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* *Who* is also sometimes a compound relative in English as "whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth", where 'whom' = 'him whom'. The ellipsis of the relative, so common in the English objective case, as, 'The books (which) I want are here', never occurs in Greek.

ὅστις (ἡμᾶς) διὰ φιλίας τῆς χώρας ἀποίσει* = 'To ask of Cyrus a guide who shall lead us back through a friendly country', or, in more idiomatic English, 'to lead us back'. Akin to this usage is ὅστις = *quippe qui*, assigning a reason, as (Aristoph. Nub. 1377.) Οὔκουν δικαίως (σὲ ἐπέτριβον) ὅστις οὐκ Εὐριπίδην ἐπαινεῖς = 'Did I not (beat thee) justly, *who* i. e. *inasmuch as thou* praisest not Euripides'. Ὅς occurs also in the sense of οἷος, responding to τοιοῦτος, as τοιαῦτα λέγεις ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων = 'you say such things *as* no man would say'. When οὕτω precedes, ὅστις, and, sometimes also, ὅς answer to it in the sense of ὥστε as (Soph. Antig. 220.) οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτω μωρὸς ὅς θανεῖν ἐρᾷ = 'there is no one so foolish as to desire to die'. *b*) Οἷος, the relative of quality, answers to τοιόσδε and τοιοῦτος in the antecedent clause, as ὢν τοιοῦτος οἷός ἐστι = 'being *such as* he is'; but these antecedent words are seldom expressed, and we have οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν instead of οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν = 'there is nothing *like* asking himself'. Farther, by the omission of the demonstrative antecedent, and the attraction of οἷος into the case of the omitted antecedent, a form οἷος σὺ ἀνὴρ is obtained, which is declinable throughout, as θαυμάζω οἵου σοῦ ἀνδρός for θαυμάζω τοιούτου ἀνδρὸς οἷος σὺ εἶ = 'I wonder at such a man as you are'. Ὅσος and ἡλίκος occur, but much more rarely, in a like formula. Οἷος with an infinitive, when τοιοῦτος precedes, has the force of ὥστε, as οὐχ ὁ Κύρου τρόπος τοιοῦτος οἷος χρηματίζεσθαι = 'Cyrus' way was not such *as* to make rich'. Not preceded by τοιοῦτος, οἷος with the infinitive is much weaker, but still expresses a sort of fitness, as οὐκ ἦν ὥρα οἷα ἄρδειν τὸ πεδίον = 'it was not the season *for* watering the plain'. *c*) Ὅσος and ἡλίκος, the relatives of quantity, answer, the former to τόσος, τοσοῦτος and τηλικοῦτος in the antecedent clause, the latter to the same,

* Note that the Latins would here use the subjunctive. §§. 41. 93.

τόσος excepted. In the singular ὅσος refers to bulk, in the plural to number: in both numbers ἡλίκος refers only to bulk, as τηλικαῦτα ἐψεύσατο ἡλίκα οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων πώποτε = 'he told such big lies as no man ever did'. A specialty regarding ἡλίκος is its reference to age (ἡλικία).

Obs. 1. Ὅς **Demonstrative.** That the form ὅς was originally demonstrative has been pointed out in §. 3. Obs. 2. Besides the instances of ὅς demonstrative there mentioned, the following occur in Ionic prose, and in Attic, ὃς μέν — ὃς δέ in all cases of the singular and plural; ὃς καὶ ὅς = 'he and he' i. e. 'any one', only in the nominative, and very rare; and the Platonic formula ἦ δ' ὅς, ἦ δ' ἥ = 'quoth he', 'quoth she'.

Obs. 2. Οἷος is sometimes used alone to intensify the superlative, as χωρίον οἷον καλεπώτατον = 'a place the most difficult possible' (§. 23. Obs. 2.). Οἷός τε = δυνατός, as οὐ γὰρ φέρειν ὅπλα οἷός τ' ἦν = 'for he was not able to carry arms'. Both these usages are easily deducible from the proper meaning of τοιοῦτος οἷος = 'of such a nature as' (§. 84. Obs. 1.).

§. 29. **Indefinite Pronouns.** *a*) Τίς, when not interrogative, is enclitic except when, taken substantively, it is opposed to μηδέν i. e. where *somebody* is opposed to *nobody*, *a cypher*, as ἠΰχεις τὶς εἶναι = 'you boasted you were *somebody*' (§. 57. Obs. 3, d.). In this sense it is always accented. The phrase ἤ τις ἢ οὐδείς, found in Herodotus and the Attic writers, means 'scarcely any one'. Subjoined to adjectives τίς enhances their meaning whatever it be, so that μέγας τις, μικρός τις, ὀλίγοι τινες are more expressive than μέγας, μικρός, ὀλίγοι alone. In this connexion it seems often equivalent to the English *sort of*, as δυσβατός τις ὁ τόπος φαίνεται καὶ κατάσκιος = 'it seems an impassable and dark *sort of* place'. *b*) The difference between ἄλλος and ἕτερος is concealed by the ambiguity of the English word 'another', which answers both to the French *encore un* = 'one more', and to the French *un autre* = 'a different one'. The former denotes difference of *individuality* merely, and that is ἄλλος; the latter difference of *kind* also, and that is ἕτερος. The distinction is well brought out in (Gal. I. 6) θαυμάζω ὅτι

οὕτω ταχέως μετατίθεσθε ... εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο = 'I wonder that ye are so soon removed to *another* gospel, which is not *another of the same kind*'. By the summing-up power of the article with plurals (§. 5. Obs. 3.) *οἱ ἄλλοι* = 'all the others' i. e. 'the rest', but *ἄλλοι* = 'others' (§. 3. Obs. 1.): and similarly *οἱ ἕτεροι* = 'all the others *of a different kind*', hence 'the opposite party'.

§. 30. **Interrogative Pronouns.** In direct interrogation these are *τίς* = 'who', always accented, and always with the acute, *πότερος* = 'which of two', *ποῖος* = 'of what sort', *πόσος* = 'how much', of bulk in the singular, of number in the plural, *πηλίκος* = 'how much', with a special reference to age (*ἡλικία*). In indirect interrogation the correspondents of these are *ὅστις*, *ὁπότερος*, *ὁποῖος*, *ὁπόσος*, *ὁπηλίκος*; but very frequently the direct interrogatives are used for the indirect.

VERBS.

The verb predicates something of an entity.

§. 31. **Greek Voices.** Verbs are divided according to their signification into transitive and intransitive, the latter being subdivided into neuter and passive. Reflexive verbs are distinguished from the simply transitive by this, that they involve their own subject as their object immediate or remote (§. 17, b.). Thus in *λούομαι* = '*I* wash *myself*' the subject is also the *immediate* object of the operation, and there is no *remote* object at all: in *ἀπέχομαι οἴνου* = '*I* keep *myself* off (abstain) from wine', the subject is again involved in *ἀπέχομαι* as its *immediate* object, and the remote object appears in the genitive: while in *σὲ ἀποπέμπομαι* = '*I* send thee away *from myself*', and in *παρασκευάζομαί τι* = '*I* procure something *for myself*', the subject is involved in the verbs

as their *remote* object, the immediate one being in the proper objective case viz. the accusative (Obs. 3.). The general difference between the active and middle forms is well illustrated by the Athenian distinction between *τιθέναι νόμους* said of the lawgiver, and *τίθεσθαι νόμους*, said of the people, because they were themselves to be subject to the laws. Of these different kinds of verbs the reflexive, neuter, and passive are most kindred in sense; for which reason it is that we constantly translate the German, French, and Italian reflexives by an English passive or neuter form, as *si dice* = 'it is said', *si muove* = 'it moves' (neuter). Accordingly, the most ancient forms of the Greek verb are the *μαι* form for reflexives, neuters and passives, and the *μι* form for simple transitives. These are also sometimes expressed by the *μαι* form; but, that the form in *μι* was peculiarly theirs, appears from the fact that, in all the Greek which has come down to us, excepting only *εἰμί* = I am, and *εἶμι* = I go — both of which, on account of their elementary meaning and frequent use, are peculiarly subject to irregularities of form — all verbs in *μι* are transitive. The form in *ω* is of later origin, as might be concluded from this alone, that most verbs in *ω* are derivatives, whereas those in *μι* are all primitives, and moreover express primary notions, as *give*, *put* &c. The form in *ω*, unlike that in *μι*, had no special attribution to the transitive meaning, and appeared as a supplanter of both the others, of the *μι* form altogether, and of the *μαι* form in so far as it was neither strictly reflexive nor strictly passive. Every Lexicon furnishes instances of the transition from *μι* to *ω*, as *ἀνώγημι*, *ἀνωγέω*, *ἀνώγω* = 'I command', *ῥήγνυμι*, *ῥηγνύω*, *ῥήσσω* = 'I break' &c. And in Homer the old *μαι* form may be seen struggling with the new one in *ω*, several verbs of a transitive or neuter signification being used by him indiscriminately in both forms, while others, used by him only in the *μαι* form, are used by later writers in the *ω* form. Such are *ἀκούεσθαι* for

ἀκούειν, *ὁρᾶσθαι* for *ὁρᾶν*, *ἰδέσθαι* for *ἰδεῖν*, *φλέγεσθαι* for *φλέγειν* (Jelf. §. 363. 5.). A farther proof is afforded by such compounds as *ναυμαχέω*, *τειχομαχέω*, *ναυπηγέω*, where the *ω* form is preferred, though the primitive verb had only the *μαι* form, as *μάχομαι*, or the *μι* form besides that in *ω*, as *πήγνυμι*.

Obs. 1. **The *μαι* Form the most Ancient.** It is possible that the specially transitive form in *μι* is itself later than that in *μαι*. The primitive conception of the verb would seem to have been absolute, as of an operation or state of the subject; and this absolute conception, in which the neuter and reflexive elements are obvious, would naturally become passive, when viewed with reference to an external *cause*,* transitive when viewed with reference to an external *object*. Examples are not wanting of neuter verbs assuming the transitive construction, and therefore *pro hâc vice* a transitive meaning, as *ἐλεεῖν τινα* = 'to pity one', from *ἐλεεῖν* = 'to be in a state of pity'. In all languages again transitives often become intransitive, as in Greek *ἐλαύνειν* = 'to drive' and 'to go', *τρέπειν* = vertere (trans. & neuter), *φαίνειν* = 'to show' and 'to shine', *πράττειν* = 'to do' (trans. & neuter, hence *εὖ πράττειν* = 'to be doing or getting on well'), *ἔχειν* = 'to have' and 'to be', hence *πῶς ἔχεις*; = 'how are you?' (For an extended list see Jelf §. 359. 6.) It appears therefore that, however distinct the different kinds of verbal signification, as transitive &c. are in our definitions, in actual language they are often represented by the same form; which shews that the comprehension of them all originally under *one* verbal form is at least possible. In point of fact they are all expressed by the form in *μαι*, as *δέχομαι*** = 'I receive' (transitive), *δύναμαι* =

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* The passive form has actually been evolved from the reflexive in the Scandinavian languages (Latham's Eng. Lang. 4th ed. §. 167. a.); and in the Slavonic languages, the reflexive and passive forms are identical throughout.

** Did we know exactly the *radical* signification of transitive deponents, we should probably always be able to deduce their present transitive from an original reflexive force. The root of *δέχομαι* and of our own *take* may have been the same, since *δεχ* contains the same sort of consonants (hence *δεκ-σιά* = 'the taking or right hand') in the same order as *take*, viz. a dental and a guttural, and on that supposition, *δέχομαι* = 'I take to myself'. The analogy of languages in which the reflexive form is largely used often helps us to the rationale of the *μαι* form for deponents, whether transitive or neuter, as *αἰσθάνεσθαι* = *s'apercevoir*, *μάχεσθαι* = *se battre*, *μεμνῆσθαι* = *se souvenir*.

'I am able' (neuter), *τύπτομαι* = 'I strike myself', or 'I am struck' (reflexive and passive). It is remarkable in this connection that those forms of the perfect and aorist called secondary, and which are known to be more ancient than the first perfects and aorists,* frequently retain a neuter or passive signification, as *ἐλειψάμην μνημόσυνα* = 'I left for myself memorials' (trans.) *ἐλειπόμην* = 'I left myself' i. e. 'I remained' (intrans.). So

ἄγνυμι = I break	*ἔαγα* = I am broken
ὄλλυμι = I destroy	*ὄλωλα* = I am undone
πήγνυμι = I fix	*πέπηγα* = I stick fast
ῥήγνυμι = I tear	*ἔῤῥωγα* = I am burst open
ἀνοίγω = I open	*ἀνέωγα* = I stand open
ἵστημι = I make to stand	*ἕστην* = I stood.

Obs. 2. **Mingling of the *μαι* and *ω* Forms.** Many anomalies in the Greek verb are explicable on the above principles. As the newer verbal forms were developed and established, according to natural laws, which did their silent work apart from human consciousness, it came to pass that the change from the primitive form in *μαι* to the later form in *ω*, was made, not uniformly and completely, but partially and with irregularities. In some verbs the transition was not made at all, as in the so-called deponents, which are to be regarded, not as having laid aside the active form, but as never having assumed it. In others the *future* alone remained of the *μαι* form, as *ἀκούω ἀκούσομαι*, *ἁμαρτάνω ἁμαρτήσομαι*, *κλέπτω κλέψομαι*. (For a list of such see Donaldson's Gr. Gram. §. 350.) In others *two* futures coexisted, one from the *μαι* form, and another from the form in *ω*, as *ζάω ζήσομαι* and *ζήσω*, *διώκω διώξομαι* and *διώξω*, *τίκτω τέξομαι* and *τέξω*. (For a list of such see Donaldson's Gr. Gram. §. 351.) In like manner, since the reflexive and passive senses are akin, and their verbal expression was originally the same, it is not wonderful that the forms, which became specially reflexive

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*) Generally speaking the duplicate tenses in Greek were of the same nature with the duplicate tenses in English, as *spake* and *spoke*, *clomb* and *climbed*, *swoll* and *swelled* &c. i. e. they were primarily dialectical varieties, and in the language at large succeeded one another as old and new. English grammarians make little account of the duplicate tenses, because they do not feel themselves called on so much as to notice what has become obsolete; but Greek grammarians dwell upon them, and must do so, because they are expected to name and trace all the developments of the language during a thousand years. In some of the English duplicates, as in the Greek, the later form is the more decidedly transitive: thus *swelled* is more decidedly transitive than *swoll*, and *hanged* than *hung*.

or middle, should be occasionally used in a passive sense, and that the forms which became specially passive should be occasionally used in a reflexive sense. The most signal illustration of this is the future *middle** which, particularly in Attic Greek, is taken in a passive sense, in prose when the passive form was not in use, and in poetry when the middle form suited better the verse, as ἄρξομαι = 'I shall be ruled', δηλώσομαι = 'I shall be shewn', τιμήσομαι = 'I shall be honoured'. (For other examples see Geddes' Gr. Gram. §. 131.) The same fact recurs in the deponent verbs, which are called middle or passive, according as their aorists take the middle or the passive form, the aorist of the passive form however not having necessarily a passive sense. Thus χαρίζομαι aor. ἐχαρισάμην = 'I did a favour', is a middle deponent; διαλέγομαι aor. διελέχθην = 'I conversed', a passive deponent. Some have had both forms at different epochs; thus ἠγασάμην and ἠρασάμην are found in Homer, and in Attic ἠγάσθην and ἠράσθην, without any difference of meaning. In others both forms coexisted, and then the passive form had a passive sense, as βιάζομαι aor. mid. ἐβιασάμην = 'I forced', aor. pass. ἐβιάσθην = 'I was forced'. The perfect also of these deponents had sometimes a passive signification (Jelf §. 320. §. 368. 3.).

Obs. 3. **Reflexive Developments.** Besides the principal reflexive developments mentioned at the beginning of §. 31, the following deserve notice. When the middle assumes a causative force, which any verb may do in any language, as *walk* in English, when we talk of '*walking* a horse', the reference to *self* still remains, as διδάσκομαι τὸν υἱόν = 'I *get my* son instructed'. Sometimes this possessive reference is the sole distinction of the middle, as ὃν ὀνομάζομαι παῖδα = 'whom I call *my* son'. In other cases a new meaning arises, as βουλεύω = 'I advise', βουλεύομαι = 'I take counsel with myself': πολιτεύω = 'I am a citizen', πολιτεύομαι 'I behave as a citizen'; and sometimes the original meaning and the reflexive element both disappear, as σοφίζομαι = 'I make myself wise', 'play the knowing dog', and hence, as somebody must be the dupe, *I deceive;* so τίνομαι = 'I pay to myself', 'get paid', 'make another pay to me', hence *punish.* — The reflexive sense may become reciprocal in the plural (§. 25, d.) as διακελεύονται = 'they exhort one another'.

Obs. 4. **Emphatic Reflexive Form.** *a*) In proportion to the convenience of a lingual form is the frequency of its use. Accordingly, the reflexive form, being in Greek the most convenient possible, inasmuch as it is expressed by one word, without any aid of pronoun or preposition, is used in very many instances where we

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* The *aorists* middle are never used in a passive sense.

content ourselves with the simple verb. Thus (Thuc. 1, 2, 7.) ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθὼν ... ἀφαιρήσεται = 'it being uncertain when some one might come and carry off (their goods)'. The English is perfectly clear, but the Greek is more precise, ἀφαιρήσεται = 'carry off for his own behoof'.* *b*) Farther, in proportion to the frequency with which any lingual form is used, especially if it be also used in *various modifications* of its primary sense, are its emphasis and precision enfeebled; but this degeneracy of lingual forms into weakness and indistinctness is constantly met by an augmentative tendency in the forms themselves. Hence, instead of the simple middle form, the reflexive pronouns are sometimes employed with the active and even with the middle, as (Thuc. 1, 31, 7.) οὐδὲ ἐσεγράψαντο ἑαυτούς = 'nor had they inscribed themselves'. By this great law of compensation, which reigns throughout the whole transition of a language from the synthetic to the analytic state, are explained the redundancies of language, as logic calls them: e. g. (Hesiod. Op. 763.) ἐκ Διόθεν for Διόθεν, like our own '*from* whence' for 'whence'. So ταὐτόν and θάτερον are used with the article, although they already contain it.

Obs. 5. **Modern Greek Parallels.** Most of the above views are corroborated by the state of the Greek verb in the modern dialect. The substitution of the form in ω for the older one in μι, begun in classical times, has been completed in the extinction of the latter: δίδω is now said for δίδωμι, θέτω for τίθημι and so on. Even the substantive verb, rather than retain the μι type, has conformed to that in μαι, thus εἶμαι, εἶσαι κ. τ. λ. The μαι form, though the most ancient of all, has survived, more perhaps on account of its passive than its reflexive force, which latter however has not been lost; φιλούμεθα, for example, is good Romaic Greek, as it was good classical, for 'we kiss one another'. The gradual substitution throughout the classical era of aorists of the passive form for aorists of the middle in deponent verbs (Obs. 2.) has been completed

* The reflexive form of the verb in German, French, and Italian, being also convenient, is frequently used. In English however the reflexive form is so awkward, requiring the use of an inharmonious dissyllabic pronoun (myself &c.), and often a pronoun (*from* or *for*) to boot, that it is used only when it cannot be avoided, which is seldom. Latham says that *I fear me,* used by Lord Campbell in his Lives of the Chancellors, is the fragment of an extensive system of reflexive verbs, developed in different degrees in the different Gothic languages, and in all more than in the English. (English Language §. 391.) To *bethink one's self*, to *betake one's self* are examples of the very few English verbs, which can be used only as reflexives.

by the extinction of the latter, so that now we have ἐδέχθην = 'I received', instead of ἐδεξάμην, just as in the New Testament we have ἀπεκρίθην = 'I answered', instead of ἀπεκρινάμην, which is alone classical in that sense. Farther, as often in classical Greek, so constantly in Romaic, the perfect participle of deponents has a passive signification.

§. 32. **Moods of the Verb.** The moods are groups of verbal forms, representing the operation denoted by the verb under various modes or aspects viz. the Indicative mood, which represents the operation denoted by the verb under the aspect of *certainty*, as existing out there in the world of *facts;* the Subjunctive Mood, which represents it under the aspect of *contingency*, as existing in here in the world of *conceptions*;* and the Imperative mood, which represents it under the aspect of a *command.* The Infinitive is no more entitled to be called a *mood,* than the nominative to be called a *case* (§. 11.); because in it the operation denoted by the verb is not represented under any particular aspect, but absolutely.

§. 33. **Tenses of the Indicative.** The tenses of the Indicative divide themselves to the eye into three pairs, the second in each being formed from the first i. e. the imperfect from the present, the aorist from the future, and the pluperfect from the perfect, and that always in the same way viz. by prefixing the augment, which is the sign of the past. The second of these formations presents a great difficulty; for, however obviously the *form* of the aorist is derived from the *form* of the future, it is inconceivable how the *meaning* of the aorist should have been derived from the *meaning* of the future. The temptation is great to conjecture that the future was once a present, and that while this quondam-present became astricted to the future signification, its past still remained a past. But whatever theory** of the connexion

* For the reason why the Optative is not mentioned here, see §. 40.

** *a*) Donaldson (New Cratylus §. 372) considers Burnouf, in his *Méthode pour étudier la langue Grecque*, to have satisfacto-

between the future and aorist be adopted, the force of the tenses must be gathered all the same from established

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rily explained the connexion between the future and aorist. The following is Burnouf's tense-system taken from p. 217 of his own work:

Singly related Tenses

i. e. Related only to the moment of speaking:

The present expresses simultaneity
,, future ,, posteriority
,, perfect ,, anteriority
} relatively to the *moment of speaking*.

Doubly related Tenses

i. e. Related to the moment of speaking as pasts, and to *some past moment* variously, as follows:

The imperfect expresses simultaneity — I was reading *while* you were writing
,, aorist ,, posteriority — I read *after* you had written
,, pluperfect ,, anteriority — I had read before you had written.

The explanation consists in the future and aorist both denoting *posteriority*, as the present and imperfect both denote *simultaneity*, and the perfect and pluperfect both *anteriority*, the former in each pair with reference to the *present* moment, and the latter with reference to a *past* one. — A very suspicious circumstance in this theory is its perfect symmetry; for the forms of language are not wont to arise in conformity with a preconceived, and nicely balanced adjustment of temporal or other relations. On the contrary they spring up and ripen into definiteness according as the development of a people's mind calls for more full and accurate modes of expression; and for that very reason they abound in irregularities, old forms acquiring new meanings, some by absorbing several cognates, and thus representing various relations under one form (§. 12. Obs.), and others, once vague and manifold in sense, by becoming astricted to one particular application. A theory therefore, which should suppose irregularity of development, is antecedently more probable than one supposing uniformity. Besides, however natural the temporal relations of *at, before*, and *after* are with reference to the present moment, they are not equally so with reference to an indeterminate past one. A man's own actual *when* and *where* is the centre from which he naturally measures all relations whatsoever; but, in regard to the past, there is rather a tendency to slur over distinctions, by *implying* merely, instead of expressing the relations of *before* and *after;* witness the neglect of the pluperfect by the Greeks (§. 38. Obs. 2, b.). Nor is there any evidence that the aorist was

usage. The following classification is based upon Burnouf's, but the nomenclature has been changed for the

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ever more astricted to denote *posteriority*, than to denote anteriority or simultaneity in relation to a past event. It is, and, so far as we know, ever was as good Greek to say ἐν ᾧ ταῦτα ἔλεγον, ἀπέθανε = '*whilst* I was saying these things he died', or πρὶν ταῦτα ἔλεξα, ἀπέθανε = '*before* I said these things, he died', as to say ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα ἔλεξα, ἀπέθανε = '*after* I said these things he died'.

b) Another mode of bringing out the connection between the future and aorist is to represent them both as *inceptive*. Curtius in his Griechische Schulgrammatik §. 484 thus classifies the tenses:

Continuative action		Present and Imperfect	
Inceptive	,,	Future	,, Aorist
Completed	,,	Perfect	,, Pluperfect.

This may be only another version of Burnouf's theory, since whatever takes place *after* a certain moment is of course *begun* after it. But if it be anything else, then, although the future may be said to be always *inceptive*, in a vague sense of that term, the aorist is so only in a small class of verbs, and not always even in them, viz. those denoting the exercise of some public office, as βασιλεύω = 'I am a king', ἐβασίλευσα = 'I became a king', βουλεύω = 'I am a senator', ἐβούλευσα = 'I became a senator', and a few others denoting *states* as πλουτῶ = 'I am rich', ἐπλούτησα = 'I became rich', ἀσθενῶ = 'I am ill', ἠσθένησα = 'I became ill'; but this restriction shews that the inceptive meaning of these aorists, called 'aorists of first attainment', arises from the meaning of the verbs themselves. Farther, the aorist denotes *completed* action even more decidedly than the perfect; for the action denoted by the perfect is always connected with the present, if not by the continuance of its effects, at least by the period of time, in which it took place, being regarded as reaching to the present, whereas the aorist represents the action as completed in a period of time severed from the present.

c) I have no satisfactory because no certain explanation to offer of the connexion between the future and aorist tenses. There is no direct evidence for the supposition in the text, that, namely, of the future having once been a present; but the following considerations may serve to shew its feasibility. The two most necessary tenses are a present and a past. They were the only tenses in Anglo-Saxon, as they are now the only simple tenses in English; and in the older Anglo-Saxon, the present performed the functions of the future, the use of *shall* and *will* as

practical purpose of indicating the law for the sequence of tenses in dependent sentences (§. 40, b.).

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auxiliaries being a later invention. The history of the Anglo-Saxon *substantive* verb is remarkably pertinent It had duplicates of the present indicative viz. *am* and *beo;* and the latter of these, after being driven out of the present indicative, as it is now in the course of being driven out of the present subjunctive also, still retained possession of the future, the functions of which it discharged *alone* for a while, though afterwards obliged to share them with *shall* and *will.* (Latham's Eng. Lang. §. 276. Hunter's Anglo-Saxon Grammar pp. 17, 21.) Had duplicates of the present existed *generally* in the Anglo-Saxon verb, it is highly probable that one of them would have become astricted to the future, and that the aid of *shall* and *will* would never have been required. This would seem to have been the course of development in Latin verbs of the third and fourth conjugations. In Latin as in Greek the *μι* and *ω* forms of the verb met, witness *inquam* and *inquio;* but, whereas in Greek the old *μι* form maintained its ground throughout the classical era, as a present indicative for a limited number of *transitive* verbs, in Latin it yielded up the present indicative to the *ω* form, and took refuge itself in the future indicative and in the subjunctive. Hence the similarity of *dicam*, *dices*, *dicet* &c. and *dicam*, *dicas*, *dicat* &c. the *m* of the first person being the representative of the Greek *μι*. Now this *may* have been the course of development in Greek; at some remote period *γράψω*, or what it now represents, *may* have been a rival present with *γράφω*, or with what it now represents; and in that case one can easily understand how *ἔγραφον* should have appropriated the continuative sense 'I was writing', and *ἔγραψα* the aorist sense 'I wrote'. The duplicates of the Greek perfect shewed a tendency to adopt different meanings (§. 31. Obs. 1.), and in no language do coexisting lingual forms preserve a perfect equivalence. Thus in English 'I write' seldom means 'I am now writing', but generally 'I am in the habit of writing'; and 'wrote', which could once express 'I was writing' is now a pure aorist. The supposed transition of *γράψω* from a present to a future signification is quite natural; for the present easily, and often even in vulgar discourse, assumes a future signification, as 'If you do that again, I beat you' (§. 34. and Obs. 2.). The natural meaning of the aorist, viewed as a past form of the future, is potential, as *will*, *would*, *shall*, *should;* werde, würde; *aurai*, *aurais:* and this potential meaning the Greek aorist also had (§. 38. Obs. 3.). It will appear less wonderful that *ἔγραψα* did not become simply potential, when *γράψω* became

Principal or Absolute Tenses.

Principal, because from them the others are derived; *Absolute* because, referring to the moment of speaking, a moment *determined* by the very act of speaking, they make a complete sense of themselves, without any farther specification of time.

Present γράφω = I am writing — at
Future γράψω = I shall write — after
Perfect γέγραφα = I have written — before
} the present time.

Historical or Indeterminate Tenses.

Historical, because referring to the past;* *Indeterminate* because, the past not being, like the present, a *moment*, and a moment determined by the act of speaking, but a *space* of time, they do not make a complete sense of themselves, and require some separate specification of time, expressed or understood, to *define* their reference.

Imperfect ἔγραφον = I was writing { incompleted action at
Aorist ἔγραψα = I wrote { completed action in
Pluperfect ἐγεγράφειν = I had written { completed action before
} some past time.

§. 34. **Present Indicative.** The Greek present has all the uses of the English present, both in the simple form of the latter, 'I write', and in the compound 'I am writing'. Thus, as habit, or recurrence can be expressed by 'I write', so by γράφω: as universal propositions, maxims, and proverbs are expressed by the present in English, so in Greek, the present contemplated by the mind being coextensive with the existing order of things: as in English past events are often narrated and future ones predicted in the present for the sake of vividness, so in Greek. But the following are peculiarities in the use of the Greek present, as compared with the English. *a*) The Greek present, expressing an *incompleted* opera-

simply future, if it be considered that every past, as such, is capable of being used potentially (Jelf §. 858, 1. 2.).

* When the present tense is used in the representation of past events (§. 34) it is called the *historic* present, and takes rank with the properly historical tenses in all applications of the law for the sequence of tenses (§. 40.).

tion, often denotes the *attempt* or *purpose* to do a thing, which we also denote by the present, but with the aid of a preposition, as ἀφαιρεῖς τὰ ἐμὰ κειμήλια = 'you *are for taking away* my jewels'. *b*) With πάλαι, or some similar word, the Greeks used the present where we use the perfect as πάλαι τοῦτο θεάομαι = '*I have been looking* at this a long time'. The French have the Greek idiom, as 'je le *regarde* depuis longtemps'.

Obs. 1. **Presents for Pasts.** The use of the present for the past is sometimes bold beyond English usage, in Greek poetry, as (Eur. Bacch. 2) Διόνυσος ὃν τίκτει ποθ' ἡ Κάδμου κόρη = 'Bacchus, whom the daughter of Cadmus erewhile *bore*'. But some presents have uniformly a past meaning, as οἴχομαι = 'I am gone'; ἥκω (a new present from the perfect ηκα) = 'I am come'. The present *state* expressed by these forms Greek and English viz. *gone* and *come*, implies the antecedent *action* of *coming* or *going;* and they may therefore be expressed by the perfect forms 'I have gone', 'I have come'.

Obs. 2. **Presents for Futures.** In verbs of *going*, the employment of the present for the future is more than rhetorical; it arises from their meaning, and is common to all languages. In English even the *continuative* present of such verbs has a future force, as 'I am going to town tomorrow' for 'I shall go &c.'; but we cannot say 'I am writing a letter tomorrow' for 'I shall write &c.'. So in Greek εἶμι, ἴέναι, ἰών are both present and future.

§. 35. **Future Tense.** The Greek future answers exactly to the English with *shall* and *will*. See §. 28, a. where the peculiar force of *shall* appears in the future indicative with ὅστις; so also in prohibitions, οὐ φονεύσεις = 'thou *shalt* not kill'. The *will* appears markedly in the polite expression of a wish by the future, as μοι φράσεις = 'you will tell me i. e. tell me', and in strong commands expressed by a negative interrogative, as οὐ παύσῃ λαλῶν; = 'will you not cease talking'?

Obs. 1. **Greek Future Indicative = Latin Subjunctive.** It is to be particularly noticed that in clauses introduced by a relative (§. 28, a.) or ὅπως (which is also a relative, only in the adverbial form), where in Greek the subjunctive may, and in Latin must be employed, the future indicative is common. Thus οὐκ ἔχομεν ὅτου σίτου ὠνησόμεθα 'non habemus quo cibum *emamus*' = 'we have not wherewith *we may* (or *can*) *buy* food'. Even when the principal tense is historical the future indicative is more frequently

used than the future optative (§. 40. a.) as (Thuc. IV. 128, 5.) ἔπρασσεν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τάχιστα τοῖς μὲν ξυμβήσεται, τῶν δὲ ἀπαλλάξεται = 'agebat quo modo quam primum cum illis quidem *compositionem faceret*, ab his vero *dissociaretur*' = 'he took measures by which he *might* (*could*, *would*, or *should*) *be* most speedily *reconciled* to the one, and *dissociated* from the other'. This correspondence of the Greek fut. indic. to the Latin subjunctive is one proof of the natural affinity between the future aspect of a verbal operation, and that aspect of it which is expressed by the subjunctive mood (§. 33. ** c. §. 41.). Farther, ὅπως stands especially with the 2d, but also with the 1st and 3d persons of the fut. indic., more often than with the subjunctive, in an imperative sense, as (Xen. An. I, 7, 3) Ὅπως οὖν ἔσεσθε ἄνδρες ἄξιοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἧς κέκτησθε = 'See that ye be men worthy of the freedom ye possess', there being an ellipsis of Ὁρᾶτε.

Obs. 2. Μέλλω. The intention to do a thing immediately, in present, future or past time, is expressed by μέλλω with the infinitive of the present or future, rarely of the aorist, thus:

μέλλω γράφειν = I am (at the present time) going to write
μελλήσω „ = I shall be (at some future time) „ „ „
ἤμελλον „ = I was (at some past time) „ „ „

Μέλλω has also the subsidiary sense of *I am wanting to* = *I am for*, particularly in the form εἰ μέλλω, as εἰ μέλλω τοῦτο πράξειν = 'If I am for doing that'; so ὁ μέλλων = 'he that would', and πῶς or τί οὐ μέλλω; = 'why should I not?'

Obs. 3. **Modern Greek Future.** The resolution of the simple future, even in classical times, by θέλω and the infinitive, is remarkable both from its correspondence with our own idiom, and because it is the established form of the future in Modern Greek. Its use in ancient Greek is quite exceptional, and not to be imitated; as (Herod. I, 109, 12.) εἰ δὲ θελήσει... ἐς τὴν θυγατέρα ταύτην ἀναβῆναι ἡ τυραννίς = 'if the government *shall* descend to this daughter'.

Obs. 4. **Future Perfect.** The future perfect of the μι and ω forms, and of deponents, is always a compound tense, as πεποιηκὼς ἔσομαι = 'I shall have done', εἰργασμένος ἔσομαι = 'I shall have worked'; but of passive verbs sometimes compound as διεφθαρμένος ἔσομαι = 'I shall have been destroyed', and sometimes simple, as πεπράξεται = 'it will have been done'. Besides answering to our future perfect, * it is used in the two following ways: *a*) to de-

* It will be observed that the Greek future perfect, both in its simple and in its compound form, has the same elements as our own, viz. a future element, and a past one. The simple form is a future type derived from a perfect tense; and in the compound form each element is represented, as in English, by a separate word. The intelligent student will have no difficulty in

note an immediate future (hence called paulo-post) where we use a present, as (Aristoph. Plut. 1027) *φράζε καὶ πεπράξεται* = 'speak and it is done': *b*) to denote continuance in the future as (Hes. Op. et Dies 177) *Ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ τοῖσι μεμίξεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν* = 'But yet good *will continue mixed* with evil'. When the perfect of the *μαι* form has the force of a present, the future derived from it has the force only of a simple future, as *κέκτημαι* = 'I possess', *κεκτήσομαι* = 'I shall possess'. In other cases also it has the force of a simple future, the place of which it even usurped in some verbs, as in *κόπτω*, *παύω*, *πιπράσκω*, particularly in Attic.

§. 36. **Perfect Tense.** The Greek perfect is fairly represented by the English with *have*, denoting a transaction at some time before the present, with the collateral idea often of its continuance, by repetition, or in its effects, to the moment of speaking. Thus 'He has always protected the just' may not be said of a monarch deceased, but may of one living, and would imply that the monarch's protection of the just continues up to the moment of speaking. In regard to a monarch deceased the *has* must be left out, and the verb then becomes *aorist*: by which it appears that the difference between the perfect and aorist tenses is mainly this: the perfect is a past connected with the present, the aorist a past severed from the present (§. 38. Obs. 1.).

Obs. 1. **Perfect for other Tenses.** *a*) As some presents may be translated by perfects, so some perfects may be translated by presents, as *κέκτημαι* = 'I have acquired', hence 'I possess'; *κεκλήσομαι* = 'I have been called', hence 'I bear the name', *βεβούλευμαι* = 'I have taken counsel with myself', hence 'I am determined'. (For other examples, see Jelf §. 399. Obs. 2.) This usage is sometimes empirical as *τεθαύμακα* = 'I wonder', just as in Italian *ho capito* = 'I understand'. *b*) The perfect is also sometimes rhetorically used for the future as (Soph. Phil. 75) *εἰ μὲ τόξων ἐγκρατὴς αἰσθήσεται, ὄλωλα* = 'if, while master of his weapons, he shall perceive me, *I am undone*'.

Obs. 2. **Compound Form.** The form *θαυμάσας ἔχω* denotes the continuation of what was begun in the past down to the present, and in the present, more markedly than the simple perfect, and means 'I *keep* wondering'; so *ἀτιμάσας ἔχει* = 'he *keeps* dishonouring'.

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tracing the influence of both these elements in all the meanings of this tense.

§. 37. **Imperfect Tense.** The Greek imperfect corresponds to the compound form of the English tense so called, as *ἔγραφον* = 'I was writing', and expresses continuative action at some past time which must be specified separately. When that specification is made by another verb, that other verb is also in the imperfect, if its time coincide with, but in the pluperfect or aorist, if its time antecede that of the principal imperfect. Like the present, and for the same reason (§. 34. a.), the imperfect often denotes the *attempt* or *disposition* to do a thing, as (Aeschin. 3. 83.) *Ἁλόννησον ἐδίδου, ὃ δὲ ἀπηγόρευε μὴ λαμβάνειν* = '(Philip) *was for giving* Halonnesus, but (Demosthenes) would not let it be accepted'. Also, because its force is continuative, the imperfect is used in vivid descriptions of the past, and is then called the *descriptive* tense, as (Hom.) *οἱ μὲν ἀρ' οἶνον ἔμισγον ἐνὶ κρητῆρσι καὶ ὕδωρ, οἱ δὲ κ. τ. λ.* = 'some *were mixing* wine with water in goblets, others &c.' Farther, repetition being one form of continuance, the imperfect has an iterative force; and in this sense it has a peculiar termination in the Ionic dialect viz. *σκον*, which is also the Ionic termination of the iterative aorist (§. 38. Obs. 3.).

Obs. 1. **Imperfect and Aorist contrasted.** When of two past events mentioned together one has in it the element of duration, and the other not, or when one of them has it to a greater degree than the other, it is common, particularly in Herodotus and Thucydides, to denote that one which has in it the element of duration, or which has that element to the greatest degree, by the imperfect, and the other by the aorist, as *τοὺς μὲν οὖν πελταστὰς ἐδέξαντο οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ ἐμάχοντο* = 'the barbarians *received* the peltastæ, and they *fought on*'. (§. 38. Obs. 1. §. 40. a.)*

* How deeply rooted in the Greek mind was this distinction between recurring or continuative, and single or transient action appears by the formation of two futures founded upon it in post-classical Greek. Thus in Romaic 'I shall write tomorrow to my parents' = *Αὔριον θὰ γράψω εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς μου·* but 'I shall write daily to my parents' = *Θὰ γράφω καθ' ἡμέραν εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς μου.* For an explanation of the particle *θά*, see the author's 'Romaic and Modern Greek' p. 17.

Obs. 2. **Imperfect used Potentially.** According to §. 33. **c. the imperfect, being an augmented tense,* is capable of being used potentially. This is particularly the case with verbs denoting *necessity* or *obligation*, as ἔδει = 'it would be necessary' (so in Latin *oportebat*); χρῆν = 'it would be one's duty'; εἰκὸς ἦν = 'it would be right'. The potential use of the imperfect however occurs in other verbs also, as (Herod. VII, 220) μένοντι δὲ αὐτοῦ μέγα κλέος ἐλείπετο = '(he thought that) great glory *awaited* him, if he remained there', where the English idiom exactly agrees with the Greek, 'awaited' being the statement, not of a *fact*, but of a *presumption*. This idiom however is sometimes used in Greek where it would be inadmissible in English, as (Eur. Bacch. 612) τίς μοι φύλαξ ἦν, εἰ σὺ συμφορᾶς τύχοις; = 'who *would be* (literally *was*) my protector, if you should meet with a misfortune?'

§. 38. **Aorist Tense.** The Greek aorist answers to the simple form of what is called the English imperfect, ἔγραψα = 'I wrote'. Wherein it differs from the perfect has been stated in §. 36. Because it can be used only with reference to a division of time that does not reach to the moment of speaking, it is the proper tense for past events of which the date is assigned or understood, and is hence distinguished as the *narrative* tense. Farther, it denotes completed action, and in that respect differs from the imperfect (§. 37. Obs. 1.). It is called *aorist* i. e. *indefinite*, not because it may denote present or future time, as well as past, for it is astricted to the last of these, but because it does not require to be accompanied by a *definite* specification, like the other augmented tenses. Whatever separates the period of time spoken of from the moment of speaking, the mere understanding, for example, that the discourse regards a bygone century or reign, is specification enough for the use of the aorist; but the imperfect, when not used as the *descriptive* tense, and the pluperfect require, in addition to that general specification, a particular one. Thus, 'the princess Charlotte died at an early age' is a com-

* The augmented tenses of the indicative, taken potentially, often express irony; the Optative with ἄν, which is the proper form of the potential in Greek, never does.

plete statement of a past event; but 'the princess Charlotte was dying at an early age', or 'had died at an early age' are incomplete statements, and prepare us for the mention of another event, cotemporaneous in the one case, subsequent in the other. From the necessity of these additional specifications of time the aorist is free, and hence its name.

Obs. 1. **Aorist contrasted with other Tenses.** How the aorist is contrasted with the imperfect in the same sentence has been pointed out in §. 37 Obs. 1. It may be added here that, apart from the *duration* of the two events in question, the imperfect, as the continuative tense, is used to denote the *more important*, as (Thuc. II, 18, 2) *Τάς τε οὖν προσβολὰς ηὐτρεπίζοντο, καὶ ἄλλως ἐνδιέτριψαν χρόνον περὶ αὐτήν* = 'Accordingly they (the Peloponnesians) *set to making preparations for* the attack, and in other ways *spent* time around it (Oenoe)'. The aorist is similarly contrasted with the historic present, the more subordinate statement being in the aorist, and the more important brought vividly forward in the present. Farther it is contrasted with the perfect as (Isocr. p. 163, a) *ὁ μὲν τοίνυν πόλεμος ἁπάντων ἡμᾶς τῶν εἰρημένων ἀπεστέρηκε· καὶ γὰρ πενεστέρους πεποίηκε καὶ πολλοὺς κινδύνους ὑπομένειν ἠνάγκασε* = 'of all that has been mentioned then the war *has deprived* us; for it *has* both *made* us poorer, and *compelled* us to undergo many dangers'; where the deprivation and impoverishment, as lasting up to the moment of speaking, are stated in the perfect, and the necessity of undergoing dangers, as being completely past, in the aorist.*

Obs. 2. **Aorist used for Other Tenses.** While these distinctions exist, it is just as true that the aorist is often found where the perfect or pluperfect might be expected. *a*) The first person of the aorist is used by the tragedians as a perfect, to denote opinions or emotions

* For the following parallel I am indebted to Weisse's German grammar p. 83. "The perfect is employed (in the German historical style) to distinguish facts and deeds as having had a great and lasting effect, and as being of universal importance as Nachdem dies in langen, ſchweren Kämpfen geſchehen war, hat ſie Julius Cäſar in ihrer Heimath aufgeſucht, und in jenen Feldzügen überwunden = 'After this had been accomplished by long and severe struggles, did Julius Cæsar seek them out in their own homes, and subdue them in those campaigns'". It is obvious that the English perfect would here be inadmissible in the translation.

of the speaker, which he may have expressed before, but still entertains, as (Soph. Phil. 1434) *καὶ σὺ ταῦτ', Ἀχιλλέως τέκνον, παρήνεσα* = 'and that is my advice to you, O son of Achilles' i. e. 'that is what I have advised and still advise'. So *ἐγέλασα, ἤνεσα, ἤσθην, ἀπέπτυσα, ἐδεξάμην*. This usage is probably due to the *usus ethicus;* for the *form* of a statement regarding one's self is less obtrusive, when made in a purely past tense like the aorist, than when made by the perfect which in Greek is always a present past.* It is in this way that Latham accounts for the aorist *ought* being used as a present in English (Eng. Lang. §. 473). The second person again of the Greek aorist is constantly used with *τί οὖν* as a perfect, to express a command interrogatively, as *τί οὖν οὐκ ἔλεξάς μοι;* = 'Why then have you not told me?' i. e. 'Tell me directly'. *b*) In like manner, and still more frequently the aorist was used for the pluperfect, as (Xen.) *Δαρεῖος Κύρον μεταπέμπεται ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς αὐτὸν σατράπην ἐποίησε* = 'Darius sends for Cyrus from the government of which *he had made* him satrap'. In particular, the aorist is constantly employed for the pluperfect after the conjunctions *ἐπεὶ, ἐπειδή, ὡς* (when), *ἕως, ἕστε, μέχρι, πρίν* (*οὐ — πρίν*); and when it is considered that these are the conjunctions which naturally introduce the pluperfect, it will become evident that that tense was to a great extent supplanted by the aorist even in classical Greek. The aggressive tendency of the aorist appears in the fact that, at the present day, while the ancient perfect and pluperfect have no existence, the ancient aorist remains intact in the daily speech of the Greek race, and often, as in ancient Greek, supplies their place. *c*) Like the present (§. 34) and perfect (§. 36. Obs. 1, *b*), the aorist is also rhetorically used of future events.

Obs. 3. **Iterative Aorist.** The aorist is employed, like the present, to denote what is *wont* to happen, as *τὰς τῶν φαύλων συν-*

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* It is well known that the Latin perfect represents both the perfect and the aorist of the Greek verb; and it is interesting in this connexion to observe the correspondence of such forms as *mordeo momordi*, *tango tetigi*, with *τύπτω τέτυφα* on the one hand, and of such others as *vivo vixi*, *scribo scripsi*, with *γράφω ἔγραψα* on the other. It would seem that, although the Latin future contains no trace of the Greek one, yet some of the Latin perfects were formed on the same type with the Greek perfects viz. by a reduplication, and others on the same type with the Greek first aorists, viz. by the assumption of a sibilant into the final syllable of the present; and this fact satisfactorily explains the twofold meaning of the Latin perfect, so that we can say both *veni ut videam* = 'I *have come* that I *may* see', and *veni ut viderem* = 'I *came* that I *might* see'.

ουσίας ὀλίγος χρόνος διέλυσε = 'a short time destroys the friendships of the bad'. Jelf (§. 402, 1) would explain this, which is a usage of the aorist, contrary to the general character of that tense, by supposing a reference in the speaker's mind to all the *past instances* of his statement, as we might say in English 'A short time ever destroyed the friendships of the bad'. This however would still be using the aorist, not as aorist, but instead of the perfect; for the time contemplated would evidently be all the past *up to the moment of speaking*. Besides, the aorist is so used in connexion with the present tense, as (Plat. Rep. VIII, 566, D) *Ἆρ' οὖν εἶπον, οὐ ταῖς μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ, προσγελᾷ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται πάντας ᾧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ, καὶ οὔτε τύραννός φησιν εἶναι, ὑποσχνεῖταί τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, χρεῶν τε ἠλευθέρωσε καὶ γῆν διένειμε δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτὸν, καὶ πᾶσιν ἵλεώς τε καὶ πρᾶος εἶναι προσποιεῖται*; = 'Well then, said I, does not (a tyrant), for the first few days smile upon and salute all, whomsoever he meets with, not calling himself sovereign at all, but making many promises both publicly and privately, yea *releasing* people from their debts, *apportioning* land to the public and to his own attendants, and affecting to be gracious and gentle towards all'. This iterative force of the aorist is more nearly allied to its natural meaning as the past of the future (§. 33. ** c) i. e. to its potential force. In the passage cited, *χρεῶν τε ἠλευθέρωσε* might be translated, '*would free* them from their debts too', without violence either to the sense or to the English idiom, for the *would* formula is often used to denote *habitual* action. * Thus (Xen. Cyr. VII, 1, 10) *ὁπότε προσβλέψειέ*** *τινος τῶν ἐν ταῖς τάξεσι, τότε μὲν εἶπεν ἄν κ. τ. λ.* = 'whenever he saw any of those in the ranks, then he *would say* &c.' i. e. 'was wont to say'. *Ἄν*, the sign of potentiality, is here employed, but all the augmented tenses of the Indicative are used potentially also without *ἄν*; and it is because they have an inherent fitness, by being pasts, to express what *would* take place on certain conditions being fulfilled, that *ἄν* accompanies *them* so often, and the unaugmented tenses never, except indeed, but very rarely, the future (§. 44. **).

§. 39. **Pluperfect Tense.** The Greek pluperfect

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* When the idea of constant recurrence, especially of a natural necessity, is to be strongly brought out, *φιλεῖν* or *θέλειν* = *solere*, is employed with the infinitive.

** *Προσβλέψειε* is here an example of what has been called the Optative "of indefinite frequency". It is used without *ἄν* after temporal conjunctions, relative words, and *εἰ* = 'as often as', when the leading verb is in a past tense, to denote recurring actions.

corresponds to the English. For the aorist as its substitute, see §. 38. Obs. 2, b. When the perfect has the sense of a present, the pluperfect has that of an imperfect, as κέκτημαι = 'I possess', ἐκεκτήμην = 'I possessed'; εἴωθα = 'I am wont', εἰώθειν = 'I was wont'.

§. 40. **Subjunctive and Optative Groups.** *a*) In briefly stating the nature of the Greek moods (§. 32.), mention was made of the Subjunctive mood, none of the Optative, the term Subjunctive having been purposely used to include both.* To understand the difference between the Groups of verbal forms in Greek, called respectively Subjunctive and Optative, the student must discard the notion that they are distinct *moods*, and learn to regard them merely as two *tenses* of the same mood; the group of forms called Subjunctive being *present* forms, and the group of forms called Optative being *past* forms of the Subjunctive Mood. It is found difficult to take this view because of the many

* To avoid confusion in the sequel, when the term *Subjunctive* is meant to comprehend all the forms commonly called Subjunctive and Optative, the word *Mood* will be added to it; but *Subjunctive* simply, or *Subjunctive Group* will be used to denote the forms commonly called *Subjunctive*, apart from those called *Optative*. Many recent writers, who include both under the name Subjunctive, call the Subjunctive Group, for distinction's sake, *Conjunctive*, a term which I decline; because, while it has the disadvantage of being an innovation, it has not the recommendation of being appropriate. It is supposed to be justified by the fact that the so-called *Conjunctive* is usually introduced by *conjunctions;* but this is also the case with the Optative, so that there is no ground of distinction here. Farther, it seems to have been overlooked by the patrons of this innovation that the *conjunctions* in question are only those which serve for the *sub*ordination of clauses, and which might therefore be called *sub*junctions, in contrast with the *con*junctions proper, the copulative for example, which serve for the *co*-ordination of clauses. The nomenclature proposed in the present work accommodates the old-established nomenclature to the real facts of the case, by calling the Subjunctive and Optative respectively *Groups*, and both together the *Subjunctive Mood.*

forms in each Group, called tenses, and named according to those tenses of the Indicative with which they are evidently cognate. Here again the student must de liver himself from the tyranny of names, and beware of transferring what has been said regarding the tenses of the Indicative to the Subjunctive and Optative forms called after them. The Subjunctive and Optative forms, called perfects, are still seldomer used than the perfect and pluperfect indicative;* and the future Optative is used only in the *oratio obliqua*, as the representative of the future indicative (§. 43.), so that the only Subjunctive and Optative forms in general use are those called present and aorist. Now, when these are taken in the proper sense of the Subjunctive Mood, i. e. as denoting contingency with subordination, they are distinguished not by a difference of time, but by this, that the present, whether Subj. or Opt. represents the operation denoted by the verb with the accessory idea of recurrence or continuance, and the aorist, whether Subj. or Opt., with the accessory idea of singleness or momentariness. In short the difference between them is the same as that between the imperfect and aorist indicative (§. 37. Obs. 1. §. 38. Obs. 1.). In regard therefore to the so called tenses of the Subj. and Opt. groups, time-notions must be got quit of as between tense and tense,** and retained only as between group and group. *b*) The forms of the Subjunctive group are entitled to be called *presents* of the Subjunctive mood, and those of the Optative group to be called *pasts* of the Subjunctive mood, because the

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* The perfect of the Subjunctive Group is used only after ἐάν, temporal conjunctions with ἄν, as ὅταν, and relatives with ἄν, when something is to be marked as past and completed, as (Pl. Rep. II, 376. A.) ὃν δ' ἂν γνώριμον (ἴδῃ ὁ κύων) ἀσπάζεται, κἂν μηδὲν πώποτε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθῃ = 'The dog salutes an acquaintance, when he sees one, *though he may* never *have received* any benefit from him'.

** In the *oratio obliqua* the Optative forms are really tenses i. e. indications of time, but only there (§. 43).

forms of the Subjunctive group express contingency on *present* circumstances, and those of the Optative, contingency on *past* circumstances. Hence the law for the sequence of tenses in dependent clauses viz. that the verb in the *dependent* clause must be taken from the Subj. or Opt. group, according as the tense in the leading clause is a principal tense, and consequently (§. 33.) relates to the *present* moment, or a historical tense, and consequently relates to a *past* moment. Thus σπουδάζω ἵνα μανθάνω or μάθω = 'I *am* at pains that I *may* learn'; ἐσπούδασα ἵνα μανθάνοιμι or μάθοιμι = 'I *was* at pains that I *might* learn'. This law is common to all languages, and is evidently founded in nature. Let it be observed then that neither μανθάνω nor μανθάνοιμι, in the above examples, though called presents, express present time, also that neither μάθω nor μάθοιμι, though called aorists, express past time; on the contrary that, just because they all express contingency, their own time-notion, so far as they have any, is that of futurity, the contingent circumstance of learning being in both cases *subsequent* to the studying: let it however be also noticed that, when the contingent circumstance of learning depends on *present* studying, forms from the Subjunctive group are used, and when the contingent circumstance of learning depends on *past* studying, forms from the Optative group are used, in the dependent clause; it will then be easily understood why the Subjunctive forms are called *presents* of the Subjunctive mood, and the Optative forms *pasts* of the Subjunctive mood.*

Obs. 1. **Origin of the Subjunctive and Optative Forms.** Usage establishes the *fact* that the Subjunctive forms express contingency

* So far as the sequence of tenses is concerned, the Imperative in all its tenses, and all forms of the Subjunctive group used absolutely are regarded as presents, and take a Subjunctive form in the dependent clause, as ἴωμεν ἐκεῖσε ἵν' ἴδωμεν = 'let us go there that we may see'. After the Optative with or without ἄν, either the Subj. or the Opt. may follow, but the latter is more common.

on *present* circumstances, and the Optative on *past;* the *reason* of the fact must be sought in the common origin of both groups. It was remarked in §. 4. that "the *coordination in form* of sentences *logically subordinate* is the primitive structure of language". Now the Subjunctive mood expresses not mere contingency, but contingency with subordination or dependence, and is therefore a development. From the multitude of dialects in the Greek of all ages, it may be taken for granted that, while the verb was not as yet consolidated, there were not simply a *μι* form and an *ω* form in presence, but a great many modifications of each; and from such præ-classical indicative forms, those of the Subjunctive and Optative Groups would seem to have been taken (§. 33. ** c). Setting aside the future Optative, as a by-form of the future indicative, used instead of it only, and far from uniformly, in the *oratio obliqua* (§. 43), the Subj. and Opt. groups together give just the number of tenses in the Indicative viz. six; and it is not difficult to identify the three Subjunctive forms with the unaugmented tenses,* and the three Optative forms with the augmented tenses of the præ-classical Indicative supposed. The correspondence of inflection points this out, as follows.

Pres. Indic. and Subj.	Imperf. Indic. and Opt.
τύπτ-ο/ω-μαι	(ἐ)τυπτ-ο/οι-μην
τύπτ-ε/η-σαι	(ἐ)τύπτ-ε/οι-σο
τύπτ-ε/η-ται	(ἐ)τύπτ-ε/οι-το
τυπτ-ο/ω-μεθον	(ἐ)τυπτ-ο/οι-μεθον
τύπτ-ε/η-σθον	(ἐ)τύπτ-ε/οι-σθον
τύπτ-ε/η-σθον	(ἐ)τυπτ-ε/οι-σθην
τυπτ-ο/ω-μεθα	(ἐ)τυπτ-ο/οι-μεθον
τύπτ-ε/η-σθε	(ἐ)τύπτ-ε/οι-σθε
τύπτ-ο/ω-νται	(ἐ)τύπτ-ο/οι-ντο

It thus appears that in the *μαι* form, which is the primitive and least mutilated form of the verb, the Subjunctive inflection differs from that of the unaugmented Indicative tenses, and the Optative inflection from that of the augmented Indicative tenses, only in the vowel-sounds of the penult or antepenult, those of the Indicative being short, and those of the Subjunctive Mood long.** The same correspondence is traceable,

* In this way the *aorist* in the Subjunctive group should be called the *future*, as being derived from a future indicative. Latham has proposed to give it this name (Eng. Lang. §. 497.).

** The reason of the rule, which makes the 3d person dual

though less clearly, in the ω form of the verb, and in the Optative termination of verbs in μι, which is the same as that of the imperfect Indicative viz. ην, as τιθείην and ἐτίθην. It is no objection that the μι termination of the Optative active of verbs in ω is not the termination of any past indicative tense; for all first persons singular whatsoever had originally a μ in their termination, that being the characteristic consonant of the first personal pronoun, by the addition of which to the verbal root the first person of the verb was formed. In this respect the Optatives in μι, though mutilated by the loss of the augment, are nearer the primitive type than the pasts of the Indicative. (For tables of primitive verbal forms, see New Cratylus §. 422.) Thus then, since the forms of the Subjunctive group appear to have been the unaugmented tenses, and those of the Optative group the augmented tenses of an old and enfeebled Indicative, it is quite in accordance with their origin that the Subjunctive forms should denote contingency on *present* circumstances, and the Optative forms contingency on *past* circumstances; for the unaugmented tenses are all related primarily to present time, and the augmented to past (§. 33).

Obs. 2. **Subjunctive for Optative.** *a*) Although the law i. e. the prevailing classical usage for the sequence of tenses be as stated in §. 40. b, it is a law frequently disregarded in favour of the Subjunctive forms, which often replace those of the Optative group. The historians, especially Thucydides, seem often to have thrown themselves so completely into the past events which they recorded, that these events became as present to them, and hence the Subjunctive follows a historic tense. Sometimes indeed both Subjunctive and Optative are found in a clause dependent on the same historical tense, as (Thuc. III, 22, 8) ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα...τοῖς πολεμίοις ᾖ, καὶ μὴ βοηθοῖεν = 'so that the signals *should be* concealed from the enemy, and they (the enemy) *should* not *bring succour*'. In such examples the Subjunctive form often expresses the more immediate or more certain contingency, and the Optative the more remote or more uncertain contingency. Apart however from the cases where some such explanation may apply, there are thousands where it must simply be admitted that forms of the Subjunctive group are used where those of the Optative, according to the law for the sequence of tenses, ought to be. *b*) The negligence with which the distinction was observed even by Attic writers on the one hand, and the eagerness with which critics have maintained it on the other,

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of the Subjunctive forms terminate in ον, as in the unaugmented tenses of the Indicative, and that of the Optative forms terminate in ην, as in the augmented tenses of the Indicative, thus becomes obvious.

have conspired to multiply the various readings, an Optative form having been often substituted for a Subjunctive one in the Codex, because it was supposed that the author must have written according to rule. In Homer the distinction is utterly neglected, and in post-Attic Greek the Subjunctive made gradual encroachments, till at length the Optative altogether disappeared before it. In the Septuagint and Apocrypha, the substitution of the Subjunctive for the Optative in dependent clauses is common; in the New Testament it is universal; and even in Plutarch, whose style was not that of the people, it prevails. It may therefore be concluded that, so early as the first century, the Optative forms, so far as the living language of the people was concerned, were *in articulo mortis;* and the historical explanation of their extinction* is a fine example of the important part played by mere sound in determining the forms of language. *c*) In the time of Julius Cæsar, the diphthong *οι* characteristic of the Optative, was pronounced as *ee* in the English word *see* (Blackie on the pronunciation of Greek p. 35.), and then too, or not long after, the *η* characteristic of the Subjunctive, came to be similarly pronounced. Now let any one consider the many persons of Subjunctive and Optative forms, which are identical in sound when *οι* and *η* are pronounced alike; and he will easily understand how they came to be confounded, first in conversation, and then in written composition. But a long period of approximation must have preceded the actual coalescing of the *οι* and *η* sounds; and accordingly, before the Subjunctive altogether supplanted the Optative, there was a long period in which the aggressive Subjunctive continually, and ever more and more rapidly, encroached on the domain of the Optative; for be it remarked that the converse substitution viz. of the Optative for the Subjunctive is quite exceptional; as (Aristoph. Ran. 24.) *τοῦτον δ' ὀχῶ, ἵνα μὴ ταλαιπωροῖτο, μηδ' ἄχθος φέροι* = 'but I let this fellow ride, in order that he *might* not *be distressed* or *carry* a burden'. Such cases are explained by critics variously, but always conjecturally: they are to be marked, but not imitated by the student. **

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* The few formulæ in which the Optative still appears among the Greeks, such as the *μὴ γένοιτο* of the N. T. are merely the coffins of the dead Optative.

** It is a curious fact that a similar process is going on at the present day in the French language, the present Subjunctive, which answers to the Subjunctive group in Greek, threatening to supplant the past Subjunctive which answers to the Optative group. Such sounds as *que nous marchassions* displease the Parisian ear; and accordingly the only person of the Past Subjunctive still heard in Parisian conversation is the third, *qu'il mar-*

Obs. 3. **May and Might**, when signs of the Subjunctive Mood as in 'I tell you that you *may* know', and 'I told you that you *might* know', are translated, the former by a Subjunctive and the latter by an Optative form; but when indicative of permission or power, they must be translated by separate Greek verbs of a correspondent signification. Thus 'you *may* speak if you like' = *ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, εἰ βούλει*: 'you *might have* spoken if you liked' = *ἐξῆν σοι λέγειν, εἰ ἐβούλου*. If *power* be meant, as sometimes by *may*, and oftener by *can*, then *ἔνεστι* means what is *possible*, *πάρεστι* what is *easy to be done*. So also of *mere power δύναμαι* and *οἷόντε εἶναι*, which are synonymes.

§. 41. **Subjunctive Forms taken Absolutely.** *a*) There is a remarkable affinity in meaning between the future indicative and the forms of the Subjunctive group. It appears even to the eye in the Latin verb (§. 33. ** c.), and forces itself upon our notice in translating from one language into another, as *mittunt legatos qui dicant* = *πέμπουσι πρέσβεις οἵτινες λέξουσι* = 'they send ambassadors who shall say' (§. 28. * §. 35. Obs. 1.). These interchanges are due to the natural affinity existing between contingency on *present* circumstances and futurity. Accordingly, the Subjunctive forms occur in the sense of a future indicative, as (Il. I. 262.) *οὐ γάρ πω τοίους ἴδον ἀνέρας, οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι* = 'for I have never seen such men, nor *shall I see* them'. But this use of the Subjunctive which is often accompanied by *κέ*, is almost confined to Epic writers and the tragedians, and is most common with the negative *οὐ μή* (§. 48. Obs. 12.). *b*) Akin to this future is what has been called the *deliberative* Subjunctive, as (Eur. Ion. 758.) *εἴπωμεν ἢ σιγῶμεν, ἢ τί δράσομεν*; 'shall we speak or shall we be silent? or what shall we do?' where the coordination of the subjunctive with the future indicative is very significant as

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*châ*t, where the sibilants are wanting. In the south of France, where the neighbourhood of the Italian *bocca larga* exerts an influence, the Past Subjunctive is still in use; but, from the literary sovereignty of the capital, there is every probability of the Past Subjunctive disappearing from the French verb, as the Optative has disappeared from the Greek one.

to the meaning of the former. *c*) The lingual forms of our own language recognise an affinity among the ideas of futurity, obligation, and command: thus if a man say 'this shall be done', all the three are more or less involved. Accordingly, as the future indicative is used imperatively (§. 35.) so are certain forms of the Subjunctive group. These are the 1st pers. plur. as *ἴωμεν* = *eamus* = 'let us go', preceded often by *ἴθι*, *ἄγε*, *φέρε*, *εἰπέ*, *ἴδε*, and the 1st pers. sing., which is seldom used without these prefixes, as *φέρε δὴ τὰς μαρτυρίας ὑμῖν ἀναγνῶ* = 'come now, let me read to you the evidence'. Also the 2d and 3d persons of the aorist with *μή* in prohibitions, as *μηδενὶ συμφορὰν ὀνειδίσῃς* = '*reproach* no one with misfortune'.

§. 42. **Optative Forms taken Absolutely.** *a*) The Optative forms occur absolutely in the truly optative sense, as expressing a *wish* that something should happen *now* or *in the future*: as (Soph. Aj. 550.) *ὦ παῖ γένοιο πατρὸς εὐτυχέστερος* = 'My child, *may'st thou be* more fortunate than thy father!' In negative wishes *μή*, never *οὐ*, must be used, as *μὴ γένοιτο* = 'let it not be'! This optative power is not the essence of the Optative forms, but is derived by an elliptical construction, common in language, from these forms as pasts of the Subjunctive mood. So in Italian *Oh avessi danaro!* = 'Oh, that I had money!' Compare *volesse Iddio* = *plût à Dieu* = 'would to God!' *b*) A wish expressed in the 2d or 3d person, and addressed to human beings, is a mild form of command, and in this case the Optative may be interchanged with the Imperative. *c*) The Optative forms are also sometimes *deliberative*, like those of the Subjunctive group, but with this difference that, as expressing contingency on *past* circumstances, they imply a certain hopelessness; so *ποῖ τις φύγῃ*; = 'whither *may* (or *can*) one flee?' but *ποῖ τις φύγοι*; = 'whither *might* (or *could*) one flee?'

Obs. **Impossible Wishes.** All sorts of wishes are often intro-

duced by *εἰ*, *εἴθε* (Hom. *αἰ*, *αἴθε*), *εἰ γάρ*, *ὡς*. A wish regarding the past, and now impossible of fulfilment, is expressed by the imperfect or aorist *indicative*, as *εἴθε σοὶ τότε συνεγενόμην* = 'oh that I had then been with thee!' or by *ὤφελον* (I ought) with the aorist infinitive, as *ὀλέσθαι ὤφελον τῇδ' ἡμέρᾳ* = 'oh that I had perished on that day!' But *ὤφελον* with the *present* infinitive denotes an impossible wish regarding the *present*, as (Il. I, 415.) *αἰθ' ὄφελες παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀδάκρυτος καὶ ἀπήμων ἧσθαι* = 'oh that you were (now) sitting beside the ships, without a tear, and without a wrong!'

§. 43. **Optative forms in the Oratio Obliqua.** In most languages there are different forms for the *oratio recta* or direct statement, and the *oratio obliqua* or indirect statement. Thus *οἱ Ἰνδοὶ ἔλεξαν ὅτι πέμψειε σφᾶς ὁ Ἰνδῶν βασιλεύς* = (Scoticé) 'The Indians said that the king o' the Indians *suld hae sent* them',* where, it will be observed, the Optative is used. The forms of the Optative group however are those of the *oratio obliqua* in Greek, only when the *oratio obliqua* is introduced by a *historical* tense; for, as the Optative denotes contingency on *past* circumstances, it may not be used when the *oratio obliqua* is introduced by a *principal* tense, unless indeed by the present used historially (§. 33. * p. 63.). It is in the *oratio obliqua* so introduced that the Optative forms have the force of the *tenses* after which they are respectively named, the pres. Opt. representing the pres. and imperf. Indic., the fut. Opt. representing the fut. Indic., the aor. Opt. the aor. Indic., and the perf. Opt. the perf. and plup. Indic. This conversion of the moods is best shewn in examples:

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* Here is an instance from Hume's history of England: "The general report is that he *should have said* in confidence to Clifford that, if he was sure that the young prince, who appeared in Flanders, was really son to king Edward, he never would bear arms against him". In this passage *he should have said* is a Scotticism for *he said*, there being no separate form for the *oratio obliqua* in English. The Scotticism is quite classical in German, er ſoll geſagt haben, or er habe geſagt.

Pres. Opt. for Pres. Indic. (Thuc. II. 13, 1.)

O. R. *Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν ἐμοὶ ξένος ἐστίν* = 'Archidamus indeed *is* my guest'.

O. O. *Περικλῆς ... προηγόρευε ... ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν οἱ ξένος εἴη* = 'Pericles declared that Archidamus *was* his guest'.

Pres. Opt. for Imperf. Indic. (Xen. Hell. VII. 1, 38.)

O. R. *οὔτε συσκηνοῦν ἤθελεν ἐμοί, μετά τε Πελοπίδου πάντα ἐβουλεύετο* = 'he *refused* to live in the same tent with me, and *laid* all his *plans* in concert with Pelopidas'.

O. O. *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφίκοντο οἱ πρέσβεις ἕκαστος οἴκαδε, τὸν μὲν Τιμαγόραν ἀπέκτειναν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, κατηγοροῦντος τοῦ Λέοντος ὡς οὔτε συσκηνοῦν ἐθέλοι ἑαυτῷ, μετά τε Πελοπίδου πάντα βουλεύοιτο* = 'but when the several ambassadors reached their respective homes, the Athenians put Timagoras to death, on the accusation of Leon that he *had refused* to live in the same tent with him, and *was laying* all his plans in concert with Pelopidas'.

Fut. Opt. for Fut. Indic.* (Xen. An. I. 4, 11.)

O. R. *ἡ ὁδὸς ἔσεται πρὸς βασιλέα μέγαν* = 'our march *will be* to the great king'.

O. O. *Κῦρος ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἡ ὁδὸς ἔσοιτο πρὸς βασιλέα μέγαν* = 'Cyrus said that their march *would be* to the great king'.

Aorist. Opt. for Aorist Indic. (Xen. An. II. 4, 22.)

O. R. *οἱ βάρβαροι ὑπέπεμψαν τὸν ἄνθρωπον* = 'the barbarians *sent* the man *privately*'.

O. O. *τότε δὴ καὶ ἐγνώσθη ὅτι οἱ βάρβαροι ὑποπέμψαιεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον* = 'then it was known that the barbarians *had sent* the man *privately*'.

Perf. Opt. for Perf. Indic. (Xen. An. I. 2, 21.)

O. R. *Συέννεσις λέλοιπε τὰ ἄκρα* = 'Syennesis *has left* the heights'.

O. O. *ἦκεν ἄγγελος λέγων ὅτι Συέννεσις λελοιπὼς εἴη τὰ ἄκρα* = 'a messenger came saying that Syennesis *had left* the heights'.

Pres. Opt. for Imperf. Indic. after *historic* present (Xen. I. 1, 3.)

O. R. *ἐπεβούλευε αὐτῷ* = '*he was plotting* against him (his brother)'.

O. O. *Τισσαφέρνης διαβάλλει τὸν Κῦρον πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοι αὐτῷ* = 'Tissaphernes accuses Cyrus to his brother, to the effect that *he was plotting* against him'.

The optative forms represent in the *oratio obliqua* not on-

* This is the least common substitution of all.

ly the Indicative of the leading clause in the *oratio recta*, but also the Indicative and Subjunctive (when the latter is introduced by a relative or a conjunction with ἄν) of the *accessory* clauses in the *oratio recta*, except when the verb in these accessory clauses is in the imperfect or aorist indicative. Thus δώσω ἃ δυνήσομαι, and δώσω ἃ ἄν εὕρω become, in the *oratio obliqua*, ἔλεγεν ὅτι δώσοι ἃ δυνήσοιτο, and ἔλεγεν ὅτι δώσοι ἃ εὕροι respectively; but ἔδωκα ἃ εἶχον merely ἔλεγεν ὅτι δοίη ἃ εἶχε.

Obs. 1. **Indicative for Optative.** The nice distinction expressed by the use of the Optative in the *oratio obliqua*, that namely between a transaction viewed as a *fact* and the same transaction viewed merely as a *conception*, was not uniformly observed even by the Attic writers, and still less so by those who preceded and followed them. In Homer ὅτι is not once found with the Optative; and in the New Testament there is not a single instance of the Optative being used in consequence of the *oratio obliqua* (Moses Stuart's Grammar §. 131. 3. Note 2.). In Attic they are sometimes interchanged as (Xen. An. II. 1, 3.) ἔλεγον ὅτι Κῦρος μὲν τέθνηκεν, Ἀριαῖος δὲ πεφευγὼς εἴη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων βαρβάρων = 'they said that Cyrus *was dead*, and that Ariæus *had fled* with the other barbarians'. Here, as often, the more important, or more certain event is stated in the Indicative, the less important or less certain in the Optative. *

Obs. 2. **Tenses in the Oratio Obliqua.** Whatever mood be used in the *oratio obliqua*, the student must not be misled as to the tense by that English idiom, which puts a *past* tense in the declarative clause, whenever the leading verb is *past*. Thus an English orator, repelling a charge tantamount to the δεινὰ ποιεῖ of Aeschines, might say, 'the honourable gentleman *exclaimed* that I *did* terrible things'; but Demosthenes retained the present, ἐβόα ὁ βάσκανος οὗτος ὅτι δεινὰ ποιῶ = 'this detestable fellow *exclaimed*

* In German also either the Indicative, or the Subjunctive mood may in general (§. 100 *) be used in the *oratio obliqua*, and with much the same distinction as in Greek viz. that the use of the Indicative implies the certainty of the event in the speaker's view, while the use of the subjunctive mood implies no such guarantee. Thus er ſagt, er iſt gefallen = 'he says he has fallen', implies that the speaker believes the saying true, whereas er ſagt, er ſei gefallen, which cannot be translated otherwise into English, leaves the truth or falsehood of the statement an open question.

that *I do* terrible things'. The rule in Greek is to retain in the *indirect* statement, whatever tense was in the *direct* one. Thus, in the fourth example of this section, the English of the *indirect* statement would suggest the pluperfect, but that of the corresponding *direct* statement shews that the aorist must be used.

§. 44. **Ἄν with the Finite Verb.** Ἄν is supposed to be cognate with ἀνά, and its Epic equivalents κέ, κά with κατά, both in the sense of 'according to': at all events this derivation agrees with their force, which is to represent the operation denoted by the verb, with which they are joined, as taking place or not *according as* certain conditions, expressed or understood, are fulfilled or not, as (Plat. Gorg. p. 516. E.) εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον = 'if they were good men, they would certainly not be suffering these things', as if '*in that case* they suffered them not'. Ἄν became the established sign of potentiality in Greek,* and in this capacity is found with all the tenses of the Indicative, except the present and perfect,** and with all optative forms. As the imperfect and aorist, however, are the past tenses in most frequent use at any rate, so especially they are the tenses with which ἄν is most frequently found. Even without ἄν these tenses in the Indicative are sometimes potential (§. 37. Obs. 2.); but this is a quasi-rhetorical usage, and they become *formally* so with ἄν. The optative, as expressing contingency on past circumstances, has an inherent fitness to express potentiality, and sometimes does so without ἄν, but only in poetry, as (Moschus I. 6.) ἐν εἴκοσι πᾶσι μάθοις νιν † = 'among whole twenty you might (could or would)

* Ἄν, the sign of potentiality, may be distinguished from ἄν = 'if' by this, that, whereas the latter *introduces* its clause, the former, except in short parentheses, as ἄν τις φαίη = 'one might say', never does.

** Ἄν is hardly ever found with the *future* indicative, but the Epic κέ very often, not as adding anything to the sense of the future, but as a mere expletive coinciding with it.

† In Hermann's edition, instead of μάθοις νιν stands μάθοις κεν· but he says in a note "Libri μάθοις νιν".

know him'. The English correspondents of the Greek potential forms are as follows:

ἡμάρτανες ἄν = you would err
ἥμαρτες ἄν = you would have erred
ἁμαρτάνοις ἄν = you would err (§. 95. Obs.).

Obs. 1. **Ἄν with the Indicative.** The above being the almost invariable force of the imperfect and aorist indicative respectively with ἄν, it must yet be mentioned that the imperfect is found in the sense of the aorist, chiefly however to denote an abiding state, or continued series of actions, as (Xen. M. S. I. 1, 5.) δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν προέλεγεν, εἰ μὴ ἐπίστευεν ἀληθεύσειν = 'it is evident then that he *would* not *have foretold*, unless he believed that he would turn out a true prophet', where Socrates' *usual* manner of discourse is in question. So always ἐβουλόμην ἄν = 'I should have wished'; but βουλοίμην ἄν = 'I should wish'. Sometimes also (§. 95. Obs. *), but very rarely, the aorist is used, where we should have expected the imperfect. (Madv. §. 117, a. Rem. 1.)

Obs. 2. **Ἄν with the Optative.** Whilst the potential indicative cannot be used except in connexion with some condition expressed or understood, the potential optative may be used *absolutely*, like what is called the *Conditional* in the French and Italian verbs, but with a more extensive range of signification, to denote what is conceivable or possible. It may be translated, according to circumstances, by any of the auxiliaries of the English potential, as τοῦτο γένοιτ' ἄν = 'this might be'; οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τοῦτο = 'this could'nt be'; ταῦτα εἴποι τις ἄν = 'one would say so'; ἡδέως ἂν θεασαίμην τὴν Ἀκρόπολιν = 'I should like to see the Acropolis'. So in polite questions, Ἆρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν Γοργίας ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; = 'Would Gorgias desire to converse with us?' The potential sense is more nearly allied to that of the Indicative than to that of the Subjunctive mood, as clearly appears from the optative potential forms being used *absolutely* (§. 48. Obs. 1, c.). Often indeed their only difference from the Indicative is in giving a modest or polite turn to the expression, as βουλοίμην ἂν σὲ ἐρωτᾶν τι, instead of βούλομαι, just as we say 'I should like to ask you something' instead of directly 'I wish to &c.'. It is no wonder then that the optative potential forms should be used for the future indicative, even when the assertion intended is really very positive, as οὐκ ἂν φεύγοις = 'you would'nt escape' i. e. if you attempted it, hence 'you sha'nt escape'.

Obs. 3. **Ἄν in Subjunctive Clauses.** In Subjunctive clauses ἄν refers, not to the verb, but to the conjunction or relative which introduces the verb. Accordingly, whereas in Optative clauses it is usually associated with the verb, in Subjunctive clauses it is usually associated with the introductory conjunction or relative, in some

cases indeed has coalesced with the conjunction, as ἐάν = εἰ ἄν, ὅταν = ὅτε ἄν κ. τ. λ. It affects their meaning very much as the English suffix *ever* affects the meaning of the words to which it is appended, as ὅτε = 'when', ὅταν = 'whenever', ὅς = 'who', ὅς ἄν = 'whoever'. Now ἐάν, and all temporal conjunctions with ἄν, whether ἄν be attracted into the conjunction, as in ὅταν, or separated from it, as in ἕως ἄν, and all relative words with ἄν, whether declinable as ὅς ἄν, or indeclinable as ὅπου ἄν, uniformly take verbs of the Subjunctive group,* expressing contingency on present circumstances. Hence ὃ ἐγένετο = 'what came to pass', but ὃ ἄν γένηται = 'whatever may or shall come to pass'; ὅτε παρεγένετο = 'when he appeared', but ὅταν παραγένηται = 'whenever he may or shall appear', or 'shall have appeared'. Compare ὅσους εἶδεν = 'as many as he saw' (on some one occasion), ὅσους ἴδοι = 'as many as he might see' (i. e. saw on recurring occasions; Opt. of indefinite frequency §. 38. Obs. 3, **), ὅσους ἂν ἴδῃ = 'as many as he may or shall see' (on some future occasion). How nearly allied contingency on present circumstances, as expressed by the subjunctive, is to the futurity of the indicative, appears again in these examples.

§. 45. **The Imperative Mood, and its Tenses.** *a*) All commands necessarily regard the future; and that distinction between the present and aorist, which is independent of time (§. 40, a.), recurs in the Imperative as (Dem.) λαβὲ τὰς μαρτυρίας καὶ ἀνάγνωσκε = '*take* the testimonies and *read* them'; the *taking* is momentary, and therefore in the aorist, the *reading* continuative, and therefore in the present. Often however they are confounded, and λαβὲ τὰς μαρτυρίας καὶ ἀνάγνωθι also occurs. *b*) The perfect denotes either an impatient command, or a desire that a thing *should remain as it has been done;* so ταῦτα ἡμῖν λελέχθω = 'let these things have been said by us' i. e. 'let them remain as they have been said', and τέθναθι = 'lie dead'.** *c*) In prohibitions

* In the poets the relative, even without ἄν, is taken indefinitely, and construed with the Subjunctive, as (Soph. Oed. Col. 395) γέροντα δ' ὀρθοῦν, φλαῦρον, ὃς νέος πέσῃ = 'but it is a poor thing to raise a man up when old, who fell when young'.

** The use of a perfect form to express a command, which necessarily regards the future, may be illustrated by the use of the German past participle, with the ellipsis of course of a finite verb, to denote the same, as ſtillgeſtanden = 'stand still', zuge-

with μή, the aorist Subjunctive is commonly used instead of the aorist imperative: the latter occurs now and then in the 3d person with μή, hardly ever in the 2d.

Obs. **Oratio Variata.** The singular phrase οἶσθ' ὃ δρᾶσον may be noticed here. Literally it means, 'Knowest thou what? — do it' i. e. 'Knowest thou what thou must do?' It is really a case of *oratio variata*, with which compare (Luke V. 14.) καὶ αὐτὸς παρήγγειλεν αὐτῷ μηδενὶ εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀπελθὼν δεῖξον σεαυτὸν τῷ ἱερεῖ = 'and he commanded him *to tell* no man, but to go and *shew himself* to the priest', (lit.) 'but go and *shew thyself*'.

§. 46. **The Infinitive and its Tenses.** The future infinitive always retains its force as a future; but the other tenses are related precisely as in the Subjunctive group, i. e. the perfect is seldom used, while the present and aorist are either confounded, or distinguished as in §. 40, a. After verbs *declarandi et sentiendi* however, the Infinitive forms are in general really tenses i. e. indications of time. When a *past* tense of such verbs introduces the infinitive, the present, the perfect or aorist, and the future infinitive are used respectively to denote what was present, past, or future at the time of the verb *declarandi et sentiendi*, as οὐκ ἔφασαν τὰς ναῦς παρεῖναι = 'they denied that the ships *were there*' (i. e. *at* the time of denying); τοὺς στρατιώτας ἥξειν ἐνόμιζον = 'they thought that the soldiers *would come*' (i. e. *after* the time of thinking); ὡμολόγει κεκομίσθαι τὴν προῖκα = 'he acknowledged that he *had received* the dowry' (i. e. *before* the time of acknowledging); Ἐπάξα ἐλέγετο Κύρῳ δοῦναι πολλὰ χρήματα = 'Epyaxa was said *to have given* Cyrus much money (i. e. *before* the time when it was so said). (For English idiom which is not Greek, see §. 43. Obs. 2.) After a *present* verb *declarandi et sentiendi*, the sole difference is that only the aorist, not the perfect, is used of events completely past.

Obs. 1. **Confusion of Tenses.** *a*) When the infinitive denotes

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fahren = 'drive on' i. e. let something be done that shall result in the states expressed by these past participles.

a purpose, or anything akin to a purpose, not only a present and an aorist, but even a perfect may be used, so weak is the time-notion, as (Pl. Rep. 3, 406.) *Ὁ κάμνων ἀξιοῖ .... ἀπηλλάχθαι τοῦ νοσήματος* = 'The sick man claims to be delivered from his disease'. *b*) In some passages, verbs of *hoping* and *promising*, which naturally and usually take the future infinitive, are found with the present, and sometimes even with the aorist, as (Thuc. V. 109.) *οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐς νῆσόν γε αὐτοὺς, ἡμῶν ναυκρατόρων ὄντων, περαιωθῆναι* = 'it is not likely that they (the Lacedæmonians) *will cross over* to the island, while we (the Athenians) are masters of the sea'; and (Xen. M. S. I. 1, 3.) *καίτοι γε οὐδὲ πώποτε ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι τούτου* = 'although indeed he never promised *to be* a teacher of this', in which last example the Greek and English idioms agree. These anomalies are quite inexplicable, if we insist on regarding the tenses of the Infinitive as always *tenses* properly so called i. e. indications of time. But they are easily explicable, if we simply acknowledge the fact that the so-called tenses of the Infinitive were used as verbal substantives, like the English gerund. In this way *οὐκ εἰκὸς ... αὐτοὺς περαιωθῆναι* = 'their crossing over is not likely'; and so *ἀπαλλαχθῆναι* = 'deliverance'.

Obs. 2. **Potential Infinitive.** It has been said (§. 32.) that the Infinitive is not itself properly a mood: with *ἄν* however it becomes potential. It is not certain that the *future* infinitive is ever found with *ἄν* in Attic: the common forms, and their force are thus represented:

γράφειν ἄν = scripturum esse
γεγραφέναι ἄν = scripturum fuisse
} = *γράψαι ἄν.*

Examples are the following, and, as the aorist is used in both of them, it will be seen how wide is the range of that tense in the infinitive, as in other moods: *μάλιστα οἶμαι ἂν σοῦ πυθέσθαι* (*ὅτι πυθοίμην ἄν*) = 'I think that I *might* (*could, would* or *should*) *learn* best from you'; *Κῦρος, εἰ ἐβίωσεν, ἄριστος ἂν**

* Notice the position of *ἄν* here. Usually it stands beside the word which it qualifies, but often it is attracted, as in the above instance, into juxtaposition with the most emphatic word standing at the head of the clause. Grammarians add that it is sometimes transferred from the optative in the dependent clause, to which it really belongs, to the indicative verb in the principal clause, particularly when that principal clause is *οὐκ οἶδα*, as (Eur. Med. 941) *οὐκ οἶδ' ἂν εἰ πείσαιμι, πειρᾶσθαι δὲ χρή* = 'I don't know if I shall succeed in persuading, but I must try'. Instead of any such dislocation however, it seems more natural to regard *ἄν* as really affecting *οἶδα*, and forming with it a modest dubitative expression, similar to our own 'I *should* say so', politely used for 'I say so'.

δοκεῖ ἄρχων γενέσθαι (οἶμαι ὅτι ἂν ἐγένετο) = 'It seems that Cyrus, had he lived, *would have proved* an excellent ruler'. The object of the above parentheses is to illustrate the rule, that *ἄν* is used with the infinitive, only when, if the infinitive clause were turned into one with a finite verb, *ἄν* would still be in it.

Obs. 3. **Elliptical Infinitive.** *a*) The Infinitive is occasionally used for the Imperative of the second person, and, in the most ancient Greek, for the third as well, as (Hom.) *παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λῦσαί τε φίλην, τά τ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι* = '*give up* to me my dear child, and *accept* the ransom'. It is even interchanged with the Imperative, as (Il. 280—4.) 'If, on the one hand, Alexander slay Menelaus', *αὐτὸς ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην ἔχέτω* = 'then *let* him *keep* Helen ... if, on the other hand, Menelaus slay Alexander', *Τρῶας ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην ἀποδοῦναι* = 'then *let* the Trojans *restore* Helen'. The Italians have the same idiom, but confined to prohibitions, as *non dir questo* = 'do'nt say so', *non credere ciò* = 'do'nt believe that'. The usage is explicable by an ellipsis, like the salutation *χαίρειν*, as *τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν* (*κελεύω* understood) = 'Good morning, Ion': so *non temere* = 'dont fear', is explained by *non devi temere*. *b*) The Infinitive is also used to express necessity or duty, and that in reference to all the three persons, *δεῖ* or *χρή* being understood, as (Herod. VIII. 109.) *νῦν μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι καταμείναντες ἡμέων τε αὐτέων ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῶν οἰκετέων* = 'now then having settled in Greece, *we must take care* of ourselves and our domestics'. *c*) Farther, with *αἰ γάρ*, or *εἴθε*, the Infinitive denotes a wish as (Od. VII. 311 and sqq.) *αἰ γὰρ... παῖδα τ' ἐμὴν ἐχέμεν* = 'Oh that I had my daughter', *ὤφελον, -ες, -ε* being understood: but this is scarcely found except in the Odyssey. *d*) Lastly, the Infinitive stands for the deliberative subjunctive of the first and second persons, some such word as *πρέπει* being understood, as (Herod. I. 88.) *ὦ βασιλεῦ κότερον λέγειν πρὸς σὲ τὰ νοέων τυγχάνω, ἢ σιγᾶν ἐν τῷ παρέοντι χρόνῳ* = 'O king, whether *shall I say* what is now in my mind, or *be silent* for the present'.

Obs. 4. **Adverbial Infinitive.** The infinitive appears in a number of adverbial phrases, as *ἑκὼν εἶναι* = 'to be willing' i. e. 'willingly,' like our 'to be sure' = 'certainly'. Thus (Thuc. II. 89, 8.) *τὸν δὲ ἀγῶνα οὐκ ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ ἑκὼν εἶναι ποιήσομαι* = 'I shall not join battle in the gulf *with my will*'. So *ἐμοί δοκεῖν* = 'as seems to me'; *ὀλίγου δεῖν* = 'almost'; *τὸ νῦν εἶναι* = 'in present circumstances'; *κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι* = 'in this respect'; *τὸ κατὰ τοῦτον εἶναι* = 'as far as he is concerned'. *Ὡς* often introduces these infinitives, particularly in Herodotus, as *ὡς εἰπεῖν* or *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* = 'so to say'; *ὡς δὲ συνελόντι εἰπεῖν* = 'and to say (it) in brief'; *ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖν* = 'as it seems to me at least'; (Herod. VII. 24.) *ὡς μὲν ἐμὲ συμβαλλεόμενον εὑρίσκειν* = 'as I at least, on consideration, find'. So (Thuc. I. 21, 1.) *ὡς παλαιὰ εἶναι* = 'as

being ancient'. Similarly *ὅσον γέ μ' εἰδέναι*, and *ὅ,τι μ' εἰδέναι* = *quantum sciam* = 'as far as I know'.

§. 47. **The Participles.** The participial forms are always strictly tenses i. e. indications of time, and their distribution as tenses, in reference to those of the Indicative, is precisely the same as that of the Optative forms in the *oratio obliqua* (§. 43.). By the assignment of a coincident, anterior, or subsequent action, they denote a variety of circumstances, as *time*, *ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἀπήειν* = 'having said this I departed'; *manner*, *γελῶν εἶπε* = 'he said laughing'; *means*, *ληϊζόμενοι ζῶσιν* = 'they live by plunder'; *cause*, *τοῦ κέρδους ἀπεσχόμην αἰσχρὸν νομίζων* = 'I abstained from gain, deeming it base'; *purpose*, *οἱ δὲ μετήισαν ἄξοντες* = 'they went after *to fetch him*'. The future alone expresses purpose, and it is constantly so used after verbs of *coming* and *going*. The participles *ἔχων*, *λαβών*, *φέρων*, *ἄγων* often represent the English *with*, as *ὤφθη ξίφος ἔχων* = 'he was seen *with* a sword', *ἄγων* being used of animate things, *φέρων* of inanimate, and the first two of both. So also *χρώμενος*, as *πολλῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος τοὺς πολεμίους ἐνίκησεν* = '*with much skill* he conquered the enemy'.

Obs. 1. **Definitions of Participial Force.** Adverbial words often accompany the participle to bring out its peculiar force, viz. *ἅμα*, *μεταξύ*, denoting *simultaneity*, as *οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐμάχοντο ἅμα πορευόμενοι* = 'the Greeks fought *while* marching'; *αὐτίκα*, *εὐθύς*, denoting *immediate sequence*, as *τῷ δεξιῷ κέρᾳ εὐθὺς ἀποβεβηκότι ἐπέκειντο* = 'they pressed upon the right wing *immediately* on its landing'; *ἅτε*, *ἅτε δή*, *οἷον*, *οἷα δή*, denoting the *cause*, as *κατέδαρθε πάνυ πολὺ ἅτε μακρῶν τῶν νυκτῶν οὐσῶν* 'he slept a great while, *as* the nights were long'; *καίπερ* denoting *concession*, as *οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἠδὺ γέλασσαν* = 'and, grieved *though* they were, they laughed heartily at him'; *ὡς*, *ὥσπερ*, denoting a *conception*, as *ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐβλέπομεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα ἀκουσόμενοι θαυμασίους τινὰς λόγους* = 'we all looked to him *as* about to (i. e. in the notion that we should immediately) hear some very wonderful discourse'. Here the conception is causal, but it is often merely the apparent cause, or pretext.

Obs. 2. **Participle involving complementary Clause.** The Greek

participle often supplies the place of an Indicative clause with *ὅτι*, complementary to a principal one. When the subject of both propositions is the same, the participle is put in the nominative as *μέμνησο ἄνθρωπος ὤν* = 'remember that you are a man'; *δειχθήσομαι ποιήσας τι* = 'I shall be shown to have done something (that I have done)'. When a reflexive pronoun accompanies the verb, the participle may agree either with it, or with the subject of the verb, as *ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ* or *ἐπιστάμενος* = 'I am not conscious that I know anything'; *ἑαυτὸν οὐδεὶς ὁμολογεῖ κακοῦργον ὄντα* or *κακοῦργος ὤν* = 'no one acknowledges himself to be (that he is) wicked'. When the subjects of the two propositions are different, the participle is put in whatever case the principal verb may require, as *ἠσθόμην αὐτῶν οἰομένων εἶναι σοφωτάτων* = 'I perceived that they thought themselves very wise'; *μηδέποτε μετεμέλησέ μοι σιγήσαντι, φθεγξαμένῳ δὲ πολλάκις* = 'It never repented me that I was silent, but often that I spoke'; *γνῶτε ἀναγκαῖον ὂν ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεσθαι* = 'Know that it is necessary for you to be brave men'. All verbs of *knowledge* and *experience* may introduce such participles i. e. participles involving a sentence.

Obs. 3. **Participle involving complementary verbal Idea.** After a number of neuter verbs, particularly those denoting *continuance* or *cessation*, *satisfaction* or *weariness*, *being right* or *wrong*, the participle is put in concord with the *subject* of the verb, to complete the meaning of the verb, not to add a new proposition, as in the former case. Thus *διατέλει με ἀγαπῶν* = 'continue-loving me', where the whole verbal notion is represented by *διατέλει-ἀγαπῶν*. So *μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν* = 'do'nt weary-benefitting a friend'. In like manner the object of the verb receives a complement from a participle in concord after *παύω*, *περιορῶ*, *εὑρίσκω*, *καταλαμβάνω*, *φωρῶ*, and here the English idiom allows the participle to be literally translated, as *παῦσον τὸν ἄνδρα ὑβρίζοντα* = 'make the man give over *insulting*'.

Obs. 4. **Adverbial Participle.** Some participles have an adverbial force, as *ἀνύσας ἄνοιγε* = 'open *quickly*'; *τελευτῶν συνεχώρησε* = '*at last* he yielded'; *τί ληρεῖς ἔχων;* = 'why do you talk nonsense *continually*', or 'why do you *keep* talking nonsense' (§. 36. Obs. 2.). Emphatic forms for *τί;* = 'why', are *τί μαθών;* as if '*from what information*', and *τί παθών;* as if '*under what impulse*' do you do so and so? both always in the way of censure, the former in regard to deliberate, and the latter in regard to unintentional errors. In indirect questions *ὅ,τι μαθών* occurs in the same sense. With verbs of *motion* or *change*, *φέρων*, and sometimes *φερόμενος*, denote precipitation or vehemence, as *εἰς ταῦτα φέρων περιέστησε τὰ πράγματα* = 'to that pass he *has gone* and brought our affairs'.

Obs. 5. **Participle involving principal Predicate.** At other times the participle contains the principal idea, the affirmation in fact of the sentence, and the accompanying finite verb has an adverbial force, as *ὡς δὲ ἦλθον, ἔτυχεν ἀπιών* = 'when I came, he *was* just* *going away*'; *ταῦτα ποιήσας, ἔλαθεν ὑπεκφυγώς* = 'having done this, he *got off* unobserved'; *χαίρουσιν ἐπαινοῦντες* = '*they praise* gladly'; *ἔφθασα αὐτὸν παρελθών* = 'I *came* earlier than he did'; *οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις λέγων;* = 'wont you be quick and *say?*' *οὐκ ἔφθημεν ἐλθόντες καὶ νόσοις ἐλήφθημεν* = 'we no sooner *came* than we were taken ill'.** But the construction of *λανθάνειν* and *φθάνειν* is sometimes reversed, their *participles* being used in an adverbial sense (Obs. 4.), as *ἅψ δ' ἀπὸ τείχεος ἅλτο λαθών* = 'he sprang back from the wall *unobserved*'.

Obs. 6. **Participle distinguished from Infinitive.** Notice the distinction between *φαίνεται ὤν* = 'it manifestly is', and *φαίνεται εἶναι* = 'it seems to be', the participle implying *actuality*: so *αἰσχύνομαι λέγων* = 'I am ashamed (while) saying', but *αἰσχύνομαι λέγειν* 'I am ashamed to say (and therefore do'nt)'; *μεμνήσθω ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ὤν* = 'let him remember that he is a good man', but with *εἶναι*, 'let him remember to be a good man'. With many verbs however there is no perceptible difference, as (Thuc. I. 107, 1.) *ἤρξαντο ... καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ... οἰκοδομεῖν* = 'they began to build' (or *οἰκοδομοῦντες* = building) 'the long walls too'.

Obs. 7. **Participle with *ἄν*.** The participles become potential with *ἄν*, with the same *caveat* regarding the future, and under the same conditions as the Infinitive forms (§. 46. Obs. 2.). Thus *Φίλιππος Ποτίδαιαν ἑλὼν, καὶ δυνηθεὶς ἂν αὐτὸς ἔχειν Ὀλυνθίοις παρέδωκε* = 'Philip, having taken Potidæa, handed it over to the Olynthians, *when he might have* kept it himself' (*ἠδυνήθη ἄν* with a finite verb); *ἐγώ εἰμι τῶν ἡδέως ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων*

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* The force of *τυγχάνω* is often best rendered by our 'just'; for, like the English 'happen', it denotes coincidence or meeting with, as well as chance. A common equivalent for 'just', local and temporal, is *ἤδη* = 'now', 'already', as (Thuc. III. 95, 1) *Φωκεῦσιν ἤδη ὅμορος ἡ Βοιωτία ἐστίν* = 'Bœotia is *exactly* conterminous with the Phocians'; *ἤδη ἀπῆλθε* = 'he is *just* gone'; *ἤδη ἀπελεύσεται* = 'he will be going *just now*'. After pronouns and conjunctions, *δή*, which seems to be only a shortened form of *ἤδη*, has the same force, as *ἵνα δή* = '*just* that'; *οὗτος δή* = '*just* he'.

** *φθάνω* = 'I anticipate' often takes the accusative of the person anticipated, as (Herod. VI. 115) *βουλόμενοι φθῆναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπικόμενοι εἰς τὸ ἄστυ* = 'wishing to anticipate the Athenians by reaching the city'.

= 'I am of those who would gladly be convinced' (*ἡδέως ἂν ἐλεγχθείην* with a finite verb).

Obs. 8. **Omission of** *ἄν*. As *ἄν*, with whatever part of the verb associated, is sometimes omitted, so it is sometimes repeated: in either case the difference is not one of meaning, but of perspicuity or emphasis. Thus (Thuc. I. 118, 3.) *ἐπηρώτων τὸν θεὸν εἰ (αὐτοῖς) πολεμοῦσιν ἄμεινον ἔσται* = 'they inquired of the god if, *should they make war*, it would be better for them', would certainly have been more perspicuous with *ἄν*, as *εἰ (αὐτοῖς) πολεμοῦσιν ἂν ἄμεινον ἔσοιτο*.

ADVERBS.

The adverb is an indeclinable word, expressing some circumstance affecting the adjective or the verb.

§. 48. **Primitive Adverbs.** The most important of the primitive adverbs, syntactically considered, are the negatives *οὐ* and *μή*, and their compounds *οὐδείς*, *μηδείς* &c. which have the same nature respectively, as *οὐ* and *μή*. *Οὐ* and *μή* differ from each other as do the Indicative and Subjunctive moods (§. 32.) *οὐ* being the *no* of fact, *μή* the *no* of conception: hence *οὐ* is the invariable accompaniment of the Indicative used as such, i. e. as the affirming mood, *μή* of the Subjunctive mood used as such i. e. as expressing contingency with subordination; thus *οὐκ ἀποκρίνομαι ἵνα μὴ ὀργίσω φίλον ἄνδρα* = 'I do not answer that I may not anger my friend'. Why is the Greek for nonentity, *μηδέν*, not *οὐδέν*? Because nonentity i. e. absolute nothing is a mere *conception*.

Obs. 1. *Οὐ* **with the Subjunctive Mood.** The cases in which *οὐ* is found with forms of the Subjunctive and Optative groups, and *μή* with the Indicative, serve only to set the above distinction in clearer evidence. *Οὐ* is found *a*) with forms of the Subjunctive group in Homer, when these have the sense of a future indicative (§. 41, a.). *b*) With forms of the Optative group in the *oratio obliqua* (§. 43.) where these represent tenses of the Indicative, as *λέγων ὅτι οὔπω δὴ πολλοῦ χρόνου ἡδίονι οἴνῳ ἐπιτύχοι* = 'saying that he had not met with pleasanter wine for a long time', *ἐπιτύχοι*

representing *ἐπέτυχον* in the *oratio recta*. *c*) With the potential forms of the Optative (§. 44.), the affinity between which and the forms of the Indicative mood appears from the fact, that they *may* often be expressed by a circumlocution with the Indicative, as *οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ταῦτα* = *οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι ταῦτα* = 'these things may not (wo'nt) happen'.

Obs. 2. *Μή* **with the Indicative.** *Μή* again is found with the Indicative. *a*) In questions, expecting a negative answer, as *ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀρχιτέκτων βούλει γενέσθαι*; = 'but you do'nt want to become an architect, do you?' In all questions however the verb denotes of course, not a *fact*, but a *conception*. *b*) In wishes, as *μήποτε ὤφελον λιπεῖν τὸν Σκῦρον* = 'Oh that I had never left Scyros!' But in wishes too the verb denotes a mere *conception*. *c*) In conditional clauses, as *εἰ μὴ φυλάξεις μίκρ' ἀπολεῖς τὰ μείζονα* = 'If you do'nt take care of littles, you will lose the great'. In every conditional clause, however, the verb, even when representing a fact, represents it not as such but as a *conception*. At the same time, since the view of it as a fact may prevail in the mind, notwithstanding the conditional conjunction employed, *οὐ* is also found with the indicative in conditional clauses introduced by *εἰ*, particularly when two clauses are contrasted by *μέν* and *δέ*. (Madv. §. 202, a. Rem.) How these two aspects mingle in conditional expressions appears from this, that, as often in English *if* = *since*, so sometimes in Greek *εἰ* = *ὅτι*, the very word, which properly raises a doubt, being used to introduce an assertion. *Εἰ* has constantly this sense after *θαυμάζω* and the like, and then the verb which it introduces takes *οὐ*, not *μή*, because in this case the Indicative is used in its proper sense, as the affirming mood; thus *θαυμάζω εἰ ταῦτα οὐ ποιεῖς* = 'I wonder that you do'nt do this' (§. 91. Obs. 2.). *d*) In final clauses with the *future* indicative (§. 35. Obs. 1.), that tense being used in a truly Subjunctive sense, as *Τιμοκράτης τοῖς πονηροῖς, ὅπως μὴ δώσουσι δίκην, ὁδὸν δείκνυσιν* = 'Timocrates shews to bad men a way by which they may escape punishment'. *e*) In clauses introduced by a relative, whether declinable as *ὅς*, or indeclinable as *ὅτε*, when the relative clause, instead of being merely attributive, introduces the reason, aim, or result of the principal clause, in other words, when the relative answers not to *qui* or *ubi*, but to *qualis* or *quare*. Thus *Οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς σφαλερόν ἐστι τὸ, ἃ μὴ οἶδε τις, ταῦτα λέγειν καὶ πράττειν*; = 'Seest thou not how mistaken it is to say and do what one does not understand?' The contingency in *ἃ μὴ οἶδε τις* is obvious: it means not *particular things which*, but *such things as*, and would be rendered in Latin by *quae nescias*. In *ἀνὴρ ὃν οὐκ εἰδες* = 'the man whom you saw not', the relative clause is purely attributive, and therefore takes *οὐ*. Again in *ἦ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους πείσαιμι ἀνθρώπους .... ὅτε γε μήδ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν* =

'certainly I shall persuade other men with some difficulty .... when I am not able to persuade you', ὅτε is obviously equivalent not to *at the time when*, but to *seeing that*, in other words introduces not a fact as such, but the conception of a fact, as a reason. Compare with this ἦν ποτε χρόνος ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν = 'there was once a time when there were indeed gods, but no mortal generations', where ὅτε, meaning strictly *when*, and introducing a fact viewed as a fact, takes οὐ. It must be noted however, that in actual Greek there is the same hesitancy between οὐ and μή in relative as in conditional (c) clauses, and for the same reason; but the guiding principle remains viz. that, when the relative clause is merely attributive to the antecedent, οὐ should be used, and in all other cases μή. *f*) There is often a peculiar force and beauty in μή with the indicative, as (Soph. El. 379.) μέλλουσι γὰρ σὲ ἐνταῦθα πέμψαι, ἔνθα μὴ ποτ' ἡλίου φέγγος προσόψει = 'for they are going to send thee, where thou shalt never see the light of the sun': μή in this relative clause indicates the gloom of the place as the *reason* of its selection; οὐ, though equally good in grammar, would be inferior rhetorically, by representing the gloom merely as a fact characteristic of the place.

Obs. 3. **Imperative, Infinitive, and Participles, how negatived.** The use of οὐ and μή respectively with the other moods is in accordance with the distinction already drawn between them. *a*) Thus μή, never οὐ, is used with the imperative, because that mood, as contemplating future contingencies, is more nearly allied to the Subjunctive mood than to the Indicative. *b*) The Infinitive again is negatived by μή, except after verbs *declarandi et sentiendi*, because then the infinitive clause is equivalent to ὅτι with the indicative, as ὁμολογῶ οὐ κατὰ Μέλητον καὶ Ἄνυτον εἶναι ῥήτωρ = 'I acknowledge that I am not an orator after the fashion of Meletus and Anytus', where οὐ ..... εἶναι = ὅτι οὐκ εἰμι. In other cases the Infinitive takes μή, as δέομαι σοῦ μὴ περιορᾶν ἐμὲ ἀπολλύμενον = 'I pray thee not to stand by, and see me perish', where μή with the infinitive = ἵνα μή with the Subjunctive. Be it noted however that, even after verbs *declarandi et sentiendi*, μή is also found, sometimes perhaps through the mere force of syntactical attraction (§. 26, **), and sometimes to mark more distinctly the subordination of the infinitive clause to that of the principal verb. Thus ἔφη ταῦτα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν, and ἔφη ταῦτα μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν are both found; and, though the same in meaning, differ in force, as do ἔφη ὅτι ταῦτα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, and ἔφη ὅτι ταῦτα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι (§. 43. Obs. 1.). Hence the form with μή is more polite, but the form with οὐ, as being more decided, is always preferred in the antithesis of infinitival clauses, as ὤμοσε δ' οὐκέτι λοιπὸν ὑπὲρ πελάγους πόδα θεῖναι, ἀλλὰ μένειν ἐπὶ γῆς = 'he swore never more henceforth to set foot over the sea, but to remain on land'. *c*) In like manner with

participles, when they are employed attributively i. e. are resolvable into a relative with the Indicative, *οὐ* is used, otherwise *μή*. Thus *λέγω ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν* = 'I speak among people *who are ignorant*'; but *τίς ἂν πόλις ὑπὸ μὴ πειθομένων ἀλοίη*; = 'what city could be taken by men *who should not obey?*' where the participle expresses a contingency. The guiding principle is still the same; but here as in conditional (Obs. 2, c.) relative (Obs. 2, e.) and infinitival (b) clauses, the fact is sometimes stated as a conception i. e. with *μή*, and the conception as a fact i. e. with *οὐ*. Madvig observes (§. 207. Rem. 2.) that later writers, as Plutarch, Lucian, Arrian, use *μή* in accessory sentences with *ὅτι*, *ὡς* (that), and *ὅτι*, *ἐπεί* (because), and with participles, much more frequently than the older writers. This is probably due to the advance of the *usus ethicus*, which prefers the mild form of indirect negation with *μή*, to the bolder with *οὐ*.

Obs. 4. **Negations in Subordinate Clauses.** When the finite verb, though a verb *declarandi et sentiendi*, on which the infinitival or participial clause depends, is itself in a form, which would require *μή* to negative it, e. g. in the imperative, then the infinitive or participle in like manner takes *μή*. Thus *νόμιζε μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων βέβαιον* = 'consider that nothing human is stable', where the infinitive takes *μή* simply because the governing *νόμιζε* is in the imperative, which can be negatived only by *μή*. So *οἶμαί σε, ἐάν τι αἴσθῃ σεαυτὸν μὴ εἰδότα, ζητεῖν τοὺς ἐπισταμένους* = 'I suppose, if you feel yourself ignorant of anything, that you seek those who do know about it', where the participle takes *μὴ* because of the conditional form *ἐὰν αἴσθῃ*, on which it depends.

Obs. 5. *Λιτότης* **in Negations.** By the much used *λιτότης* of the Greeks, whereby more is meant than meets the ear, *οὐ* and *μή*, particularly the former, often combine with a word, so as to express not a mere negation of something, but an assertion of the opposite. Thus *οὐχ ἥκιστα* = *μάλιστα*, *οὐκ ἀφανής* = *ἔνδοξος*, *οὐκ ἐῶ* = 'I hinder', to all which we have English idioms akin. But the Greeks carried their *λιτότης* much farther, and said *οὔ φημι* = 'I deny', *οὐχ ὑπισχνοῦμαι* = 'I refuse', *οὐ κελεύω* = 'I forbid', *οὐ στέργω* = 'I hate'. In such combinations *οὐ* is often a permanent adjunct, which cannot under any circumstances be changed into *μή*; hence *οὐ φῶμεν* = 'let us deny', *οὐ* really forming one word with *φημί* in all its inflexions, just as *ἀπό* with *ἀγορεύω* in *ἀπαγορεύω*. Many of the instances in which *οὐ* is found, where *μή* might have been expected, are explicable on this principle.

Obs. 6. **Negations with Substantives and Adjectives.** The distinction between *οὐ* and *μή* appears also in their use with substantives, as *γράψας τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν οὐ διάλυσιν* = 'having communicated by letter the non-destruction of the bridges', said of a *fact*, where *οὐ διάλυσιν* = *ὅτι οὐ διελύθησαν* but *δεινὸν δ'*

ἐστὶν ἡ μὴ ἐμπειρία = 'inexperience is a terrible thing', said of a *conception*', where *ἡ μὴ ἐμπειρία* = *εἰ μή τις ἐστὶν ἔμπειρος*. So with adjectives, as *ἀνὴρ οὐκ εὐδαίμων* = 'an unhappy man', *ἀνὴρ μὴ εὐδαίμων* = 'a man, if he were unhappy'.

Obs. 7. **Repetition of the Negative.** Two negatives belonging to *different* predicates cancel one another, as in English; thus *οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται* = 'there is none who will not laugh' i. e. 'every one will'. But, when they belong to the same predicate, they strengthen one another, as *μὴ λανθανέτω σὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο* = 'let not even this escape your notice'. Hence the indefinites *any one, anyhow, any-where, at any time*, in an English negative sentence, when the most emphatic negation is intended, must *all* be translated by Greek negatives, as (Plat. Rep. p. 495.) *σμικρὰ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην, οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ* = 'a petty nature never makes anything great, whether a state or an individual'. Hence in *οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ* after a negative sentence, *οὐδὲ* actually strengthens the *far from it*, as if it were *no; far from it*. When emphasis is not an object, the English indefinites above mentioned may be translated by Greek indefinites, as (Xen. Mem. IV. 8. 1.) *οὐδεὶς πώποτε κάλλιον θάνατον ἤνεγκεν ἢ Σωκράτης* = 'no one *ever* met death more nobly than Socrates', where *πώποτε* is less emphatic than *οὐπώποτε** would have been. Such instances as (Dem. 19. 77.) *μὴ οὖν .... μὴ δότω δίκην* = 'let not Aeschines escape punishment', where the two negatives, though referring to the same predicate, cancel one another, are explained by Obs. 5. the *μή*, immediately preceding *δότω*, making up one notion with it, *μὴ δότω* = 'escape'. The negatives repeated in confirmation of the first must all be of the same kind with it i. e. either *οὐ* or *μή*; and this law explains some instances of *οὐ* with the infinitive where *μή* might have been expected, as *ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἐᾷ εἰσιέναι, οὐ ἄν ἡ ὁ τετελευτηκὼς, οὐδεμίαν γυναῖκα ἄλλην ἢ κ. τ. λ.* = 'the law does not allow any woman to enter the house of one who has died, except' &c.**

Obs. 8. *Μή* **expletive with Infinitive.** After verbs of *denying, refusing, forbidding, hindering, refraining from, acquitting,*

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* *Οὔπω* and *οὐπώποτε* generally refer to past time; *οὔποτε* and *οὐδέποτε* to the future, or that absolute present which comprehends all time (§. 34).

** It thus appears that the English vulgarism, '*I don't know nothing*' = '*I don't know anything*', is classical in Greek, *οὐ γινώσκω οὐδέν*. It is equally so in Italian, and, what is more to the purpose, it was so in Anglo-Saxon: historically therefore it is not a corruption of pure English, but a surviving fragment of the primitive dialect.

changing one's mind, and the like, they themselves not being accompanied by a negative, a *μή*, which cannot be translated into English, is added to the infinitive as *ἤρνοῦντο μὴ πεπτωκέναι* = 'they denied that they had fallen'. The student can enter into this idiom by considering the infinitive clause with *μή* as an expression, not simply of the thing prohibited, but of the prohibition itself; and he may easily do so by understanding *ὥστε* = 'to the effect that' after the principal verb, thus: *Τιμόθεος Ἀριοβαρζάνει ἀπέγνω μὴ βοηθεῖν* = 'T. refused A. assistance' i. e. 'refused to the effect that he would *not* assist'. This *μή* however is sometimes omitted, particularly after *κωλύω*, and its compounds. With *ἀντιλέγω*, *μεταγιγνώσκω*, *ἀνατίθεμαι*, the omission of *μή* gives a different sense, as *μεταγιγνώσκω μὴ ποιεῖν τι* = 'I change my mind to the effect that I shall *not* do so and so', but *μεταγιγνώσκω ποιεῖν τι* = 'I change my mind to the effect that I shall do so and so'.

Obs. 9. *Οὐ* **expletive after** *ἤ*. In like manner after comparatives with *ἤ*, *οὐ*, sometimes used to repeat a preceding negation, cannot be translated in English, as (Herod. IV. 118. 15.) *ἥκει γὰρ ὁ Πέρσης οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἡμέας, ἢ οὐ καὶ ἐπὶ ὑμέας* = 'for the Persian is come not more against us than against you'. Also when no negative precedes, as (Thuc. III. 36. 4.) *μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς . . . . πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους* = 'immediately a certain repentance came upon them . . . . . for destroying a whole city rather than the guilty'. Compare the French 'il n'écrit pas mieux cette année-ci qu'il *n*'en faisait l'année passée', and 'il faut plus d'esprit pour apprendre une science, qu'il *n*'en faut pour s'en moquer'.

Obs. 10. *Μή* = **Lest.** *Μή* has this meaning after verbs of *considering*, *doubting*, and *fearing*, and may be followed not only by the Subjunctive or Optative, according as the leading verb is in a principal or a historical tense (§. 40. Obs. 2, a.), but by any tense of the Indicative. The Indicative is used when the object of anxiety is *believed* to exist, the Subjunctive or Optative, when its existence is only *suspected*. Thus (Thuc. III. 53. 2.) *νῦν δὲ φοβοῦμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν* = 'but now we are afraid, lest we have missed both at once'; *δέδοικα μὴ ἀποθάνῃ* = 'I fear lest he die' i. e. 'that he *will die*', and negatively *δέδοικα μὴ οὐκ ἀποθάνῃ* = 'I fear lest he die not' i. e. 'that he *will not* die'; for the aorist in this construction has a decidedly future force (§. 92. Obs. *).

Obs. 11. *Μὴ οὐ*. After a principal verb either directly negative, or negative by being put interrogatively, also after *δεινόν*, *αἰσχρόν*, *αἰσχύνη*, *ἀνόητον*, *πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστιν*, and *αἰσχύνομαι*, all which words imply a negative notion, viz. disapprobation, the infinitive is generally negatived by *μὴ οὐ*, as *πολλὴ ἄνοια μὴ οὐχὶ ἓν τε καὶ ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος* =

'it is a great folly not to consider beauty in all objects as one and the same thing'. In the first mentioned case i. e. when the principal verb is *directly* negatived, *μὴ οὐκ* with the infinitive corresponds to the Latin *quominus* and *quin* with the subjunctive, as *οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ οὐ κ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο* = *nihil impedit quominus id verum sit* = 'nothing prevents this from being true'; *οὐχ' οἷός τ' εἰμὶ μὴ οὐ λέγειν* = *non possum quin dicam* = 'I cannot but say'. Simple *μή* however is often found after negative expressions of possibility, as also after *οὔ φημι*, *οὐ λέγω*. *Μὴ οὐ* is also found with participles depending on verbs with a negative (Jelf. §. 750. 3.).

Obs. 12. *Οὐ μή* is almost restricted to the future indicative, and aorist subjunctive taken in a future sense (§. 41.) as (Soph. El. 1052.) *ἀλλ' εἶσιθ· οὔ σοι μὴ μεθέψομαί ποτε* = 'but enter; I shall never follow thee': *οὔ μὴ κρατηθῶ ὥστε ποιεῖν τι ὧν μὴ χρὴ ποιεῖν* = 'No; I shall never be forced to do what ought not to be done'. *Οὐ μή* is also found in the *oratio obliqua* with the fut. Opt. representing the future indicative in the *oratio recta*. For *οὐ* and *μή* in interrogations, see §. 98.

Obs. 13. **Particles.** Many primitive adverbs in Greek serve merely to indicate the relative importance of words or clauses, the degree of the speaker's assurance in uttering them, or some other feature of the *animus loquentis*, which, for the most part, *we* convey to the hearer by suitable modulations of the voice, and to the reader by underlining in manuscript, or italics in print. These are called particles, and, just as the proper use of the Italian *pure*, or of the German *wohl*, cannot be learned by rules, neither can the proper use of the Greek particles. Their manifold combinations present the greatest difficulty; and only by careful and extensive reading is it it possible to realise their force. Here and there throughout the work, such information as can be posited regarding the principal among them, is given: for the particles so noticed see the Greek Index.

§. 49. **Derivative Adverbs.** Most derived adverbs are formed from adjectives by changing the final *ν* of the genitive plural into *ς*, as *σοφῶς* from *σοφῶν*.* All such derivatives are capable of comparison; and their comparatives and superlatives are precisely the same, the former as the neuter singular, and the latter as the neuter plural of the accusative of the adjective, which

* This mode of derivation is an infallible key to the accent of the adverb; for it is always the same as that of the gen. plur. of the adjective, as *φίλως* from *φίλων*, but *καλῶς* from *καλῶν*.

confirms the semi-adverbial character of that case (§. 18. 1, b.). Even the positive is frequently expressed by the accusative of the adjective, as πολύ = 'much'; πολλά, συχνά, πυκνά = 'frequently'; ὀλίγον = 'a little while'; and so in the phrases μέγα βοᾶν = 'to cry aloud'; ὀξὺ ὁρᾶν = 'to see keenly'; ἡδύ, κακὸν ὄζειν = 'to smell sweetly, badly'.* The accusative of nouns too furnishes a far greater number of adverbs than the genitive or dative as κράτος = 'strongly'; τάχος = 'quickly'; μέγεθος = 'greatly'; πέρας = 'lastly'; δωρεάν, δωτίνην, προῖκα = 'gratis'; μάτην = 'in vain'; ἀρχήν = *omnino*; ἀκμήν = 'yet'. To these may be added the pronominal accusative καὶ ταῦτα = 'and that too'. But the genitive and dative are also represented, as the genitive in ὑψοῦ = 'on high'; τηλοῦ = 'at a distance'; αἴφνης, ἐξαίφνης, ἐξαπίνης = 'on a sudden'; ἐπιπολῆς = 'on the surface'; ἑξῆς, ἐφεξῆς = 'in order'; and the pronominals οὗ, ποῦ, ὅπου: the dative in ὧδε, τῶδε, ἄνω, κάτω; ταύτῃ . . . ᾗ = 'here . . . where'; ἄλλῃ = 'elsewhere'; τῇ ἄν = 'wheresoever'; ὕψι = *in alto*, and *in altum*; χάμαι and πεδοῖ = *humi* and *humum*, and the pronominals in οι, as ἐνταυθοῖ, οἷ, ποῖ, ὅποι. For farther information on the derivation of adverbs, see Jelf. §§. 324. 339.

PREPOSITIONS.

Prepositions, like the case-endings of nouns, denote the relations of an entity. **

§. 50. **The Prepositions as Adverbs.** All the prepositions, except ὑπέρ, occur as local adverbs, which

* In this last example the adjectival form in English is more common than the adverbial (§. 22. Obs. 3).

** This being the case, the frequent omission of Greek prepositions in poetry, where we should find them in prose, is easily explicable: the difference is one not of meaning, but of precision.

was no doubt their primitive character. In English too some prepositions are also adverbs, as *before* and *after*. The adverbial use of the preposition is most frequent in Homer and Herodotus: thus (Il. XVIII. 562.) *μέλανες δ' ἀνὰ βότρυες ἦσαν* = 'and black grapes were *thereon*'. The particle *δέ* is often joined with them, as *ἐν δέ* = 'among them'; *σὺν δέ* = 'at the same time'; *ἐπὶ δέ* = 'thereupon' (*tum*); *μετὰ δέ* = *postea*; *πρὸς δέ* = 'besides'. Two prepositions taken adverbially are sometimes found together, as (Il. XI. 180.) *περὶ πρὸ γὰρ ἔγχεϊ θῦεν* = 'for round and forwards he slew them with his spear'.

Obs. 1. **Prepositions and Adverbs.** *a*) Prepositions are often compounded with local and temporal adverbs, particularly from Herodotus downwards, as *εἰσοπίσω*, *ὑποκάτω*, *ἔμπροσθεν*, *εἰς τότε*, *ἐφ' ἅπαξ*; and several of those compounded with *ἔτι* take their proper case as prepositions e. g. *προσέτι τούτῳ* = 'in addition to this still'. *b*) At other times, and more rarely, an adverb governing a case, and therefore called an *improper preposition* (§. 74. b.), is joined to a proper one, without being compounded, for the purpose of bringing out more distinctly the relation intended, as (Thuc. VIII. 92.) *ὅσον ἀπὸ βοῆς ἕνεκα* = 'so far as outcry was concerned'.

Obs. 2. **Prepositions with Accent thrown back.** *Πάρα*, *ἔπι*, *μέτα*, *πέρι*, *ὔπο*, *ἔνι*, which differ from the simple prepositions only in accentuation, represent respectively *πάρεστι*, *ἔπεστι* &c. *Ἄνα* paroxytone is an imperative, or sort of interjection = 'up then!' = *ἀνάστηθι*.

§. 51. **Conjunctions.** Conjunctions denote purely metaphysical relations, i. e. the relations in which ideas and thoughts stand to one another, whether as coordinate or subordinate, and then how coordinate or subordinate. It is probable that, in the primitive state of language, each thought was enunciated independently, and that conjunctions belong to the period of development, having arisen as the connexion and dependence of thoughts came to be more clearly perceived, and the advantage of indicating that connexion and dependence to be more strongly felt (§. 4.). The copulative and disjunctive conjunctions seem to have been the most ancient in all languages, and no reliable etymology of *καί*, *τέ*, *ἤ* can

be given. Most of the others however are clearly traceable to pronominal words, like our own *that* = 'in order that'. Thus the adversatives *μέν* — *δέ* are connected with the first two numerals,* and mean primarily 'first — second', hence 'on the one hand, — on the other hand'. *Ἀλλά* again differs from the neuter plural of *ἄλλος* only in accentuation, and means primarily, after an enumeration of certain things, 'other or different things', hence 'but', for it is just such things that 'but' introduces. The relation of *ὡς* to *ὅς* is precisely the same, accentuation apart, as that of *σοφῶς* to *σοφός*: thus *σοφός* = 'a wise person', *σοφῶς* = 'in a wise way', *ὅς* = 'what person', *ὡς* = 'in what way', from which its meanings 'so that' and 'in order that' may be easily derived. Or, to take an illustration from English, *ὡς* and *ὅτε* are related to *ὅς* exactly as 'how' and 'when' to 'who': similarly *ὅπως* and *ὁπότε*. Donaldson (New Cratylus §. 139.) derives *εἰ* from the dative of *ἵ* (old nominative of *οὗ*) = 'on this condition', hence 'if'; and *ἵνα* = 'in order that', which occurs as a local adverb = 'where', seems also to have a pronominal origin, probably from a relative form corresponding to the interrogative *τίς*.

§. 52. **Interjections.** These denote moral states, i. e. the passions of the speaker, and are for the most part mere instinctive cries written down. Hence the simplest of them are common to all languages; particularly the sound O, as the outcry of grief or of wonder. Interjections were classified with adverbs by

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* It is remarkable that the feminine only of the cardinal unit should begin with *μ*, especially when the correlate word *μόνος* is considered; then in the Iliad *ἴα* occurs for *μία*, which countenances the supposition that, *μ* having been dropped at a still earlier period from the masculine and neuter, the nominative of the cardinal unit was originally *μεἱς*, *μία*, *μέν*: *δέ* is evidently connected with *δύο*, *δἱς* (§. 86).

the ancient Greeks, and were first treated of separately by the Roman grammarians, who invented the name *interjectio*, apparently in contrast to *præpositio*; because, as *ponere* aptly characterises our use of prepositions, which is deliberate, so *jacere* aptly characterises our use of interjections, which is impulsive.

PART II. SYNTAX OF WORDS.

§. 53. **Concords in general.** For the purpose of marking the coincidence of one entity with one another, or of a quality or operation with some entity, it was a natural device to make the word denoting the subordinate entity, the quality, or the operation, agree grammatically, as far as its nature would allow, with the word denoting the principal entity. Hence arose the concords i. e. the agreement in case of substantives in apposition, the agreement of an adjective with its substantive in gender, number, and case, of the verb with its subject in number and person, and of the relative with its antecedent in gender, number, and person. Be it observed that the *magistral* word in all these concords is a substantive, that one namely which expresses the *main subject of discourse*. For the nature of government in Syntax, see §. 2.

§. 54. **Concord in Case, of Noun with Noun, called Apposition.** *a*) Substantives denoting the same entity agree in case, as *Δημοσθένης ὁ ῥήτωρ* = 'Demosthenes the orator': and this concord holds even though a verb intervene. Verbs which may intervene are called *appositional*, and are divided into *substantive* verbs as *εἶναι*, *γίγνεσθαι*, *ὑπάρχειν*, *φῦναι*, *τυγχάνειν*, *λαγχάνειν**, *ἔχειν*, *κυρεῖν*, *πέλεσθαι* (the last two poetic); verbs of *seeming* as *φαίνομαι*, *δοκέω*, *ἔοικα*, passive verbs of *naming*, *elect-*

* *Λαγχάνειν* is appositional in the sense of *to become by lot*, as *ἔλαχε τειχοποιός* = 'He (Dem.) became superintendent of public buildings by lot'; and *ἔχω* in the sense of *to be*, *to keep one's self*, as *ἔχ' ἥσυχος* = 'keep quiet'.

ing and *judging*, to which must be added the active forms *κλύω*, *ἀκούω*, in the sense of 'I am called or considered'; also verbs of *gesture* and *position* (*ἔχομαι*, *στείχω*, *κεῖμαι*). The following examples, *ἀρχιτέκτων ἐστὶν οὗτος* = 'This man is an architect', *οὐ ψεύστης ἀκούσομαι ἐγώ* = 'I shall not be called a liar', *ἐκείνη στείχει βασίλεια* = 'she walks a queen', are all cases of apposition, though predicative, as really as *Κροῖσος ὁ βασιλεύς* = 'Crœsus the king'. *b*) Be it observed that, in this predicative apposition, which is usually expressed by the rule that "substantive verbs take the same case after as before them", the demonstrative pronoun is apt to assume in Greek the gender and number, as well as the case, of the noun to which it stands in apposition, as (Pl. Rep. I. 331.) *Οὐκ ἄρα οὗτος ὅρος ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν, καὶ ἃ ἄν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι* = 'This then is not the definition of justice, to speak the truth, and to return whatever one may have received'. The English idiom would have led us to expect *τοῦτο* instead of *οὗτος* (§. 7. Obs. 1.). *c*) The rule, that substantive verbs take the same case after as before them, holds in the oblique cases as well as in the nominative. Thus, in the genitive, *ἐδέοντο Κύρου εἶναι προθύμου* = 'they begged Cyrus to be full of ardour'; in the dative, *Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀπεῖπε ναύταις εἶναι* = 'he forbade the Lacedæmonians to be sailors'; in the accusative, *Κροῖσος ἐνόμιζεν ἑαυτὸν εἶναι πάντων ὀλβιώτατον* = 'Crœsus thought himself to be of all men the happiest'. But not unfrequently the infinitive attracts the predicate into the proper case of its own subject viz. the accusative, as *συμφέρει αὐτοῖς φίλους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμίους* = 'it is their interest to be friends rather than enemies'.

Obs. 1. **Sentences in Apposition.** A noun in the accusative is often put in apposition to a sentence as (Eur.) *Ἑλένην κτάνωμεν, Μενέλεω λύπην πικράν* = 'let us kill Helen (which would be) a bitter grief to Menelaus'. On the other hand a whole sentence is often put in apposition to a neuter demonstrative pronoun, by way of detailing what that demonstrative has merely indicated as (Plat.

Rep. II. 359. B.) ὡς δὲ οἱ (τὴν δικαιοσύνην) ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀκόντες ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστ' ἂν αἰσθανοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ, δόντες ἑξουσίαν ἑκατέρῳ ποιεῖν, ὅ,τι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἶτ' ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι, ποῖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάτερον ἄξει = 'But that those who, being unable to do otherwise, practise justice, do so against their will, we should clearly perceive by making *this supposition* viz. giving to the just and the unjust man alike power to do what each may please, and then following them to see whither the desire of each would lead him'.

Obs. 2. **Proper Names in Apposition.** *a*) Proper names, when cited merely as names, sometimes refuse this concord, standing in the nominative, as (Herod. I. 199. 17.) *Μύλιττα δὲ καλέουσι Ἀφροδίτην Ἀσσύριοι* = 'now the Assyrians call Aphrodite *Mylitta*'. Farther, names of places, when mentioned after their general designation, as *city*, *harbour* &c., often submit to a regimen as (Hom.) *Ἰλίου πτολίεθρον* = 'city of Troy', which agrees with the English idiom; and (Thuc. IV. 46. 1.) *ἐν τῷ ὄρει τῆς Ἰστώνης* = 'in the mountain Istone', where the Greek genitive cannot with propriety be marked by the English *of*. These may be cases of syntactical attraction (§. 26. **). * *b*) Contrary to the English idiom, specifications of quantity are put in apposition to their general designation, as *πρόσοδος ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα* = 'a revenue of 60 talents'. *c*) *Ἀνήρ*, in apposition with the name of an employment, denotes that that employment is not the temporary occupation, but the profession of the man; thus *ἀνὴρ μάντις* = 'a soothsayer by profession', but *μάντις* = 'one who merely acts as such'.

Obs. 3. **Appositional Idioms** *a*) The noun in apposition often denotes the peculiar character under, or end for which the subject or object of discourse appears, as *ἥκεις μοι σωτήρ* = 'thou art come (as) my deliverer'; *τοὺς φίλους μάρτυρας παρέχω* = 'I ad-

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* There is another explanation more philosophical, and, in regard to the original denomination of places, more just; for the appositional construction is logically proper only when, by long usage, the name has become identified with the object. At first however an object is not named so and so, but named *after* so and so, and the person from whom, the place or circumstance from which an object is named, is properly put in the genitive. Had the mariners who first doubled the southern point of Africa been Greeks, they too, on taking heart, would have called it *ἀκρωτήριον καλῆς ἐλπίδος*, and the appositional construction could have replaced this regimen only after the name, from being historical and descriptive, had become merely empirical i. e. nothing but a name.

duce my friends (as) witnesses'. Ὡς indeed, which answers to the English *as*, is sometimes expressed. *b*) The whole and the part, particularly when the whole of a person is denoted by a pronoun, and some part of his body is then mentioned, are often put in apposition by the poets, particularly by Homer, as (Il. XIV. 218.) τόν ῥά οἱ ἔμβαλεν χερσίν = 'she put it (the necklace) into *her hands*'; (Soph. Phil. 1301.) μέθες με ... χεῖρα = 'let go *my hand*'. This by the schema καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος. (§. 56. Obs. 3.)

§. 55. **Concord of the Adjective with the Noun in Gender, Number and Case.** *a*) This concord obtains whether the adjective be used *attributiveby*, as οἱ καρτεροὶ στρατιῶται = 'the brave soldiers', or *appositively* as οἱ στρατιῶται οἱ καρτεροί = 'the soldiers, brave fellows', or *predicativeby*, as καρτεροὶ οἱ στρατιῶται = 'the soldiers *are* brave', the copula being always understood in this last collocation of the noun and adjective. *b*) If there be several substantives, the adjective, though referred mentally to them all, agrees only with the first in the attributive formula, as τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι = 'I say that a good man and woman are happy':* and the same holds of the article, when not repeated with each substantive, as may be seen in the above example. But in the appositive and predicative formulæ the adjective must be plural** when it refers to several substantives, and in that case, if the substantives denote living creatures, especially *persons*, the ad-

* For greater precision, the *verbal* reference may be made to agree with the *mental*, by adopting the appositive formula, thus τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα ἀγαθοὺς ὄντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναί φημι, or by repeating the adjective with each substantive in the attributive formula.

** There are indeed two exceptions in the predicative formula viz. where one of the substantives is pre-eminent as in the above example, καὶ γυναῖκα being really a parenthesis, so that not only the attributive ἀγαθόν, but also the predicative εὐδαίμονα, is regulated by ἄνδρα; and where the predicative word takes its concord from the substantive next which it stands, as (Il. V. 891.) Αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη, πόλεμοί τε, μάχαι τε = 'for contention is always agreeable to thee, and wars and battles'.

jective takes their gender, if they have one in common, as *ἡ μήτηρ καὶ ἡ θυγάτηρ αἱ καλαί* = 'the beautiful mother and daughter'; or, if they be of different genders, the masculine preferably to the feminine, and the feminine preferably to the neuter, as *γυναῖκες καὶ παιδία καθήμεναι* = 'women and children sitting': if however the substantives denote *things*, the adjective is always neuter, if they be of different genders, and neuter preferably even when they are both masculine or both feminine, the *things* being in fact regarded as genderless; thus *ταραχαὶ καὶ στάσεις ὀλέθρια ταῖς πόλεσιν* = 'troubles and seditions are ruinous to states'. Even *persons* may be regarded as *things* e. g. merely as subjects of discourse, and then they take a neuter adjective, as (Plat. Rep. VIII. 561.) *ἡ καλλίστη δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτεία τε καὶ ὁ κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ λοιπὰ ἄν ἡμῖν εἴη διελθεῖν* = 'the best political constitution then, said I, and the best man, are, I presume, topics remaining for discussion by us': so also *ἄνθρωποι καὶ κύων ἀγριώτατα* = 'man and the dog are most savage things'.* *c*) When there are several adjectives to one substantive, they may be regarded as coordinate, and are then either separated from one another by a conjunction, as *σοφός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ καλὸς ἀνήρ*, or arranged thus *σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, καλὸς, ἀγαθός*.** Often however, when there are only two adjectives, one of them is subordinated to the other as in *τὸ πρῶτον καλὸν πρᾶγμα*, where *καλὸν πρᾶγμα* makes one compound idea, of which *πρῶτον* is the attribute. But *πολλοί*, even when subordinate in sense, is usually coordinate in form, as *πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα*, which simply means 'many noble deeds'.

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* When there are several antecedents to one relative, the relative is subject to the same laws as the appositive or predicative adjective referring to several substantives.

** The student must therefore beware of copying into Greek the English idiom, which places a conjunction only before the last in a series of adjectives, as 'the wise, brave, *and* noble man'.

Obs. 1. **Exceptions in Gender.** *a*) Owing to the hesitancy of the language in distinguishing, by separate terminations, the masculine and feminine *dual* of the article, and of *αὐτός*, *οὗτος*, *ἐμός*, *μόνος*, *ἀμφότεροι*, *μάταιος*, *ἄξιος*, many apparent exceptions occur with these words, particularly in Attic poetry, their masculine dual being joined with feminine nouns. Since however some adjectives, as *αἰώνιος*, have two complete forms for the feminine, one according to the first declension, and another according to the second, it is better simply to recognise the fact that the feminine dual of the words enumerated fluctuated between the form in *α* and the form in *ω*. In this way the apparent discord is removed. *b*) The masculine dual of participles is often found with feminine nouns as (Plat. Phædr. 237, D.) *ἡμῶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ δύο τινὲ ἑστὸν ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε οἷν ἑπόμεθα ᾗ ἂν ἄγητον* = 'in each one of us there are two governing and leading ideas, which we follow wheresover they lead'. The *ἰδέα* are here personified, and the key to this anomalous construction probably lies in the fact, that it is particularly common with duals denoting *persons*, the peculiarity of gender being lost in the dominant idea of personality, sex in humanity. This principle clearly appears in the tragic chorus, where a woman may speak of herself in the masculine singular; and in tragic composition generally, where a *single* woman may speak of herself in the plural masculine, much more *several* women (§. 11. Obs. 2.). *c*) Such instances as *φίλε τέκνον* = 'dear boy', in the attributive formula, *τὰ τέλη καταβάντας* (Thuc. IV. 15, 1.) = 'the magistrates having descended', in the appositive, and *κοῦφον ἡ νεότης* = 'youth is a giddy thing', in the predicative, are explicable by the sense-schema (*σχῆμα κατὰ σύνεσιν*). In the first two cases, regard is had, not to the grammatical gender of the word, but to the real gender of the persons; and in the last, the object is, not simply to ascribe the quality of giddiness to youth, which would be done by *ἡ νεότης κούφη*, but to represent substantively the *essence* of a certain *class* of objects: this is effected in English by adding to the adjective the word *thing* (*χρῆμα*, *πρᾶγμα*, *κτῆμα*), in Greek by using simply the neuter singular of the adjective, as *ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός* = 'woman is a weaker thing than man'. This neuter singular of the adjective may be employed even when the noun to which it refers is plural, as *οἱ παῖδες εἰσὶν ἀνιαρόν* = 'boys are a bore'. The same general *thing*-notion accounts for the neuters *ἀμφότερον*, *ἀμφότερα*, *οὐδέτερον*, *οὐδέτερα* in the predicative formula, as (Pl. Rep. I, 349.) *ἔστι δέ γε, ἔφην φρόνιμός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερα* = 'at that rate, said I, the unjust man is both wise and good, the just man neither'. *d*) Note particularly that, in using the adjectives enumerated in §. 22. Obs. 1., the English will not always suggest the idiomatic gender of the Greek. Thus (Thuc. I. 93, 2.) *καὶ δήλη ἡ οἰκοδομία ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐστιν ὅτι κατὰ σπου-*

δὴν ἐγένετο = 'and it is manifest even now that the building (of the walls) was accomplished in haste'. This English would suggest καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὅτι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐγένετο ἡ οἰκοδομία, which would be good Greek too, but not idiomatic like the other. For discords of gender attributed to poetical license, or to carelessness, see Jelf §. 390. 1, c. Obs.

Obs. 2. **Exceptions in Number.** Dual nouns are occasionally found with plural adjectives as ὀσσε φαεινά = 'brilliant eyes', and still more frequently with plural participles, as (Pl. Euthyd. 273, D.) ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἄμφω βλέψαντες εἰς ἀλλήλους = 'both laughed then as they looked to one another'. So also a plural noun is sometimes found with a dual numeral, as (Xen. An. IV. 1, 22.) ἔχω δύο ἄνδρας. These irregularities merely illustrate the subordinate character of the dual as a kind of plural; and one has only to multiply them in imagination to see how the dual might gradually slip out of use altogether, as it eventually did in Greek, and invariably does in the transition of a language from the synthethic to the analytic state (§. 10.).

Obs. 3. **Exceptions in Case.** *a*) Adjectives which, by limiting the reference of their nouns, have a partitive force, often assume the partitive construction, and this is esteemed an elegance with plural adjectives, whose own proper meaning is not partitive. Thus οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, οἱ χρηστοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων are more elegant expressions than οἱ παλαιοὶ ποιηταί, οἱ χρηστοὶ ἄνθρωποι. This construction is common in Attic with the partitives ἥμισυς, πολύς, and with numerals, comparatives, and superlatives, *the adjective taking the gender of the following nouns*, as ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ = 'half the number', ἡ πολλὴ τῆς Πελοποννήσου = 'great part of the Peloponnesus', τοῦς τρεῖς τῶν δακτύλων &c. The more common construction, however, in all dialects, particularly when not number but *degree* is in question, is to put the partitive in the *neuter* singular, and the whole in the genitive, as (Thuc. I. 1, 2.) ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων = 'among the greatest part of mankind', (Thuc. I. 118, 2.) ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως = 'they rose to a great pitch of power', πρὸς τοῦτο καιροῦ = 'to this point of time', εἰς τοσοῦτον τύφου = *in tantum superbiae* (§. 59. Obs. 1.). There are even examples of a neuter *plural* taken partitively with a masculine or feminine noun in the genitive, as (Soph. Oed. C. 923.) φωτῶν ἀθλίων ἱκτήρια = 'wretched mortals who are suppliants'. So Horace *vilia rerum*. But this is rare, especially in prose (Xen. Cyr. VIII. 3, 41.). *b*) There is a whole class of apparent discords, or *anacoloutha*, in which a participle occurs in the nominative, though referring to a noun in some oblique case, as δοκεῖ μοι ὁρῶν, where mere grammar would require ὁρῶντι. Such instances are to be explained by the sense-schema; for the speaker is often more intent on the thought itself, than on the form of the thought, and, in the mind,

δοκεῖ μοι = *ἡγοῦμαι-ὁρῶν* therefore follows the construction of the thought *ἡγοῦμαι*. This anacolouthon is frequent in Thucydides. The nominative absolute may often be explained on the same principle, as (Thuc. IV. 23, 2.) *καὶ τὰ περὶ Πύλον ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων κατὰ κράτος ἐπολεμεῖτο* (= *ἀμφότεροι ἐπολέμουν*) *Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν .... τὴν νῆσον περιπλέοντες κ. τ. λ.* = 'and the war at Pylos was vigorously carried on by both, the Athenians on the one hand sailing round the island &c.' The accusative of the participle occurs in a similar anacolouthon as (Soph. El. 479.) *ὑπεστί μοι θράσος ἀδυπνόων κλύουσαν ἀρτίως ὀνειράτων* = 'confidence steals upon me, as I listen to sweetly-breathing dreams'. It is instructive to observe that the deviations from regular syntax in these anacoloutha are all in favour of the nominative (the subject-case), and the accusative (the object-case); for this points to a broad fact in the history of languages. As a language passes from the synthetic to the analytic state, these two cases always survive the others, and so necessary is the distinction between subject and object, that in the languages of southern Europe, which are even more analytic, so far as cases are concerned, than English, there are yet separate forms for the nominative and accusative in the personal pronouns. *c*) The adjective is sometimes attracted from the nominative into the vocative of the person addressed, as (Theoc. XVII. 66.) *ὄλβιε κῶρε γένοιο* = 'may you be happy, boy!'

Obs. 4. **Adverbial Comparatives.** In Attic *πλείων, μείων, ἐλάττων* seldom agree with their substantives in any respect, but stand adverbially, often without regimen as without concord. So *τοξότας πλέον ἢ εἴκοσι μυριάδας* = 'more than 200,000 archers', and (Aristoph. Av. 1251.) *Πορφυρίωνας ... πλεῖν ἑξακοσίους τὸν ἀριθμόν* = 'Porphyrions more than 600 in number', as in Latin *decem amplius homines*.

Obs. 5. **Poetic Forms.** Such poetic forms as *ἐμὰ κήδεα θύμου* = 'the woes of my heart', are to be explained by regarding *κήδεα θύμου* as forming one compound notion, like 'heart-woes' in English. Often however the English parallel cannot be given, as in *τἀμὰ δυστήνου κακά* = 'the ills of unfortunate me'; but the possessive pronoun easily yields the genitive of the personal (§. 26.).

Obs. 6. **Substantives Omitted.** The substantive is very commonly omitted with the article in the formation of new substantival expressions (§. 6. and §. 6. Obs. 2.). This occurs most frequently in the neuter gender, as *τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων* = 'the affairs of men'. As *men* in English, so *ἄνθρωποι* or *ἄνδρες* is frequently omitted in Greek; as *οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων* = 'those at the head of affairs'. In like manner, *υἱός* is omitted, as in *Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Φιλίππου* = 'Alexander (son) of Philip'; *γῆ*, as in *ἡ οἰκουμένη* = 'the inhabited (world)'; *χώρα*, as in *ἡ ὀρεινή* = 'the highlands'; *ἡμέρα*, as in *ἡ αὔριον* = 'tomorrow'; *δραχμή* with numerals, as we also talk of

'a man worth thousands', *pounds* being understood; *πέλαγος*, as we also say 'the Mediterranean', *sea* being understood; *χείρ*, as we also say 'on the right', *hand* being understood; *τέχνη*, as in *ἡ μουσική*, *ἡ γραμματική*, whence our substantives, 'music' and 'grammar'. For others less commonly omitted see Jelf §. 436, *β*.

Obs. 7. **Adjective used Proleptically.** The adjective is said to be used *proleptically*, when it denotes, not a quality already predicable of the substantive, but one which will become so, when the operation denoted by an accompanying verb has been completed, as (Aesch. Ag. 1247.) *εὔφημον... κοίμησον στόμα* = (literally) 'shut your propitious mouth': *στόμα* however becomes *εὔφημον* only when the command in *κοίμησον* has been obeyed.

§. 56. **Concord of the Verb with its Nominative in Number and Person.** This concord makes the simplest form of the simple sentence, as *Κροῖσος ἐπλούτησε* = 'Crœsus was rich'. The phrase *Κροῖσος ὁ πλούσιος* = 'Crœsus the rich', though conveying the same ideas viz. *Crœsus* and *rich*, and referring the one to the other too by the concord of gender, number, and case, is yet not a *sentence*, because, instead of actually predicating the one idea of the other, it takes the one idea for granted as already belonging to the other: it presupposes that the predication has been made, and is true, but it does not make the predication. The finite verb is the predicating word, and hence, so many finite verbs, so many sentences. Especially the copula (§. 1. Obs. 1.) is the predicating word, for every finite verb predicates by containing the copula; and every sentence may be resolved so as to exhibit the two ideas necessary to the constitution of a sentence, and the copula separately, as *ὁ Κροῖσος πλούσιος ἐγένετο* = *Κροῖσος ἐπλούτησε*. Be it observed that when, in a sentence with the copula, the predicate is a substantive or word used substantively, the copula generally stands close by it, and conforms to it, as (Pl. Men. 91, C.) *οὗτοί γε* (*οἱ σοφισταὶ*) *φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνομένων* = 'these sophists are an evident pest and ruin to those who consort with them': (Thuc. IV. 102. 3.) *χωρίον, ὅπερ πρότερον*

Ἐννέα Ὁδοὶ ἐκαλοῦντο = 'a place which was formerly called Nine Ways'.

Obs. 1. **The Attic Schema.** Attic writers, both in prose and poetry, join a neuter plural with the singular verb, as (Eur. Med. 618.) κακοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς δῶρ' ὄνησιν οὐκ ἔχει = 'for the gifts of a bad man bring no help'. The rationale of this idiom is suggested by the fact that, when the neuter plural denotes *persons*, the verb is also generally plural, the idea of plurality appearing most clearly in the light of personality, as τὰ μειράκια διαλεγόμενοι ἐπιμέμνηνται Σωκράτους = 'the boys, in their talk, make mention of Socrates'. It would appear that in relation to *things* the idea of plurality came to be confounded with that of *multitude* or *mass*, and thus to a plural substantival form was attached a singular idea. This is particularly obvious in ταῦτα, τάδε which are used, the former to sum up any number of previously mentioned particulars, the latter to sum up particulars about to be mentioned (§. 27.), the particulars in both cases being regarded as one whole by the mind. Starting from some such origin, the Attic schema, which is a deviation in general grammar, became the norm in that dialect; yet there are instances in which, the fact of plurality being important, a plural verb is found with a plural neuter denoting things, as (Xen. An. I. 7. 17.) ἀλλ' ὑποχωροῦντων φανερὰ ἦσαν καὶ ἵππων καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἴχνη πολλά = 'and there were many obvious marks of horses and men retreating'. The regular construction of neuters plural with a plural verb reappeared in the κοινὴ διάλεκτος, which succeeded the pure Attic about B. C. 300.

Obs. 2. **Bœotian or Pindaric Schema.** In the Doric poets a masculine or feminine plural is joined with a singular verb, as (Pind. Pyth. X. 71.) ἐν δ' ἀγαθοῖσι κεῖται* πατρῴϊαι κεδναὶ πολίων κυβερνάσιες = 'for in good men lies the paternal and watchful government of states'. In Homer, Hesiod, and Herodotus this construction is also found, but less frequently than in the Bœotian or Aeolic dialect; and in Attic it is almost confined to ἔστι and ἦν at the beginning of a sentence as (Plat. Rep. 463. A.) ἔστι μέν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες καὶ δῆμος; = '*are* there then in other cities also rulers and a public?' Sometimes the English coincides with this idiom as (Herod. VII. 34.) ἔστι δ' ἑπτὰ στάδιοι ἐξ Ἀβύδου ἐς τὴν ἀπαντίον = 'it is seven stadii from Abydos to the opposite side', the singular idea of distance being evidently in the mind; and it is a favourite idiom in French as *Il est cent hommes* = 'There are a hundred men'. The indefinite ἔνιοι =

* Bergk, in his edition of the Greek lyric poets, admits κεῖται into the text, and remarks "κεῖται libri plures, κεῖνται vulgo".

'some', from ἔστιν οἳ = 'there are who', is an example of this construction (§. 27. Obs.).

Obs. 3. **The Schema** κατ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος. This name (the whole and part schema) has been given to such examples as the following (Herod. III. 158.) ἔμενον ἐν τῇ ἑωϋτοῦ τάξι ἕκαστος = *in suo quisque ordine manserunt* = 'they remained each in his own rank', where the same thing is represented as being done by many, but by each in a way, or with a circumstance peculiar to himself. This construction is common in all languages as a short cut to the expression of a complex thought, and the discord does not even appear in English, where the clause beginning with *each* is evidently an expletive apposition to the nominative *they*. The same is really the case in Greek. The apparent discord of person in (Aristoph. Av. 1186.) χώρει δεῦρο πᾶς ὑπηρέτης = 'come hither every servant', and of both number and person* in (Il. XIV. 111.) καὶ μή τι κότῳ ἀγάσησθε ἕκαστος = 'and be not angry, each of you', is to be similarly explained. Sometimes the verb agrees, not with the principal, but with the expletive nominative, as (Xen. An. II. 1. 15.) οὗτοι μὲν ὦ Κλέαρχε ἄλλος ἄλλα λέγει = 'these say, one one thing, another another', but in this case the verb is placed after the expletive nominative.

Obs. 4. **Duals with Plurals.** A plural verb is often found with a dual nominative, the idea of duality being sunk in the more comprehensive one of plurality; but, when the dual nominative is neuter, and the idea of duality is disregarded, the verb is in the singular by the Attic schema (Obs. 1.). Also, but much more rarely, a dual verb is found with a plural nominative, the object being to shew that the individuals, no matter how many, are divided into two as (Aesch. Eumen. 255.) λεύσσετον πάντα = 'look everywhere', with reference to the two halves of the chorus.

Obs. 5. **Several Nominatives to the same Verb.** *a*) If there be several nominatives, connected by copulatives, the verb is generally plural, unless they be neuters, in which case the verb is singular by the Attic schema: if they be two, and the circumstance of duality is important, the verb must be dual. When the nominatives differ in person, the verb prefers the first person to the second, and the second to the third, as τὴν τέχνην ταύτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἀσκοῦμεν = 'I and my father practise this craft'. Sometimes however the verb agrees, in both number and person, with the subject nearest it, as σύ τε Ἕλλην εἶ καὶ ἡμεῖς = 'thou and we are Greeks'; particularly when the verb stands at the beginning or end of a sentence, as (Dem.) ἐνίκων οὗτοι οἱ ξένοι, καὶ ἡμεῖς μετ'

* There is never in fact a discord of person. In such phrases as ἄγε σκοπῶμεν = 'come let us consider', ἄγε, φέρε &c. (§. 41. c.) are mere interjectional expressions.

αὐτῶν = 'these strangers conquered, and we with them', (Pl. Tim. 82. C.) *κατὰ φύσιν γὰρ σάρκες καὶ νεῦρα ἐξ αἵματος γίγνεται* = 'for naturally the flesh and sinews are formed from the blood'; and, in any situation, the verb may be singular, when that one of all the nominatives, to which the others are subordinate in sense, is singular, as (Xen. An. I. 10. 1.) *Βασιλεὺς, καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ, διώκων εἰσπίπτει εἰς τὸ Κυρεῖον στρατόπεδον* = 'the king, and those with him, pursuing fall upon the camp of Cyrus'; the phrase *καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ* being regarded as a mere parenthesis. Note on the other hand (Thuc. III. 109.) *Δημοσθένης μετὰ τῶν ξυστρατηγῶν σπεύδονται Μαντινεῦσιν* = 'Demosthenes, and his fellow-generals make a truce with the Mantineans', where, although the formal nominative be singular, the verb, by the sense schema, conforms to the plurality in the real nominative viz. *Δημοσθένης μετὰ τῶν ξυστρατηγῶν*. *b*) When several singular nominatives are connected disjunctively, if the assertion can be true of only one of the subjects at a time, the verb must be singular as, *ἢ οὗτος ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἀληθῆ λέγει* = 'either this man or that says the truth'. But when the assertion is true of all the subjects at the same time, the verb is plural, as (Eur. Alc. 360.) *καὶ μ' οὔθ' ὁ Πλούτωνος κύων, οὔθ' ὑπὸ κώπῃ ψυχοπομπὸς ἂν γέρων ἔσχον* = 'and neither Pluto's dog, nor the aged spirit-guide at the oar would prevent me'. When the nominatives so connected are of different numbers, the verb agrees with that which is nearest it. The same remark holds when one subject is appended to another by the comparative *ἤ*, as (Pl. Theæt. 109. A.) *τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διεννοούμην ὧν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἤ τις ἄλλος ἔχει* = 'I meant then some one of those common things, in which thou hast no more share than any other'.

Obs. 6. **Omission of the Nominative.** The subject is omitted when it can be easily supplied from the context or by the mind, as in *φασί*, *λέγουσι*. For the omission of the personal pronouns see §. 24. a. The indefinite *τίς* is also sometimes understood, as *ἡδὺ τὸ οἴεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται* = 'it is pleasing to think that one is going to obtain what one desires'. The verbs called impersonal have generally for their nominative an infinitive or infinitival clause, as *δεῖ λέγειν* = 'it is necessary to say': what is necessary? *λέγειν*. So in *πέπρωται θανεῖν*, what has been appointed by fate? *θανεῖν* = 'to die'. Others again have, or, in the origin of language, had a nominative understood, as *ὕει* = 'it rains' i. e. *Ζεὺς ὕει*, and so of all operations in nature. Some impersonals are said to have acquired in this way their ultimate meaning, as *χρή* i. e. *ὁ Θεὸς χρή* = 'God intimates by an oracle', hence 'it behoves'. In others still the real subject may be evolved from the verb itself, as *ἐσάλπιγξε* = 'he' i. e. 'the trumpeter trumpeted', or, as we should say, 'the trumpet was sounded': all professional operations are thus impersonally expressed (§. 18. Obs. 2, a.). So also may be explained

with the aid of the copula, *ἐνδεὶ μοι χρημάτων* = 'I am in want of money' = *ἔστι μοι ἔνδεια χρημάτων* *μεταμέλει μοι τούτου* = 'I repent me of this' = *γίγνεταί μοι μετάμελος τούτου*, for, although in *language* a verb may stand without a nominative, in *thought* there is no such thing as predication without a subject.

Obs. 7. **Omission of the Verb.** The copula is often omitted when it can be easily supplied by the mind as *Ἕλλην ἐγώ* = 'I am a Greek'. More frequently than the first or second person, the third is omitted, particularly in maxims and proverbs, and in the initial clause of a sentence after the nouns *ἀνάγκη*, *χρεών*, *θέμις*, *εἰκός*, the adjectives *ἕτοιμος*, *πρόθυμος*, *φροῦδος*, *ἄξιος*, *δυνατός*, *αἴτιος*, *ῥᾴδιον*, *χαλεπόν*, verbals in *τέος* especially when neuter, and *οἷόν τε*, *θαυμαστὸν ὅσον*, *ἀμήχανον ὅσον*, also in relative sentences with *οὐδείς*, as *οὐδεὶς ὅς* = 'there is no one who', and sometimes in dependent sentences, as (Il. III. 106.) *ἐπεὶ οἳ παῖδες ὑπερφίαλοι* = 'because his sons are perfidious'. Note particularly the phrase *οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ* = 'there is none who not' i. e. 'all', which, its syntactical origin being disregarded, is declined throughout, like a single word, *οὐδείς* following the regimen of *ὅστις*, as *οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ ἀρέσκω* = 'there is no one whom I do not please' i. e. 'I please every body'; and (Pl. Prot. 317.) *οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην* = 'there is no one of you all, whose father I might not be, in respect of age' (§. 58. Obs. 4. b.). Other verbs besides the copula may be omitted from a sentence, when the immediate context supplies them; e. g. in answering a question, the verb, by which the question was put, need not be repeated, as *τί ἔλεγες*; = 'what were you saying?' *οὐδέν* = 'nothing'. The license of omission is much greater in proverbs, but the reason is still the same, frequent use enabling the mind to supply the verb, as *ἡ ἅμαξα τὸν βοῦν* i. e. *ἡ ἅμαξα ἐκφέρει τὸν βοῦν*, as we say 'putting the cart before the horse'; *γλαῦκ' εἰς Ἀθήνας* i. e. *ἄγε γλαῦκ' εἰς Ἀθήνας*, as we say 'carrying salt to Dysart, or coals to Newcastle'. So in *εἰς κόρακας*, as we say 'go to the dogs', and in short curses, prayers, exhortations and prohibitions generally. Note particularly the omission of a verb of *doing* with *οὐδὲν ἄλλο*, as *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ παίζουσιν* = 'they (do) nothing else than play'.

§. 57. **Accusative with Infinitive.** As the subject of a finite verb is expressed in the nominative, so that of the infinitive is expressed in the accusative; and what is said in the *oratio recta* by the finite verb with its nominative may be said in the *oratio obliqua* by the infinitive with its accusative. Thus *τέθνηκε ὁ βασιλεύς* = 'the king is dead', becomes in the *oratio obliqua* *λέγει τεθνηκέναι*

τὸν βασιλέα = 'he says that the king is dead'. (§. 100.) It will be observed that, in this example, the subject of the infinitive (τὸν βασιλέα) is different from that of the principal verb (αὐτός): when however they are the same, as often happens after verbs *declarandi et sentiendi*, it suffices that the subject of the principal verb be expressed or known, as ὁμολογῶ ἀδικῆσαι = 'I confess that I did wrong'. (§. 63. Obs. 2.) When, in this case, both are expressed, it is for the sake of emphasizing the person: thus the full form οἴομαι ἐμαυτὸν ἁμαρτεῖν is more emphatic of the person than οἴομαι ἁμαρτεῖν, though they equally mean 'I think that I erred'. This full form accordingly is more frequent, when the infinitive is at some distance from the principal verb, and particularly when there is an antithesis of persons, because then each must be made emphatic, as φημὶ δεῖν ἐκείνους μὲν ἀπολέσθαι, ὅτι ἠσέβησαν, ἐμὲ δὲ σῴζεσθαι, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμάρτηκα = 'I say that they indeed ought to perish, because they have behaved impiously, but that I should be saved, because I have done no wrong'.

Obs. 1. **Nominative before the Infinitive.** When the subject of the Infinitive is the same as that of the principal verb, the former is sometimes attracted into the case of the latter i. e. the nominative, for the purpose of marking their identity, as (Dem.) ἔφη δανεῖσαι τὸν πατέρα Ἀντιμάχῳ, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς λαβεῖν = 'he said that his father had lent to A., and that he himself had received nothing'. As αὐτός in the oblique cases is not reflexive in Attic, the accusative here would not have brought out the same sense. Hence ἔφη αὐτὸς γεγραφέναι = 'he said that he (himself) had written', but ἔφη αὐτὸν γεγραφέναι = 'he said that he (another person) had written'. This attraction occurs even when the infinitive clause is under the government of a preposition, as (Xen. Cyr. I. 4. 3.) (Ὁ Κῦρος) διὰ τὸ φιλομαθὴς εἶναι κ. τ. λ. = '(Cyrus) because he was fond of learning &c.'; in like manner ἐκ τοῦ χαλεπὸς εἶναι = 'from being ill-tempered'; τῷ δοῦλος εἶναι = 'by being a slave', χαλεπός and δοῦλος referring to the nominative in the principal clause.

Obs. 2. **Subject of the Infinitive Omitted.** When the subject of the infinitive is also the object of a principal verb governing the genitive or dative, in the former case it appears only as the object of the principal verb, in the latter it may appear either as the

object of the principal verb, or in the accusative as the subject of the infinitive. Thus only *δεόμαι σοῦ ἐλθεῖν* = 'I beg you to come'; but either *συμβουλεύω σοὶ σωφρονεῖν* = 'I advise you to be prudent', or *συμβουλεύω σὲ σωφρονεῖν* = 'I advise that you be prudent' indifferently.

Obs. 3. **Case of Attributives in the Infinitival Clause.** *a*) When an attributive word or phrase, referring to the subject of the infinitive, follows, that attributive word or phrase generally agrees with the subject of the infinitive in whatever case it may have been expressed (§. 54. c.); nor does *ὥστε*, introducing the infinitival clause, interfere with the attraction of the attributive into concord with the subject of the principal verb, when that is also the understood subject of the infinitive, as (Thuc. I. 12. 1.) *ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἔτι μετανίστατό τε καὶ κατῳκίζετο ὥστε μή, ἡσυχάσασα, αὐξηθῆναι* = 'Greece was still in a migratory condition, seeking new settlements, so that it did not prosper *by being at rest*'. *b*) Often however, particularly in the case of participles, the attributive word or phrase is attracted out of this apposition into the accusative as the normal case for the subject of the infinitive as (Herod. III. 36. 23.) *ἐνετείλατο τοῖσι θεράπουσι λαβόντας μιν ἀποκτεῖναι* = 'he charged the attendants to take and kill him'; (Lys. 10. 31.) *ὑμῶν δέομαι καταψηφίσασθαι Θεομνήστου, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι κ. τ. λ.* = 'I pray you to give sentence against Th., remembering that &c.' *c*) Sometimes again, but rarely, it takes the case required by the principal verb, even when by Obs. 2. that case has yielded in favour of the accusative, as (Soph. Oed. R. 350.) *ἐννέπω σὲ τῷ κηρύγματι ἐμμένειν . . . . ὡς ὄντι γῆς μιάστορι* = 'I charge thee, the land's polluter as thou art, to abide by thy proclamation'. *d*) Note that *τί* = 'somewhat' i. e. in the substantival sense (§. 29. a.) remains always the same, like an indeclinable, as (Gal. II. 6.) *ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι τί* = 'but of those who seemed to be somewhat'. So (Pl. Menex. 247, B.) *ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ τὶ εἶναι* = 'to a man thinking himself something'.

Obs. 4. **Conversion of Accusative into Nominative.** The accusative subject of an infinitive, following verbs *declarandi et sentiendi* taken impersonally, may be changed, as in English, into the nominative of these verbs taken personally. Thus *λέγεται ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων, εἶδος μὲν κάλλιστον, ψυχὴν δὲ φιλανθρωπότατον φῦναι τὸν Κῦρον* = (Xen. Cyr. I. 2. 1.) *Φῦναι ὁ Κῦρος λέγεται ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων, εἶδος μὲν κάλλιστος, ψυχὴν δὲ φιλανθρωπότατος*, just as 'It is even yet said by the barbarians that Cyrus was most handsome in person, and most humane in soul' = 'Cyrus is even yet said by the barbarians to have been most handsome &c.'

§. 58. Concord of the Relative with its Anteced-

ent in Gender, Number, Person, and, by Attraction, in Case. Logically the case of the relative is determined by that word in its own clause on which it depends, as *μέμνησθε τοῦ ὅρκου ὃν ὀμωμόκατε* = 'remember the oath *which you have sworn*'. But in Attic with a few rare exceptions (Thuc. I. 50. 1.), and sometimes even in Homer (Il. V. 265.), the attributive character (§. 28.) of the relative clause is more distinctly marked by the agreement of the relative with the antecedent in case also, as *μέμνησθε τοῦ ὅρκου οὗ ὀμωμόκατε*. This is called *attraction* of the relative, and occurs chiefly when the relative is attracted, as in the above example, from the accusative into the genitive or dative of its antecedent. The attributive character of the relative clause is still more expressly brought out, when the substantival antecedent passes from its own into the relative clause, as *μέμνησθε οὗ ὀμωμόκατε ὅρκου*. Attraction occurs with a demonstrative as well as a substantival antecedent, as *οἷς οὗσιν ὑμετέροις ἔχει, τούτοις πάντα τἄλλα ἀσφαλῶς κέκτηται* = '*with what things* of yours he has, *with these* he possesses all the rest securely'.* And when the demonstrative antecedent is omitted, the relative itself may still be attracted as *ἀμελῶ ὧν μὲ δεῖ πράττειν* = 'I neglect *what* I ought to do'.**

Obs. 1. **Exceptions.** *a*) *As to Gender.* These all belong to

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* As in this example, so usually, the relative clause precedes the antecedent, when the former defines the latter, or is in any way the more important of the two.

** It may aid the English student to enter into this Attic idiom of attraction, if he consider that, just as the Greek *relative* is attracted into the case of the omitted demonstrative antecedent, so in English the *demonstrative antecedent* may be attracted into the case of the omitted relative (§. 27. Obs. *). Thus (Coriolanus V. 5.)

"*Him* I accuse
The city-gates by this has entered".

Also (Antony and Cleopatra III. 1.)

"Better leave undone than by our deeds acquire
Too high a fame, when *him* we serve's away".

the sense-schema (§. 55. Obs. 1, c.), as (Il. X. 278.) *Διὸς τέκος ἦ τε μοι αἰεὶ . . . παρίσταται* = '*daughter* of Jove *who* art ever by my side', where the relative follows the real gender of the person addressed. Again (Soph. Oed. R. 540.) *ἆρ' οὐχὶ μῶρόν ἐστι τοὐγχείρημά σου, ἄνευ τε πλήθους καὶ φίλων τυραννίδα θηρᾶν, ὁ πληθει χρήμασίν θ' ἁλίσκεται*; 'is not yours a foolish undertaking, without numbers and friends (at your back), to hunt after kingly power, (a thing, or the very thing) which is obtained by numbers and friends?' where the neuter relative represents the particular thing *τυραννίδα* as one of a class. When the predicate of the relative clause is completed by a substantive in apposition with the antecedent, the relative generally takes the gender of that substantive, as (Herod. VII. 54. 10.) *Περσικὸν ξίφος τὸν ἀκινάκην καλέουσι* = 'a Persian sword *which* they call *ἀκινάκης*'. *b*) *As to number.* A plural relative may have a singular antecedent, when the mind contemplates a whole class, one individual of which is denoted by the antecedent, in other words when *ὅς* = *οἷος* as (Plato) *θησαυροποιὸς ἀνὴρ οὗς δὴ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος* = 'a money-making man, *such as* of course the multitude praise'. Also *ὅστις* and *ὅς ἄν*, with the Subjunctive, may, in virtue of their indefinite force as meaning *any one whatever of a multitude*, have a plural antecedent, as (Pl. Rep. VIII. 566. D.) *ἀσπάζεται πάντας ᾧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ* = 'salutes *all whomsoever* he may meet': *πάντες οἵτινες* is never found, but *πάντες ὅσοι*, or *ὅστις*. *c*) *As to Person.* The relative to a vocative antecedent may take a verb in the third person instead of the second: for example see *a*).

Obs. 2. **Implicit Antecedents.** The antecedent is sometimes involved in a possessive pronoun as (Soph. Oed. Col. 730.) *τῆς ἐμῆς ἐπεισόδου ὃν μήτ' οἰκνεῖτε κ. τ. λ.* = 'the approach of me, whom neither fear (ye) &c.'; and sometimes in an adjective as (Thuc.) *εἰ δὲ μὲ δεῖ καὶ γυναικείας τι ἀρετῆς, ὅσαι νῦν ἐν χηρείᾳ ἔσονται, μνησθῆναι* = 'if I must also say something of the virtue of the women who will henceforth live in widowhood'.

Obs. 3. **Attraction.** *a*) Examples are found of the relative attracted from the nominative and dative into the case of the antecedent, but they are very rare. Such are (Pl. Phæd. p. 69. a.) *τοῦτο δ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ᾧ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο* = 'this is like what was just now said'; and (Xen. Cyr. V. 4. 39.) *ἦγετο δὲ καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν τε πιστῶν οἷς ἥδετο, καὶ ὧν* (for *ἐκείνων οἷς*) *ἠπίστει πολλους* = 'and he led with him many of his people, both of the loyal in whom he delighted, and of those whom he distrusted'. *b*) Attraction is inadmissible when the relative depends for its own proper case on a different preposition from the antecedent, or on the same preposition in a different sense. Thus *εἶμι παρ' ἐκείνους παρ' ὧν ἔλαβες τὸ ἀργύριον* = 'I am going to those from whom you received the money', could not suffer attraction.

Obs. 4. **Inverse Attraction.** *a*) This occurs when the substantival antecedent is attracted into the proper case, as well as into the clause of the relative. It most frequently happens when the substantive's own case is the nominative or accusative, as (Soph. Oed. C. 1150.) *λόγος δ' ὃς ἐμπέπτωκεν ἀρτίως ἐμοὶ στείχοντι δεῦρο (τούτου) συμβάλου γνώμην* = 'apply your mind to the tale which met me lately as I came hither'. So in Latin (Aen. I. 572.) *urbem quam statuo vestra est.* The place vacated by the noun in this inverse attraction is often actually supplied by a demonstrative, as shewn by the parenthesis of *τούτου*. *b*) The phrase *οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ* (§. 56. Obs. 7.) is attracted both ways, inversely which is very common, as (Pl. Menon. 70.) *οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ ἀποκρίνεται* = 'there is no one to whom he does not answer', the antecedent being attracted into the case of the relative; and directly, which is rare, as (Xen. Cyr. I. 4. 25.) *οὐδένα ἔφασαν ὄντιν' οὐ δακρύοντ' ἀποστρέφεσθαι* = 'they said there was not one who did not turn away weeping', the relative being attracted into the case of the antecedent; for the normal construction would be *οὐδένα ἔφασαν ὅστις οὐ δακρύων ἀποστρέφοιτο.*

Obs. 5. **Omission of Relative.** In the case of two clauses connected by a copulative or adversative conjunction, the relative which introduces the first is seldom repeated in the second, even when, were it repeated, its case would have to be changed: but either it is simply omitted, or its place is supplied by a personal or demonstrative pronoun, as (Od. I. 110.) *ἄμπελοι αἵτε φέρουσιν οἶνον ἐριστάφυλον καί (ἅς) σφιν Διὸς ὄμβρος ἀέξει* = 'vines which bear the clustering grape, and (which) the rain of Heaven makes grow for them (the Cyclops)', where the second relative is simply omitted; and (Plat. Rep. VI. 505. E.) *ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχή, καὶ τοῦτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει* = 'which every man hunts after, and does all things on account *of it*', where the second relative is replaced by *τούτου*.

§. 59. **Government of one Substantive by another in the Genitive.** When a compound idea is to be expressed by two substantives, not denoting the same entity (§. 54.), the secondary or attributive one is put in the genitive, as *ὁ τοῦ δένδρου καρπός* = 'the tree's fruit', where *καρπός* is the principal substantive, *δένδρου* the secondary or attributive one. How this construction came to prevail, even when the relation between the two entities is one that cannot be derived from any development of the genitive case, whether as genitive proper (of), or as ablative (from), has been explained in §. 26**.

Accordingly it must not be supposed that the translation of the Greek genitive in this construction by *of* or *from*, much less by *of* alone, will always give the sense; for the relation denoted by it is often that of *belonging to* in the most general way, *with respect to*, and the particular relation or respect intended must be gathered from the context. The following examples will shew this, and put the student sufficiently on his guard:

ἀπόστασις τῶν Ἀθηναίων = revolt *from* the Athenians
ἐπικούρημα τῆς χιόνος = shelter *from* the snow (*πρός*)
τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα = the decree *regarding* the Megarcans (*περί*)
ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ = persistance *in* evil (*ἐμμένειν τῷ κακῷ*)
τὴν τῆς Αἰτωλίας ξυμφοράν = the mishap *in* Aetolia.*

Some of these expressions are quite capable in themselves of another meaning than that which their context requires. Thus *τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα* might mean, in another passage, the decree *of* the Megareans, and *ἀπόστασις τῶν Ἀθηναίων* 'the revolt or secession *of* the Athenians'. So, according to circumstances,

ἡδοναὶ τέκνων = pleasures *of* or *in*** children
ἄλγος ἑταίρων = grief *of* or *for*** comrades
φροντὶς παίδων = anxiety *of* or *for*** children
φιλία, ἔχθρα τινός = friendship, enmity *of* or *towards* any one
ὁ τῶν πολεμίων φόβος = *our* fear of the enemy, or *theirs* of us
ἀγάπη τοῦ Πατρός = *our* love to the Father, or *His* to us†
ἀρσένων κράτος = the power *of* males, or *over* males††
ποινὴ Πατρόκλοιο = satisfaction *given* or *taken by* Patroclus, or *taken by another for him*,

which last it actually means in Homer.

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* These phrases, in the sense assigned to each, will be found in Thuc. VIII. 5. 1. Xen. An. IV. 5. 13. Thuc. I. 140. 3. Pl. Gorg. 479. D. Thuc. III. 114. 1.

** The periphrasis *arising from*, which is truly expletive of the genitive, would bring out these second relations.

† In the former sense the genitive has been called *objective*, because it denotes the *object* of love; and in the latter *subjective*, because it denotes the *subject* of love, i. e. in whom it resides.

†† The latter of these meanings occurs in Eur. Hec. 883. *καὶ πῶς γυναιξὶν ἀρσένων ἔσται κράτος*; = 'and how shall women have power over males?'

Obs. 1. **Neuter Adjective with Genitive.** A neuter adjective sometimes conforms to the government of substantives, as *ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας* = 'an inconceivable pitch of happpiness'; but this is rare except in the case of expressly quantitative words (§. 55. Obs. 3. a.), and especially rare in any other than the accusative case, as *ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἶναι* = 'to be in all manner of ills'.

Obs. 2. **Compound Regimen.** Theoretically, any number of substantives may be combined by means of successive genitives, so as to express one compound idea; but convenience and intelligibility limit the number to three, as *ἡ τοῦ Σωκράτους σοφίας ἐπιθυμία* = 'the desire of (for) Socrates' wisdom'. In this example the two genitives depend on one another, express in fact by themselves a compound idea, which is still farther compounded with *ἐπιθυμία*. There may however be two genitives not depending on one another, but both on the principal substantive, as (Thuc. VII. 34. 6.) *διά τε τὴν τοῦ ἀνέμου ἄπωσιν αὐτῶν ἐς τὸ πέλαγος* = 'by the wind's drifting of them (the wrecks) to sea', where both genitives depend on *ἄπωσιν*. Cases of four substantives so combined i. e. of one substantive with three successive genitives (II. Cor. IV. 4.) are rare.

Obs. 3. **Article in Regimen.** Generally when the genitive has the article, so has the principal substantive, but, when one of the two substantives is to be specially distinguished, it only has the article. In poetry the article is used often only with the genitive. Note particularly the genitive of a country or district with the name of a particular point in it, as (Thuc. I. 111. 1.) *Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν τῆς Θεσσαλίας ἐπὶ Φάρσαλον* = 'the Athenians made an expedition to Pharsalus in Thessaly'. The genitive of the well known district, by which the spot is defined, has always the article, the spot itself never.

Obs. 4. **Genitive for Dative of General Reference.** The genitive of a personal pronoun, used for the dative of general reference (§. 16. Obs. 2.), may be separated from the noun on which it depends by several words, as (Pl. Phaed. p. 117. B.) *ἕως ἄν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται* = 'until weariness come upon *your* limbs'.

Obs. 5. **Omission of Governing Substantive.** With the prepositions *εἰς* and *ἐν*, *οἰκία*, or some similar word as *ἱερόν*, on which the genitive depends, is commonly omitted (§. 55. Obs. 6.). Thus *εἰς Ἅιδου*, *ἐν Ἅιδου*, *εἰς διδασκάλου*, *εἰς Πλάτωνος*, just as we say 'at Oliver and Boyd's', or 'in St. Paul's'.

Obs. 6. **Dative after Nouns.** In poetry, and sometimes in prose, the dative is put for the genitive. We ourselves can say of a man that he is son *to* or *of* such another. Personal pronouns are more often so converted than substantives, and hardly any other dative but theirs stands for the possessive genitive, as (Xen.) *ἡ γάρ μοι*

ψυχή = 'for *my* soul'.* The *dativus commodi et incommodi* is the most common, as *θεοῖς δωρήματα* = 'gifts *for the gods*', *τοῖς ἀσθένεσι τροφή* = 'food *for the infirm*', *τοῖς φίλοις βοήθεια* = 'assistance *to friends*', *ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ δόσις ὑμῖν* = 'God's gift *to you*'. It will be observed that several of these datives distinctly bring out a meaning, which the genitive would but obscurely convey, and that they are in a manner necessitated by the verbal meaning of the principal substantives on which they depend. On this ground a noun may take both a genitive and a dative, as *ἡ πόλεων ἐπιμιξία πόλεσιν* = 'the intercourse of states with states'. In such cases it is not correct to say that the dative is put for the genitive, since the relation expressed is truly dative, and not genitive at all.

Obs. 7. **Hebraism.** The use of a genitive under the government of a substantive, instead of an adjective in concord with it, is to be found in the poetry of all languages, but its frequency in the New Testament is a Hebraism. (Luke IV. 22.) *τοῖς λόγοις τῆς χάριτος* = 'at the words of grace' i. e. 'at the gracious words': (Luke XVI. 18.) *οἰκονόμος τῆς ἀδικίας* = 'the steward of injustice' i. e. 'the unjust steward'.

§. 60. **Adjectives governing the Genitive.**** These are adjectives denoting *a*) *appropriation* or *segregation*, *b*) *plenty* or *deficiency*, *c*) *participation* or *privation*, and *d*)

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* Here and elsewhere in the text, to secure intelligibility, and out of deference to the conventional language of grammarians, one case is said to be put for another, i. e. where another is more generally found. It must be remembered however that, as no word is the perfect synonyme of another, so neither is any case in any connexion the perfect equivalent of another. For instance, in the example adduced, *μοί* is really the dative of general reference, and the whole phrase *ἡ γάρ μοι ψυχή*, strictly translated, means 'for in my case the soul'.

** The question, what case should follow an adjective in Greek, corresponds to the question what preposition should follow it in English; and the English preposition is generally a safe guide to the Greek case, provided the meaning of the adjective be expressed by a neuter form in English. This condition is necessary, because, from the paucity of adjectives proper in English, and the substitution of participles passive for them, the aspect of the adjective in English is often that of a *state produced*, not that of a *resident quality*, which is the proper adjectival aspect. Thus, if '*experienced in* affairs' be turned into '*having experience of* affairs', the Greek case will be suggested, *ἔμπειρος πραγμάτων*.

some mental affections, as *carefulness*, *mindfulness*, *skill*, *capacity*, and their contraries; also *e*) all *partitives*, *f*) *comparatives*, *superlatives*, and adjectives implying *comparison*, *g*) with some others, as *a*) *τόπος ἱερὸς τοῦ Διός* = 'a place sacred to Jove', where the genitive is that of the *possessor; οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον ποιῶν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος* = 'doing nothing alien from (nothing but what made for the) interest of his country', where the genitive is truly *ablative*. *b*) *πόλις μέστη ἐμπόρων* = 'a city full of merchants', *ἐνδεὴς χρημάτων* = 'scarce of money', where the genitive is that of *material*. *c*) *μέτοχος ἀρετῆς* = 'a sharer of virtue', *ὀρφανὸς παίδων* = 'bereft of children'. Such adjectives are hardly distinguishable from those of the preceding class. Most of those denoting deficiency and privation are compounds with *α* privative, almost all of which are construed with the privative genitive, as *κακῶν ἄγευστος* = 'one who has not tasted of ills'. *d*) *ἐπιστήμων τῆς θαλάσσης* = 'acquainted with the sea', *ἄπειρος γραμμάτων* = 'innocent of learning'. * This is the metaphysical genitive i. e. the genitive of that *about* (*περί*) which the skill, care, &c. are concerned. To this class belong adjectives in *ικός* denoting capacity for a thing, as *παρασκευαστικὸς τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον* = 'capable of providing the necessaries of war'. *e*) *ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν* = 'few of the many'. *f*) *νέοις τὸ σιγᾶν κρεῖττόν ἐστιν τοῦ λαλεῖν* = 'for youth silence is better than talking', *τῶν πάλαι σοφώτατος ὁ Σωκράτης* = 'Socrates was the wisest of the ancients'. Adjectives implying comparison are *multiples in άσιος*, as *διπλασίοις αὐτῶν μάχονται* = 'they fight with double their own number', and all adjectives implying *superiority* as *ἐγκρατὴς ἡδονῶν* = 'having power over pleasures' i. e. 'not their slave', or

* These compounds with *α* privative are often, especially by the poets, used with cognate substantives tautologically, as (Xen. Cyr. IV. 6. 2.) *ἄπαις δέ εἰμι ἀῤῥένων παίδων* = 'male children I have none'. Similarly (Soph. Oed. Col. 677.) *ἀνήνεμος πάντων χειμώνων* = 'sheltered from all storms'.

inferiority as ὑπήκοοι τῶν γονέων = 'obedient to parents', or *excess*, as περιττὰ τῶν ἀρκούντων = 'more than enough', or *difference* as ἕτερον τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ = 'the pleasing is different from the good', or *equivalence* as ἄξιος ἐπαίνου = 'worthy of praise', δόξα χρημάτων οὐκ ὠνητή = 'glory is not to be bought for money'. *g*) Such are those denoting *success* or *failure* (ἐπιτυχής, ἀτυχής), *profusion* or *parsimony* (ἀφειδής, φείδωλος), *guilt* or *innocence* (αἴτιος, ἀναίτιος), and various local relations, as μέσος, ἀντίος, ἐναντίος, ἀντίστροφος, παραπλήσιος, also ὡραῖος, as ὡραία γάμου = 'ripe for marriage'.

Obs. 1. **Variations.** *a*) Whenever the notion of advantage or disadvantage is attached to any of the above adjectives, they take the dative, e. g. οἰκεῖος = 'well inclined to', and ἀλλότριος = 'unfavourable to', as (Dem.) ἡ Θάσος τότε Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν οἰκεία, ἡμῖν δ' ἀλλοτρία ἦν = 'Thasus was then friendly to the Lacedæmonians, hostile to us'. Also ἐναντίος, when it means not simply *opposite to*, but *opposed to*, takes the dative: so also ὑπήκοος, when the obedience is regarded not simply as belonging, but as subservient to another. *b*) Sometimes adjectives of plenty, particularly δασύς, are found with the instrumental dative, as δασὺς δένδρων or δένδροις = 'thick with trees', in the latter of which constructions the trees appear not as the material *out of which*, but as the means *by* which a place is filled. (§. 64. Obs. 2.)

Obs. 2. **Forms of Comparison.** Not only are πρό and ἀντί sometimes prefixed to the comparative genitive, but instead of it the accusative with παρά* or πρός is sometimes used, or the comparison is made by the conjunction ἤ with the same case after it as before it. Thus 'the son is bigger than the father' may be rendered

ὁ πατὴρ μείζων τοῦ υἱοῦ
or „ „ „ παρὰ τὸν υἱόν
or „ „ „ ἢ ὁ υἱός

There are instances of the comparative genitive itself being accompanied by ἤ

Obs. 3. **Ἤ after Words implying Comparison.** Besides comparatives, words implying difference may have the following genitive resolved by ἤ, as ἄλλα ἢ τὰ γιγνόμενα = 'other things than what have happened', τοὐναντίον ἢ τὰ προσδοκώμενα = 'the contrary of what was expected'; διπλήσια νέμονται αὐτῷ ἢ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι = 'his share is double that of the others'; τὸν ἥμισυν σῖτον ἢ

* Πάρα with the accusative, which is rare after comparatives in classic Greek, is the dominant formula of comparison in the surviving dialect.

πρόσθεν = 'half the former allowance of corn'; *διαφέρει τὰ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μή* = 'there is a difference between the relations of him who loves, and of him who loves not'; *πλεῖστα ἢ ἄλλη πᾶσα χώρη* = 'more than any other country'. So, *μᾶλλον* being omitted, after *βούλεσθαι*, as (Il. I. 117.), *βούλομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σόον ἔμμεναι ἢ ἀπολέσθαι* = 'I would rather that the people were safe than that they perished': and after *δίκαιόν ἐστι*, as *οὕτω οὖν ἡμᾶς δίκαιον ἔχειν τὸ ἕτερον μέρος ἢπερ Ἀθηναίους* = 'thus it is right that we should have the other part rather than the Athenians'. Here, as often, *περ* is joined to *ἤ*. (§. 96. Obs. *)

Obs. 4. **Comparison of two Properties belonging to the same Entity.** If two properties of the same entity are compared in degree, the Greeks commonly used two comparatives, where we use only one, as *θάττων ἢ σοφώτερός ἐστι* = 'he is more hasty than wise'. Sometimes however two positives are used, as (Soph. Aj. 966) *ἐμοὶ πικρὸς τέθνηκεν ἢ κείνοις γλυκύς* = 'his death was more bitter to me than sweet to them'.

Obs. 5. **Comparison of an Entity with itself.** If an entity at one time is compared with itself at another, in respect of any quality, the genitive of the reflexive pronoun is used with *αὐτός*, as *δυνατώτεροι αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν* = 'they were mightier than themselves' i. e. 'they surpassed themselves'. And in the like case, when the very highest degree is to be marked, the superlative is similarly used, as *δεινότατος σαυτοῦ ἦσθα* = 'you quite excelled yourself'.

Obs. 6. **Comparison of Entities Incommensurate.** When the object of the comparison is to declare two entities incommensurate, out of all proportion to one another, *ἢ κατά*, and more rarely *ἢ πρός* (*quam pro* in Latin) with the accusative are used, sometimes *ἢ ἐπί* with the dative, as *νεκρὸς μείζων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον* = 'a corpse larger than comports with the normal size of the human body', 'of extraordinary size for a man'. The same construction occurs with infinitival clauses, as *σοφώτερ' ἢ κατ' ἄνδρα συμβαλεῖν ἔπη* = 'sayings wiser than that a man can understand them'.

Obs. 7. **Equivalent Forms.** In such phrases as *λόγου μείζων* = 'too big for expression', *ἐλπίδων κρείσσων* = 'too good for hope', the genitive nouns are equivalent to the infinitive verb with *ἢ ὥστε* (§. 90. Obs. 3.), or to the potential with *ἢ ὡς*, as *ἔστι γὰρ μείζω τἀκείνων ἔργα ἢ ὡς τῷ λόγῳ τις ἂν εἴποι* = 'their works were greater than that one could recount them'.

Obs. 8. **Comparatio Compendiaria.** The Greeks frequently used a compendious form of comparison, which is not logically correct, as (Il. XXI. 191.) *Κρείσσων δ' αὖτε Διὸς γενεὴ ποταμοῖο τέτυκται* = 'the race of Jove has been created stronger than the river', for the comparison is not between *Ζεύς* and *ποταμός*, but between the race of *Ζεύς*, and the race of *ποταμός*. This illogicality may

be avoided by the use of the demonstrative article, which represents the noun understood, as our own *that* does in 'than *that* of the river'. (§. 8. Obs. 2.)

Obs. 9. **Redundant Negative after Comparatives.** The negative *οὐ* is often added to *μᾶλλον ἤ*, when the principal clause is negative, or implies a negative by being interrogative, or by expressing censure, as (Thuc. III. 36. 4.) *ὠμὸν τὸ βούλευμα . . . πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους* = 'it is a cruel decree to destroy a whole city rather than the guilty'. (Madv. §. 88. b. Rem. 2.)*

§. 61. **Adjectives governing the Dative.** These are adjectives expressing *a*) *likeness* in its various forms as *agreement*, *equality*, *identity*; *b*) *connexion* in its various forms as *proximity*, *union*, *mixture*; *c*) *advantage* in its various forms, as *adaptation*, *subjection*, *friendliness*, *assistance* with their contraries; and *d*) *verbals* having a *passive* sense (§. 72. d.), as *a*) *οἱ πονηροὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοιοι* = 'the wicked resemble one another'; *b*) *ὅμοροι τοῖς Ἀρμενίοις* = 'bordering with the Armenians'; *c*) *εὔνους Ἀθηναίοις* = 'favourable to the Athenians; *d*) *ποθεινὸς φίλοις* = 'regretted by friends', *ὠφελητέα μοι ἡ Ἑλλάς* = 'Greece must be aided by me'.

Obs. 1. *a*) **Variations.** A multitude of adjectives denoting agreement and connexion are compounds with *σύν* or *ὁμοῦ*: these, as also *ἴσος* and *κοινός* are sometimes found with the genitive. *b*) When the contraries imply separation, as many of those compounded with *α* privative** do, they prefer the genitive, as *ἀμιγεῖς βαρβάρων* =

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* The negation is similarly redundant after comparatives in Italian, whenever a verb follows them, as 'io scrivo più che io *non* parlo' = 'I write more than I speak'. This redundancy of the negative is due to a transition in the thought: it begins 'I *do* something more', and it ends 'I *don't* do something else so much'. The idiom, whether Greek or Italian, is an instance of a logical inaccuracy made classical by custom.

** The *privative* *α* (*ἄνευ*), as in *ἀπόλεμος* = 'unwarlike', must be distinguished from the *collective* (*ἅμα*), as in *ἅπας*, *ἀδελφός* = *ὁμόδελφος* (*ὁ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς δελφύος*); from the *intensive* (*ἄγαν*) as in *ἀχανής* = 'gaping wide' as well as 'not gaping at all', *ἄξυλος* = 'thickly wooded' as well as 'treeless'; and from the merely *euphonic*, as *στάχυς* or *ἄσταχυς* = 'an ear of corn', *σπαίρω* or *ἀσπαίρω* = 'I breathe', and probably *ἀγαθός*, the root being

'unmixed with barbarians'. *c*) In other instances the genitive is to be explained by the adjective having assumed a substantival character, as (Herod. II. 74.) *ἱροὶ ὄφιες ἀνθρώπων οὐδαμῶς δηλήμονες* = 'sacred serpents not at all *harmers* of men'.

Obs. 2. **Resolution of Dative by Preposition and Accusative.** The dative of advantage or disadvantage is often resolved into *πρός* or *εἰς* with the accusative, as *χρήσιμος πρὸς πόλεμον* = 'useful for war', *χρήσιμος εἰς τὸ λέγειν* = 'useful for discourse', *βλαβερὸν πρὸς οὐσίαν* = 'injurious to one's fortune'. These examples are from Plato, and they are classic steps in the transition of Greek from the synthetic to the analytic state.

Obs. 3. **Illogical Regimen avoided by *καί*.** When it is denoted by *ὅμοιος*, *ἴσος*, *παραπλήσιος*, *ὁ αὐτός*, that two entities have the same or a similar thing in common, there is the same illogicality in the use of the dative as in the compendious form of comparison (§. 60. Obs. 8.), as *ὁμοίαν γνώμην σοὶ ἔχω* = 'I have the same opinion with you', literally 'I have an opinion like you', but it should be 'like yours', the likeness being between opinion and opinion. This illogical construction, which is frequent enough in Greek, is however commonly avoided by coupling the two entities by *καί*, and leaving the adjective without regimen; *καί* may in such cases be translated into English by *as*, thus *ὁμοίαν γνώμην ἔχω καὶ σύ* = 'I have the same opinion *as* you; *νόμος δὲ τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι . . . ὠυτὸς καὶ τοῖσι βαρβάροισι* = 'the Lacedæmonians have the same law *as* the barbarians'. With *ἴσος* and *ὁ αὐτός*, *ὡς* and *ὥσπερ* are also found, especially in Attic prose writers: and this is precisely our modern formula, 'the same *as*' = *τὸ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ*.

§. 62. **The Accusative after Adjectives.** This is always the accusative denoting *in what respect*, for which see §. 18. Obs. 5. i.

§. 63. **The Infinitive after Adjectives.** *a*) This construction is most frequent after adjectives denoting *ability* or the want of it, whether physical, mental or moral (i. e. inclination), also *ἄξιος* and *ἀνάξιος*, as *Θεμιστοκλῆς ἱκανώτατος ἦν εἰπεῖν, καὶ γνῶναι, καὶ πρᾶξαι* = 'Themistocles was capable in the highest degree of speech, resolution, and action'. Homer uses this construction with all sorts of adjectives as *θείειν ἀνέμοισιν ὅμοιοι* = 'like the

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γαθ corresponding to our own *good*, *God*, and the German gut. English parallels are *squire* and *esquire*, *Gad* and *Egad*.

winds *for running*', *μέγα καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι* = 'great too for posterity *to hear of*'. *b*) To denote more distinctly the effect or aim, *ὥστε* may be prefixed, as (Xen. Cyr. IV. 3. 11.) *Πότερα παῖδές εἰσι φρονιμώτεροι ὥστε μαθεῖν τὰ φραζόμενα καὶ δεικνύμενα ἢ ἄνδρες* = 'whether are children or men the more capable, so as to learn what is said and shewn'.

Obs. 1. **Voices of the Infinitive.** As in English sometimes, so and still oftener in Greek, the infinitive active is employed, where the infinitive passive might be expected, as *ἀνὴρ χαλεπὸς συζῆν* = 'a man difficult to live with', *καλὸς ὁρᾶν* = 'fair to see or to be seen', *θαυμάσιον εἰπεῖν* = 'wonderful to tell or to be told'. Thucydides uses both active and passive infinitives after *ἄξιος*, as (II. 40. 1.) *τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι* = 'that the city is worthy to be admired', and (I. 138. 3.) *ἄξιος θαυμάσαι* in the very same sense. (§. 73.)

Obs. 2. **Subject of the Infinitive.** Especially after adjectives denoting adaptation, and after comparatives, the understood subject of the infinitive may be different from that to which the adjective refers: in all the above examples it was the same. Thus (Pl. Menex. 239. B.) *ὅ τε χρόνος βραχὺς ἀξίως διηγήσασθαι* = 'and the time is short for worthily recounting (what happened)', where *χρόνος*, to which the adjective refers, is of course not the narrator. So *ψυχρὸν τὸ ὕδωρ ὥστε λούσασθαι* = 'the water is (too) cold for bathing'. The best English of this infinitive is by *for* with the gerund.

§. 64. **Verbs governing the Genitive.** These are verbs signifying *a*) *participation* or *abstinence; b*) *fulness* or *deficiency; c*) *commencement* or *cessation*; *d*) certain mental affections, as *mindfulness*, *carefulness*, *contempt*, *desire*, *enjoyment*, and their contraries; *e*) the manifestations of desire, as *aiming at*, *hitting* or *missing*, *holding by*; also *f*) those denoting difference or comparison, whether in the way of *superiority* or *inferiority;* and *g*) the *operation of the senses*. Thus *a*) *ἀμείνονος μοίρας μεταλαμβάνειν* = 'to share a better fate', *φείδεο τῶν νηῶν* = 'spare the ships': *b*) *γέμομεν ἐλπίδων* = 'we are full of hopes:' *c*) *μύθων ἦρχε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν* = 'the father of men began a speech', *οὐ λήξω θρήνων* = 'I shall not cease from lamentations': *d*) *τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπιλανθάνομαι* = 'I forget the names', *τοῦ*

συμφέροντος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι = 'to take care of one's interest', *κρύους καὶ θάλπους ὁμοίως καταφρονεῖ* = 'he despises cold and heat alike', *ἐπιθυμῶ τῆς σοφίας* = 'I desire wisdom', *σχολῆς ἀπολαύομεν* = 'we enjoy leisure: *e*) *στοχάζομαι τοῦ σκοποῦ* = 'I aim at the mark', *τιμῆς τυγχάνειν* = 'to obtain honour', *τοῦτό τις λέγων οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοι τἀληθέος* = 'any one, who should say this, would not miss the truth', *καί μοι ἕπου ἐχόμενος τῆς χλαμύδος* = 'and follow me holding on by my cloak': *f*) *διαφέρειν τῶν πολλῶν* = 'to differ from the multitude', *πάντων κυριεύειν* = 'to be master of all', *ὑστέρησε τῆς μάχης* = 'he came too late for the battle:' *g*) *ἅπτεσθαι τῆς χειρός* = 'to touch the hand'.

Obs. 1. **Verbs of Participation.** A great many verbs of participation are compounds with *μετά* and *σύν*, as *μετέχειν*, *συλλαμβάνειν*. The genitive after them is truly partitive; and accordingly, when *μέρος*, or any word implying it, as *ἴσον* (*μέρος*) accompanies such verbs, it is put in the accusative, as (Thuc. VI. 40. 1.) *ἴσον . . . μετασχεῖν* = 'to obtain an equal share', because the whole *ἴσον μέρος* is taken.

Obs. 2. **Verbs of Plenty and Want.** After verbs of fulness, particularly *βρύειν*, the genitive is sometimes replaced by the dative, the relation *whereof* being changed, as often in English, into *wherewith* (§. 60. Obs. 1. b.). To this class belong verbs denoting satiety, as *ἄσασθαι*, *κορέσασθαι*. The verb *δέω* = 'I am in want' occurs impersonally in a number of adverbial phrases, as *πολλοῦ δεῖ* = 'far from it', *ὀλίγου*, *μικροῦ δεῖ* = 'almost'. It is used also personally, as *πολλοῦ*, *ὀλίγου*, *δέω* = 'I am far from, within a little of'; and in statements of number, as *τριακοστὸν ἔτος ἑνὸς δέον* = 'the thirtieth year wanting one' i. e. 'the twenty-ninth'; *δυοῖν δέοντες πεντήκοντα ἄνδρες* = 'fifty men wanting two' i. e. 'forty eight'.

Obs. 3. **Verbs denoting Mental Affections,** particularly verbs of *remembering* and *forgetting*, hesitate between the genitive and accusative, inclining rather to the accusative, where *things*, not persons, are remembered or forgotten. Mental affections have in fact a twofold aspect. *Remembering,* for example, may be regarded as either voluntary or involuntary: in the former case it is an *act* logically requiring the accusative, and in the latter a mental *sensation* appropriately taking the genitive of that *whence* it arises. The double construction of the corresponding verbs in Latin points to the same distinction, and our own language recognises it, *recollect* and *re-*

member denoting respectively, according to synonymists, voluntary and involuntary memory. The distinction is not indeed always observed; yet it clearly appears in this, that, when *recollect* is used of involuntary memory, it may take *of* the sign of the genitive after it, but not otherwise: thus 'I don't recollect *of* it' is often said, but 'I shall try to recollect *of* it', or imperatively 'recollect *of* this', never; in the last two examples, where the will is energetic, *of* must be omitted. The genitive after such verbs then is primarily the genitive of origin or cause, denoting the *whence* of the mental affection; but when men came to regard themselves, rather as *acting* than as *acted on* in their mental affections, the accusative began to supplant the genitive. In some instances the transition can be marked, as in λανθάνομαι, which is uniformly construed with the genitive, while its later compound ἐπιλανθάνομαι, which differs from it only in being more emphatic, is found with the accusative also. So λοιδοροῦμαι always takes the dative, but the later form λοιδορῶ generally the accusative, the primary notion of the former being interpreted by 'I cherish contempt *for*', and the more energetic signification of the latter being brought out by 'I bring into contempt'. The fact of transition appears also in the greater or less frequency with which verbs of this class are construed with the accusative: thus ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐπιμαίεσθαι are found with it sometimes, ἐνθυμοῦμαι, στένω, and οἰκτείρω generally, φιλεῖν, ἀγαπᾶν and στέργειν almost always. (§. 65. Obs. 3.) In the sense of *to relate*, μνημονεύω of course takes the accusative. Many verbs of this class, particularly verbs of *caring for* take περί, and sometimes ὑπέρ, with the genitive. These prepositions introduce, not the genitive of origin or cause, but of concern, and their use may have been a step in the transition from the indirect to the direct construction, for the object *about* which, or *in behalf of* which a mental affection is employed, is obviously akin to the object *to* which it is directed.

Obs. 4. **Verbs of Aiming at.** It seems strange to us that the verbs in class *e*) should have their object in the genitive: but this only shews that these verbs wore a different aspect to the Greek mind from what they do to ours. In some cases we can obtain a glimpse of their view. Thus we perceive a difference between shooting or throwing *at* a thing and shooting or throwing a thing itself; the verbs are directly transitive in the latter case, indirectly so in the former. Accordingly τοξεύειν, βάλλειν = 'shooting', 'throwing', take the genitive in the former sense *, but the accusative in the latter. So ἁμαρτάνειν, and ψευ-

* In regard to this difficult construction it may be observed that as, in shooting, the arrow is first drawn *from*, and then launched *to* the mark, so, in every case of aiming at a thing, the eye or the mind first scans the distance and obstacles between the object aimed at and the aimer, *beginning with the former*,

δεσθαι in the sense, not of 'missing' and 'mistaking', but of 'speaking falsely', take the accusative. It is important to consider verbs of this class as manifestations of desire, for, when that idea is absent, they take a different construction: thus *τυγχάνω*, *ἀπαντῶ*, *ἐγγίζω*, when they mean simply to *meet with* or *approach to*, without any notion of desire or aim so to do, take, the first the accusative, and the last two the dative. As confirmatory of the connexion in language between desire and its manifestations, it may be mentioned that sometimes the same root supplies verbs for both, as in Latin *havere* = 'to wish', and *habere* = 'to have'; *cupio* = 'I desire', and *capio* = 'I take'. Verbs of holding by (§. 75. Obs. 1. b. *, p. 152.), as *λαμβάνομαι* and its compounds with *ἐπί*, *ἀντί*, *σύν*, also *ἔχομαι* and *ἀντέχομαι*, must not be confounded with directly transitive verbs, signifying *to lay hold of*. These take an accusative of the object seized with a genitive of the part, as *λαβεῖν τινα γούνων*, *ζώνης* = 'to seize one by the knees, by the girdle'; *λύκον τῶν ὤτων κρατῶ* = 'I hold a wolf by the ears'. Hence many consider the genitive after the middles *λαμβάνομαι*, *δράττομαι* &c. to be partitive; and Matthiæ (§. 331.) alleges that, whenever the *whole* of a thing grasped &c. is meant, the accusative, and not the genitive, is used.

Obs. 5. **Verbs implying Comparison.** The genitive after these verbs denotes the standard of comparison, not the particular wherein the difference consists. That is put in the dative (§. 16. a.) with or without *ἐν*, *ἐπί*, or in the accusative with *εἰς*, *κατά*, and in poetry without any preposition. All verbs of governing, as *κρατεῖν*, *τυραννεῖν*, *δυναστεύειν* belong to this class. A dative is often found with them in poetry, especially in Homer with *ἀνάσσειν*, as (Il. XII. 242.) *ὃς πᾶσι θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάσσει* = 'who governs all mortals and immortals'. The rule may be maintained by interpreting this dative as local, 'who rules *among*', whereas the translation of the genitive would be 'who rules *over*', conveying the idea of superiority.

Obs. 6. **Verbs denoting Operation of the Senses.** Verbs of *seeing* almost uniformly take the accusative, and, regarding verbs of *hearing*, it generally holds that they take the accusative of the sound heard, and the genitive of that which produces it. The reason of this is important. These verbs denote primarily *sensations*, not *acts* of the subject, and in this view naturally take the genitive

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withdrawing *from* it as it were, and then action is taken in the line selected, so as to reach or hit the object. The genitive would seem to suggest the preliminary process of taking aim *from* an object; while the English prepositions used with these verbs are more appropriate to the *action* consequent thereon.

of the object *whence* the sensation arises. But that which is in some circumstances chiefly a sensation is in others chiefly an act, and this latter aspect, which desiderates the accusatival construction, gained ground in proportion as the Greek mind in general receded from the attitude of *receptivity*, and took up that of *activity*. (§. 66. Obs. 1.) Farther, the Greeks distinguished between the sensuous perception itself (*αἴσθησις*), and the object whence it proceeded (*τὸ αἰσθητόν*), the accusative being the proper case for the former, because it is always cognate with the verb (§. 66. b.), and the genitive for the latter. Now, in regard to *hearing* this distinction is palpable, for the *sound* that comes from a bell cannot easily be confounded with the bell itself; but in *seeing*, the *image* of the bell, which alone is received into the mind, cannot be distinguished from the bell itself, whence the image comes, without an effort of reflection: this latter distinction in short is scientific, not popular, and therefore of no account in the philosophy of language. Hence the almost uniform construction of verbs of *seeing* with the accusative, the popular mind regarding the thing seen, not as the source of a sensation, but as the object of an act; and hence also the prevailing usage with verbs of *hearing*, that they take the accusative of the sound, as *βοὴν ἀκούω* = 'I hear a shouting', but the genitive of that which produces it, as *ἀκούω σοῦ βοῶντος* = 'I hear you shouting'. Sometimes however the primitive construction prevails, as (Aristoph. Ach. 306) *τῶν δ' ἐμῶν σπονδῶν ἀκούσατε* = 'but listen to my truce'. Those who would maintain the rule explain this by a personification, as if the *σπονδαί* were speaking. The construction of verbs of seeing with the genitive is quite exceptional, as (Aristoph. Eq. 803.) *ὁ δὲ δῆμος ... μὴ καθορᾷ σοῦ* = 'and lest Demus observe you'. There is a beautiful parallel between verbs of *seeing* and *hearing* on the one hand, and verbs of *knowing* and *remembering*, which may be called intellectual seeing and hearing, on the other, in respect of construction. Like verbs of *seeing*, those of *knowing*, *ἐπίστασθαι*, *εἰδέναι*, *διανοεῖσθαι*, *γιγνώσκειν*, are found almost uniformly with the accusative, while those of *remembering* (Obs. 3.), like those of *hearing*, hesitate between the genitive and accusative, with rather a preponderance to the former. — In regard to verbs of touching, tasting, and smelling, the *αἴσθησις*, that which enters the mind by the sense, is easily distinguishable from the *αἰσθητόν*, the object whence it proceeds; and accordingly the genitive of the *αἰσθητόν* is most common with them, as (Herod. I. 80. 26.) *ὡς ὄσφρανντο τάχιστα τῶν καμήλων οἱ ἵπποι* = 'as soon as the horses scented the camels', but the accusative of the *αἴσθησις* always, as (Herod. I. 80. 21.) *κάμηλον ἵππος φοβέεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται ... τὴν ὀδμὴν ὀσφραινόμενος* = 'the horse dreads the camel, and cannot endure to smell the scent of it'. 'To smell of perfume' = *ὄζειν μύρου*, always with the genitive. Pindar joins *θιγγάνω* and *ἅπτεσθαι*

with the dative, perhaps on account of the juxtaposition with their objects, which these verbs imply.

Obs. 7. **Verbs of Motion.** *a*) After all verbs of motion the genitive may be used to denote the starting-point (§. 18. Obs. 5. b.); but *φεύγω* sometimes takes an accusative, even as we can say 'to flee the country'. The local *from* often follows the verb in Greek, where some other relation is substituted for it in English, as (Aristoph. Ach. 256) *αὔξεται τῶν ἐμῶν χωρίων* = 'grows *from* (we say *on*) my lands'. *b*) In certain phrases, the local genitive is used after verbs of motion for the direction whither, just as *ποῦ* = 'whither' sometimes, though properly *where:* thus (Xen. An. I. 3. 1.) *οἱ γὰρ στρατιῶται οὐκ ἔφασαν ἰέναι τοῦ πρόσω* = 'for the soldiers refused to go forward'; (Thuc. IV. 47. 3.) *ἐπετάχυνον τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς κ. τ. λ.* = 'hastened on the way those &c.' (Thuc. IV. 60. 2.) *τῆς ἀρχῆς . . . προκοπτόντων ἐκείνοις* = 'furthering their progress to dominion'. (§. 75. Obs. 2. b.) Compare with these examples the German idiom ſeiner Wege gehen = 'to walk off'.

§. 65. **Verbs governing the Dative.** These are verbs denoting *a*) *agreement*; *b*) *likeness*; *c*) *proximity*; and *d*) the various forms of *advantage* or *disadvantage*, as *obedience, assistance* and *opposition:* as *a*) *ὁμονοεῖν ἀλλήλοις* = 'to agree with one another': *ὁμολογῶ σοί* = 'I agree with you:' *b*) *παιδὶ ἔοικε* = 'he is like a child': *c*) *ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ αἰεὶ πελάζει* = 'like always draws to like': *d*) *πειθαρχεῖν πατρί* = 'to obey one's father', *βοηθεῖν τοῖς φίλοις* = 'to assist one's friends', *πολεμεῖν τινι* = 'to war with any one'. (§. 69. Obs. 3.)

Obs. 1. **Dativus Commodi et Incommodi.** Verbs of *pleasing* and *being angry with* belong to class *d*), but *ἀρέσκω* and *ἀπαρέσκω* are found with the accusative also. To the same class belong verbs of *trusting*, and *following*, but with the latter the dative is often preceded by *σύν*, *μετά*, *ἅμα*. Instead of the simple dative with verbs of fighting, the dative with *μετά* is found, as (Il. XXVII. 148.) *μάρνασθαι μετ' ἀνδράσι* = 'to fight with men', but more frequently *πρός* or *ἐπί* with the accusative. When the root of verbs denoting *subserviency*, and in that regard taking the dative, contains the idea of inferiority, as *ὑπηρετεῖν* = (lit.) 'to be an underrower', they may take the genitive, because comparison in the way of inferiority is implied. On the other hand, verbs implying superiority are found with the dative, when the idea of advantage prevails in their signification or use, as *ἡγεμονεύειν τινί* = 'to be one's guide'.

Obs. 2. **Dative of General Reference.** The dative of general reference (§. 16. Obs. 2.) has a very wide range with substantive verbs, as *νῆες οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡμῖν* = 'we have no ships', where *εἶναι* with the dative = *ἔχω*. *Παρύσατις ἦ μήτηρ ὑπῆρχε τῷ Κύρῳ* = 'Parysatis was mother to Cyrus'; *πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί σοι αὗται γεγόνασιν*; = 'whence have these accusations against you proceeded?' *ἡμέρα ἦν πέμπτη ἐπιπλέουσιν Ἀθηναίοις* = 'it was the fifth day to the Athenians sailing' i. e. 'they had been sailing five days'. The dative after impersonal verbs is also that of general reference: *πρέπει* however is found with the genitive, and *δοκεῖ*, *μέλει* are sometimes used personally, as (Il. X. 481.) *μελήσουσι δέ μοι ἵπποι* = 'horses shall be my care'.

Obs. 3. **Instrumental Dative.** Certain verbs denoting *joy* and *sorrow* take the instrumental dative. Such are *ἥδομαι*, *χαίρω*, *ἀγάλλομαι*, *ἐπαίρομαι*, *ἄχθομαι*, *ἀθυμῶ*, as *ἄχθομαι τοῖς γεγενημένοις* = 'I grieve at what has happened', or, giving it the passive form, 'I am grieved by what has happened': but *ἐπί* is often added, as *ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τύχῃ ἥδεται* = 'he is delighted with his brother's fortune'. Even *ἀγαπᾶν* and *στέργειν* are found with this dative, as *στέργειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ τύχῃ* = 'to be pleased with one's own fortune'.

Obs. 4. *Χρῶμαι*. The verb *χρῶμαι* = 'I use', governs the dative, perhaps because that is the instrumental case, whatever we use being as it were an instrument in our hands. So also *νομίζω*, when it has a kindred sense, as (Thuc. II. 38. 1.) *ἀγῶσι μέν γε καὶ θυσίαις διετησίοις νομίζοντες*='celebrating annual games and sacrifices', where *νομίζοντες* seems to mean 'employing according to custom'.

§. 66. **Verbs governing the Accusative.** *a*) Verbs *directly transitive* i. e. denoting such an action that their objects are conceived of as suffering a change in some way or other, of place for example, or condition, take an accusative of the patient, as *τύπτω σέ* = 'I strike thee'. In regard to all others it is better, instead of classifying the verbs themselves, to classify the accusatives found with them. *b*) These are the accusative of the *cognate substantive*, and the accusative of the *equivalent notion.* The former may follow any kind of verb, even a neuter verb, as *νοσεῖν νόσον* = 'to be ill'. This accusative is much more common in Greek than in English; it is chiefly employed, however, when some farther definition of the state or action is to be given, as *δεινὴν νόσον νοσεῖν* = *δεινὰ νοσεῖν* = 'to be grievously

ill', just as we say 'to live a long life', 'to sleep the sleep of the righteous', where also specifications are added. *c*) The accusative of the *equivalent notion* is just an extension of the former. Thus in *δέμω δόμον* = 'I build a building', the accusative is of the cognate substantive, in *δέμω ἀνάκτορα* = 'I build a palace', of the equivalent notion, *palace* being only a particular kind of building. *d*) The large class of accusatives, denoting the *result* of the verbal operation, are either of the cognate substantive, as *γράφω γράμμα* = 'I write a letter', or of the equivalent notion, as *γράφω βίβλον* = 'I write a book'. *e*) The descriptive accusative (§. 17. c.), which may follow any kind of verb, as *ἀλγῶ τοὺς πόδας* = 'I have a pain in my feet', is no more under the government of the verb than the dative of place or time would be, or any other of the specifications mentioned in §. 18. Obs. 5. The descriptive *neuter* accusatives of pronouns and numeral adjectives are particularly noticeable, as *ἓν σοι οὐχ ὁμολογῶ* = 'in one respect I do'nt agree with you'; *τί βούλεται Κῦρος ἡμῖν χρῆσθαι*; = 'in what respect (for what purpose) does Cyrus wish to employ us?' *αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἥκω παρά σε'* = 'in respect of these very things (for this very reason) am I now come to you'.

Obs. 1. **Transitive Verbs.** The distinction between transitive and intransitive verbs is unmistakeable, and in all languages uniform, in extreme cases, as *to put* and *to go;* but there is a large class of verbs (most of those in §§. 64. 65.), which may be regarded either as transitive or intransitive, or more accurately as transitive directly or indirectly, and, in regard to these, usage varies with every language. Hence the strangeness of Greek constructions to us has often a merely local origin, many of them, which appear unnatural to us, appearing quite natural to other moderns, the idiom of whose language happens to coincide with the Greek. Thus that *αἰσθάνομαι, μέμνημαι,* and *θαυμάζω* should govern the genitive, appears quite natural to a Frenchman, because he himself says 's'apercevoir *de*', 'se souvenir *de*', 's'étonner *de* quelque chose'; and that *βοηθεῖν, ἀρέσκειν, πείθεσθαι, ἕπεσθαι* should govern the dative appears quite natural to a German, because he himself says 'einem helfen, gefallen, gehorchen, folgen.' The prevalence of the indirect regimen in Greek, and of the direct in the modern languages,

arises from a difference of mental attitude, receptivity having been the mental attitude of the primitive Greek mind, whereas activity is that of the modern. In the isolation and indolence of patriarchal life, it was natural for man to regard himself chiefly as the subject of impressions, because he really was so; even a modern imagination may realise how small and weak these ancient shepherds must have felt themselves to be, in presence of heaven and earth, and their majestic phenomena. But when, by association and accumulated experience, man came to recognise in himself the sovereign of the world, he gradually learned to regard himself less as the receiver of impressions than as the producer of effects; and this latter aspect has, in the busy modern world, almost entirely supplanted the other. Hence *hearing*, *remembering*, *desiring* &c. which were to the primitive Greek mind impressions passing from without inwards, are in our case acts proceeding from within outwards; there is no violence done to nature in either case, and, in both, the syntax of language has conformed to the *ἐνδιάθετος λόγος*. It is probable too that Christianity, which invigorated man's sense of responsibility, by teaching him that he is not the sport of Fate, and need not be the sport of his passions, but may become master of both, has contributed not a little to the substitution of the modern for the ancient mental attitude. At all events, however produced, a change has taken place in the form of thought, and consequently in the form of language; and the main point of the change appears in the following contrast of idioms, (Soph. Phil. 646.) *ὅτου σε χρεία καί ποθ' μάλιστ' ἔχει* = 'any thing, need and desire of which have thee particularly' i. e. 'which you particularly need and desire'; (Soph. Oed. Col. 1142.) *βάρος γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἐκ τούτων ἔχει* = 'for no displeasure on this account has us' i. e. 'we have no displeasure on that account'. Anciently the feeling had the man, now the man has the feeling; and that because the attitude of the mind was *receptive* then, and is *active* now.* Accordingly if, as in the case of adjectives (§. 60. **) the English verb, when apparently transitive, be put into a neuter form, the true Greek construction will often naturally appear, as 'I desire' = 'I am desirous *of*', 'I remember' = 'I come in

* In English more uniformly than in any other language, is *activity* the mental attitude represented. Thus the Germans say not only ich bereue = 'I repent', but also es reut mich which we can translate only by a periphrasis, 'I am overcome with remorse'; not only ich bedauere = 'I pity', but es dauert mich = 'it moves me with compassion'; not only ich wundere mich, which is already a less active form than the English 'I wonder', but es wundert mich = 'it makes me wonder'. Has this peculiarity of the English idiom any connexion with the extreme development of outward activity in the Anglo-Saxon race?

mind *of*', 'I assist' = 'I am helpful *to*' &c.* A good Lexicon however is the only perfect guide to the construction of particular verbs; and the above views are useful, not as superseding the study of syntactical irregularities in detail, but as accounting for two broad and puzzling facts which meet the student at the very outset viz. that so many verbs, directly transitive in English, are indirectly so in Greek, and that almost all Greek verbs, generally construed as indirectly transitive i. e. with the genitive or dative, are also sometimes construed as directly transitive i. e. with the accusative. The difference of mental attitude accounts for the former, and the *gradual* transition from the attitude of receptivity to that of activity accounts for the latter. Sometimes indeed (§. 64. Obs. 4.) a difference of signification will account for the difference of cases; thus,

προορᾶν τὸν πόλεμον = 'to foresee the war', the notion of *seeing* prevailing;

„ *τοῦ πολέμου* = 'to take thought about the war', the notion of *concern* prevailing;

„ *τῷ πολέμῳ* = 'to provide for the war', the notion of *subserviency* prevailing.

But very often verbs are employed in precisely the same sense with different cases, as *ἀρέσκειν*, *ἀπαρέσκειν*, *ὠφελεῖν*, *ἐνοχλεῖν*, *φιλοφρονοῦμαι*, *λυμαίνομαι*, with the dative and accusative, *αἰσθάνεσθαι* and *λαγχάνω* with the genitive and accusative.** An ingenious person might indeed try to account for this diversity of con-

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* Let the student make this experiment with *βασιλεύω*, *στρατηγῶ*, *ἀλλοτριοῦμαι*, *πληροῦμαι*, *γέμω*, *μετέχω*, *στέρομαι*, *ἐπιθυμῶ*, *ἐπιμελοῦμαι*, *ἀμελῶ*, *φροντίζω*, *ὀλιγωρῶ*, *μέμνημαι*, *ἐπιλανθάνομαι*, *φείδομαι*, *διαφέρω*, *καλλιστεύω*, which govern the genitive, and with *ταυτίζομαι*, *ὁμοιοῦμαι*, *ἰσοῦμαι*, *συμφωνῶ*, *ὁμογνωμονῶ*, *μίγνυμαι*, *ὁμιλῶ*, *πλησιάζω*, *ἐννοῶ*, *βοηθῶ*, *συμμαχῶ*, *χρησιμεύω*, *ἐναντιοῦμαι*, *πείθομαι*, *ἀπειθῶ*, *πιστεύω*, *ἁρμόζει*, *πρέπει*, which govern the dative. He will observe that each of these verbs is resolvable into the copula and a Greek adjective governing the same case as the corresponding verb; which is another proof of the primary non-transitive character of all verbs governing the genitive or dative, since no adjective is properly transitive.

** Had the dominion of the ancient literature over the Greek race never been interrupted, many of the indirect constructions might have survived, as in other living languages, spite the change of mental attitude, which would have been no longer in harmony with them; but, that dominion having been interrupted for more than a thousand years, the indirect constructions have all but disappeared, and an almost universal accusative, with or without a preposition, now follows the verb in the modern dialect.

struction, even when the sense remains the same by alleging a diversity of aspect. He might say e. g. that *ἀρέσκειν τινί* means 'to be pleasing *to* some one' and that *ἀρέσκειν τινά* means 'to *make* some one pleased'; and no doubt the rationale of the diversity lies in this direction. But such remarks would only be applications in detail of the general principle, that the direct replaces the indirect construction just as the mental attitude changes from receptivity to activity.

Obs. 2. **Omission of the Accusative.** *a*) A demonstrative pronoun in the accusative, and sometimes even in the dative, is constantly omitted after a verb, when not particularly emphatic, as (Thuc. VII. 3. 4.) *μέρος δέ τι πέμψας πρὸς τὸ φρούριον αἱρεῖ* = and having sent a detachment to the fortress, he takes (it): (Xen.) *ἐν ᾗ δ' ἂν τῶν φυλῶν πλεῖστοι ὦσιν ἀνδρικώτατοι ἐπαινοῦσιν οἱ πολῖται* = 'in whichever of the tribes are the most heroes, (that one) the citizens praise'. In short, as the pronominal subject, so the pronominal object, is generally omitted in Greek, wherever the context can supply it to the mind. *b*) On the other hand verbs of *knowing* and *saying*, where in English they have a whole clause for their object, often take also a personal object in Greek, as (Luke VI. 34.) *οἶδά σε τίς εἶ* = 'I know thee who thou art'; where *thee* is due to the literalness of the translation, not to the English idiom: so *καί μοι τὸν υἱὸν εἰπὲ εἰ μεμάθηκε τὴν τέχνην* = 'and tell me whether my son has learned the craft'. The demonstrative *τοῦτο* is often employed in this way before *ὅτι*, and *ἵνα*, particularly in the New Testament (Acts IX. 21: 20. 29: 1. Tim. I. 9.).

Obs. 3. **Intransitive Verbs.** Some verbs, the English correspondents of which are intransitive, uniformly take an accusative after them in Greek, which cannot be called the descriptive, as *ἀποδιδράσκω δεσπότην* = 'I run away from my master'; *εἰσέρχομαι γραφήν* = 'I enter an accusation'; *ἐκλείπει με ἡ ἐλπίς* = 'hope fails me'. So *λανθάνω* = 'I escape the notice of'; *εὐλαβοῦμαι* = 'I am cautious of'; *θαῤῥῶ* = 'I dare'; *φυλάττομαι* = 'I am on my guard against'; and *δορυφορεῖν τινα* = 'to be spear-bearer for one'. The poets especially use great liberties in this way, as *χορεύω θεόν* = 'I dance in honour of a god'; (Eur. Hipp. 1339.) *τοὺς εὐσεβεῖς θεοὶ θνήσκοντας οὐ χαίρουσιν* = 'the gods take no pleasure in the death of the pious'.

Obs. 4. **Verbs compounded with Prepositions.** *a*) A great many intransitive verbs of motion become transitive by being compounded with a preposition, especially with *διά*, *μετά*, *παρά*, *περί*, *ὑπέρ*, *ὑπό*, and take the accusative, as *διαβαίνω ποταμόν* = 'I cross a river': *παραβαίνω νόμον* = 'I transgress a law'; *διεξέρχομαι λόγον* = 'I go through a discourse' &c.* *b*) Other verbs again

* Similarly in German einem Briefe antworten and einen Brief beantworten; and in French *courir au marché*, and *parcourir l'Asie*.

sometimes become intransitive from transitive, by being compounded with a preposition, as *ἐνδιδόναι* = 'to give in' i. e. 'yield', from *διδόναι* = 'to give'; *προκόπτειν* = 'to advance', from *κόπτειν* = 'to cut'; *διαφέρειν* = 'to differ', from *φέρω* = 'to bear'; *ἐσβάλλειν*, *ἐμβάλλειν* = 'to flow or fall into', used of rivers, from *βάλλειν* = 'to throw'.

§. 67. **Verbs governing the Accusative and Genitive.** These are verbs of *a*) *filling* and *emptying*; *b*) *separating*, *excluding*, *hindering* or *making to cease*, *freeing* and *receiving*; *c*) of *wondering at*, *congratulating*, *praising*, *blaming*, *accusing*, *prosecuting*, *condemning* and *acquitting*; *d*) *exchanging*, *buying*, *selling*, *valuing*, and *preferring*, the accusative being that of the object emptied, separated, praised, valued, &c. and the genitive the material of which that object is emptied, the whole from which it is separated, the cause on account of which it is praised, the price at which it is valued &c. Thus *a*) *ζεύγη σίτου γεμίσαντες* = 'having filled waggons with corn': *b*) *ἐγώ σὲ παύσω τοῦ θράσους* = 'I shall make you cease from your boldness': *c*) *ἐπαινεῖν τινα τῆς ἀρετῆς* = 'to praise any one on account of his virtue': *d*) *πλείστου τιμᾶν τι* = 'to value any thing very highly'.

Obs. 1. **Single and Double Regimen.** The distinction between verbs of *filling* and verbs of *fulness* (§. 64. b.) is obvious: the former alone are capable of a double regimen. There are not always separate words, as *γέμω* and *γεμίζω*, where a like distinction exists, and the same word may thus have sometimes a single and sometimes a double regimen; as *προσπελάζω* = 'I approach', and 'I make to approach', hence the constructions *προσπελάζω τινί* (§. 65. c.), and *προσπελάζω τινά τινι* (§. 68.).

Obs. 2. **Ἀρήγω and ἀμύνω.** With verbs of *warding off*, which belong to class *b*), the genitive of the person *from* whom an evil is warded off, may be turned into the dative of the person benefitted by the evil being warded off, and this is generally the case with *ἀρήγω* and *ἀμύνω*. Thus *ἀμύνω τόνδε σοι* is more common than *ἀμύνω τόνδε σου*. The directly transitive notion of warding off an evil is often so far lost in the indirectly transitive one of assisting a person, that these two verbs are frequently found with a single regimen viz. the dative (§. 65, d.). Verbs of receiving, which also belong to class *b*), generally take *παρά* with the genitive, whether the thing received be a material substance, or information,

as ὑμεῖς (παρ') ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν = 'you shall hear the whole truth from me'.

Obs. 3. **Peculiarities.** *a*) Verbs of *wondering at* have a single regimen in two cases. When only the person wondered at is mentioned, and not also the cause, the person is usually put in the genitive, the cause being often added by a participle in concord, as θαυμάζω σοῦ λέγοντος τοιαῦτα = 'I wonder at you saying such things'. When however there is no question of a person, but only of a thing, and that without any specification of the particular quality or circumstance exciting the emotion, the thing is generally in the accusative, as (Xen. Cyr. IV. 2. 28.) οἳ μὲν ἐθαύμαζον τὰ δρώμενα = 'these wondered at what was done'. *b*) Verbs of *accusing* and *condemning*, when they are compounds of κατά, as κατηγορῶ, καταγιγνώσκω, καταδικάζω, κατακρίνω, καταψηφίζομαι, take the accusative of the crime, and the genitive of the person accused, as καταγιγνώσκειν φυγὴν τινος = 'to condemn a man to exile'. All others follow the rule, taking the accusative of the crime, and the genitive of the person, as in English; so γράφομαι Φίλιππον φόνου = 'I impeach Philip of murder'. The prepositions περί and ἕνεκα often accompany these genitives, especially after verbs of *prosecuting* and *sentencing*. On verbs of blaming see §. 68. Obs. 2.

Obs. 4. **Verbs of Exchanging.** With verbs of *exchanging* the genitive often takes ἀντί, or is replaced by the accusative with πρός. Verbs of *requiting* and *revenging* also often take ἀντί before the genitive, and belong to the same class, as involving the notion of a *quid pro quo*, as (Herod. III. 145. 17.) τοὺς ἐπικούρους ..... τιμωρήσομαι τῆς ἐνθάδε ἀπίξιος = 'I shall make the auxiliaries pay for this incursion'. Verbs of *wagering* take the genitive of the stakes, as περιδόσθαι τῆς κεφαλῆς = 'to wager one's head', (lit.) 'to make a wager *of* one's head'. In all these cases the genitive can hardly be said to depend on the verb, any more than the descriptive accusative (§. 66, e.).*

§. 68. Verbs governing the Accusative and Dative.

These all involve, more or less distinctly, the idea of

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* No more than two cases are ever really dependent on a verb, because no more than two are ever required as complements to its meaning; but theoretically any number of cases may accompany it, as τὴν σοφίαν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλεῖ Ἀθήνησιν = 'he sells wisdom for money to whoever will at Athens', where the accusative denotes the thing sold, the dative the party to whom, the genitive the price for which, and another dative the place where it is sold.

transmission, and take the accusative of the thing transmitted, and the dative of that to which it is transmitted. Such are verbs of *giving*, *bringing*, *declaring*, *promising*, *enjoining*; of *adapting*, *opposing*, and *comparing* or *likening* one thing to another; and of *mixing* one thing with another: as *δῶρα τῷ θεῷ φέρειν* = 'to bring gifts to the god'; *σοὶ ἐπιτάττω ὅ, τι αν δοκῶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι* = 'I enjoin upon you whatever I think proper;' *προσαρμόζειν ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ* = 'to adapt each to each'; *ἴσους ἴσοισι πολεμίοις ἀντιτιθείς* = 'opposing equals to equals as enemies'; *ἐμὲ θεῷ οὐκ εἰκασεν* = 'he did not liken me to a god'; *κόπρον τῇ γῇ μιγνύναι* = 'to mix dung with the land'.

Obs. 1. *Κελεύω*. In the strict sense of *ordering*, *κελεύω* with the dative is doubtful in Attic prose; the accusative with the infinitive is the common construction. Hence we can say, either *κελεύω σοὶ τοῦτο* = 'I recommend this to you', or *κελεύω σὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι* = 'I order you to do this'. Notice here that the dative belongs to the weaker meaning of the verb, and the accusative to the stronger.

Obs. 2. **Single Regimen.** *a*) Verbs of *blaming* (§. 67, b.), in single regimen of the person, are found with the dative, the transmission of blame being the idea, as (Thuc. IV. 61. 5.) *οὐ τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπακούειν ἑτοιμοτέροις οὖσιν* = 'I do'nt blame those who wish to rule, but those who are too ready to obey'. *b*) Verbs of *opposing* and *mixing* in the indirectly transitive sense of *making opposition to* and *mingling with*, take of course only a single regimen, and that the dative, as *ἐρίζειν τινί* = 'to strive with any one', *ἀθρόοι προσέμιξαν τοῖς βαρβάροις* = 'in great numbers they mingled with the barbarians'.

Obs. 3. **Latin Parallels.** Like *circumdo* and *dono* in Latin, *περιβάλλομαι* and *δωρέομαι* have a double construction, thus *περιβάλλομαι τεῖχος τῇ πόλει* = 'I throw a wall round the city', or *περιβάλλομαι τὴν πόλιν τείχει* = 'I surround the city with a wall': *δωρεῖσθαι τόξον ἑκάστῳ* = 'to present a bow to each', or *δωρεῖσθαι τόξῳ ἕκαστον* = 'to present each with a bow' (Geddes' Gram. §. 93.).

§. 69. **Verbs governing Two Accusatives.** Verbs of *asking*, *teaching*, *reminding*, *persuading*, *speaking or doing good or ill*, *concealing*, *clothing* and *stripping* take two accusatives, one of the person, and another of the thing; as *αἰτήσας νέας ἑβδομήκοντα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους* = 'having

asked the Athenians for seventy ships'; *τίς σὲ ἐδίδαξε τὴν στρατηγίαν*; = 'who taught you generalship?' *ἀναμνήσω ὑμᾶς καὶ τοὺς τῶν προγόνων κινδύνους* = 'I shall remind you also of our ancestors' dangers'; *ἔπειθε τοῦτο τοὺς Φωκαιέας* = 'he persuaded the Phocæans of this'; *πᾶς τις τὸ γυναικεῖον φῦλον κακὰ πολλ' ἀγορεύει* = 'every one says much ill of the female sex'; *μὴ κρύψῃς τὴν θυγατέρα τὸν θάνατον τοῦ ἀνδρός* = 'do'nt conceal from your daughter the death of her husband'; *τὴν ἐσθῆτα ἀπέδυσαν αὐτόν* = 'they stripped him of his garment'.

Obs. 1. **Verbs of Praying.** *a*) With verbs of *praying*, the object addressed is sometimes in the transmissive dative, as (Eur.) *προσευξόμεθα τοῖσι σοὶς ἀγάλμασι* = 'we shall pray to thine image'; and sometimes in the genitive as the party *from* whom something is asked. In this way *δέομαι*, as containing the notions both of entreaty and need, is found with a double genitive, as (Herod. I. 59. 23.) *ἐδέετο τοῦ δήμου φυλακῆς τινος* = 'he requested from the people a guard', where *δήμου* seems to depend on the notion of entreaty, and *φυλακῆς* on that of need. *b*) The sanctioning powers, in the case of a prayer or vow, are always in the genitive,* as (Herod. VI. 68. 10.) *ἐγὼ ὧν σὲ μετέρχομαι τῶν θεῶν* = 'I beseech you then by the gods', as if *in presence of*, *πρὸς*, *ἀντί* being sometimes expressed, and also *ὑπέρ* = 'for the sake of'. *c*) Hence the person in whose honour a libation is poured out, or a toast drunk, is also in the genitive, as (Aristoph. Ach. 985.) *σπεῖσον ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος* = 'pour out a libation in honour of the good Genius'; (Theocr. XIV. 18.) *ἔδοξ' ἐπιχεῖσθαι ἄκρατον ὥτινος ἤθελ' ἕκαστος* = 'it pleased them to pour out unmixed wine in whose honour soever each wished' i. e. 'to fill up a bumper to him'.

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* The sanctioning powers are in the accusative after *ὄμνυμι*, and *ἐπιορκέω*, as *ὄμνυμι, ἐπιορκέω τοὺς θεούς* = 'I swear, swear falsely by the gods'. Similarly *αἰσχύνομαι*, as (Xen. An. II. 3, 22.) *αἰσχύνομαι θεοὺς Κῦρον προδοῦναι* = 'I am ashamed before the gods to betray Cyrus', where the infinitival clause represents another accusative; for, without the sanctioning powers, the construction of *αἰσχύνομαι* is still the same, as *αἰσχύνομαι αὐτόν* = 'I am ashamed of him'. The particles of adjuration are *νή* or *ναί*, used only in affirmative sentences, with or without *μά* to strengthen them, as *νὴ τὸν Δία* or *ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία* = 'truly by Jove'; and *μά* itself, which is used without *ναί* when the adjuration is negative, as *οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία* = 'no by Jove', or *μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ ἐρέω* = 'No by Jove, I shall not tell'.

Obs. 2. **Variations.** The construction of others among these verbs is varied, particularly by the use of prepositions. Thus *ἀναμιμνήσκειν τινά τινος* = 'to remind one of something', occurs: also *ἀποστερεῖν τινά τινος* = 'to deprive one of something', *ἀφαιρεῖσθαί τί τινος* = 'to take something from some one', but in the active *ἀφαιρεῖν τινί τι*. Hortatory verbs are most frequently used with a preposition before the accusative of the thing, as *προκαλεῖσθαι*, *προτρέπειν*, *ἄγειν εἰς* or *ἐπί τι*. So *αἰτεῖν τι παρά τινος*.

Obs. 3. **Adverbial Accusative.** *a*) The accusative of the thing, with verbs of *saying* and *doing good* or *ill*, is really adverbial, as (Xen. Mem. II. 2. 9.) *ὅταν* (*οἱ ὑποκριταὶ*) *ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἀλλήλους τἀ ἔσχατα λέγωσιν* = 'when the actors in the drama say *the uttermost* against one another': hence the phrases *εὖ*, *κακῶς*, *λέγειν*, *ποιεῖν τινά* = 'to treat one well or ill by word or deed', *τινά* being the accusative of the person, while that of the thing is represented by the adverbs. *b*) The student must not suppose that, because there is a *dativus commodi et incommodi*, all verbs of *benefitting* and *injuring* govern that case. On the contrary, verbs expressing these notions *most decidedly*, as *εὐεργετῶ*, *κακουργῶ*, *ἀδικῶ*, *βλάπτω* take the accusative of the patient, and only those which denote a *tendency*, as it were, to actual benefit or injury take the indirect regimen of the dative; for, the more decided the benefitting or injuring, the more appropriate is the direct construction: *ὠφελῶ* hesitates between the dative and accusative, but the dative is chiefly poetic.

Obs. 4. **Descriptive Accusative.** In regard to some of these verbs, it may be a question whether the accusative of the thing be any other than the descriptive. It is nothing else in the case of verbs of dividing, which take two accusatives, one of the whole, and another of the parts, as (Xen. Cyr. VII. 5. 13.) *ὁ Κῦρος τὸ στράτευμα κατένειμε δώδεκα μέρη* = 'Cyrus divided his army into twelve parts'. So also in all the cases of the schema *καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος*, as (Il. XI. 250.) *κρατερόν ῥά ἑ πένθος ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκάλυψε* = 'a mighty sorrow clouded his eyes', *ἕ* being the whole and *ὀφθαλμούς* the part. In like manner, by the addition of a descriptive accusative, verbs which are usually found with one case, sometimes occur with two, as *βοηθεῖν τινι τὰ δίκαια* = 'to assist one *as to what is fair*'.

§. 70. **Verbs governing the Genitive and Dative.** These are chiefly *impersonals* implying *concern* as *μέλει μοὶ τούτου* = 'this is my concern'; *μεταμέλει μοὶ ἀνοίας* = 'I repent me of folly'; *προσήκει μοὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς* = 'I have to do with the government': or *need*, as *δεῖ μοι χρημάτων*, = 'I have need of money': certain *legal phrases*, as *ἀντιποιοῦμαι τῆς ἀρχῆς τινος* = 'I contest the govern-

ment with some one'; *ἐπέξειμί τινι φόνου* = 'I accuse some one of murder'; *δικάζομαί τινι κλήρου* = 'I go to law with a person on account of an inheritance': verbs of *praising*, *blaming* and *grudging* in poetry, as (Soph. Ant. 1177) *πατρὶ μηνίσας φόνου* = 'being angry with his father on account of the murder', *φθονέω τινί τινος* = 'I have a grudge at some one on account of something': verbs of *participation*, personal and impersonal, as *μέτεστί μοι τῆς λείας* = 'I have a share of the booty'; *συναίρομαί τινι τοῦ κινδύνου* = 'I share the danger with some one': and transmissive verbs with a partitive genitive instead of the accusative, as *μεταδίδωμι τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ πλούτου* = 'I bestow on whoever will a portion of my soul's wealth'.

Obs. *Δεῖ* and *χρή*. In poetry, the accusative may replace the dative with *δεῖ* and *χρή*, but the most usual construction of both is with the accusative and a following infinitive, as *δεῖ μὲ ποιεῖν* = 'I must do', rarely *δεῖ μοὶ ποιεῖν*.

§. 71. **Passive Verbs.** These take the genitive of the agent, as (Il. V. 6.) *λελουμένος Ὠκεανοῖο* = 'washed by Ocean' (§. 14. Obs. 4. b.). The Epic is exceedingly rich in this causal genitive; but, in the development of the language, it came to be indicated by *ὑπό*, often also by *παρά*, *πρός*, and sometimes by *ἐκ*, *διά*. The dative too is employed, of persons to denote the agent, of things to denote the means, as *πολλαὶ θεραπεῖαι τοῖς ἰατροῖς εὕρηνται* = 'many remedies have been discovered by physicians'; *οἱ Πλαταιῆς . . . τῷ σίτῳ ἐπιλιπόντι ἐπιέζοντο* = 'the Platæans were hard pressed by their store of grain failing'. The accusative after passive verbs is descriptive, as (Herod. VI. 38.) *πληγέντα τὴν κεφαλὴν πελέκεϊ* = 'struck with an axe on the head'.

Obs. **Personal Construction.** In Latin, only those verbs can be used personally in the passive voice, which take an accusative in the active, that accusative becoming the nominative of the passive: but in Greek the usage is more free. Not only the accusative, but also the genitive and dative after active verbs, governing a single

case, may be turned into the nominative of these same verbs in the passive, as (Pl. Rep. VIII. 551. A.) *ἀσκεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀεὶ τιμώμενον, ἀμελεῖται δὲ τὸ ἀτιμαζόμενον* = 'what is uniformly honoured is cultivated, and what is dishonoured neglected', where in the active *ἀσκεῖν* would govern the accusative, and *ἀμελεῖν* the genitive; (Thuc. IV. 61. 1.) *οἱ ἔνοικοι ξύμπαντες μὲν ἐπιβουλευόμεθα* = 'all we, the inhabitants (of Sicily), are being plotted against', where in the active *ἐπιβουλεύειν* would govern the dative. In the case of verbs governing the accusative and genitive, only the accusative may become the nominative of the passive used personally, but in that of verbs governing the accusative and dative, either may be so employed; it is however more elegant in Greek to invert the dative of the person than the accusative of the thing, as (Thuc. I. 126. 11.) *οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακήν* = 'those of the Athenians who had been entrusted with the watch', the construction of the active being *ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτοῖς τὴν φυλακήν*. Likewise in the case of verbs governing two accusatives, that of the person becomes the nominative of the passive, as *ὁ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Λάμπρου μουσικὴν ἐπαιδεύθη* = 'the man was taught music by Lamprus', the construction of the active being *τὸν ἄνδρα Λάμπρος ἐπαίδευσε μουσικήν*.

§. 72. **Verbals in** *τέος*. *a*) When these are formed from directly transitive verbs i. e. verbs governing the accusative, they are personal or impersonal; when personal, they agree with their subject in gender, number and case, as *ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀσκητέα ἐστί* = 'virtue is to be practised'; when impersonal, they stand in the neuter, and their subject becomes their object in the accusative, as *ἀσκητέον ἐστὶ τὴν ἀρετήν*. *b*) When derived from other than directly transitive verbs, they are always used impersonally, and govern the cases proper to the verbs from which they are severally derived, as *ἐπιμελητέον τῶν βοσκημάτων* = 'the cattle must be cared for'; *ἐπιχειρητέον τῷ ἔργῳ* = 'the work must be undertaken'. *c*) When derived from verbs which assume a new sense in the middle voice, and with it a new construction, these verbals take both senses, and the constructions corresponding to each, as *πειστέον ἐστὶν αὐτόν* = 'he must be persuaded', from *πείθω* = 'I persuade', which governs the accusative; and *πειστέον ἐστὶν αὐτῷ* = 'he must be obeyed', from *πείθομαι* = 'I obey', which governs the

dative. *d*) With all verbals in *τέος* the agent is put in the dative, as *ἐπιθυμητέον ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς* = 'virtue is to be desired by men'; *βοηθητέον ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει ὑμῖν* = 'the state must be aided by you'; *ἰτέον ἡμῖν* = 'we must be gone', which last is an example of a verbal that can have no proper regimen of its own, and also of the omission of the copula, which is very common with verbals in *τέος*.

Obs. 1. **Accusative of the Agent.** In Attic, the agent is sometimes expressed by the accusative, which is anomalous indeed with respect to the grammatical form, but in perfect correspondence to the thought, the force of the verbal being that of *δεῖ* with the accusative and following infinitive. Thus (Plat. Gorg. p. 507. D.) *τὸν βουλομενον . . . εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον* = 'he who would be happy, must seek after and cultivate moderation' = *δεῖ τὸν βουλομενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην διώκειν καὶ ἀσκεῖν.*

Obs. 2. **Number of the Verbals.** When used impersonally these verbals are often in the neuter plural, instead of the neuter singular. The same holds of adjectives in general, when predicated of an infinitival clause, particularly of those in *τος*, thus *δήμου ἄρχοντος ἀδύνατα μὴ οὐ κακότητα ἐγγίνεσθαι* = 'when the people rule, it is impossible but that abuses should arise'.

§. 73. **Infinitive after Verbs.** *a*) The infinitive after verbs is as common, and, in its force, as varied in Greek as in English.* Thus it frequently denotes a purpose, (§. 46. Obs. 1.) as, (Thuc. VI. 50. 4.) *δέκα δὲ τῶν νεῶν προὔπεμψαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα πλεῦσαι καὶ κατασκέψασθαι εἰ κ. τ. λ.* = 'they (the Athenians) sent ten of their ships *to sail* to the great harbour (of Syracuse), and observe if &c.' (Soph. Oed. Col. 12.) *μανθάνειν ἥκομεν ξένοι πρὸς ἀστῶν* = 'we strangers are come *to learn* of (you) citizens'. *b*) Even when the subject of the principal verb, or, as in the case of adjectives §. 63. Obs. 1., when the noun in concord with the adjective, is the real *object* of the action denoted by the infinitive, that infinitive is,

* Even after *ἔχω*, the infinitive is used as in English, in which case *ἔχω* = *δύναμαι*, as *οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν οὐδέν* = 'I have nothing to say', or 'I am not able to say anything'.

with rare exceptions, in the active form in Greek, as, (Pl. Gorg. p. 489. C.) *παρέχειν (ἑαυτὸν) ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ καίειν ἰατρῷ* = 'to offer (himself) as it were to be hacked and cauterised by a physician'; (Xen. Hell. IV. 4. 15.) *καὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν ἄκραν φυλάττειν αὐτοῖς παρέδωκαν* = 'they (the Phliasii) gave up both the city and the citadel to them (the Lacedæmonians) to guard', i. e. 'to be guarded'.

§. 74. **Government of Adverbs.** *a*) Adverbs derived from adjectives govern the case required by these adjectives, as *βουλεύεσθε ἀξίως τῆς πόλεως* = 'devise counsels worthy of the state'; *ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν* = 'to live agreeably to nature'. *b*) Except *ἅμα, ἑξῆς, ἐφεξῆς*, which uniformly take the dative, all others capable of government, and these are chiefly the adverbs denoting *place*, *time*, *order*, *repetition*, govern the genitive, as *ποῦ γῆς* = *ubi terrarum*, *τότε τοῦ ἔτους* = 'at that time of the year', *πολλάκις τῆς ἡμέρας* = 'many times a day', *ὀψὲ τῆς ἡμέρας* = 'late in the day', *πόῤῥω τῆς ἡλικίας* = 'far on in age', *μέχρι τῆς σήμερον* = 'until today', (hence the conjunctional forms *μέχρις οὗ*, *ἄχρις οὗ*, like *ἕως οὗ* = 'as far as, until', §. 94, d.) *πέλας τοῦ οἴκου* = 'near the house', *ἄνευ ὅπλων* = 'without arms', *λάθρα τῆς πόλεως* = 'unknown to the state'. Adverbs governing a case, except those derived from adjectives, are called *improper prepositions*.

Obs. 1. **Variations.** *a*) The following however are sometimes found with the dative, *ἄγχι*, *ἐγγύς*, *σχεδόν*, *ὁμοῦ*, *ἅλις*, thus *ἐγγὺς τῇ πόλει* or *ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως* = 'near the city'*. *b*) *Χάριν* and *κύκλῳ* hesitate between the substantival and prepositional con-

* In English we say 'far *from*' but 'near *to*', because, in regarding distance under the aspect of remoteness, our language contemplates a traveller going *from* a place, whereas, in regarding distance under the aspect of proximity, it contemplates a traveller going *towards* a place; accordingly if *near* be turned into its equivalent *not far*, *from* comes naturally after it. In Greek the construction proper to the relation *from* may be preserved in both cases, as it always is in French, where 'near to'

structions, as *ἐμὴν χάριν* or *ἐμοῦ χάριν* = 'for my sake', *κύκλῳ δένδρου*, or *κύκλῳ δένδρον* = 'around a tree'. In these instances, as also in *δέμας* (poet.), *νόμον* (Plat.), *δίκην* = *instar* = 'like', the Greek noun may be observed passing into the prepositional state, just as the English gerund in *concerning, regarding, touching*. *c*) With *ἕνεκα* the genitive is sometimes not causal, but that of concern, as *ἕνεκα τῶν ἑτέρων ἄστρων* = 'so far as the other heavenly bodies are concerned'. *d*) As a conjunction, *πλήν* may take any case after it, as *οὔκ ἐστιν ἄλλος πλὴν ἐγω* = 'it is no other than myself'. When used prepositionally, it takes the privative genitive.

Obs. 2. **Ἔχω with an Adverb and a Genitive.** The genitival construction of adverbs along with *ἔχω* is a frequent idiom, as *ἀμελῶς ἔχειν τινός* = 'to be negligent of something', *οὐκ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης* = 'I do'nt know how (or what) he is in respect of learning and justice', *ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον* = 'as fast as they could run'. Sometimes also with *κεῖμαι* and *ἥκω*, as *ἡ Κέρκυρα τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κεῖται* = 'in regard to Italy and Sicily, Corcyra lies well for a coasting voyage', where there is even a double genitive: *εὖ ἥκειν χρημάτων* = 'to be well off for money'.

§. 75. **Government of Prepositions.** It would appear that prepositions received their name, not because they stand before their cases, for certain of them frequently follow after, especially in poetry, as (Eur. Med. 925.) *τέκνων τῶνδ' ἐννομένη πέρι* = 'thinking of these children'; but because in *composition* they always *precede* the other element of the compound word. Adverbs governing cases are never used in composition, and that is the grand distinction between them and prepositions properly so called. (§. 74. b.) *Πρό* however never follows its case, nor *ἀντί*, *διά*, *ἀνά*, *ἀμφί*, and *ἐν* only in Epic; but the others may follow their cases, the accent being thrown back as in the above example, *πέρι* not *περί*.

= 'près *de*', and 'far from' = 'loin *de*'. The Italians use every idiom possible in the case; thus 'presso $\left\{\begin{matrix} della \\ alla \\ la \end{matrix}\right\}$ torre' all mean simply 'near the tower'. By the syntactical attraction of the cognate adverbs, *πλησιάζω*, which usually takes the dative, is yet found with the genitive, as (Xen.) *ἐπλησίαζον τῶν ἄκρων* = 'ils s'approchaient des sommets' = 'they approached the heights'.

When a preposition governs a substantive and an adjective in concord, it may stand either before both or between the two, as ἐν τῷ μακρῷ πολέμῳ = 'in the long war', μάχῃ ἔνι κυδιανείρῃ = 'in the glorious fight', θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας = 'to the swift ships'. There are eighteen prepositions of which four govern the genitive viz. ἀπό, ἐκ or ἐξ, ἀντί, πρό· two the dative ἐν, σύν· one the accusative εἰς· one the dative and accusative, ἀνά· three the genitive and accusative διά, κατά, ὑπέρ· and seven the genitive, dative, and accusative, ἀμφί, περί, ἐπί, μετά, παρά, πρός, ὑπό.*

* If it appear strange to the English student that many and diverse, sometimes indeed opposite meanings, should belong to the same Greek preposition, it is merely because he has not studied the development of prepositions in his own language. A few hours devoted to the Imperial Dictionary would reconcile him to the manifold character of these words, and indeed throw not a little light upon the Greek prepositions themselves. Take for instance *by* and *with*, both of which start from the same local idea viz. proximity, under the aspect of mere juxtaposition in the former, under that of consociation in the latter; it is very instructive to notice where they coincide, and where they differ in their derived applications, as follows:

By = near	as 'I have a cask of wine *by* me'
= along	,, 'I shall walk *by* the riverside'
= on	,, 'battles *by* sea and land'
= before	,, '*by* this time the sun had risen'
= during	,, '*by* the space of forty years'
= according to	,, '*by* his own account he acted nobly'.
Farther, *by* denotes	
the agent,	,, 'the Iliad was written *by* Homer'
the instrument,	,, 'the cities were destroyed *by* fire'
the manner,	,, 'he entered *by* force'
distribution,	,, 'day *by* day', 'to sell *by* the pound'
adjuration,	,, 'No! *by* Heaven!'
With denotes	
along with,	,, 'I walked *with* him a mile'
among	,, '*with* the ancients suicide was not a crime'
immediately after,	,, '*with* this he pointed to the stars and exclaimed'
on the side of,	,, 'Fear not, I am *with* thee'
in opposition to,	,, 'the Allies fought *with* the Russians'

Obs. 1. Ἀπό and ἐκ or ἐξ.* These both denote *removal from*, or *position away from*, but with this difference, that ἀπό = 'from the *surface* or *edge* of a thing', ἐκ = 'from the *interior*'. Hence ἀπό = *from* simply, ἐκ = *out of*. In the causal sense ἀπό denotes the more remote, ἐκ the more immediate cause. *a*) Ἀπό. The *from* relation is often preserved in Greek by ἀπό, where the English idiom employs some other, as ἀφ' ἵππων μάχεσθαι = 'to fight on (lit. *from*) horseback', the English expressing the warrior's position, but the Greek the flight of his darts from that position: so (Il. XXIV. 605.) ἀπὸ βιοῖο πέφνεν = 'slew with (lit. from) the bow'; and (Thuc. I. 17. 1.) ἐπραχθη τε ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔργον ἀξιόλογον = 'and by (lit. from) them nothing of moment was accomplished'. Hence the adverbial phrase ὡς ἀπ' ὀμμάτων = 'as by eyesight', the *means* being represented in Greek as the *source* of judgment. When, in a definition of time, only the prior limit of an interval is mentioned, ἀπο = 'after', as ἀπὸ δείπνου = 'after supper'. Both the *from* of connection, and the *from* of separation (§. 13.) appear markedly in different uses of ἀπό· the former in οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος = 'Plato's disciples', τὰ ἀπό τινος = 'the things of a man', and the latter in (Thuc. VI. 64. 3.) αὐλίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων ἐν τῇ πόλει = 'to bivouack *unarmed* in the city', a usage which seems to have arisen from such phrases as ἀπὸ θαλάσσης οἰκεῖν = 'to dwell far from the sea'. *b*) Ἐκ or ἐξ. The use of this preposition with verbs of *rest* to denote position away from, though found in Herodotus, is chiefly Epic, as ἐκ βελέων = 'out of gunshot' (as we should say). Its distinction from ἀπό, as denoting more *immediate* procession, appears in such phrases as ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένω = 'changing from one city to another', ἐξ ἡμέρας ἐς ἡμέραν ἀναβαλλόμενοι = 'putting off from day to day', where *immediate* succession is the idea: so ἐκ δείπνου = 'immediately after supper'. By denoting the *whence*, like ἀπό, it may introduce the cause, as ἐκ φύσεως = 'by (lit. out of) nature'; but its use with the genitive of the agent is almost entirely Ionic, as Herod. III. 62. 4.) τὰ ἐντεταλμένα ἐκ τοῦ Μάγου = 'what was commanded by the Magus'. In all phrases implying dependence i.

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the instrument, as 'to write *with* pen and ink'
the manner, ,, 'he acts *with* precipitation'.
By resorting to nice distinctions, a still greater variety of meanings might be educed; but the above are unquestionable. Let them be compared with those of παρά and μετά, which, in respect to the local starting-point, are the Greek correspondents of 'by' and 'with' respectively.

* It is not difficult to recognise in these the Latin *ab* and *ex*. The form *abs* is represented by the Homeric ἄψ = 'back'.

e. *hanging from*, ἐκ is the preposition to be used,* as φέρειν ἐκ τῶν ζωστήρων = 'to carry at the girdle i. e. suspended from it', (Herod. III. 19. 13.) πᾶς ἐκ Φοινίκων ἤρτητο ὁ ναυτικὸς στρατός = 'the naval armament wholly depended *on* the Phœnicians', where the English *on* is accountable by the loss of the etymological meaning of *depend*, and the syntactical attraction of its equivalent *leaning on*.**

Obs. 2. Ἀντί **and** πρό (Latin *ante*, *pro*, and *præ*). These both mean *before*, but with this difference, that ἀντί denotes *exact fronting*, *face to face*, as the poles of a globe, whereas πρό means simply *before*, as when we say that 'a cart is *before* the door'. Hence, in their development, ἀντί implies *opposition*, especially in composition, as ἀντέχω = 'I resist', but πρό *defence*, as ὀλέσθαι πρὸ πόλεως = *mourir pour la patrie*. Compare προκαθῆσθαι = 'to protect', with *præsidium*. They govern the genitive because, when one thing is *before* another, they are supposed to be at some distance *from* each other, not in juxtaposition. As objects, to be compared, must be brought into each other's presence, both are used for all comparative notions, and are variously translated 'in preference to', 'in exchange or return for', and 'instead of', according as the context may require. Hence the adverbial expressions ἀνθ' οὗ, ἀνθ' ὧν = 'in return for which' = 'wherefore' = 'because', as χάριν σοὶ οἶδα, ἀνθ' ὧν ἦλθες = 'I thank you that you are come'. In the same sense πρὸ τῶνδε is used. *a*) Ἀντί. This preposition never refers to time; but is used in adjurations, as ἀντὶ παίδων τῶνδε = 'by these children', (lit.) 'in their presence'. *b*) Πρό. This preposition is used of time, like the English 'before', and often answers to *ago*, as πρὸ πολλοῦ = 'long ago'. In Homer and the tragedians it has often a semi-adverbial sense in relation to place, as Ἰλιόθι πρό = 'forwards from Troy', γῆν πρὸ γῆς

* This ἐκ is probably the true expletive of the genitive with verbs of *holding by* (§. 64. Obs. 4.).

** We say 'independent *of*', but 'dependent *on*', an irregularity which cannot be admitted into French, so long as the simple verb *pendre* = 'to hang' exists to preserve the etymological meaning of *dépendre*. The irregularity in English is an example of the law by which the loss of etymology, giving scope for the operation of new analogies, leads to changes of construction. The analogy of the sense often prevails, even where the etymology has not been lost, but only enfeebled. Thus ἐπιχειρέω = 'I put the hand to', properly governs the dative; but the graphic outstretching of the hand *to* a thing, which suggested the indirect regimen, was at length forgotten, and replaced by the abstract idea of *undertake*, in which sense it is sometimes found with the accusative in later writers.

ἐλαύνομαι = 'I hurry forward from land to land', *πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἐγένοντο* = 'they were forward on the way.' This *πρὸ* is doubtless the expletive of the local genitive noticed in §. 64. Obs. 7. b. Farther, *πρό* denotes the internal cause, as *πρὸ χαρᾶς* = *prae gaudio* = vor Freude = 'for joy', where the Latin and German exactly represent the Greek, whereas the English does so only in form, because *for* never means *before*.

Obs. 3. *Ἐν*, *ἐνί* poetic, *εἰν* and *εἰνί* Epic (Latin *in* with the ablative), and *σύν*, *ξύν* in old Attic, Doric, and Ionic (Latin *cum*), as denoting, the former intraposition *in*, the latter juxtaposition *together with*, naturally take the dative, the case of the place *where*. Both are used of the *manner*, as *ἐν τάχει* = 'in haste', *σὺν τάχει* = 'with haste'; and of the instrument, as *ὁρᾶσθαι ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς* = 'to see with the eyes', *σὺν δὲ νεφέεσσι κάλυψεν γαῖαν* = 'and with clouds he covered the earth'; but *ἐν* only is used of moral states, as *ἐν ὀργῇ εἶναι* = 'to be angry'; *ἐν ἡδονῇ μοί ἐστιν* = 'it is pleasing to me'. *a*) *Ἐν*. With words indicating place *where*, this preposition is variously translated according to the English idiom, as *ἐν νήσῳ* = '*in* an island', *ἐν Σπάρτῃ* = '*at* Sparta', *ἐν ἀνθρώποις* = '*among* men', *ἐν ἀριστερῇ* = '*on* the left hand'. Its temporal use is post-Homeric, as *ἐν ᾧ* (*χρόνῳ*) = 'whilst'. * *b*) *Σύν*. This preposition never refers to time. With the name of a superior being it signifies 'with the help of', as *σὺν Θεῷ* = 'with God's help'; in relation to men, 'on the side of', as *σύν τινι μάχεσθαι* = 'to fight on one's side'; with an abstract quality, *conformity*, as *σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ τὴν ψῆφον τίθεσθαι* = 'to vote according to justice'.

Obs. 4. *Εἰς*, *ἐς* in Ionic and old Attic, and in the poets for the sake of the metre, (Latin *in* with the accusative) = 'to, into', appropriately takes the accusative, the case of the place *whither*. With the name of a person it is often equivalent to the French *chez*, as *ἐς Μενέλαον* = 'to Menelaus' (tent)'; and, when *motion to* has a hostile intent, it means *against*, as *ἐστράτευσαν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν* = 'they made an expedition into or against Attica'. Temporally it may

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* In Pindar (Pyth. II. 11.), *ἐν* occurs with the accusative signifying motion to a place; and, on the other hand, *ἐς* is said to occur with the dative in inscriptions. These irregularities, as also the use of *ἐς* with the accusative for *ἐν* with the dative, which occurs in Herodotus, (as (VII. 239.) *ἐς τὸ χρηστήριον τὸ ἐς Δελφοὺς ἀπέπεμψαν* = 'they sent to the oracle viz. to the one *at* Delphi') is frequent in the N. T., and ultimately prevailed to the expulsion of *ἐν* altogether from the spoken language, point to one primitive type, whence the Greeks obtained their two forms *ἐν* and *εἰς*, and the Romans their single form *in* with however a twofold construction.

denote the limit of time, as ἐς ἡέλιον καταδύντα = 'till sunset', ἐς ἐμέ = 'up to my time'; so εἰς δύναμιν = 'up to the limit of one's power'; also a *point* of time, as εἰς τὴν τρίτην ὥραν = 'at the third hour'; or *duration* of time, as εἰς ἐνιαυτόν = 'for a year'. With numbers it denotes sometimes the *limit*, as ναῦς ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας = 'up to four hundred ships', and sometimes *distribution*, as εἰς ἑκατόν = 'by hundreds'. Of metaphysical relations it denotes the *object*, as εἰς κέρδος τι δρᾶν = 'to do anything for gain', and in the New Testament the *result*, as (Rom. I. 20.) εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους = 'so that they are without excuse'; also, general reference, as φρόνιμος εἰς πάντα = 'prudent in every respect'. Ὡς, for εἰς, is used only with persons, or with things conceived of as persons, e. g. with the names of towns, when the inhabitants are meant, and always in the sense of motion *to*. It is most common in Attic Greek, but is found even in Homer.

Obs. 5. Ἀνά. In the Epic and lyric poets, and in the choral songs of the tragedians, ἀνά = *on* is found with the dative, as χρυσέῳ ἀνὰ σκήπτρῳ = 'on a golden staff': elsewhere it governs the accusative, and in this regimen is opposed to κατά with the accusative, the former meaning '*up* through', the latter '*down* through', as ἀνὰ τὸν ποταμόν = 'up the river', κατὰ τὸν ποταμόν = 'down the river'.* Where, however, there is no actual motion up or down, these two meanings, originally opposed, coincide in 'along', 'throughout' 'according to', as ἀνὰ κράτος, κατὰ κράτος = 'strongly'; ἀνὰ or κατὰ στρατόν = 'throughout the army'; ἀνὰ or κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον = 'throughout this war'; ἀνὰ χρόνον = 'in the course of time' (Herod. VII. 10. 6.) and 'on the spur of moment' (Eur. Ion. 830.). With numbers ἀνά has sometimes a distributive force, as ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος = 'yearly', and sometimes an approximative, as ἀνὰ διηκόσια στάδια = 'about two-hundred stadia', in which latter sense it is first used by Herodotus.

Obs. 6. Διά, cognate with δύο = 'two', and with the Latin *dis*, which also implies division, means 'through the midst of', as in the phrase διὰ χειρῶν ἔχειν = 'to have among one's hands', and governs the genitive and accusative, because motion *through* may be regarded with equal propriety as having a *whence* and a *whither*. *a*) Διά *with the genitive* often implies not only 'through', but 'through and out again',** as διὰ ὤμου ἦλθεν ἔγχος

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* Hence the adverbs ἄνω, κάτω, in relation to countries, denote, the former the interior, and the latter the littoral region. The force of ἀνά and κατά is well brought out in the Romaic word ἀνακατόνω = 'I turn upside down': ἄνω κάτω has the same meaning *adverbially* in classic Greek.

** This compound notion is sometimes expressed in Homer by δι' ἐκ, as (Od. XVII. 460.) δι' ἐκ μεγάροιο = 'through the

'the spear went through the shoulder, and came out on the other side': hence it came to denote the extreme limit of a transition, whether in place or time, as (Thuc. II. 29. 3.) *διὰ τοσούτου* = 'at so great a distance'; (Herod. IV. 181. 6.) *διὰ δέκα ἡμερέων ὁδοῦ* = 'at the distance of ten days journey'; (Herod. VI. 118. 13.) *δι' ἐτέων εἴκοσι* = 'after twenty years'. The nature of the verb usually indicates whether *διά* denotes the space, local or temporal, passed through, or the term arrived at on the transition being completed, as *διὰ πολλοῦ (χρόνου) ἦλθε* = '*after* a long time he came', but *διὰ πολλοῦ ἐμάχοντο* = 'they fought *during* a long time'. The temporal *after* gave rise to the distributive force of *διά*, as *διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν*, or *διὰ πέμπτου ἔτους* = 'after five years, or the fifth year' i. e. 'every five years, or every fifth year'; and so of other things, as (Thuc. III. 21. 3.) *διὰ δέκα δὲ ἐπάλξεων* = 'every tenth battlement'. Most other uses of *διά* with the genitive may be explained by *through* in the sense of 'by means of', as *δι' ὀφθαλμῶν ὁρᾶν* = 'to see with the eyes'; (Hebr. 1. 2.) *δι' οὗ καὶ τοὺς αἰῶνας ἐποίησε* = 'by whom also he made the worlds'; *διὰ βασιλέων πεφυκέναι* = 'to be sprung from kings', where the English idiom admits only the relation of origin, not that of instrumentality; so the *material* as *δι' ἐλέφαντος* = 'of ivory', the *manner* as *διὰ τάχους* = 'quickly', and the *value* as *δι' οὐδενὸς ποιεῖσθαι* = 'to count for nothing'; but in *ἔπρεπε διὰ πάντων* = 'he was distinguished among all', *διά* preserves its strict local force. That same force is preserved also in adverbial expressions with *εἶναι*, *γίγνεσθαι*, and sometimes also with *ἰέναι*, *ἔχεσθαι*, *πορεύεσθαι*, denoting mental states, as *διὰ φόβου εἶναι* = 'to be in fear', *δι' ὀργῆς γίγνεσθαί τινι* = 'to get into a rage with any one', *διὰ φιλίας ἰέναι τινί* = 'to be on friendly terms with one', *διὰ μάχης ἔρχεσθαί τινι* = 'to fight with any one', where the mind is conceived of as passing *through* the state in question. *b) Διά with the accusative.* The broad distinction here is that, while *διά* with the genitive = 'by means of', *διά* with the accusative = 'on account of', as, *διὰ τοὺς ἀδίκως πολιτευομένους ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ δημοκρατία*

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house, and out at the other side': *δι' ἑκ* is exactly parallel to the English 'throughout' in form, but not in sense, for it means, not *throughout*, but *out through*. There is however a development, exactly analogous to this compound notion of *διά*, in the English preposition 'by', which properly means 'near', but in many connexions 'near and away again'; as when we say 'he went *by* me without speaking'. As a mere adjunct to a verb this meaning of 'away' is sometimes all that remains to 'by', as in the phrase 'to put a thing *by*' i. e. 'away into its proper place till it is needed again', which is the English of the Scotticism 'to put a thing *past*'.

γίγνεται = 'democracy arises on account of those who administer the government unjustly under oligarchy'; εἰ μὴ διὰ τοῦτον ἔφυγον ἄν = 'but for him I should have fled': hence διό, originally δι' ὅ = 'on which account i. e. wherefore', and διότι = 'on that account i. e. because'. Διά may also denote the *final* cause (with a view to). In regard to time, διά with the accusative is sometimes equivalent to διά with the genitive, as διὰ νύκτα = 'through the night'; and in poetry there are instances of this same equivalence in regard to the local and instrumental *through*, as (Aesch.) φεύγειν διὰ νῶμ' ἅλιον = 'to escape through the salt wave'; (Od.) νικῆσαι δι' Ἀθήνην = 'to conquer by means of Minerva'.

Obs. 7. Κατά (Obs. 5.). In the sense of 'down *from*', this preposition naturally takes the genitive, as βῆ δὲ κατ' Ὀλύμποιο καρήνων = 'and he went down the heights of Olympus'; in the sense of down *along*, the accusative, as καθ' ὁδόν = 'down along the way'. *a*) Κατά *with the genitive*. Contrary to what might have been expected, the prevailing sense of κατά with the genitive is not down *from*, but down *to* or *on*, as κατὰ χθονὸς ὄμματα πῆξαι = 'to fix the eyes down to or on the ground';* μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχέειν = 'to pour perfume down on the head'; and that too with the collateral idea of opposition, as λόγος κατά τινος = 'a speech against some one', but not always, as (Aeschin. Ctes. 60. 36.) οἱ κατὰ Δημοσθένους ἔπαινοι = 'the praises of Demosthenes': so with verbs of aiming at and hitting, as κατὰ σκοποῦ τοξεύειν = 'to shoot at a mark' (§. 64. Obs. 4.). In Attic it is used also of the person or thing sworn by, as if the swearer laid his hands down upon it. *b*) Κατά *with the accusative* (Obs. 5.). With verbs of motion it sometimes denotes direction *towards*, but its prevailing force is *along*, *according to*, or, more generally, *with respect to*, particularly in adverbial phrases. Thus κατὰ γῆν τε καὶ θάλασσαν πορεύεσθαι = 'to travel by land and sea'; οἱ κατά τινα = 'a man's cotemporaries'; κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμήν = 'according to my opinion'; οὐ κατὰ Μιτραδάτην = 'not after the fashion of Mitradates'; κατὰ χόνδρους μεγάλους = 'in great lumps'; κατ' ἀρχάς = 'at the beginning'; καθ' ὑπερβολήν = 'exceedingly'; κατὰ συντυχίην = 'by chance'; καθό or καθότι = 'inasmuch as'; κατά τι = 'in some respect'; κατὰ πάντα = 'in every respect'; κατ' οὐδέν = 'in no respect'. It is also used distributively as κατὰ μῆνα = 'per month'; καθ' ἡμέραν = 'daily'; ἓν καθ' ἕν = 'one by one'; and to indicate the latitude or longitude of one place by the

* Our own *upon* presents a similar incongruity, for we can say 'to cast the eyes upon the ground'; and an etymologist may one day ask why, seeing the whole operation is *downwards*, the element *up* should be admissible at all.

mention of another, as *κατὰ Σινώπην* = 'on the same parallel or meridian with Sinope'.

Obs. 8. *Ὑπέρ* (super) has the same elements of sound, and the same meaning as the English *over*. *a*) With the genitive of motion or rest in space, as *ὁ ἥλιος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν στεγῶν πορευόμενος* = 'the sun travelling over us and the roofs': *in behalf of*, the protector being conceived of as standing *over* the protected, as *μάχεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος* = 'to fight *for* one's country'; hence *on account of*, as *ὑπὲρ πένθους ἀποθανεῖν* = 'to die *of* grief'. It seldom denotes the final cause as in (Dem.) *ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου* = 'in order not to be ill treated by Philip'. *b*) With the accusative it means *over to* i. e. *beyond* as *ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήσποντον οἰκεῖν* = 'to dwell *beyond* the Hellespont', *τοὺς ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας* = 'those *beyond* thirty years of age', *ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους* = *au-dessus de nous autres* i. e. '*beyond* our comprehension'.

Obs. 9. *Ἀμφί* and *περί*. These differ less in signification than in the extent to which they are used. Properly *ἀμφί*, as connected with *ἄμφω*, means 'on both sides', and *περί* 'all round'; but this distinction is not maintained. *Ἀμφί* is mostly confined to the Ionic dialect and poetry, and, as its use was limited in classic times, so it is the only ancient preposition which has not survived in the modern dialect. *a*) With the genitive. The use of *ἀμφί* for the local *about* is post-Homeric, as (Herod.) *οἱ ἀμφὶ ταύτης οἰκέοντες πόλιος* = 'the dwellers about this city': *περί* in this sense with the genitive is poetic, and rare. Both are used for the metaphysical *about* i. e. 'concerning', as *μάχεσθαι ἀμφὶ* or *περὶ πατρίδος* = 'to fight *for* one's country'; (Eur. Or. 867.) *πυθέσθαι δεόμενος τά τ' ἀμφὶ σοῦ τά τ' ἀμφ' Ὀρέστου* = 'begging to be informed of the things *concerning* you, and *concerning* Orestes'; *περί τε τῶν νοσηρῶν χωρίων καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν λέγοντες* = 'discoursing about the unhealthy regions, and the healthy'. Farther, *περί* with the genitive denotes the mental cause, as (Hom.) *περὶ ἔριδος μάχεσθαι* = 'to fight for fighting's sake'; and in Homer alone *superiority*, which is supposed to be its primary signification, as *περὶ πάντων ἔμμεναι ἄλλων* = 'to surpass all others'. Hence its use in the phrases, *περὶ πολλοῦ*, *πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι*, *ἡγεῖσθαι* = 'to esteem highly, more highly'. *b*) With the dative. Both are used in the sense of *concerning*, as (Herod. III. 32. 1.) *ἀμφὶ δὲ τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτῆς διξὸς.... λέγεται λόγος* = 'about her death two reports are told'; *θαρρεῖν περί τινι* = 'to be of good cheer about something': both of the mental cause, as *ἀμφὶ φόβῳ* = 'for fear'; *περὶ χάρματι* = 'for joy'. *Ἀμφί* with the dative is wholly unknown in Attic prose; but denotes elsewhere a variety of local relations all implying nearness, as *στῆσαι τρίποδα ἀμφὶ πυρί* = 'to put the kettle on the fire'; *ἀμφὶ κλάδοις ἕζεσθαι* = 'to sit among twigs'; *ἀμφὶ Νεμέᾳ* =

'at the Nemean games'. In Pindar it has even a temporal usage, as ἀμφ' ἑνὶ ἀλίῳ = 'in one (sun) day'; and sometimes denotes the instrument,* as (Pyth. I. 12.) θέλγει φρένας ἀμφί τε Λατοΐδα σοφίᾳ βαθυκόλπων τε Μουσᾶν = 'soothes the mind by the art of Apollo and the deep-bosomed Muses'. *Περί* with the dative has the strictly local force of *around*, as θώραξ περὶ τοῖς στέρνοις = 'a breastplate *around* the chest'. *c*) With the accusative. Both mean *about* locally, as οἱ ἀμφὶ or περὶ Πλατωνα = 'Plato and his disciples'; both *about* approximatively, as ἀμφὶ or περὶ τοὺς μυρίους = '*about* ten thousand'; both *concerning*, as τὰ ἀμφὶ τὸν πόλεμον = 'the things which concern the war'; αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναί = 'the pleasures which concern the body'. Farther ἀμφί = *during* in Pindar, as (Ol. I. 97.) λοιπὸν ἀμφὶ βίοτον = 'for the rest of his life'.

Obs. 10. Ἐπί. The radical and prevailing force of this preposition is *on*, *upon;* but its uses are much more varied than those of its English equivalents. *a*) *With the genitive.* Locally, position *on*, as ἐφ' ἵππων ὀχεῖσθαι = 'to ride *on* horseback'; motion *on to* with names of places, as ἐπὶ Σάρδεων φεύγειν = 'to flee to Sardes' (§. 76. b.); *in the presence of* with verbs of affirming and swearing, as λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστῶν = 'to speak before the judges'. Temporally it denotes simultaneity, as ἐπ' εἰρήνης = 'in time of peace'; particularly with names of persons, as ἐπὶ Δαρείου = 'in time of Darius'. With verbs of saying ἐπί = *concerning*, as λέγειν ἐπί τινος = 'to speak on a certain subject'; and with verbs of naming it introduces the namesake, as καλεῖσθαι ἐπὶ πατρός = 'to be called after one's father'. Note the following οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων = 'those at the head of affairs', where *on* = *over;* εἶπαν ἐπ' ὅρκον = 'they said on oath', where the Greek and English idioms agree, the oath being regarded as the basis on which the statement rests; ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν = 'in many things one may see'; ἐπὶ τριῶν τετάχθαι = 'to be ranked three men deep'. *b*) *With the dative.* Locally it denotes not only position *on*, as with the genitive, but also proximity, as ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ οἰκεῖν = 'to dwell near the sea'; and position *behind* as οἱ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τεταγμένοι = 'the rear of an army'; hence often *in addition to*, and *succession* as φόνος ἐπὶ φόνῳ = 'murder on murder'. Temporally, it denotes not only simultaneity as in the genitive (not with names of persons however in the dative), but also posteriority, as ἐπ' ἐξεργασμένοις = 'after all was over'. Causally it denotes the condition, as ἐπὶ τούτοις = 'on these terms'; ἐπ' οὐδενί = 'on no account'; the purpose, as ἐπὶ μόσχῳ ᾄδειν = 'to sing for the prize of a calf'; οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ = 'not with a bad intention'; the object of any mental affection, as γελᾶν

* That ἀμφί, which means properly 'on both sides of', should be used of the instrument, is no more strange than that our *with* should be used in the sense of *by*.

ἐπί τινι = 'to laugh at anything'; circumstance, as ἐπὶ πείρᾳ = 'by way of experiment', ἐπὶ κωκυτῷ = 'with wailing'; and with names of persons 'in the power of'. *c*) *With the accusative.* Ἐπί = *on to*, as ἀναβαίνειν ἐφ' ἵππον = 'to mount on horseback'; and, when hostility is implied, *against*, as στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Λυδούς = 'to make an expedition against the Lydians': also *on* in the sense of *over*, as πλεῖν ἐπὶ πόντον = 'to sail over the deep'. Temporally it denotes sometimes *during*, as ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας = 'during many days'; sometimes *until*, as ἐπ' ἠώ = 'until morning'. With numbers *up to*, as ἐπὶ τριηκόσια = 'up to three hundred'; and in military language, as with the genitive, τετάχθαι ἐπὶ πολλούς = 'to be ranked many men deep'.

Obs. 11. Μετά (German mit = with) seems to be connected with μέσος, and means primarily with all cases *in the midst*, as μετὰ τῶν νεκρῶν = 'among the dead', μετ' ἀνδράσι = 'among men', μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχειν = 'to have among one's hands, or on hand'. More particularly *a*) *With the genitive*, it denotes *along with* in various ways; conformity, as μετὰ τοῦ νόμου διακινδυνεύειν = 'to encounter danger with i. e. while acting in conformity with the law'; *on the side of*, as μετά τινος μάχεσθαι = 'to fight on one's side'; and circumstance, as μετ' ἀρετῆς πρωτεύειν = 'to excel in virtue'. *b*) *With the dative* it occurs only in poetry, chiefly Epic, and always in its primary sense. *c*) *With the accusative* it means *into the midst*, as ἀΐσσων μετὰ χῆνας = 'rushing in among geese'; βῆναι μετὰ Νέστορα = 'to go and join Nestor': *after* in a variety of senses, as *ordinally* κάλλιστος μετὰ Πηλείωνα = 'handsomest after Pelion'; *temporally*, μετὰ ταῦτα = 'after these things', μετὰ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον = 'after Solon's departure', a participle usually accompanying proper names, μεθ' ἡμέραν = 'after day-light', and hence 'by day'; *after*, as an object of pursuit, πλεῖν μετὰ χαλκόν = 'to sail after copper' i. e. *ad æs petendum; after* in the sense of conformity, as μετὰ σὸν καὶ ἐμὸν κῆρ = 'after your heart's desire and mine'.*

Obs. 12. Παρά has for its general meaning *beside*. *a*) With the genitive '*from* beside', as μανθάνειν παρά τινος = 'to learn from some one'; sometimes also with passive verbs before the genitive of the agent, *by*. *b*) With the dative, '*at* beside' as παρὰ ταῖς ναυσί = 'at the ships', παρ' ἡμῖν = 'among us', παρ' ἐμοί = 'in my opinion'. *c*) With the accusative '*to* beside', chiefly of persons as ἰέναι παρὰ Κροῖσον = 'to go to Crœsus'; then *along*, as παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν = 'along the river'; *throughout*, as παρὰ πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα = 'throughout all human affairs'; and

* The *with* of μετά with the genitive is less intimate than that of σύν with the dative, which usually implies juxtaposition; and the *after* of μετά with the accusative is less intimate than that of ἐκ with the genitive, which means '*immediately* after'.

temporally (post-Homeric) *παρὰ τὸν πόλεμον* = 'throughout i. e. during the war'; *beyond*, as *παρ' ἐλπίδα* = 'beyond expectation', *παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ὥσπερ θεοὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι βιοτεύουσι* = 'beyond other animals men live as gods', and hence after comparatives (§. 60. Obs. 2.), and with verbs of valuing in the phrases *παρ' ὀλίγον*, *παρὰ πολύ*, *παρ' οὐδέν*, as *παρ' οὐδὲν τίθεσθαι* = 'to count for nothing'. Also causally, as *παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν* = 'by his own carelessness'; distributively, as *παρὰ πέντε ναῦς* = 'for every five ships'; and successively, as *ἡμέρα παρ' ἡμέραν* = 'day by day', *πληγὴν παρὰ πληγήν* = 'blow upon blow'.

Obs. 13. *Πρός* (*προτί*, *ποτί* in Homeric and Doric) is related to *πρό*, and has the same radical meaning with all cases, viz. *before* or *in front of*, as *γνώμην ἐπίφθονον πρὸς πλείονων* = 'a sentiment odious to (in presence of) most', and in adjuration, *πρὸς θεῶν* = 'by (in presence of) the gods', *πρὸς τοῖς κρίταις* = 'in presence of the judges'; hence with all cases *towards* i. e. the aspect fronting, as *πρὸς μεσεμβρίης* or *μεσεμβρίην Ἀραβίη ἔστι* = 'Arabia lies towards the south', *πρὸς ἑσπέρᾳ* or *ἑσπέραν* = 'towards evening'. More particularly *a*) With the genitive, *against* i. e. fronting as a barrier, *φυλακαὶ κατέστησαν πρὸς Αἰθιόπων* = 'guards were stationed against the Ethiopians'; *on the side of*, i. e. fronting as defence, *εἶναι πρός τινος* = 'to be on one's side'; and procession *from before* in various ways, as descent *πρὸς μητρός* = 'by the mother's side', of qualities and actions consonant with their origin *πρὸς δίκης ἔστιν* = 'it is right' (§. 14. Obs. 5. c.), *πρὸς τῶν ἐχόντων νόμος* = 'a law for the rich': sometimes simply *from*, and hence, after passive and intransitive verbs, *by*, with the genitive of the agent: also *on account of*, as (Soph. Antig. 51.) *πρὸς ἀμπλακημάτων* = *propter facinora*. *b*) With the dative, *in addition to*, as *πρὸς τούτοις* = 'moreover'. *c*) With the accusative the notion *to in front of* prevails; as, in the sense of *against*, *μάχεσθαι πρός τινα* = 'to fight against one'; of the party addressed, *λογίζεσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτόν* = 'to consider with one's self'; and of the object in view, *πρὸς σωτηρίαν* = 'for safety'. Also *on account of*, as *πρὸς ταῦτα* = 'for this reason'; *according to*, as *πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ κήρυγμα* = 'according to this proclamation'; *with respect to*, as *τέλειος πρὸς ἀρετήν* = 'perfect in respect of virtue'; and *for* in the comparative sense, as (Thuc. I. 10.) *πρὸς τὸ κλέος αὐτῶν* = 'for i. e. compared with their glory', *ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καταλλάττεσθαι* = 'to exchange pleasures for pleasures'.

Obs. 14. *Ὑπό* (sub) = 'under'. *a*) With the genitive *from under*, as *νεκρὸν ὑπ' Αἴαντος ἑρύειν* = 'to drag the corpse from under Ajax i. e. out of his power'; simply *under*, in which sense the dative is more usual, except with verbs of hitting (§. 64. Obs. 4.), as *τὸν βάλ' ὑπὸ γναθμοῖο* = 'struck him under the jaw-bone'; also of the mental cause, as *ὑπὸ δέους* = 'from fear', as if 'under

the influence of fear', similarly *ὑπ' αὐλοῦ χορεύειν* = 'to dance to the flute'; and of the agent, as *πεπαιδευμένος ὑπό τινος* = 'instructed *by* some one'. *b*) With the dative, position under, as *ὑπ' Τμησσῶ* = 'under Hymettus i. e. at the foot of it'; *περῶν ὑπ' οἰδμασιν* = 'passing among the billows', they being conceived as overhanging the passenger; *ποιεῖν τι ὑπό τινι* = 'to subdue anything under one'. In poetry, *ὑπό* with the dative sometimes denotes the agent; and in such phrases as *ὑπ' αὐλοῦ χορεύειν*, the dative may replace the genitive. *c*) With the accusative '*to* under', as *ποιεῖν τι ὑπό τινα* = 'to subdue anything under one' (§. 76. b.); simply *to* with verbs of approaching, the object approached being conceived of as lofty, *ὑπ' Ἴλιον ἦλθον* = 'they came to Troy'; *under* in the sense of *beneath*, as *τῷ ὑπὸ γῆν λεγομένῳ εἶναι θεῷ* = 'to the god said to be under the earth'; *under* in the sense of protection, as (Herod.) *ὑπὸ τὸν πεζὸν στρατόν* = 'under the protection of the infantry': also *ὑπό τι*, as we say 'under some point of view'. Temporally it denotes approximation, as *ὑπὸ νύκτα* = *sub noctem; ὑπὸ τὸν νηὸν κατακαέντα* = 'about the time the temple was burnt'; and sometimes *during*, as *ὑπὸ τὴν παροιχομένην νύκτα* = 'during the past night'.

§. 76. **Pregnant Construction of Prepositions.** *a*) This occurs when a preposition with the dative accompanies a verb implying motion *to*, or when a preposition with the accusative accompanies a verb implying motion or rest *in*. In the former case the state of rest, in which the motion results, is regarded; in the latter the state of motion, which preceded the state of rest. Thus in English we say, not only 'to put *into* the hands of a person', but also 'to put *in* his hands', which latter exactly corresponds to the Greek *τιθέναι ἐν χερσίν*, or the Latin *ponere in manibus*, and implies putting *into* the hands, and letting remain *there*. In no language however is it logically correct, since putting implies motion *to* or *into*. So (Il. XV. 277.) *ἐφάνη λὶς... εἰς ὁδόν* = 'a lion stepped into the way and appeared there', for we cannot say in English 'appeared *into* the way'. The prepositions *ἐν*, *εἰς* are frequently so used, *ἀμφί*, *περί*, *ἐπί*, *πρός*, *ὑπό* sometimes. *b*) Some of the prepositional constructions, which appear inconsistent with the proper force of the case employed, are explicable on this principle. Thus *φεύγειν ἐπὶ Σάρδεων*, may be explained by 'fleeing to Sardes and abiding

there', the genitive denoting the place of the fugitive's *rest* (§. 14. Obs. 2.). Similarly, in *ποιεῖν τι ὑπό τινα*, the preposition denotes transition *into* the state of subjection, and in *ποιεῖν τι ὑπό τινι*, rest *in* the state of subjection. *c*) So also the prepositions *ἀπό* and *ἐκ* are often used proleptically i. e. in anticipation of a motion *from* being expressed, where however the *from* relation cannot be translated into English, as *οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀπέφυγον* = 'those who were in the forum fled'; (Herod.) *οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων τοῖς ἀκοντίοις ... ἐχρῶντο* = 'those who were on the decks used javelins', *ἐκ* and *ἀπό* denoting implicitly the *where* of the men, by denoting expressly the *whence* of the men's flight in the one case, and of the missiles' flight in the other.

Obs. **Analogous Usage of Local Adverbs.** The same principle accounts for the confusion, which pervades all languages, more or less, in the use of local adverbs, as *where* for *whither*. Thus (Soph. Trach. 40.) *κεῖνος δ' ὅ που βέβηκεν οὐδεὶς οἶδε* = '*where* he is gone no one knows i. e. whither he is gone, and where he now is', the verb implying motion *to*, and the adverb rest *in* a place. (Aristoph. Av. 9.) *ὅποι γῆς ἔσμεν*; = 'where are we i. e. whither have we come and where are we?' the adverb implying motion *to* and the verb rest *in* a place. So proleptically (Aristoph. Plut. 227.) *τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κρεαδίον τῶν ἔνδοθέν τις εἰσενεγκάτω λαβών* = 'but let some one of those from within take and carry in this bit of meat', where *ἔνδοθεν* implies that the people are *within*, by indicating that they must come *out*, in order to do what they are requested.

§. 77. **Adverbial Phrases formed by Prepositions.** In addition to those enumerated in §. 6. Obs. 3., or adduced as examples of prepositional government, the following may be useful. It will be observed that, when the adverbial phrase is formed from an adjective, it is the exact equivalent of the adverb formed from the adjective, as *ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου* = *ἀπροσδοκήτως* = 'unexpectedly'.

ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς = openly
ἀπὸ στόματος λέγειν = to say by heart'
ἐξ ἑτοίμου = promptly
κατὰ τὸ ἰσχυρόν } = violently
πρὸς βίαν }
κατ' ὀλίγον = in a small degree
κατὰ πολύ = in a great degree

ἐκ παίδων = from childhood
ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, παρ' ἑαυτοῦ } = spontaneously
παρ' ἑαυτοῦ = from one's own resources
ἐκ τοῦ ἀδίκου = unjustly
ἐν καιρῷ = in the nick of time
ἐν προσθήκης μέρει = into the bargain
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ = for the most part
ἐπ' ἴσα = in the same way
ἐπ' ἀμφότερα = both ways
ἐπὶ τὰ μακρότερα = lengthways
ἐπὶ προφάσιος = on pretence.
ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ = in the very act
ἐν μέρει, ἀνὰ μέρος = in turn
ἀνὰ λόγον = proportionally
παρὰ ποδός = on the spot
πρὸς ἀνάγκην = necessarily.

§. 78. **Force and Government of Prepositions in Composition.** Though the preposition always adds some element to the meaning of the simple verb, it by no means always affects its construction (see προορᾶν §. 66. Obs. 1.): but, when the meaning of the simple verb is not merely intensified, or slightly modified, but changed by the preposition, so that the prepositional element becomes the principal one, then the preposition determines the construction of the verb. Thus ἔχω = 'I have' governs the accusative, but μετέχω = 'I share' the genitive. It will be satisfactory to go through the prepositions in detail.

Obs. 1. Ἀπό denotes separation, and hence completion, as ἀπεργάζεσθαι = (lit.) 'to work off' hence 'to complete'. The idea of separation appears even in verbs of giving and receiving, as ἀποδιδόναι, ἀπολαμβάνειν, but does not prevail: wherever it prevails however, the compounds govern the genitive, as πόσον ἀπέχω πόλεως; = 'how far am I *from* town?'

Obs. 2. Ἐκ = *out*, as ἐκβάλλειν, hence completeness, or a high degree, by the same analogy which accounts for the general meaning of *utmost*, the superlative of *out*; thus ἐξοπλίζεσθαι = 'to furnish out i. e. to thoroughly arm'; ἐκμανθάνειν = 'to learn thoroughly', but ἀπομανθάνειν = 'to unlearn, to forget'.* Even when the

* It is a fine instance of that caprice in language, which now accepts, and now rejects an analogy, that these two verbs have at length exchanged significations: in the modern dialect, ἀπέμαθεν = 'he has done learning', as we say 'learned it *off*', ἀπό denoting the separation involved in completion, and ἐξέμαθεν = 'he has unlearned or forgotten', which is the exact meaning of the former in classic Greek.

local *out* prevails in the meaning of the compound verb, the following genitive is usually governed by a separate preposition.

Obs. 3. Ἀντί denotes substitution or opposition. In the former sense, the compounds take the genitive of the thing supplanted, as ἀντιτιθέναι τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς μελέτης = 'to substitute experience for study'; and in the latter, the dative of that to which opposition is made, as τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀντιλέγειν 'to speak against the truth'. Such compounds as ἀνταδικεῖν and ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, take the cases of the simple verbs, viz. the former the accusative, and the latter the genitive, because in them ἀντί expresses neither substitution nor opposition decidedly: in ἀνταδικεῖν, ἀντί = *in return*, and in ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, it denotes the object reached after, as simply *in front of* the person reaching.

Obs. 4. Πρό = *before*, in the sense of *beforehand*, as προειπεῖν = 'to foretell'; *forward*, as προβαίνειν = 'to advance'; also publicity as προγράφειν = 'to proclaim in writing', and superiority, as προστατεύω = 'I preside over'. Verbs compounded with πρό in this last sense take the genitive.

Obs. 5. Ἐν. This preposition does not affect the construction of its compounds. Their regimen depends on their own meaning, and is divided between the dative, and the accusative with or without εἰς: ἐμπίπτειν is found with all three.

Obs. 6. Σύν. The compounds of σύν denoting *association*, or *cooperation with*, take the dative; those denoting *participation* the genitive.

Obs. 7. Εἰς is the antithesis of ἐξ in composition, as εἰσάγω and ἐξάγω: its compounds take the accusative, often with εἰς repeated before the noun; but εἰσέρχεσθαι, and εἰσιέναι are also found with the personal dative, in the sense of *occurring to one's mind*, or of *encountering* in regard to things external.

Obs. 8. Ἀνά signifies in composition *up*, as ἀναπηδᾶν = 'to jump up'; hence it is intensive, as ἀναβοᾶν = 'to cry aloud': also *back*, corresponding to the Latin *re*, as ἀναχωρεῖν = 'to return'; hence of *opening out*, as ἀναπεταννύναι = 'to unfold', 'to fold *back*' as it were; lastly *again*, as ἀναδιδάσκειν τὰ δράματα = 'to represent the dramas again'. Ἀνά in composition has no influence on the construction of the verb.

Obs. 9. Διά denotes *through*, as διέρχεσθαι = 'to traverse'; *duration*, as διατελεῖν = 'to continue'; *separation*, as διέχειν = 'to divide'; *dispersion*, like the Latin *dis*, as διαδόναι = 'to distribute'. Its compounds take the accusative, except such as signify simply *difference*, which take the genitive, as διαφέρειν τινός, or difference with the accessory idea of *strife*, which take the dative, as διαφέρεσθαί τινι = 'to quarrel with one'.

Obs. 10. Κατά denotes *down* as καταπηδᾶν = 'to jump

down'; * *against*, as κατηγορεῖν = 'to inform against'; *thoroughly*, as καταφαγεῖν = 'to eat up', and similarly in adjectives, as καταβόστρυχος = 'full of clusters, as we might say '*be*clustered'; also *back*, but only in words denoting the return of exiles, as κατάγειν, κατιέναι, κατέρχεσθαι. Hence ἡ κάθοδος τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν = 'the return of the Heraclidæ'. Those compounds, in which κατά signifies 'against', take the genitive: but καταγελᾶν and καθυβρίζειν are also found with the *dativus incommodi* (§. 67. Obs. 3, b.).

Obs. 11. Ὑπέρ always means 'over', but under various aspects, viz. *simple superiority* as ὑπερέχειν· *excess*, as ὑπερμισεῖν· and *contempt*, as ὑπερορᾶν. In the first of these aspects, its compounds take the genitive, most commonly also in the last.

Obs. 12. Ἀμφί retains in composition the same meanings which it has separately, but exercises no influence on the construction of its compounds. With verbs it means *all round*, as ἀμφιδέρκομαι = 'I look on all sides', but with adjectives its relation to ἄμφω often appears, as in ἀμφίστομος = 'double-tongued': compare *amphibious*.

Obs. 13. Περί denotes *round* locally, as περιάγω = 'I lead about'; *superiority*, as περιγίγνεσθαι = 'to excel'; *excess*, as περιαλγῶ = 'I am exceedingly grieved', hence περιεργάζομαι = 'I labour overmuch i. e. in vain'; and *contempt*, as περιορᾶν = 'I despise'. The compounds denoting *superiority* take the genitive.

Obs. 14. Ἐπί denotes *upon*, as ἐπιτιθέναι = 'to place upon'; *against*, as ἐπιστρατεύειν = 'to war against'; *behind*, as ἐπιτάττειν τῇ φαλάγγι = 'to rank behind the phalanx'. Its compounds, when ἐπί has either of the last two senses, take the dative.

Obs. 15. Μετά denotes participation, as μετέχω = 'I share'; change, as μεθίστημι = 'I substitute'; *after*, as μεταδιώκω = 'I pursue after', μεταπέμπομαι = 'I send after or for'. Its compounds in the first of these senses take the genitive.

Obs. 16. Παρά denotes *proximity*, as παρεῖναι = 'to be present', παρακαθῆσθαι = 'to sit near'; *perversion* in some way, as παρασπονδεῖν = 'to violate a treaty', παρερμηνεύειν = 'to misinterpret'. It has no influence on the construction of its compounds, except as making some intransitives transitive, as παραβαίνω = 'I transgress', from βαίνω = 'I go'.

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* In this sense κατά is the antithesis of ἀνά; hence κατανεύω = 'I assent'; ἀνανεύω, also ἀπονεύω = 'I dissent'. All men nod *down* or *forwards* in assenting; but the ancient Greeks, like the modern, also nodded *up* or *back* in dissenting. Even the language of signs therefore has its dialects, an upward or backward movement of a Greek head being translated in the rest of Europe by a shake. Similarly κατάφημι = 'I affirm', and ἀπόφημι = 'I deny'.

Obs. 17. *Πρός* denotes *motion to*, as *προσιέναι* = 'to go to'; *addition*, as *προσδεῖν* = 'to need in addition to what one has'; *fitness*, as *οὔ σοι προσήκει* = 'it does not become you'.

Obs. 18. *Ὑπό* denotes *under*, as *ὑποδέω* = 'I tie under', hence 'I shoe'. It often denotes that the action proceeds in an imperceptible secret manner, *underhand* as we say, e. g. *ὑπέξειμι* = 'I steal forth' as in a sortie. With adjectives, it answers to the English termination *ish*, denoting a slight degree, and is in this sense opposed to *κατά* (Obs. 10.). Thus *ὑπόλευκος* = 'whitish', *ὑπόπικρος* = 'bitterish'.

Obs. 19. **Tmesis of the Preposition.** In Homer, Herodotus, and the tragic chorus, the preposition is often separated by some words from the verb to which it belongs, or by a particle from its case. In Attic prose and later Greek, the tmesis of the preposition from the verb with which it is compounded, does not occur. The following is a rare instance of the preposition separated from its case by several words, (Thuc. VI. 76. 4.) *περὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν σφίσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκείνῳ καταδουλώσεως* = 'some for the sake of subjugation under themselves, but not under him i. e. that they might be their own masters, not his slaves'.

§. 79. **Omission and Repetition of Prepositions.** In a series of substantives connected by *καί*, *τέ*, the preposition may be either repeated before every one, or prefixed only to the first: in poetry, however, it is sometimes omitted before the first, and placed before the second, as (Eur. Hec. 146.) *ἀλλ' ἴθι ναούς, ἴθι πρὸς βωμούς* = 'but go to the temples, go to the altars'. In Attic, especially in prose, the preposition before the antecedent is seldom repeated before the relative, as (Xen. Symp. IV. 1.) *ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ᾧ ὑμῶν ἀκούω* = 'in the time during which I hear you'.

Obs. **Compound Words.** When a verb, compounded with a preposition, is to be repeated, either the verb is omitted, and the preposition alone repeated, as (Herod. IX. 5. 15.) *κατὰ μὲν ἔλευσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν γυναῖκα, κατὰ δὲ τὰ τέκνα* = 'they stoned to death both his wife and his children': or the preposition is omitted, and the verb alone repeated, as (Plat. Phæd. p. 59. B.) *παρῆν καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ... ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος* = 'Critobulus was present, and his father ... Ctesippus too was there'.

§. 80. **Government of Conjunctions.** All that can

be posited, in regard to the government of conjunctions, is that, although εἰ without ἄν, in the sense of *if*, is found, in the Ionic and Doric poets, with the Subjunctive, it is never so found in Attic, except in the choral odes, and archaic phraseology of the law (Madv. §. 125. Rem. 2.), but always with the Indicative, or Optative, according to the sense; on the other hand, ἐάν = *if*, ὅταν = *whenever*, and the like, (§. 44. Obs. 3.) are found only with the Subjunctive: farther ὅφρα, ὡς, ὅπως, ἵνα = 'in order that', require forms of the Subjunctive and Optative groups, the former when the principal verb, on which the *final* clause depends, is in a principal tense, the latter when it is in a historical one.

Obs. Ἵνα **with the Indicative.** When the four last mentioned conjunctions are found with the Indicative, they may be Englished 'in which case', as (Soph. Oed. T. 1387.) ἀλλ' εἰ τῆς ἀκουούσης ἔτ' ἦν πηγῆς δι' ὤτων φραγμὸς, οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμην τὸ μὴ 'ποκλεῖσαι τοῦμὸν ἄθλιον δέμας, ἵν' ἦν τυφλός τε καὶ κλύων μηδέν = 'but, were stoppage possible of that fountain of hearing by the ear, which is still open, I should not refrain from closing up this wretched body of mine, *in which case* I should be both blind and deaf'. See also Aristoph. Vesp. 961. ἵνα μὴ ... ἐνέγραφε κ. τ. λ. Ὅπως however does occur with the *future* indicative in the sense of 'in order that', as (Soph. Oed. T. 1518.) γῆς μ' ὅπως πέμψεις ἄποικον = '*in order that* you may send me from the land a banished man'. This construction confirms the alleged affinity between the aspect of the verb in the future indicative, and its aspect in the Subjunctive (§. 35. Obs. 1.).

§. 81. **Government of Interjections.** The interjection ὦ, when simply vocative, takes of course the vocative case, as ὦ Κῦρε καί οἱ ἄλλοι Πέρσαι = 'O Cyrus, and ye other Persians'. But, when the interjections are outcries of passion, they take the genitive of that *whence* the passion arises, in other words the genitive of the *cause*, as (Eur. Hipp. 366.) ὦ τάλαινα τῶν δ' ἀλγέων = Oh wretched me, (on account of) these woes! (Aristoph. Av. 1131.) ὦ Πόσειδον τοῦ μάκρους = 'O Neptune, what a length!' In these passages the vocative of the person appealed to also occurs; but that is often omitted, as ὦ

τῆς μωρίας = 'O the folly!' *οἴμοι* * *τῶν κακῶν* = 'alas the ills!' *Οἴμοι τὰ κακά* is also found, the ills being regarded as the *object* on which grief is spent, rather than as the source whence grief arises. Frequently, interjections are used without any regimen at all, as *ἆ*, *ἆ*, *μηδαμῶς*, *μὴ πρὸς θεῶν βέλος ἀφῇς* = 'take care, take care, no, on no account, by the gods, let fly the dart.' They are often classified, according as they express commiseration, wonder, exultation &c. but, as it is impossible to define satisfactorily the shades of *thought* denoted by the Greek particles, so it is impossible to define satisfactorily the shades of *passion* denoted by the interjections. Often indeed the same interjection refers to opposite passions, as *οἴμοι τάλας* = 'O wretched me', *οἴμ' ὡς ἥδομαι* = 'O how I am delighted.'

Obs. **Position of** *ὦ*. When the vocative is accompanied by an adjective, *ὦ* may be either prefixed to both, or placed between them, that one of the two which is the more emphatic taking precedence of the other. A form of adjuration may also stand between *ὦ* and the vocative, as *ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλιτε* = 'O, by Jove, Melitus'.

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* Both *οἴμοι* and *ὤμοι* would seem to be merely natural exclamations prefixed to the dative of general reference *μοί*, from *ἐγώ*.

PART III. SYNTAX OF SENTENCES.

§. 82. **Order of Words in a Sentence.** The standard order of collocation was the same in Greek as it is in English, viz. the natural order, according to which the subject, with all that belongs to it, stands first, and then the predicate, with all that belongs to it. The emphatic positions in a sentence being the beginning and end, particularly the former (except in a flight of oratory, where the concluding words are often the most emphatic of all), this natural order is often inverted even in English, for the purpose of conveying, not only the thought, but the mode of its conception, in other words, for the purpose of expressing, not only the logical, but the rhetorical element. Thus we perceive a difference between "Great is Diana of the Ephesians", and "Diana of the Ephesians is great"; and although these sentences differ only in collocation, yet they so differ, that the latter is merely a proposition, while the former is an outcry of passion as well. In English however, as in all languages where the declinable parts of speech have a limited inflexion, the power of varying the collocation of words in a sentence is comparatively small: juxtaposition, and *set* forms of collocation, are necessarily resorted to, for the purpose of shewing how the words are related to one another. Thus "you love the children", differs from "the children love you" only in collocation; yet they express two different thoughts, and the collocation could not be changed in either case, without damage to the perspicuity of the expression. But in Greek, these sentences σὺ ἀγα-

πᾶς τὰ τέκνα, and τὰ τέκνα σὲ ἀγαπῶσι, may be collocated anyhow, and will always mean respectively the same thing, with the same clearness, simply because the terminations of the Greek pronoun and verb, are different for different cases and persons. In like manner, correspondence of case-ending shewed the Greeks that two words, though distant from each other in a sentence, referred to the same thing, whereas our only resource in English, to denote this community of reference, is juxtaposition. Freed in this way, to so great an extent, from set forms, the *animus loquentis* was the chief element, determining the arrangement of words in Greek composition, and their apparent dislocation is usually seen to be effective collocation, when the reader enters into the spirit of his author. *

Obs. 1. **Normal Collocation.** In the normal collocation of a simple sentence, the subject stands first and the predicate last, whatever is in apposition to the subject being *appended* to it, and whatever words belong to the predicate being *prefixed* to it, in an order dictated by the intimacy of their connexion with the predicate, as *οἱ Ἕλληνες οἱ ἄτρομοι ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν Μαραθῶνι τοὺς Πέρσας ἐνίκησαν* = 'the Greeks, dauntless fellows, conquered the Persians at Marathon on this day'. It will be observed that the *immediate* object of the predicate *immediately* precedes it, and that the circumstance of *place* is nearer the predicate than that of *time*. When a verb governs two cases, the accusative, being the immediate object,

* The student may aid his conceptions in this matter, by trying in how many ways, according to the *animus loquentis*, he can collocate a sentence of ordinary English. Thus, 'I have been so engaged today writing letters, that I could not attend the committee': this is the natural order; but, if the *day* were important, as in the case of a man who had not missed a day till this one, he would say '*Today* I have been &c.'; if again he wanted to make the *reason* of his non-attendance prominent, he would begin '*So engaged* have I been &c.'; and again, if he had been annoyed by the particular *mode* of his occupation, he might, in the impotence of English to completely invert the sentence, betake himself to repetition, and say '*Letters*, *letters*, I have been so engaged to-day writing letters &c.'. Here are four different collocations of the same sentence even in English.

stands next the predicate; and when the two cases are two accusatives, that of the thing stands nearer than that of the person, as *τὸν παῖδα τὴν γραμματικὴν διδάσκω* = 'I teach the boy grammar'. In Greek as in English, however, a modal adverb stands close beside the verb, as *οἱ Ἕλληνες τοὺς Πέρσας καλῶς ἐνίκησαν* = 'the Greeks completely (or, more accurately, *in style*) conquered the Persians'. In a compound sentence, the subordinate clauses occupy the places of the single words which they represent. Thus a relative clause, expletive of the subject, occupies the place of the appositive phrase, a temporal clause that of the temporal word, and so on; but a clause, which is either subject, or object to a verb *declarandi aut sentiendi*, follows it as in English: thus *οἵ δ' ἔλεγον*, or *ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἄρκτοι πολλοὺς ἤδη διέφθειραν* = 'they said', or 'it was said, that bears had already destroyed many'. (Jelf §. 901.)

Obs. 2. **Rhetorical Collocation.** Deviations from the above order, endless as they are, must be referred to the *animus loquentis*, and are justifiable, or reprehensible, according as they aid or mar its expression. The name *hyperbaton* has been given to a mode of emphasizing words, which cannot be imitated in English, consisting in the separation of those which should naturally stand together, as (Il. II. 483.) *ἐκπρεπέ' ἐν πολλοῖσι καὶ ἔξοχον ἡρώεσσιν* = 'illustrious and eminent among many heroes'. Comparatives are often so separated from the words used to strengthen them, such as *πολύ, πολλῷ*. Neither can we imitate the Chiasma (*Χίασμα*, so called from its analogy to the letter X), which consists in marking the opposition between pairs of words, by placing them at corresponding distances from a common centre, as *πολλάκις ἡδονὴ βραχεῖα μακρὰν τίκτει λύπην* = 'brief pleasure often begets long grief'. (Jelf §. 904. 1. 3.)



Obs. 3. **Words never First.** No indefinite word, declinable or indeclinable, can begin a sentence; neither can any of the following particles, *ἄρα, αὖ, γάρ, μέν, δέ, δή, νύν, οὖν, τέ, τοί, τοίνυν:* these generally stand after the first or second word of the sentence. For *ἄν* see §. 44. *. The vocative *may* stand last in a sentence, but never does in the tragic and comic writers. For the collocation of the noun and adjective with the article see §. 8: for that of nouns and pronouns in regimen §. 8. Obs. 1.

Obs. 4. **Collocation in N. T.** The collocation of words in the Greek authors, that have come down to us, differs much more from our own, than did the collocation of words in ordinary discourse; because, in ordinary discourse, the thoughts are simpler, and more simply expressed than in set composition. Adherence to the natural order of collocation, is one main reason why the New Testament,

particularly those parts of it written by men who had not received a Greek education, is so intelligible to us: another is the more frequent indication of case-relations by means of prepositions; and a third is the more frequent indication of the verbal subject and object by means of pronouns, whereas in classical Greek, these, when not themselves expressed, are generally left to be gathered from the context. (§. 66. Obs. 2.)

§. 83. **Compound Sentences.** These are coordinate or subordinate. When the clauses, of which a compound sentence consists, are of equal weight in the discourse, as in copulative, adversative, and disjunctive sentences, it is coordinate. But, when one of the clauses is subsidiary to the other, when, for example, one of them expresses merely the time at which, the ground on which, or the end for which the transaction stated by the other took place, the compound sentence is called subordinate; not that it is itself as a whole subordinate, but for brevity's sake, and because it contains a subordinate clause.

§. 84. **Simply Copulative Sentences.** These are joined by *τέ* or *καί*, which may be either repeated in each clause, or joined only to the latter. *Καί* is the stronger of the two, and accordingly, in Epic, *τέ* is often found with several successive clauses, and *καί* only with the last. The most intimate connection of all is effected by *τέ ... καί*, as *τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα* = 'what was both said and done'; particularly when *τέ* and *καί* immediately succeed each other, uniting parts into one whole, as *ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες* = 'both men and women'; *πεζοί τε καὶ ἱππεῖς* = 'both infantry and cavalry'.* Being the stronger, *καί* appropriately introduces the more important word, as (Thuc. I. 3. 2.) *ἔθνη τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὸ Πελασγικόν* = 'other nations *and especially* the Pelasgic'; hence the phrase *ἄλλως τε καί* = (lit.) 'both otherwise and' i. e. 'especially'. Being enclitic, *τε* cannot begin a sentence: it stands after the first word of the *clause* which

* The use of *τέ* without *καί*, though very common in Epic, and in tragedy, is rare in prose.

it connects, and immediately after *single words*, when it connects these; if however it connects a phrase made up of two words in concord or in regimen, it stands between them, as (Il. I. 5.) αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν οἰωνοῖσι τε πᾶσι = 'he made them a prey to dogs and all birds'. *Καί*, on the other hand, frequently begins a sentence. Note the formula *καί ... τέ ... καί* = 'And besides ... and', as Καὶ ἤδη τε ἦν ἀμφὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν, καὶ πλησίον ἦν ὁ σταθμός = '*And besides* it was now about the time of full market, *and* the station was near.' This introductory *καί ... τέ* is always followed in Attic prose by another *καί*.

Obs. 1. *Τε* **suffixed.** In Epic frequently, but rarely in Attic, *τέ* is joined to conjunctions and relatives, probably from the old practice of expressing subordinate clauses as coordinate, before, that is to say, the force of these conjunctions and relatives was fairly consolidated. From this practice arose such combinations in Attic as ὥστε, and particularly οἷός τε εἰμί = 'I am able'. (§. 28. Obs. 2.)

Obs. 2. *Καί* **as Adverb.** *Καί* is also an adverb in the sense of ἔτι (Latin *et*), as αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν = 'these very same things the gods *too* have suffered'; καὶ σὺ Βροῦτε = 'tu *quoque* Brute'. So always after ὥσπερ, and in the phrase εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, as ὁ Σωκράτης ταῦτ' ἔλεξεν ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι = 'these things said Socrates *even* as the others'; ὁ Σωκράτης εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος = 'Socrates *too* if any other man', a form which, according to the Greek λιτότης, really means 'Socrates more than any other man'.

Obs. 3. *Καί* = ὅτε. Thus (Thuc. I. 50. 5.) Ἤδη δὲ ἦν ὀψὲ ... καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐξαπίνης πρύμναν ἐκροῦντο = 'and it was now late, *when* the Corinthians suddenly backed water'. This usage is an example of the subordinate sentence in the coordinate form (§. 4.). On the same principle ὡς...καί, and ἅμα...καί = *simulac*, the elements of which, it will be noticed, are precisely the same as those of ἅμα ... καί. Thus (Thuc. II. 93. 4.) ὡς δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐχώρουν εὐθύς = '*simulac* decretum est ab iis, continuo discesserunt': ἅμα διαλλάττονται καὶ τῆς ἔχθρας ἐπιλανθάνονται = '*as soon as* they are reconciled, they forget their enmity'. *Καί* = ὥσπερ, after ὁ αὐτός, ὅμοιος, and the like, belongs to the same primitive use of the copulatives.

Obs. 4. *Καί* **in N. T.** The frequent use of *καί* in the New Testament, particularly in the writings of Matthew and Peter, to connect sentences really adversative i. e. in the sense of *but*, is a He-

braism. Thus (Mat. XI. 17.) *ηὐλήσαμεν ὑμῖν καὶ οὐκ ὠρχήσασθε* = 'we have piped unto you, *but* ye have not danced'. (Mat. X. 39. XII. 35.)*

§. 85. **Incressively Copulative Sentences.** These are connected by *οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καί* = 'not only . . . but also'. The addition of *καί* is not necessary, but it marks the connected clauses as of equal weight. Synonymes for *οὐ μόνον*, in this construction, are *οὐ μόνον ὅτι*, *οὐχ* or *μὴ ὅτι*, *οὐχ* or *μὴ ὅπως*, *οὐχ οἷον*, *οὐχ ὅσον*, the construction being elliptical wherever *ὅτι* or *ὅπως* is used. Thus *οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες ὁπλίζονται* = '*not only* men *but* women *too* are arming', as if *οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι κ. τ. λ.* 'I shall not say that men, — but women too are arming'. For their interpretation the following is important. When the latter clause is *augmentative* of the former, *οὐχ ὅτι* and its synonymes signify 'not only', as in the above example, and in *οὐχ ὅτι ἔτρεσεν ἀλλ' ἔφυγεν* = 'not that he trembled, but he fled' i. e. 'he *not only* trembled but fled'.** When, however, the two clauses are *really opposed*, *οὐχ ὅτι* signifies 'not only *not*', as *οὐχ ὅτι ἔφυγεν ἀλλ' ἐνίκησε* = 'not that he fled, but he conquered' i. e. '*not only* did he

* Sometimes coordinate sentences suceeed each other without any conjunction to connect them. This is called *asyndeton*, and occurs chiefly in the poets and orators: it contributes to dignity in the Epic style, and to passion in the Lyric. Before *τὰ τοιαῦτα* and *ἄλλος*, *καὶ* is commonly omitted, as (Plat. Gorg. p. 503. E.) *εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγοὺς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς* = 'if you wish to see the painters, the architects, the ship-builders, *and* all the other artists'. The phrase *ἐδόκει ταῦτα* is always appended without *καί*, as (Xen. An. III. 2. 38.) *ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδεὶς ἀντέλεγεν, εἶπεν· Ὅτῳ δοκεῖ ταῦτα, ἀνατεινάτω τὴν χεῖρα. Ἐδοξε ταῦτα* = 'and, when no one made opposition, he said: Whoever is of this mind, let him hold up his hand. (*So*) these things were determined on'.

** Exactly so, in Italian, *non che* = *non solamente*, as 'rispetto *non che* ad una parte del tutto, *ma* a tutte le cose insieme' = 'respect *not only* to one part of the whole, *but* to all the things together'. See *non che* in the "Vocabolario della Crusca".

not flee, but he conquered'. Here flight and victory are opposites; not so flight and fear in the former example. Accordingly, whenever the second clause is negatived by *οὐδέ* = 'not even', because that implies opposition between the two clauses, *οὐχ ὅτι*, and its synonymes, must be translated 'not only *not*', as *μὴ ὅπως ὀρχεῖσθαι ἐν ῥυθμῷ, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὀρθοῦσθαι ἠδύνασθε* = '*not only* could you *not* dance, but you could not even stand upright'.

Obs. *Οὐχ ὅπως*. Another positively incressive formula is *ἔφυγεν οὐχ ὅπως ἔτρεσεν*, the incressive verb standing first, *οὐχ ὅπως* being joined with the second clause, and *ἀλλά* omitted altogether. In this case *οὐχ ὅπως*, with the weaker verb, may be translated *not to say*, *not to mention*, *let alone*, as in the English of the above example, 'he fled, *not to mention* his trembling' i. e. 'not only he trembled, but he fled'. Similarly with nouns, as *ἄχρηστον καὶ γυναιξί, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσι* = 'useless to women even, *let alone* men'. * It will be observed that these Greek formulæ represent the Latin *nedum*, for which *μήτοιγε δή, μή τί γε δή*, and *σχολῇ γε* are also used, as *οὐκ ἔνι αὐτὸν ἀργοῦντα οὐδὲ τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτάττειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τι ποιεῖν, μή τί γε δὴ τοῖς θεοῖς* = 'he who is himself idle may not require that his friends, *much less* that the gods, should do anything for him'.

§. 86. **Adversative Sentences.** The particles *μέν ... δέ* = 'one ... two' (§. 51. *.) i. e. 'on the one hand ... on the other hand', are the chief instruments in the formation of these. The adversative, or, as some call it, the distributive force of *μέν* and *δέ*, appears markedly in the following:

πρῶτον μέν .. ἔπειτα δέ = at first indeed .. but afterwards
ἐνταῦθα μέν ... ἐκεὶ δέ = here indeed ... but there
ποτὲ μέν ... ποτὲ δέ ** = sometimes ... at other times
ὁτὲ μέν ... ὁτὲ δέ ** = now ... again
τοτὲ μέν ... τοτὲ δέ ** = at one time ... at another time

* The Italians have this idiom also, as 'i fortissimi uomini, *non che* le tenere donne, hanno già molte volte vinti' = 'the strongest men, *not to mention* the delicate ladies, have already many a time conquered'. See *non che* in the Vocabolario della Crusca.

** These three are really synonymes, and are differently

ὁ μέν .. ὁ δέ = he here .. he there i. e. this man .. that man τὰ μέν .. τὰ δέ = partly .. partly.

Here is an instance from Plato of so strong an opposition by μέν ... δέ, that the translation of the latter requires a negative in English: κἂν μὲν βούλῃ ἔτι ἐρωτᾶν, ἕτοιμός εἰμι σοὶ παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, σὺ ἐμοὶ πάρασχε = 'if you wish to question farther, I am ready to afford you an answer; but if *not*, then answer me'. When *clauses* are connected, μέν and δέ usually stand second in them, when single words, μέν and δέ stand immediately after the words connected. In a *series* of clauses, μέν generally goes with the first, and δέ with all the rest; but, when the clauses are so poised, that there is a parallelism between pairs of them, this is sometimes indicated by μέν ... μέν ... δέ ... δέ, as παρ' οἷς μέν ... παρὰ τούτοις μέν ... ὅπου δέ ... ἐνταῦθα δέ = 'with whom *on the one hand* ... with these *indeed* ... *but* where ... there *truly*'. In Homer however μέν never refers twice to the same thing; and, where it is repeated, the first μέν belongs to a protasis, and the following μέν ... δέ to an apodosis (Il. XX. 41—47.)

Obs. 1. Μέν ... δέ = **whilst.** When the simultaneity of the things opposed is an important point, the force of μέν ... δέ is rendered by *whilst*, as αἰσχρόν ἐστιν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν τοὺς πόνους, ὑμεῖς δὲ μηδὲ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἀνέξεσθε = 'it is a shame if, *whilst* I bear their unjust actions, you shall not put up with even their words'.

Obs. 2. **Substitutes for** δέ. For δέ, responsive to μέν, other adversatives are frequently substituted, as ἀλλά, αὖ, αὐτάρ, ἀτάρ, μέντοι, ὅμως. *a*) Ἀλλά (§. 51.). Notice ἀλλ' ἤ = 'except', after negative clauses, and interrogative clauses implying a negative, as ἀργύριον μὲν οὐκ ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἢ μικρόν τι = 'I have no money, save a little'. Elliptical forms are οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα (the most frequent in Attic) all of which mean

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translated in the text, merely to suggest several of their manifold English equivalents. It will be observed that ὁτέ, τοτέ, ποτέ are here accented like the indefinite ποτέ = 'ever', 'at any time', not like the interrogative πότε; = 'when?'

no indeed! but, or simply *yet,* as (Xen. Cyr. I. 4. 8.) *ὁ ἵππος πίπτει εἰς γόνατα, καὶ μικροῦ κἀκεῖνον ἐξετραχήλισεν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπέμεινεν ὁ Κῦρος μόλις πως* = 'the horse came down upon its knees, and almost threw him over its neck; *yet* Cyrus stuck on, though with some difficulty', where the full construction would seem to be *οὐ μὴν ἐξετραχήλισεν ἀλλ' κ. τ. λ.* The contrast, indicated by *ἀλλά*, is often not expressed, as in questions *ἀλλ' ἢ φρονεῖς;* = '*but* do you really think?' and in exhortations, as *πειράσατ' ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς γε* = '*but* do you at least try' i. e. 'others won't or may not, *but* do you at least'. Sometimes *ἀλλά* is best translated by *well,* as *ἀλλὰ βούλομαι* = '*well,* I consent', there being really a contrast, however, between the present and former dispositions of the speaker. *b) Αὖ* and its compounds. *Αὖ* seems to have been originally a local adverb, as in the compound *αὐερύειν* = 'to drag *backwards*', and then to have acquired both a temporal and an adversative force, like the English *again*, as 'he said this *again* i. e. a second time', and '*he again* said this' i. e. 'he on the other hand'. In Homer it is generally accompanied by *δέ* when referring to a previous *μέν*. From *αὖ* are formed *αὖτε* (§. 84. Obs. 1.), *αὖθις, αὖτις, αὐτάρ*, and *ἀτάρ*, the first three being synonymous with *αὖ*, and the last two with *ἀλλά*. *Αὖ, αὐτάρ*, and *ἀτάρ* always stand at the beginning of a clause, and usually introduce something unexpected. *c) Μέντοι* = 'however'. When not adversative, it is merely emphatic; and is so used, particularly in answers, both seriously and ironically, like the English 'indeed'. *d) Ὅμως*, from *ὁμός* = 'equal', signifies *nevertheless, however.* In the dramatists, especially Euripides, *ἀλλ' ὅμως* is often found by itself at the end of a line, as (Eur. Elect. 753.) *ἤκουσα κἀγὼ τηλόθεν μέν, ἀλλ' ὅμως* = 'I too heard it, at a distance truly, *but yet* (I heard the wailing)'. So in entreaties addressed to a reluctant party, *ἀλλ' ὅμως* = 'but yet do!'

Obs. 3. *Μέν* **without** *δέ*. *Μέν* is found adversatively without *δέ* or any of its equivalents following, as *ἐνταῦθα μέν . . . ἐκεῖ* = 'here on the one hand . . . there'; *ἐκεῖ* of itself implying opposition to *ἐνταῦθα*. Even when *μέν*, not followed by *δέ*, is said to be merely emphatic, and is translated by *indeed,** as it often is with the personal and demonstrative pronouns, one can generally imagine an adversative thought in the mind. Thus *λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὅδε ὁ λόγος, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ πιθανός* = 'and there is told also the following story, to me *indeed* (or to me *however*) not a likely one';

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* *Μήν* (Doric and Epic *μάν*) = 'surely', would seem to be only another form of the confirmative *μέν*. Its position in a sentence is the same, and its force is simply confirmative, as *ἕπου μήν* = 'follow to be sure', *ἦ μήν* = 'assuredly', a common phrase introducing adjurations.

παρεγένου μὲν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τῇ μάχῃ; = 'were you *really* present, said he, at the battle?' In both these examples, as in every expression of incredulity and surprise, the thought is somewhat adversative; thus, in the former, 'to others perhaps credible, *but* not to me', and in the latter, 'I did not think you had been at the battle, *but* were you really there'.

Obs. 4. *Δέ* **without** *μέν*. Likewise *δέ* is often found without any preceding *μέν*, as a mere copulative. Its adverbial force appears in *οὐδέ*, *μηδέ* = 'also not', 'not even', and in *καὶ δέ* (separated, except in Epic, by the contrasting word) = 'and too', as *καὶ ὀμνύουσι δὲ λέγοντες* = '*and* they swear it *too*'. The etymological connection of *δέ* with *δύο* clearly appears in its adverbial meaning *too*, *also*.

§. 87. **Positively Disjunctive Sentences.** Positive disjunction is effected by *ἤ* ... *ἤ* = 'either ... or', the former of which, in Greek as in English, may be omitted. Homer sometimes adds *τέ* to *ἤ* making *ἤτε* (§. 84. Obs. 1.). In Attic, *τοί* is often added to the first *ἤ*, making *ἤτοι*, rarely to the second; and this Attic *ἤτοι* must be distinguished from the Epic, which merely asseverates without disjoining.

Obs. 1. *Ἤ μέν ... ἠ δέ*. In Epic, and sometimes in tragedy, *ἤ* is prefixed to *μέν* and *δέ*, making *ἠμέν ... ἠδέ* = *καί ... καί*, or *τέ ... τέ*, *ἰδέ* being used for *ἠδέ* where the metre requires it. This formation of copulatives from disjunctives will appear less strange, if it be considered that, in English, 'either ... or' are sometimes in effect equivalent to 'both ... and': thus 'I can teach either Latin or Greek', differs from 'I can teach both Latin and Greek', not in effective meaning, but merely in the aspect under which the particulars are presented, which is distributive in the former, and cumulative in the latter. Now disjunction may be either exclusive, or merely distributive; and this latter kind is allied to conjunction.

Obs. 2. **Hypothetical Disjunctives.** These are *εἴτε ... εἴτε*, sometimes *εἴτε ... ἤ*, and in poetry *ἤ ... εἴτε* = 'whether ... or'. A single *εἴτε* is almost exclusively poetic, as (Soph. Oed. T. 517.) *λόγοισιν εἴτ' ἔργοισιν* 'by word or deed'. Another form is *εἰ ... εἴτε*, as *εἰ δικαίως εἴτε μή* = 'whether justly or not'. *Ἐάν τε ... ἐάν τε, ἤν τε ... ἤν τε, ἄν τε ... ἄν τε* have the same meaning, but are always used with the Subjunctive.

§. 88. **Negatively Disjunctive Sentences.** *Οὔτε ... οὔτε*, *μήτε ... μήτε* = 'neither ... nor', are the opposites

of *τέ ... τέ*, the *μή* form being used wherever the nature of the sentence would require negation by *μή*, not *οὐ* (§. 48.), as *μὴ δῶμεν αὐτοῖς σχολὴν μήτε βουλεύσασθαι, μήτε παρασκευάσασθαι ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτοῖς μηδέν* = 'let us give them no leisure either to deliberate, or to provide for themselves any good thing'. There occur also *οὐ... οὔτε, οὔτε ... οὐ* (both chiefly poetic); *οὐδέ ... οὔτε*, in which *οὐδέ* connects its clause with what precedes; and *οὔτε ... οὐδέ* = 'neither ... nor yet', *δέ* in *οὐδέ* implying opposition.

Obs. 1. *Οὔτε ... τὲ*. An affirmative clause may be added to a negative by *οὔτε ... τέ* (seldom *καί*), as *οὔτε τἄλλα οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἥκιστ' ἂν ἀνθρώπων* = 'I do'nt think myself a bad man in other respects, and I should take myself to be least of all men envious'. Also by *οὔτε ... δέ*, when the second clause is opposed to the first.

Obs. 2. *Οὐδέ, μηδέ* = 'but not', 'and not', 'not even'. They denote *a*) *Opposition*, and, in this sense, are always used when the same notion is expressed first in a positive, and then in a negative form, as *δόλῳ οὐδὲ βίηφιν* = 'by fraud, not by force'. *b*) *Mere connexion*, as *οὐδ' ἄρα τώγε ἰδὼν γήθησεν Ἀχιλλεύς* = 'and truly, seeing these two, Achilles did not rejoice'. *c*) *A negative continuation with an intensive force*, as (Thuc. I. 142. 7.) *πῶς δὴ ἄνδρες γεωργοὶ καὶ οὐ θαλάσσιοι, καὶ προσέτι μηδὲ μελετῆσαι ἐασόμενοι ... ἄξιον ἄν τι δρῷεν*; = 'how indeed should men, accustomed to agriculture and not to the sea, and who besides shall *not even* be allowed any opportunity of practice ... perform any exploit?' *d*) *Οὐδέ ... οὐδέ*, and *μηδέ ... μηδέ*, are not exactly the same as *οὔτε ... οὔτε*, and *μήτε ... μήτε*; for the first *οὐδέ* or *μηδέ* is always continuative, *also not*, whereas the first *οὔτε* or *μήτε* makes no reference to what precedes. A negative clause may be subjoined to a positive by *τέ ... οὐδέ*, and a positive to a negative by *οὐδέ ... τέ* or *καί*. From *οὐδέ* = 'not even', are derived *οὐδείς* = 'not even one', *οὐδ' ὥς* = 'not even thus', and the like.

§. 89. **Causal Sentences.** In these, one clause assigns the *reason* of a statement contained in another, and *γάρ* = 'for' marks the former. This *γάρ* is compounded of *γέ* = 'verily' *, and *ἄρα* = 'therefore'; and, in some

* The simple *γέ* usually stands after the word which it emphasizes, as *οὗτός γε* = 'he, I say': often, however, it stands

of its uses, the meaning of *γέ* prevails, as in *καὶ γάρ* = 'and in fact', introducing a sentence, and *ἀλλὰ γάρ* = 'but then', introducing an adversative clause, as (Plat. Apol. p. 20. C.) *ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ... ἡβρυνόμην ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι* = 'but assuredly even I myself would be proud, if I knew these things; *but then* I don't know them'. So in short adresses, wishes, orders, and questions, where the force of *γάρ* is confirmative, as *κακῶς γὰρ ἐξόλοιο* = 'may you *then* perish'. The meaning of *ἄρα* prevails in *γάρ* = 'for'. *Γάρ* never begins its clause, but stands generally second, as *λέγε· σὺ γὰρ οἶσθα* = 'speak, for you know'. Very often, especially in Herodotus, the *γάρ* clause precedes that containing the statement for which a reason is assigned; and in that case, if the Greek order be preserved in the translation, *γάρ* must be rendered 'because'. Thus (Herod. (VI. 102. 5.) *καὶ, ἦν γὰρ ὁ Μαραθὼν ἐπιτηδεώτατον χωρίον τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐνιππεῦσαι ... ἐς τοῦτό σφι κατηγέετο Ἱππίας* = 'and, *because* Marathon was the most suitable place in Attica for entering with cavalry, Hippias landed at this part of it'.

Obs. **Because**, is properly rendered in Greek by *ὅτι*, *διότι*, *διόπερ*, *διότι περ*, the first being the weakest, and the last two the strongest forms. The expansion *διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι* certainly represents the meaning of *διότι*, but not the mode of its formation, as if *τοῦτο*, having once been used, had dropped out. In the search after precision and emphasis, *διά*, which with the accusative means 'on account of', was *directly* prefixed to *ὅτι*. Our own inelegant and now rare 'for that' is a parallel, and a still better one is the Romaic *διὰ νά* = 'in order that', where *διά* is used to strengthen a truncated form of *ἵνα*, exactly as in *διότι* it strengthens *ὅτι*.

§. 90. **Illative Sentences.** These consist of two clauses, one of which is related to the other as a conclusion to its premisses. The illative clause is marked by *οὖν*, *ἄρα*, *τοίνυν*, *τοιγάρ*, *τοιγάρτοι*, all in the *sense* of 'therefore', by whatever other word they may be trans-

between a preposition and its case, or between the article and its substantive.

lated in different passages, as *οὕτω κοινόν τι ἄρα χαρᾷ καὶ λύπῃ δάκρυά ἐστιν* = 'thus *then* tears are common to joy and grief'. *Οὖν*, *ἄρα*, and *τοίνυν* never stand first, but generally second, in the illative clause; *τοιγάρ* generally begins its clause, and *τοιγάρτοι* always, as *τοιγὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω* = 'therefore I shall speak'.

Obs. 1. *Οὖν* and *Ἄρα*. The illative force of neither of these was fully developed till after Homer. *a*) He, as well as Pindar, uses *οὖν* chiefly after pronouns and conjunctions, to fortify their own meaning: thus, after *ὅστις*, *οὖν* has the same force as the Latin *cunque* in *quicunque*. Notice the difference between *οὔκουν* = 'no then', and *οὐκοῦν*; = 'is there not then?' i. e. 'therefore'. In both, *οὖν* is illative, but the accent is on that element which gives character to the word: *οὔκουν* is always negative;* *οὐκοῦν* again, by being interrogative, is always positive, as *οὐκοῦν ὑπόλοιπον δουλεύειν*; = 'does not then slavery await us?' i. e. 'therefore slavery awaits us'. *b*) In Homer *ἄρα* answers to our 'just' = 'exactly', as *ὅτ' ἄρα* = 'just when', *εἰ μὴ ἄρα* = 'if not exactly', often in an ironical sense, like *nisi forte* in Latin. Hence it is often used, in Epic narrative, as a continuative particle, like our 'namely', 'to wit'; and, in Ionic and Attic prose, in the sense of 'straightway', as *ταῦτα ἀκούσας ὁ Κῦρος ἐπαίσατο ἄρα τὸν μηρόν* = 'having heard these things, Cyrus *forthwith* struck his thigh'. Note that, in the lyric, tragic, and comic poets, the lengthened *ἆρα*, which is properly interrogative, occurs sometimes for the illative *ἄρα*. (Jelf. §. 789. Obs.)

Obs. 2. *Νῦν*, the Latin *nunc*, is also illative, like the English 'now', as (Soph. Phil. 1224.) *εἰ νῦν ἐπίστω* = 'if *then* thou knowest'. The enclitic *νύν* is a weaker illative, found only in poetry, where also it has sometimes a temporal force; and the enclitic *νύ* of Homer, used in asseveration, with somewhat of irony, is another form of the same. The temporal *νῦν* occurs with all the unaugmented tenses, as does also the demonstrative form *νυνί*. It occurs also with the imperfect denoting an immediate past, as (Eur. Hec. 1144.) *ἐν ᾧπερ νῦν ἐκάμνομεν* = 'in which (evil) we were *just now* involved'.

Obs. 3. *Ὥστε*. The result or effect is introduced by *ὥστε*, rarely *ὡς*. *Ὥστε* is used with the indicative and infinitive, to intro-

* It is a peculiarity of Herodotus, to introduce a negative notion by *οὔκων coordinately* with its consequences, as (IV. 118. 10.) *οὔκων ποιήσετε ταῦτα; ἡμεῖς . . . ἢ ἐκλείψομεν τὴν χώρην κ. τ λ.* = 'will you not do these things? . . . (i. e. if you don't, then) we shall either leave the country &c.'

duce the *actual* result; but, as the indicative makes a new sentence (§. 1. Obs. 2.), and the infinitive merely adds a complement to the principal one, the construction of ὥστε with the infinitive is the more compact, and to be preferred in the case of immediate or necessary results. The infinitive should also be used whenever ὥστε includes the notion of an *aim*, or means *on condition that*, as (Dem. p. 68. 11.) ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τῶν λοιπῶν ἄρχειν Ἑλλήνων, ὥστ' αὐτοὺς ὑπακούειν βασιλεῖ = 'it being allowed them to rule over the other Greeks, *provided that* (as we say, *so always that*) *they themselves are subject* to the king'; or when it follows a comparative, as (Herod. III. 14. 42.) ὦ παῖ Κύρου, τὰ μὲν οἰκήϊα ἦν μέζω κακά, ἢ ὥστε ἀνακλαίειν = 'O son of Cyrus, these domestic ills are *greater than can be wept aloud for*', more idiomatically 'are *too great for loud lamentation*'. Ὥστε is only expletive of a force which the infinitive itself possesses: it occurs only twice in Homer, and both times with the infinitive. When ὥστε introduces a result *dependent on conditions*, it takes the potential forms with ἄν (§. 44.), but sometimes also the optative without ἄν, as (Xen. Oec. I. 13.) εἴ τις χρῷτο τῷ ἀργυρίῳ, ὥστε . . . κάκιον τὸ σῶμα ἔχοι . . . πῶς ἂν ἔτι τὸ ἀργύριον αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμον εἴη; = 'if any one used money, *so that* his body *should be* the worse for it, how would the money be any longer of use to him?' Instead of the potential indicative forms with ἄν, ὥστε may take the infinitive with ἄν. Only by the *oratio variata* is it found with the imperative, as (Soph. El. 1171.) θνητοῦ πέφυκας πατρὸς, Ἠλέκτρα, φρόνει, θνητὸς δ' Ὀρέστης, ὥστε μὴ λίαν στένε = 'consider, Electra, thou wast born of a mortal father, and Orestes was mortal, *so then grieve* not over-much', literally '*so that* . . . *grieve* not over-much': the construction would be regular with στένειν for στένε.*

§. 91. **Declarative Sentences.** These are introduced by the conjunctions ὅτι, ὡς; and, in respect to mood and tense, all that has been said of the *oratio obliqua* in general (§. 43.) applies to them. Wherever a dash of uncertainty is to be given to the declaration, ὡς is to be preferred to ὅτι, as (Thuc. IV. 88. 3.) νομίζουσι δὲ οἱ ἐκείνῃ ἄνθρωποι . . . ὡς ὁ Ἥφαιστος χαλκεύει = 'the men in

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* Ὥστε μή with the infinitive is often a good formula for translating 'without' with the English gerund: thus (Soph. Phil. 340.) οἶμαι μὲν ἀρκεῖν σοί γε καὶ τὰ σὰ . . . ἀλγήματα, ὥστε μὴ τὰ τῶν πέλας στένειν = 'I think you have ills enough of your own to deplore, *without lamenting* those of your neighbours'.

that region think that Vulcan works as a smith'. The declarative clause is really object to the leading verb, for it answers to the question *what* after it; thus, in the above example, 'the men think — what?' *ὡς ὁ Ἥφαιστος χαλκεύει*: hence they are called by some *objective* sentences. It accords with this view that, instead of *ὡς* or *ὅτι* with the finite verb, the infinitive, with or without an accusative for its subject (§. 57.), may be used. Sometimes indeed, by the *oratio variata*, the finite verb is in one clause, and the infinitive in another, as (Thuc. III. 3. 3.) *ἐσηγγέλθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὡς εἴη Ἀπόλλωνος ... ἑορτή, ἐν ᾗ πανδημεὶ Μυτιληναῖοι ἑορτάζουσιν, καὶ ἐλπίδα εἶναι ἐπειχθέντας ἐπιπεσεῖν ἄφνω* = 'and it was told them that there *was* a festival of Apollo, which the Mytilenæans celebrated in mass, and that there *was* a chance, if they made haste, of falling suddenly upon them'. The declarative clause may also be expressed by means of a participle (§. 47. Obs. 2.).

Obs. 1. *Ὅτι* **Redundant.** As in English often, so in Greek sometimes, the conjunction, *ὅτι* or *ὡς*, may be omitted, as (Herod. IV. 135. 9.) *προφάσιος τῇσδε δηλαδὴ, αὐτὸς μὲν σὺν τῷ καθαρῷ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἐπιθήσεσθαι μέλλοι τοῖσι Σκύθῃσι* = 'under the following pretext, viz. (that) he was going to attack the Scythians with the flower of the army'. On the other hand, *ὅτι* is used in introducing actual quotations, which is never the case in English; it may then be translated 'as follows': thus (Thuc. I. 137. 4.), with regard to the famous letter of Themistocles to Artaxerxes, *ἐδήλου δ' ἡ γραφὴ ὅτι "Θεμιστοκλῆς ἥκω παρὰ σέ" κ. τ. λ.* = 'and the letter ran *as follows*, "I Themistocles am come to thee" &c.'. This occurs even when the quotation is in the imperative mood, as (Plat. Crit. p. 50. C.) *ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν (οἱ νόμοι) ὅτι, "ὦ Σώκρατες μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα"* = 'perhaps the laws might speak thus, "O Socrates wonder not at what things are said"'. (Mat. II. 23: V. 31: XXI. 16: Acts XI. 3.)*

Obs. 2. *Εἰ* = *Ὅτι.* (§. 48. Obs. 2. c.) The frequent use of *εἰ* for *ὅτι* is due to Attic politeness, which avoided *direct* assertion. Accordingly, though it may occur after any verb expressing mental

* Similarly in French, 'il dit *que* oui', 'il dit *que* non' = 'he said, Yes', 'he said No'.

emotion, it is most common after those which imply, *dis*approbation, as ἄχθεσθαι, ἀγανακτεῖν, αἰσχύνεσθαι, μέμφεσθαι, φθονεῖν, δεινόν ἐστι, αἰσχρόν ἐστι: thus (Plat. Lach. p. 94. A.) ἀγανακτῶ εἰ οὑτωσὶ ἃ νοῶ μὴ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν = 'I am indignant that in this way I cannot say what I think'.

§. 92. **Final Sentences.** These are introduced by ὡς, ὅπως, ἵνα = 'in order that', with the Subjunctive or Optative, according as the verb in the leading clause is in a principal or historical tense. For an account of this rule, with the variations from it, and for examples see §. 40. and §. 40. Obs. 2. All that was said, in §. 35. Obs. 1., about ὅπως with the future indicative, applies also to ὅπως μή, and in Herodotus to ὡς and ὡς μη.

Obs. Ὅπως **after Verbs of Fearing.** Such verbs are followed by ὅπως, only in Attic poetry, and then ὅπως = 'that not', and ὅπως μή = 'that', the Greek idiom agreeing here with the Latin, and that of the modern languages derived from it, differing consequently from the English. Just as *vereor ne veniat* = 'I fear that he *will* come', and *vereor ut veniat* = 'I fear that he will *not* come': so (Soph. Oed. R. 1074.) δέδοιχ' ὅπως μὴ 'κ τῆς σιωπῆς τῆσδ' ἀναῤῥήξει κακά = 'I fear that out of this silence ills *will* burst forth', and (Eur. Iph. T. 995.) τὴν θεὸν δ' ὅπως λάθω δέδοικα = 'I fear that I *shall not* escape the observation of the goddess'. There is a perfect opposition of idioms here, the English using a negative where the Greek uses a positive expression, and *vice versâ*. The rationale of this will become evident, if the matter of fear be expressed, not by one of its *issues*, as is always done when a finite verb is used, but in general terms, say by the gerund as 'I fear his coming'. This expression is ambiguous; for, said of a welcome visitor, it would mean 'I fear that he will *not* come', and, said of an unwelcome visitor, it would mean 'I fear that he *will* come'; which shews that a *neutral* phrase yields a negative issue, when interpreted by the *fear of desire*, and a positive one when interpreted by the *fear of dislike*. Now, as either issue, i. e. the desired, or the disliked one, may be contemplated by the mind in every case of fear, it is *à priori* indifferent, which of them be stated in the clause succeeding the verb of fearing; and the opposition of idioms under consideration arises from the *fact*, that in English the said clause always expresses the issue *disliked*, in Greek, Latin, French, and Italian, always the issue *desired*. Both idioms will appear equally justifiable from their respective points of view, if the above examples, and the following modern parallels be examined in the light of this remark:

Issue desired		Issue disliked
Je crains que vous ne m' abandonniez Temo che voi non mi abbandoniate	=	I fear that you *will* forsake me
Je crains qu'elle soit heureuse Temo che ella sia felice	=	I fear that she is *not* happy. *

§. 93. **Relative Sentences.** Theoretically, the antecedent to every relative, declinable or indeclinable, is a demonstrative: thus ὅς answers to οὗτος or ἐκεῖνος, ὅπου to ἐκεῖ, ὅτε to τότε, ὅπως to οὕτως &c. (§. 28., where also examples of relative clauses will be found); but, in actual language, most of these antecedents are omitted, except in cases of emphasis. The relatives οἷος, ὅσος, as having the force of ὥστε, are generally followed by the infinitive, as (Soph. Oed. T. 1295.) *Θέαμα δ' εἰσόψει τάχα τοιοῦτον οἷον καὶ στυγοῦντ' ἐποικτίσαι* = 'and thou shalt speedily see a sight such as would draw pity even from an enemy'. In like manner, ἐφ' ᾧτε = 'on condition that', is more commonly followed by the infinitive than by the indicative future. For the relative with ἄν, see §. 44. Obs. 3., but the relative without ἄν is never found in prose (§. 44. Obs. 3. *) with a verb in the Subjunctive, except in a *final* sense, as (Thuc. VII. 25. 1.) *καὶ αὐτῶν μία μὲν ἐς Πελοπόννησον ᾤχετο, πρέσβεις ἄγουσα οἵπερ τά τε σφέτερα φράσωσιν* = 'and one of them (the ships) went to the Peloponnesus, conveying ambassadors *who should declare* the state of their own affairs'. Even in this sense however the future indicative is more common. Owing to the participial resources of the Greek verb, ὅς is by no means so frequently used as the Latin *qui*: e. g. whereas the latter often connects independent sentences, by its understood resolution into *et is*, the former never does. Hence *quum quae dixissent*, which is a common form of beginning a Latin sentence, and marking its con-

* This explains also how the negative μή should be equivalent to our 'lest' after verbs of *fearing*, (§. 48. Obs. 10.) for, if the examples be examined, it will be found that all which follows the verb of *fearing*, including μή in its proper negative sense, expresses the issue desired.

nection with that which precedes, would be rendered in Greek *ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντες*.

§. 94. **Temporal Sentences.** *a*) If time *when* is to be marked i. e. a point of time, these are expressed by *ὅτε* (*ἐῦτε* Epic), *ὁπότε*, *ὡς* (*ὥσπερ*, and *ὅκως* in Herodotus; *ὅπως* in Attic poetry), *ἡνίκα*, with the indicative, as *ὅτε ἐσάλπιγξε, ἤρξαντο τῆς μάχης* = 'when the trumpet sounded, they began the battle'. *b*) If time *while* is to be marked i. e. a space of time, they are expressed by *ἐν ᾧ*, *ἕως* (*ὄφρα* poetic), also with the indicative, as *χρησμοὺς ἔνεγκε ἕως καθεύδει* = 'bring forth the oracle, while he sleeps'; but *ἕως ἄν* = 'as long as', and in this sense, like all conjunctions with *ἄν*, it takes the subjunctive, as *σιωπᾶτε ἕως ἂν καθεύδῃ* = 'be silent as long as he shall sleep', the action denoted by the principal verb lasting as long as that of the verb in the temporal clause, which need to be the case with *ἕως* = 'while'. *c*) If time *whenever* is to be marked, i. e. *recurrence*, they are expressed by *ὅτε*, *ὁπότε*, *ὡς*, *ὅπως* with the optative, in reference to past events, as *τὸν Πλάτωνα ἤκουε ὁπότε ἐν Ἀθήναις διατρίβοι* = 'he attended Plato, whenever he stayed in Athens', and by these same conjunctions and *ἄν*, with the subjunctive, in reference to present and future events, as *τότε δή, ὅταν ἃ χρὴ ποιῇς, εὐτυχεῖς* = 'then truly, whenever you do what you ought, you are happy', and *τότε δή, ὅταν ἃ χρὴ ποιήσῃς, εὐτυχήσεις* = 'then truly, whenever you shall have done what you ought, you will be happy'. *d*) If time *until that* is to be marked, i. e. the limit of duration, they are expressed by *ἕως, ἕως οὗ* (*τέως* in post-Homeric Epic writers, and sometimes in Attic prose), *εἰς ὅ, ἔστε, μέχρις* or *ἄχρις οὗ, μέχρις ὅτου, μέχρι* (*ἄχρι, ὄφρα* poetic), with the indicative in reference to past events, as *τὸν φίλον ἐφύλαξα ἕως ἀπέθανε* = 'I tended my friend till he died'; but with *ἄν* and the subjunctive, in reference to future events, as (Psalm CX. 1.) *ἕως ἂν θῶ τοὺς ἐχθρούς σου ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου* = '*till I shall have made* thine

enemies thy footstool'. Sometimes, especially in poetry, ἕως occurs with the subjunctive without ἄν. *e*) If time *after that* is to be marked, i. e. the posteriority of some event to that of the temporal clause, they are expressed by ἐπεί, ἐπειδή, ἐξ οὗ, ἐξ ὅτου, ἐξ ὧν, ἀφ' οὗ generally with the indicative, as ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο οἱ σύμμαχοι, ἔφυγον οἱ πολέμιοι = 'after that the allies arrived, the enemy fled'. *f*) If time *before that* is to be marked, i. e. the priority of some event to that of the temporal clause, they are expressed by πρίν, πρὶν ἤ, πρὶν ἢ ὅτε with the indicative, in reference to past events, as (Thuc. I. 132. 5.) οὐδὲ ἠξίωσαν νεώτερόν τι ποιεῖν εἰς αὐτὸν ... πρίν γε δὴ ... ὁ μέλλων ... τὰς ἐπιστολὰς κομιεῖν μηνύτης γίγνεται = 'nor did they resolve to do anything additional against him, before (or till) he, who was going to bring the letters, *became* informer', where γίγνεται is the historic present; with ἄν and the subjunctive, after negative clauses, and principal tenses, in reference to future events, as (Soph. Oed. Col. 1040.) οὐχὶ παύσομαι πρὶν ἄν σε τῶν σῶν κύριον στήσω τέκνων = 'I shall not desist *before* (or *till*) *I make* you possessor of your own children'; in poetry ἄν may be omitted: with the optative in the *oratio obliqua* after negative clauses, and historical or optative tenses, in reference to past events, as (Xen. Cyr. I. 4. 14.) ἀπηγόρευε μηδένα βάλλειν πρὶν Κῦρος ἐμπλησθείη θηρῶν = 'he forbade any one to shoot *before* (*till*) Cyrus *was satiated* with sport'; (Soph. Phil. 961.) ὄλοιο μή πω πρὶν μάθοιμι κ. τ. λ. = 'may you not perish yet, *before I have learned* &c.'; * and by πρίν with the infinitive, with the present for the commencement of an action, as πρὶν δειπνεῖν = 'before sitting down to supper', with the aorist for the conclusion of an action, as πρὶν δειπνῆσαι

* The substitution of the Subjunctive for the Optative is exceedingly common with πρίν, as (Thuc. VIII. 9. 1.) οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ... οὐ πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ξυμπλεῖν πρὶν τὰ Ἴσθμια ... διεορτάσωσιν = 'but the Corinthians were not disposed to sail along with them, *before* (*till*) *they had celebrated* the Isthmian games'.

= 'before having finished supper', and with the perfect for the time immediately succeeding the completion of an action, as *πρὶν δεδειπνηκέναι* = 'before having risen up from supper'.

Obs. **Causal Force of Temporal Conjunctions.** As in English, so in Greek, the temporal conjunctions have often a causal force, the reason being conceived of either as coincident with the principal verb, in which case *ὅτε*, *ὁπότε*, *ὡς* are used; or as antecedent, in which case *ἐπεί*, *ἐπειδή* are used, all in the sense of the English 'since' = 'seeing', the conjunction 'since' itself being both temporal and causal. Thus (Il. XXI. 95.) *μή με κτεὶν' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὁμογάστριος Ἕκτορός εἰμι* = 'slay me not, *since* (or *for*) *I am* not the same mother's son with Hector'; (Plat. Prot. p. 335 D) *δέομαι οὖν σοῦ παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὸς ἥδιον ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ* = 'I pray you to remain with us, *since* there is not any one, to whom I would listen with more pleasure than to yourself'. The temporal conjunctions are used causally only with the Indicative mood, and the potential forms.

§. 95. **Conditional Sentences.** These are introduced by the conjunctions *εἰ*, which may take either the indicative or optative, and *ἐάν*, *ἄν*, which uniformly take the subjunctive, all = 'if'. *Εἰ*, with all the tenses of the Indicative, expresses a supposition regarded simply as possible, and besides, with the augmented tenses, a supposition regarded as impossible: with the optative it expresses a supposition regarded, sometimes as improbable, sometimes with the subordinate notion of recurrence, and sometimes merely as a supposition, without any subordinate notion whatever.* *Ἐάν* with the subjunctive expresses a supposition regarded as probable. The English verb is quite capable of conveying the main distinctive force of the three Greek formulæ, thus:

εἰ λέγει τοῦτο = if he says this
ἐὰν λέγῃ τοῦτο = if he say this
εἰ λέγοι τοῦτο = if he should say this.

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* In the *oratio obliqua*, *εἰ* with the Indicative, is always represented by *εἰ* with the optative: so is *ἐάν* with the subjunctive, when a historical tense precedes; otherwise the subjunctive remains.

The neutral character of the indicative mood in suppositions, and the greater improbability expressed by the optative as compared with the subjunctive, appear in these translations; and these are the main distinctions which can be posited.

Obs. **Protasis and Apodosis.** So much for the conditional clause, which is called the *protasis*, in contradistinction from the *apodosis*, or clause containing the statement, the truth of which depends on the fulfilment of the condition. The form of the apodosis is regulated by the meaning intended to be conveyed, for the same protasis may have different apodoses in different passages: thus

εἰ τοῦτο ποιεῖς ἁμαρτάνεις = if you do this you err
„ „ „ *ἁμαρτάνοις ἄν* = „ „ „ „ you would err
„ „ „ *ἄκουσον τὰ ἐξῆς* = „ „ „ „ hear what I am going to say.

The potential form, in Greek as in English, expresses the apodosis less directly, and more politely than the Indicative. Notwithstanding this variety, there are certain forms of the apodosis appropriate to certain forms of the protasis, and these may be represented as follows: *a*) The indicative is used in both protasis and apodosis, or the indicative in the former, and the imperative in the latter, when the fulfilment of both is implied, as *εἰ ἐβρόντησε καὶ ἤστραψε* = 'if it thundered, it lightened too' (subint. but it did thunder, therefore &c.); hence this formula is used in reasoning about actual things, as *εἰ θεὸς ἐστὶ, ἔστι καὶ ἔργα θεοῦ* = 'if God is, there are also works of God (subint. but God is, therefore &c.). *b*) The indicative of the historic tenses is used in both protasis and apodosis, in the former without, and in the latter with *ἄν*, when the non-fulfilment of both is implied, as *εἰ τὸν Φίλιππον τὰ δίκαια πράττοντα ἑώρων, σφόδρα ἂν θαυμάσιον ἡγούμην αὐτόν* = 'if I saw Philip acting justly, I should consider him worthy of the highest admiration' (subint. but I do not see Philip acting justly, therefore &c.): *ἀπέθανον ἄν εἰ μὴ ἡ τῶν τριάκοντα ἀρχὴ κατελύθη* = 'I should have died, if the government of the thirty (tyrants) had not been destroyed' (subint. but is was destroyed, therefore &c.): *εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα* = 'if this were granted us, we should easily continue the controversy' (subint. but it has not been granted, therefore &c.) * *c*) The subjunctive is used

* In the first two of these examples, the same tense is in both protasis and apodosis; this however is not necessary, and depends entirely on the sense, the imperfect indicative with *ἄν* answering to the Latin imperfect subjunctive used potentially, and the aorist and pluperfect with *ἄν* to the Latin pluperfect subjunctive used potentially. Thus *εἰ τότε ἐβοηθήσαμεν, οὐκ*

in the protasis, and the principal tenses of the Indicative, or the imperative in the apodosis, when the probable fulfilment of both is implied, as *ἂν τὰ παρεληλυθότα μνημονεύῃς, ἄμεινον περὶ τῶν μελλόντων βουλεύσει* = 'if you call to mind the past, you will devise better regarding the future'. Here the aorist subjunctive may be often translated by the future perfect, as *νέος ἂν πονήσῃς γῆρας ἕξεις εὐθαλές* = 'if you shall have laboured when young, you will have a flourishing old age'. *d*) The optative is used in both protasis and apodosis, in the former without, and in the latter with *ἄν*, when the improbable fulfilment of both is implied, as *εἴ τι ἔχοι, διδοίη ἄν* = 'if he should have any thing, he would give it'. This form of the apodosis, as referring to conditions, by containing *ἄν*, and asserting a conclusion indirectly and politely, by containing the optative, is by far the most common, and *may* be used with any protasis whatever; but it is seldom found with a protasis of class *b*).

§. 96. **Concessive Sentences.** These are introduced by *εἰ* (*ἐὰν*) *καί* = 'although', where *καί* belongs to the clause, or by *καὶ εἰ* (*ἐάν*) = 'even if', where *καί* belongs to the conjunction, the former being used of concessions that are possible, and may be real, the latter of concessions that are not real, and may be impossible: *ὅμως* = 'yet' is the proper sign of the adversative clause following, but is often suppressed. Examples are (Soph. Oed. R. 302.) *πόλιν μὲν, εἰ καὶ μὴ βλέπεις, φρονεῖς δ' ὅμως, οἵᾳ νόσῳ ξύνεστιν* = 'blind *though* you are, *yet* you perceive in what an evil case the city is'; *ἄνθρωπος, καὶ εἰ ἦν ἀθάνατος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη εὐδαίμων* = 'man, *even if* he were immortal, would not be happy'. The concessive clause is sometimes introduced by *εἰ* alone, by *εἴπερ* = 'if indeed', and in Plato by *κἂν εἰ* (Prot. 328. A.). The

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ἂν ἠνώχλει νῦν ὁ Φίλιππος = 'if we had given our aid then, Philip would not now be molesting us'; *εἰ αὐτάρκη ψηφίσματα ἦν, Φίλιππος πάλαι ἂν ἐδεδώκει δίκην* = 'if decrees were of themselves sufficient, Philip would long ago have paid the penalty'. That the imperfect with *ἄν* is sometimes used of an *enduring* past, appears from the example in §. 44. Obs. 1., and in like manner, the aorist with *ἄν*, may be used for the imperfect with *ἄν*, in regard to a *momentary* present, as *εἴ τις σὲ ἤρετο, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω*; = 'if any one asked you, what would you answer?'

force of the moods and tenses is precisely the same in these, as in the conditional sentences, of which indeed the concessive are a species.

Obs. **Other Concessive Forms.** By reference to §. 47. Obs. 1., an example will be found of the concessive clause expressed by a participle with *καί περ*. The participial indeed is the most common way of expressing concession, and for this purpose it may be used without *καί περ*, and in poetry with *περ** alone, as *γενναῖος περ ἐών* = 'noble though he be'. The participle is also extensively used in the expression of causal, temporal, final, relative, and conditional clauses (§. 47. and §. 47. Obs. 1.).

§. 97. **Comparative Sentences.** These are introduced by *ὡς*, *ὥστε*, *ὥσπερ*, *ὅπως*, and in Epic *ἤϋτε*, seldom *εὖτε*. They are really *relative* clauses, as appears from these conjunctions, the relative character of which is betrayed both by their etymology, and by their correspondence to the demonstrative adverbs *οὕτως*, *ὧδε*. Either the indicative, or the subjunctive may be used; the Optative never. Thus (Il. XV. 383.) *ὥστε μέγα κῦμα θαλάσσης . . . νηὸς ὑπὲρ τοίχων καταβήσεται . . . ὥς κ. τ. λ.* = 'as a great wave of the sea *shall dash* over a ship's bulwarks, so &c.' (Il. II. 474.) *ὥστ' αἰπόλια πλατέ' αἰγῶν αἰπόλοι ἄνδρες ῥεῖα διακρίνωσιν, ἐπεί κε νομῷ μιγέωσιν, ὥς κ. τ. λ.* = 'as goatherds may easily divide their numerous flocks, after they have been mingled in the pasture, so &c.' The English 'the . . . the', in a parallelism of comparatives, is rendered by *ὅσῳ . . . τοσούτῳ*, as (Thuc. VIII. 84. 1.) *ὅσῳ μάλιστα καὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἦσαν . . . οἱ ναῦται, τοσούτῳ καὶ θρασύτατα . . . τὸν μι-*

* In other constructions than the participial, *περ* intensifies the meaning of the word after which it stands, just as the Latin *per* intensifies the meaning of the word to which it is prefixed, as *πρῶτόν περ* = 'the very first', *αὐτοί περ* = 'we ourselves'. It was always so in Homer; but, with relative words, *περ* intensive became in Attic *περ* distributive; thus *ὅσπερ* = 'just who' in Homer, but 'whosoever' in Attic; *ὅθεν περ* = 'just whence' in Homer, but 'whencesoever' in Attic.

σθὸν ἀπῄτουν = 'the more free the sailors were, the more boldly they demanded their pay'.

§. 98. **Directly Interrogative Sentences.** *a*) Simple Interrogation. Interrogation is midway between affirmation and negation; hence some forms of the interrogative sentence prepare for an affirmative answer, others for a negative one, and others are alike adapted to either. Of the particles οὐκ, οὐκοῦν, ἆρα, μή, μῶν (= μὴ οὖν), ἦ, which often introduce interrogative clauses, the first two are used when an affirmative answer is expected, the next three when a negative answer is expected, and the last in either case. Hence οὐ φθέγγεται Ἑλληνιστί; = 'he speaks Greek, does he not?' μὴ φθέγγεται Ἑλληνιστί; = 'he does not speak Greek, does he?' and ἦ φθέγγεται Ἑλληνιστί; = 'does he speak Greek?' Certain pronouns and adverbs are expressly interrogative, as τί τοῦτο; = 'what is this?' πῶς ἔχεις; = 'how are you?' In many cases the *animus loquentis* alone, expounded by the speaker's tone of voice, or the writer's mark of interrogation, shews that a sentence is interrogative, as Ἕλληνες ὄντες βαρβάροις δουλεύσομεν; = 'Greeks as we are, shall we become slaves to barbarians?' *b*) Compound Interrogation. The decision of an alternative is asked, in Homer, and sometimes in Attic poetry, by ἤ — ἤ, but generally in Attic by πότερον — ἤ, or πότερα — ἤ = 'whether — or'; also by ἆρα — ἤ in the same sense. As in English, so in Greek, the former of these particles is often omitted: πότερον may introduce an interrogative sentence with more than two members, as (Herod. III. 82. 28.) κότερα παρὰ δήμου, ἢ ὀλιγαρχίης, ἢ μουνάρχου; = 'whether from the people, or the oligarchy, or the monarch?' and sometimes it introduces a simple question, but in this case an alternative is always implied, as (Soph. Phil. 1235.) πότερα δὴ κερτομέων λέγεις τάδε; = 'whether sayest thou this now in mockery?' i. e. 'in mockery, or in earnest?' If the second member of the compound question be negative, ἢ οὐ is used when the

negation applies to the verb, ἦ μή when it applies to any other word: thus (Plat. Rep. V. 473. A.) ἀλλὰ σὺ πότερον ὁμολογεῖς οὕτως, ἦ οὐ; = 'well then, whether do you consent thus far, or not?' and (Plat. Phædr. p. 263. C.) Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἔρωτα πότερον φῶμεν τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων, ἢ τῶν μή; = 'What then? shall we say that Love belongs to debatable, or to undebatable things?'

Obs. 1. **Particles Subjoined.** To the expressly interrogative words, certain intensive or expletive particles are often subjoined, as τέ, ποτέ, ἄρα, οὖν, δή, μήν, γάρ. Hence the Homeric τίπτ' = τί ποτε = 'why', which exactly corresponds to the English vulgarism — '*what ever* was the cause that?' So τίς τ' ἄρ, τίς νυ = 'who then?'. In Attic poetry, ἄρα becomes ἆρα for the sake of the metre, and often serves merely to denote the embarassment of the questioner. Γάρ retains, allusively, its proper inferential force: hence πῶς γάρ; is an emphatic negation, and πῶς γὰρ οὔ; an emphatic affirmation: the former, by asking 'How so then?' denies, the latter, by asking 'How not so then?' affirms. Ἀλλά often introduces questions opposed to some thought in the speaker's mind, or a remonstrance expressed interrogatively.

Obs. 2. **Elliptical Forms.** Such are τί δῆτ' ἄν, for τί δῆτ' ἂν εἴποις, as (Aristoph. Nub. 154.) τί δῆτ' ἄν, ἕτερον εἰ πύθοιο Σωκράτους φρόντισμα; = '*what would you say* to hear another of Socrates' bright ideas?' and ἄλλο τι ἤ = *nonne*, a sense which may be easily derived from the literal translation, when the ellipsis of the substantive verb is supplied, 'is it anything else than?' Thus (Xen. An. IV. 7. 5.) ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει παριέναι; = '*does anything at all* hinder from passing along?' This formula is very frequent, and occurs also without ἤ.

Obs. 3. **Responsive Formulæ.** The Greeks used a great variety of adverbial combinations in affirmative answers, besides the simple ναί, as πάνυ μὲν οὖν, παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, πάνυ γε, παντάπασί γε, σφόδρα γε, μάλιστά γε, πάντως δή, πάντως δή που, καὶ μάλα, μάλιστα. These all answer more or less exactly to our 'certainly', 'to be sure', 'unquestionably', 'of course' &c. and the last of them is still in the mouth of every Greek, as a strongly affirmative answer. The verbs φημί, ἔστι, and ἔστω are also forms of assent. A common mode of answering affirmatively, is to repeat the emphatic word of the question, with or without μέντοι (indeed), or γάρ subjoined, as ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι πτωχός; = 'Am I poor then?' πτωχὸς μέντοι = 'yes, poor indeed'. Negative answers, even when, as usually happens, the question is, put by μή (§. 98. a.), are made by οὐ, οὐ δῆτα, οὐδαμῶς, ἥκιστά γε, with

or without *φημί*, *ἔστι*, or the emphatic word of the question. In the case of compound interrogation, the answer must be understood as referring to the second clause, when the contrary is not indicated, as (Eur. Or. 1539.) *τί δρῶμεν; ἀγγέλλωμεν ἐς πόλιν τάδε, ἢ σῖγ' ἔχωμεν;* = 'what shall we do? shall we report these things to the city, or keep silence?' *ἀσφαλέστερον* = 'safer' i. e. 'it will be safer to keep silence'.

§. 99. **Indirect Interrogative Sentences.** *a*) Simple interrogation. On the indirectly interrogative pronouns see §. 30. Even in the same sentence the directly and indirectly interrogative pronouns are sometimes both used, as (Plat. Crit. p. 48. A.) *οὐκ ἄρα . . . ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πόλλοι ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ, τι ὁ ἐπαΐων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων* = 'we must not be so careful as to *what* the multitude shall say of us, but as to *what* he shall say, who can distinguish between things just, and things unjust'. The indirectly interrogative pronouns are, however, constantly used in repeating a question before answering it, as *ἀλλὰ τίς γὰρ εἶ;* = 'but who are you then?' *ὅστις; πολίτης χρηστός* = '*who am I?* a good citizen'. *b*) Compound interrogation. Besides the formulæ of direct compound interrogation, the following also are used *εἰ — ἤ* = 'whether — or',* and *εἴτε — εἴτε*, which is similarly translated, but indicates more markedly the equal importance of the two clauses, as (Soph. Antig. 38.) *καὶ δείξεις τάχα εἴτ' εὐγενὴς πέφυκας, εἴτ' ἐσθλῶν κακή* = 'you will quickly shew whether your nature is noble like your birth, or degenerate from the good stock'. In poetry *εἴτε — ἤ*, *ἤ — εἴτε*, and *εἰ — εἴτε* are also found, all in the same sense.

* *Εἰ* with the indicative and optative, and *ἐάν* with the subjunctive, often mean 'whether', in forms of *simple* indirect interrogation, but an alternative is always implied, as (Xen. M. S. IV. 4. 12.) *σκέψαι ἐὰν τόδε σοι μᾶλλον ἀρέσκει* = 'consider whether this will please thee more'. In like manner, *μή* implies an alternative in indirect interrogation, 'whether or not': Homer uses it only with the subjunctive after principal, and with the optative after historical tenses, but it takes the indicative in Attic.

Obs. *a*) In interrogation, the moods and tenses are used as in the answers, i. e. as in ordinary affirmative or negative discourse, except when, in indirect interrogation, the question is introduced by a historical tense; in that case the verb in the interrogative clause is usually in the optative, as (Herod. III. 64. 14.) *εἴρετο ὁ Καμβύσης ὅ,τι τῇ πόλι οὔνομα εἴη* = 'Cambyses asked what was the name of the city'. This is in fact an instance of the *oratio obliqua*. *b*) The student must not be misled by the Latin idiom which takes the Subjunctive after all indirectly interrogative words, as *ne me interroges quis sim* = 'do'nt ask me who I am': in Greek this would be *μὴ μ' ἀνέρῃ τίς εἰμι*. The Greek subjunctive occurs in indirect interrogation only when it would also occur in the direct form, as *βουλεύομαι πῶς σὲ ἀποδρῶ* = 'I am devising how I may escape thee', because in direct interrogation *πῶς σὲ ἀποδρῶ* would also be the form. If the introductory verb be in a past tense, this subjunctive usually becomes optative.

§. 100. **Oratio Obliqua.** *a*) The Greeks used no special forms in the *oratio obliqua*, when it was introduced by a principal tense;* but, when it was introduced by a historical tense, the several tenses of the optative repre-

* Analogy would have led us to expect that Subjunctive forms would be used in the *oratio obliqua* after *principal* tenses. Instead of this, however, the Indicative is used, as in the *oratio recta*, and the following parallel may help us to understand the reason. When a German states what he thought, believed &c. at some *past* moment, he may use the past of the Subjunctive Mood, which corresponds to the Greek Optative, as Ich dachte die Nachricht wäre falſch = *ἐνόμισα ὅτι ψευδὴς εἴη ἡ εἴδησις* = 'I thought the news *were* false'; but, when he states what he thinks, believes &c. at the *present* moment, he must use the Indicative, which is also the law in Greek, as Ich denke die Nachricht iſt falſch = *νομίζω ὅτι ψευδής ἐστι ἡ εἴδησις* = 'I think the news *are* false'. The reason is, that a man must know precisely what he *at present* thinks, believes &c., but may know only approximatively what he thought, believed &c. at some *past* moment; and whereas the Germans limit this view, which associates certainty with the *principal* tenses, to statements in the *first* person, the Greeks extended it to statements introduced by a principal tense in whatever person. Thus er ſagt er ſei gefallen = 'he says he has fallen', may not be translated into Greek *λέγει ὅτι πεπτώκη*, but *λέγει ὅτι πέπτωκε*, or better still *λέγει πεπτωκέναι* (§. 57.).

sented the corresponding tenses of the Indicative (§. 43.). *b*) As the *oratio obliqua* is often interrupted by forms of the *oratio recta* (§. 43. Obs. 1.), so forms of the *oratio obliqua* sometimes appear in the midst of the *oratio recta*. This is particularly the case with subsidiary clauses assigning a reason, as (Thuc. II. 21. 3.) *τὸν Περικλέα ... ἐκάκιζον, ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι* = 'they (the Acharnians) blamed Pericles, because, being general, he did not lead them on'. The circumstance that Pericles did not lead them on is not mentioned here as a *fact*, though it was one, but as a *conception* which, in the minds of the Acharnians, was the ground of their censure. *c*) The accusative with the infinitive is another mode of turning the *oratio recta* into the *oratio obliqua* (§. 57.), and it may be used not only with *principal* clauses as in Latin, but also with *subsidiary* ones, so that even conjunctions may stand before the Infinitive; as (Thuc. IV. 98. 4.) *ἔφασαν .. καὶ αὐτοὶ, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον δυνηθῆναι τῆς ἐκείνων κρατῆσαι, τοῦτ' ἂν ἔχειν* = 'they said too that, *if they could* subjugate their land more completely, they would retain it': (Xen. Cyr. I. 6. 18.) *λέγεις σύ, ἔφη ὦ πάτερ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὅτι,* ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γεωργοῦ ἀργοῦ οὐδὲν ὄφελος, οὕτως οὐδὲ στρατηγοῦ ἀργοῦ οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι* = 'you say, quoth he, O father, as seems to me, that, as there is no use of an idle husbandman, so neither is there any use of an idle general'. But these *anacoloutha* are not to be imitated.

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* That which was an exceptional irregularity in the case of declarative infinitival clauses in Greek, is an invariable rule in the case of appositive infinitives in French. Compare

'c'était un crime *que* l'on *abandonnât* les enfans
" " " *que* d'*abandonner* les enfans
" " " *que* l'*abandon* des enfans'.

ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΝ

πρὸς ὠφέλειαν τῶν διδασκάλων, τῶν τὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος γλώσσης Ἑλληνιστὶ παραδιδόναι προθυμουμένων.

Α. ΟΡΟΙ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΙ.

α. *Λόγος ὀνομάζεται ἄθροισις λέξεων ἀκέραιον δηλοῦσα διάνοιαν, οἷον 'οἵ Ἕλληνες εἰσέβαλον εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν.' Τὰ δὲ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα λέγονται ὧδε, ἄρθρον, ὄνομα, ἐπίθετον, ἀντωνυμία, ῥῆμα, ἐπίῤῥημα, πρόθεσις, σύνδεσμος, ἐπιφώνημα.*

β. *Τοῦ ὀνόματος αἱ πτώσεις ὀνομάζονται ὀρθὴ ἢ ὀνομαστικὴ, γενικὴ, δοτικὴ, αἰτιατικὴ, κλητική· τὰ δὲ τρία γένη ἀρσενικὸν, θηλυκὸν, οὐδέτερον. Τριπλοῦς δ' ἔστιν ὡσαύτως ὁ ἀριθμὸς, δηλαδὴ ἑνικὸς, δυϊκὸς, πληθυντικός. Τοῦ ἐπιθέτου οἱ βαθμοὶ λέγονται θετικὸς, συγκριτικὸς, ὑπερθετικός.*

γ. *Τρεῖς ἔχει διαθέσεις τὸ ῥῆμα, ἐνεργητικὴν, μέσην, παθητικὴν, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῃ διαθέσει πέντε διακρίνονται ἐγκλίσεις, ὧν τέσσαρες μὲν παρεμφατικαὶ, ὁριστικὴ, ὑποτακτικὴ, εὐκτικὴ, προστακτικὴ, μία δὲ ἀπαρέμφατος· μέρος δὲ τοῦ ῥήματός ἐστι καὶ ἡ μετοχή. Οἱ χρόνοι τοῦ ῥήματος λέγονται ὧδε· ἐνεστὼς, παρατατικὸς, μέλλων, ἀόριστος, παρακείμενος, ὑπερσυντελικός. Ἰστέον δ' ὡς οἱ μὲν ἀναύξητοι χρόνοι ἀρκτικοὶ, οἱ δὲ δι' αὐξήσεως ἐσχηματισμένοι παρωχημένοι ὀνομάζονται.*

δ. *Ὑποκείμενον λέγεται τὸ περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ κατηγορούμενον, ἢ κατηγόρημα τὸ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λεγόμενον. Διὰ μόνου τοῦ ῥήματος, καὶ ταῦτά γε παρεμφατικοῦ σχήματος, κατηγορεῖταί τι· ὅθεν, ὅπου ἂν παρῇ ῥῆμα παρεμφατικὸν, πάρεστι καὶ λόγος, καὶ ἄνευ ῥήματος παρεμφατικοῦ, εἴτε ἐκφερομένου, εἴτε ἐννοουμένου, λόγος οὐχ ἵσταται.*

Β. ΠΡΟΣΔΙΟΡΙΣΜΟΙ

ἐν οἷς, ἐμπρόθετοι ἢ ἀπρόθετοι, ἐπιῤῥηματικῶς τίθενται αἱ τοῦ ὀνόματος πτώσεις.

α. Ὁ Τόπος, ὅπου ἵσταται ἢ κινεῖταί τι, ἐκφέρεται διὰ δοτικῆς, συνήθως μὲν ἐμπροθέτου, οἷον 'ἐν τῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ', ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀπροθέτου, μάλιστά γ' ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς Ἀττικῆς δήμων, οἷον 'Μαραθῶνι'. Ὁ Τόπος, ὁπόσε κινεῖταί τι, ἐκφέρεται δι' αἰτιατικῆς, ἐν μὲν τῷ πεζῷ λόγῳ ἐμπροθέτου, οἷον 'διέβησαν εἰς Σικελίαν', 'ἔφυγον πρὸς τὴν γῆν', 'εἶμ' ἐπὶ ναῦν'· παρὰ δὲ ποιηταῖς ἐμπροθέτου τε καὶ ἀπροθέτου, οἷον (Σοφ.) 'δόμους στείχω ἐμούς.' Ὁ Τόπος, ὁπόθεν κινεῖταί τι, ἐκφέρεται διὰ γενικῆς, ἐμπροθέτου μὲν ἐν τῷ πεζῷ λόγῳ, οἷον 'ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος' ἢ 'ἀπὸ Συρακουσῶν φεύγειν'· ἐμπροθέτου δέ τε καὶ ἀπροθέτου παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαΐζουσι ποιηταῖς, οἷον (Σοφ.) 'εἰ μὴ τόνδ' ἄγοιντο νήσου τῆσδε.' Ὁ Τόπος, δι' οὗ κινεῖταί τι, ἐκφέρεται διὰ γενικῆς, συνήθως μὲν ἐμπροθέτου, οἷον 'δι' οὐρανοῦ πορεύεται', ἐνίοτε δὲ, ἀλλὰ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις ποιηταῖς, καὶ ἀπροθέτου, οἷον (Ομ.) 'ἔρχονται πεδίοιο.'

β. Ὁ Χρόνος, ὁπότε γίνεταί τι, μάλιστά γ' ἐν τοιαῖσδε χρόνου διαιρέσεσιν ἐμφαινόμενος, ἃς ἂν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ξυνθέμενοι ποιεῖν ποιῶσι, ἐκφέρεται δοτικῇ ἀπροθέτῳ, οἷον 'τρίτῃ ὥρᾳ', 'μηνὸς ἕκτῃ φθίνοντος'· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἤδη γεγενημένων ἐκφέρεται καὶ αἰτιατικῇ ἀπροθέτῳ, τῇ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος συμβάντος μέχρι τοῦ νῦν παρελθόντα χρονικὰ διαστήματα διὰ τακτικοῦ ἀριθμητικοῦ ὀνόματος δηλούσῃ, ἔσθ' ὅτε τοῦ ἤδη παρεντιθεμένου, οἷον 'τρίτην ἤδη ἡμέραν ἀπέθανε ὁ πατήρ'. Τὸ δὲ Χρόνου διάστημα, ἐν ᾧ γίνεταί τι, ἐκφέρεται γενικῇ, εἴτε ἀπροθέτῳ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχουσῶν χρόνου διαιρέσεων, οἷον 'οἱ λαγῳ τῆς νυκτὸς νέμονται', εἴτε ἐμπροθέτῳ, προτιθεμένης ἐπὶ μὲν κυρίων ὀνομάτων τῆς ἐπὶ προθέσεως, οἷον 'ἐπὶ Θησέως', 'ἐπὶ Κύρου βασιλεύοντος', τὰ δ' ἄλλα προτιθεμένης τῆς διὰ προθέσεως, οἷον 'διὰ πολλοῦ αὐτοὺς οὐχ ἑώρακα.' Ὡσαύτως ἐκφέρεται τὸ Χρόνου διάστημα, ἐν ᾧ γίγνεταί τι, διὰ δοτικῆς μετὰ τῆς ἐν προθέσεως, οἷον 'ἐν ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτεσιν οὐκ

ἂν εἷς λάθοι πονηρὸς ὤν'. Ὁ Χρόνος, ὁπότε ὡς ἔγγιστα γίνεταί τι, ἐκφέρεται δι' αἰτιατικῆς μετὰ τῆς περὶ ἢ ἀμφὶ προθέσεως, οἷον 'περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα', 'ἀμφὶ μέσας πω νύκτας'. Ὁ Χρόνος, ὁποσάκις γίνεταί τι, ἐκφέρεται διὰ γενικῆς ἀπροθέτου, οἷον 'ὁ ὁπλίτης δραχμὴν ἐλάμβανε τῆς ἡμέρας'.

γ. Τὸ Ποσὸν τόπου, χρόνου κ. τ. λ. ἐκφέρεται δι' αἰτιατικῆς ἀπροθέτου, οἷον 'ἀπέχει ἡ Πλάταια τῶν Θηβῶν σταδίους ἑβδομήκοντα', 'πολὺν χρόνον ἐμάχοντο'·* ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀνὰ, κατὰ, παρὰ προθέσεων, οἷον 'ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν', 'κατὰ ἢ παρὰ πάντα τὸν πόλεμον.' Δῆλον δ' οὖν ὡς τὸ τοῦ χρόνου πλῆθος γενικῇ τε καὶ αἰτιατικῇ ἐκφέρεται· ἔνεστι δ' ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ διαφορὰ ἥδε. Διὰ μὲν τῆς γενικῆς ὑπαινίσσεται σημεῖόν τι χρόνου ἐν τῷ πλήθει ὑπάρχον, καθ' ὃ ἐγένετο ἡ πράξις, διὰ δὲ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς ἅπας ὁ χρόνος καθ' ὃν διήρκεσε ἡ πράξις δηλοῦται. Τέλος, τὸ Ποσὸν ἐπὶ ἀνταλλαγῶν, δηλαδὴ τὸ τιμὴν δηλοῦν, κατὰ γενικὴν τίθεται, οἷον 'τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα τἀγάθ' οἱ Θεοί.'

ρ. Τὸ Αἴτιον, ὁποιονδήποτε ἂν ᾖ, ἐξαιρουμένου δὴ τοῦ τελικοῦ αἰτίου, παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς διὰ γενικῆς ἀπροθέτου, συνήθως δὲ διὰ γενικῆς μετὰ τῆς ὑπὸ προθέσεως ἐκφέρεται, οἷον 'ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπό τινος'· κείσθω δὲ τοῦτο ποιητικοῦ αἰτίου παράδειγμα. Τὸ προτρεπτικὸν ἢ ἀναγκαστικὸν αἴτιον καὶ διὰ δοτικῆς ἐκφέρεται ἀπροθέτου, οἷον 'φόβῳ πράττειν τι·' ** πρὸς δὲ δι' αἰτιατικῆς μετὰ τῆς διὰ προθέσεως, οἷον 'λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι.' Τριπλῇ ἐκφέρεται τὸ τελικὸν αἴτιον, δηλαδὴ διὰ γενικῆς μετὰ τοῦ χάριν ἢ ἕνεκα προθετικῶς ἐκλαμβανομένων, οἷον 'κολακεύουσιν ἕνεκα ἀργυρίου'· ἢ διὰ δοτικῆς μετὰ τῆς ἐπὶ προθέσεως, οἷον 'ἐπὶ γέλωτι'· ἢ δι'

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* Πολλὰ τῶν τὸ Ποσὸν δηλούντων ἐπιῤῥημάτων οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ ἐπίθετα οὐδέτερα κατ' αἰτιατικὴν, οἷον ὀλίγον, πολὺ, μέγα κ. τ. λ.

** Ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον διὰ δοτικῆς ἐκφέρεται ἀπροθέτου, τὰ μὲν πλείω ἐπὶ ἀντωνυμιων, οἷον 'ταῦτα λέλεκταί μοι', πάντοτε δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς τέος ληγόντων ῥηματικῶν, οἷον 'ἐπιθυμητέον ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς.'

αἰτιατικῆς μετὰ τῆς πρὸς προθέσεως, οἷον 'παντοδαπὰ εὑρημένα ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς φυλακὴν καὶ σωτηρίαν'.

ε. Ὁ Τρόπος, καθ' ὃν γίνεταί τι, διὰ δοτικῆς ἐκφέρεται, ἢ ἀπροθέτου, οἷον 'βίᾳ εἰς οἰκίαν παριέναι', ἢ καὶ τῆς ἐν προθέσεως προσλαμβανομένης, οἷον 'ἐν σιωπῇ ἐκάθηντο'· πρὸς δὲ καὶ δι' αἰτιατικῆς μετὰ τῆς κατὰ προθέσεως, οἷον (Δεμ.) 'συμβαίνει τῷ μὲν (Φιλίππῳ), ἐφ' ἃ ἂν ἔλθῃ, ταῦτ' ἔχειν κατὰ πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν'.

ς. Τὸ Ὄργανον, δι' οὗ γίνεταί τι, διὰ δοτικῆς ἐκφέρεται, ἢ ἀπροθέτου, οἷον 'οὐδεὶς ἔπαινον ἡδονῆς ἐκτήσατο', ἢ μετὰ τῆς ἐν προθέσεως, οἷον 'ἐν τόξοις διαγωνίζεσθαι'· πρὸς δὲ ἐκφέρεται διὰ γενικῆς μετὰ τῆς διὰ προθέσεως, οἷον 'δι' ὀφθαλμῶν ὁρᾶν'. Ἰστέον ὅτι τὸ ποσὸν, ὡς ὄργανον θεωρούμενον, μάλιστά γε τὸ διαφορὰς μέτρον δηλοῦν, κατὰ δοτικὴν τίθεται ἀπρόθετον, οἷον 'ἐνιαυτῷ πρεσβύτερος'.

ζ. Τὸ κατά τι δι' αἰτιατικῆς ἐκφέρεται, ἀπροθέτου μὲν τὰ πολλὰ, οἷον 'δεινοὶ μάχην', 'ἀλγῶ τοὺς πόδας'· ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ μετὰ τῶν κατὰ, πρὸς, εἰς προθέσεων, οἷον 'ξανθὸς κατὰ τὴν κόμην', 'σοφὸς πρός τι', 'ἔνδοξος εἰς τὰ πολεμικά'. Ἡ δὲ δοτικὴ, τὴν κατά τι σχέσιν ὡς ὄργανον δηλοῦσα, τίθεται ἀπροθέτως, οἷον 'ἅμαχοι καὶ πλήθει, καὶ πλούτῳ, καὶ τέχνῃ, καὶ ῥώμῃ'.

Γ. ΚΑΝΟΝΕΣ ΣΥΝΤΑΞΕΩΣ, ΟΙ ΚΥΡΙΩΤΕΡΟΙ.

α. Ὀνόματα, τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ πρόσωπον ἢ πρᾶγμα ἀναφερόμενα, ὁμοιοπτώτως τίθενται, οἷον 'Δημοσθένης ὁ ῥήτωρ'· τοῦτο δὲ ὀνομάτων πρόσθεσις καλεῖται. Τὰ δὲ πρὸς διάφορα ἄλλῳ ἄλλο ὑποτάσσεται ἐπὶ γενικῆς, οἷον 'ὁ τοῦ δένδρου καρπός'.

β. Τὸ Ἐπίθετον καὶ ἡ Μετοχὴ συμφωνοῦσι τοῖς εἰς ἃ ἀναφέρονται ὀνόμασι κατὰ γένος, ἀριθμὸν, πτῶσιν, οἷον 'χρηστὸς ἀνὴρ', 'οἱ παῖδες οἱ φοιτῶντες εἰς τὰ διδασκαλεῖα'. Πολλῶν τῶν ὀνομάτων ὄντων, τίθεται τὸ ἐπίθετον ἢ ἡ μετοχὴ πληθυντικῶς. Ἐπὶ μὲν ἀψύχων, εἴτε ὁμογενῶν εἴτε ἑτερογενῶν, κατ' οὐδέτερον γένος, οἷον 'ταραχαὶ καὶ στάσεις ὀλέθρια ταῖς πόλεσι', 'λίθοι τε καὶ πλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα καὶ κέραμος, ἀτάκτως ἐῤῥιμμένα, οὐδὲν χρησιμά ἐστι.' Ἐπὶ

δὲ ἐμψύχων, τῶν μὲν ὁμογενῶν, κατὰ τὸ τοῖς ὀνόμασι κοινὸν γένος, τῶν δὲ ἑτερογενῶν, κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατέστερον· ἔστι δὲ ἐπικρατέστερον τὸ μὲν ἀρσενικὸν τοῦ θηλυκοῦ, τὸ δὲ θηλυκὸν τοῦ οὐδετέρου, π. χ. 'ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθοὶ' λέγονται, καὶ οὐχὶ 'ἀγαθαί'. Ἰστέον δ' ὅτι, ἡνίκα κατ' ὀνομαστικὴν ἐπίθετόν τι ὀνόμαται παρατίθεται ἐνάρθρῳ, καίτοι τοῦ συνδετικοῦ ἐλλείποντος, λόγος αὐτοτελὴς ἀπαρτίζεται· οὕτω δὴ τὸ 'θνητὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος' δύναται τὸ 'θνητός ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος', καὶ τὸ 'ὁ ἄνθρωπος θνητός' δύναται τὸ 'ὁ ἄνθρωπος θνητός ἐστιν'. Μετοχῆς δὲ κατὰ γενικὴν ὀνόματι παρατιθεμένης, προσδιορισμὸν δὴ τότε ἡ συμφωνία αὕτη, χρονικὸν ἢ ὑποθετικὸν ἢ ἄλλον οἱονοῦν, ἐπιῤῥηματικῶς πως ἐκδηλοῖ, οἷον 'ὄρθρου γενομένου ἀφικόμεθα', 'ὁρῶ, τοῦ χωρίου χαλεποῦ ὄντος, τοὺς τριηράρχους ἀποκνοῦντας'· αὕτη δὲ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις πτῶσις ἡ σύνταξις ἀπόλυτος καλεῖται.

γ. Παρεμφατικοῦ ῥήματος τὸ ὑποκείμενον τίθεται κατ' ὀνομαστικὴν, καὶ ταύτῃ συμφωνεῖ τὸ ῥῆμα κατ' ἀριθμόν τε καὶ πρόσωπον, οἷον 'Κῦρος τέθνηκε'. Εἰώθασι μέντοι οἱ Ἀττικοὶ πληθυντικὴν ὀνομαστικὴν οὐδετέραν, ἐὰν ἄψυχα μάλιστα δηλοῖ, ῥήματι ἑνικῷ παρατιθέναι, οἷον 'ἔαρος θάλλει τὰ ῥόδα',* καὶ τοῦτο δή ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον σχῆμα Ἀττικόν. Ἐκφαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον· ὑποκείμενον δηλαδὴ περιληπτικὸν καθ' ἑνικὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐφέλκεται τὸ ῥῆμα κατὰ πληθυντικὸν, ἐξόχως δὴ ὅταν διάκρισις τῶν ἐν τῇ πληθύϊ ὑποκειμένων νοῆται, καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα καθ' ἑκάστου τούτων κατηγορῆται, οἷον (Ομ.) 'ὡς φάσαν ἡ πληθύς'· ἄλλως δὲ, τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ὡς ἁπλῆς ἑνάδος νοουμένου, παρατίθεται καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα καθ' ἑνικὸν ἀριθμὸν, οἷον 'ἀναρίθμητός ἐστιν ἡ πληθύς'. Ἐν τούτοις τε κἂν τοῖς ἑξῆς παραδείγμασι 'ἀνὴρ σὺν παιδὶ πάρεισι', 'ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνὴ πάρεισι', τὸ κατὰ σύνεσιν ἰσχύει σχῆμα. Πλειόνων δ' ὄντων τῶν τοῦ

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* Συνήθως μὲν παραλείπονται αἱ ὑποκείμενον δηλοῦσαι ἀντωνυμίαι, οἷον 'ἄλγῳ τὴν κεφαλήν'· τὸ γὰρ πρόσωπον διὰ τῆς καταληξεως αὐτοῦ τοῦ ῥήματος δηλοῦται. Ἐμφάσεως δὲ χάριν ἐκφέρονται, οἷον 'οὐκ αὐτὸς, ἀλλ' ἐγώ γ' ἐτόλμησα τὸν πόταμὸν διαβῆναι πρῶτος'.

ῥήματος ὑποκειμένων καὶ ἑτεροπροσώπων, τίθεται τὸ ῥῆμα κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατέστερον, νικᾷ δ' ἀεὶ τὸ πρῶτον τὸ δεύτερον πρόσωπον, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ τρίτον, οἷον 'ξυμφωνοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ ὑμεῖς', 'οὐ σὺ μόνος, οὐδὲ οἱ σοὶ φίλοι πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτον ταύτην τὴν δόξαν περὶ θεῶν ἔσχετε'. Ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ προσεχέστερον, ὁποιουδήποτε ἀριθμοῦ τε καὶ προσώπου ἂν ᾖ, τίθεται τὸ ῥῆμα, οἷον 'ἐγὼ λέγω καὶ Σεύθης τὰ αὐτά', 'ἑνίκων οὗτοι οἱ ξένοι, καὶ ἡμεῖς μετ' ἐκείνων'.

δ. Τῆς ἀπαρεμφάτου τὸ ὑποκείμενον τίθεται κατ' αἰτιατικήν, οἷον 'πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἁμαρτάνειν ἀληθές'. Ἐὰν ὅμως τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχῃ ὑποκείμενον ἡ ἀπαρέμφατος καὶ παρεμφατικόν τι ῥῆμα ἐξ οὗ ἐξαρτᾶται ἡ ἀπαρέμφατος, ἢ παραλείπεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον τοῦτο, τὸ ἀμφοτέροις κοινὸν, οἷον 'ὁμολογῶ ἡμαρτηκέναι', ἢ τίθεται κατ' ὀνομαστικήν, οἷον 'φησὶ αὐτὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν γεγραφέναι.'

ε. Ἡ ἀναφορικὴ λεγομένη ἀντωνυμία συμφωνεῖ τῷ ἑαυτῆς ἡγουμένῳ κατὰ γένος καὶ ἀριθμὸν καὶ πρόσωπον, οἷον 'Ζεὺς ὃς ἐφορᾷ πάντα'. Τῷ συντακτικῷ δὲ σχήματι, ὃ καλεῖται ἕλξις ἢ ἔφελξις, ἕλκεται ἡ ἀντωνυμία εἰς τὴν πτῶσιν τοῦ ἡγουμένου, καὶ δὴ τὸ 'χρῶμαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἃ ἔχω' τρέπεται ὧδε, 'χρῶμαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς ἔχω', ἢ καὶ, μεταθέσει τοῦ ἡγουμένου, 'χρῶμαι οἷς ἔχω ἀγαθοῖς'. Ἀντιστρόφως δ' ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ ἡ ἀντωνυμία ἕλκει τὸ μετατεθειμένον ἡγούμενον, καὶ δὴ τὸ 'οὗτος ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνὴρ ὃν εἶδες' μεταβάλλεται εἰς τὸ 'οὗτος ἐστὶν ὃν εἶδες ἄνδρα'.

ς. Γενικῇ συντάσσονται ἐπίθετα καὶ ῥήματα, τὰ πληρώσεως, μεθέξεως, ἐμπειρίας, ἐπιμελείας, μνήμης, ἐπιτυχίας, φειδοῦς σημαντικά, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία· πρὸς δὲ ἓκ τῶν ἐπιθέτων τὰ εἰς ικός λήγοντα, τὰ ἐκ τοῦ α στερητικοῦ σύνθετα, καὶ τὰ παραθετικά, τὰ συγκριτικὰ δηλαδὴ καὶ ὑπερθετικά, καὶ τούτοις ἀνάλογα, οἷον δεύτερος, περιττός· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ῥημάτων τὰ ἀρχικὰ καὶ ὑπαρχικά, τὰ ἐνάρξεως ἢ λήξεως σημαντικά, καὶ τὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, πλὴν τοῦ ὁρῶ.

ζ. Δοτικῇ συντάσσονται ἐπίθετα καὶ ῥήματα, τὰ ὁμοιότητος, ἀναλογίας, προσεγγίσεως, μίξεως σημαντικά, τά τε φιλικὴν ἢ ἐχθρικὴν πρός τινα διάθεσιν δηλοῦντα,

ἅπερ, συντομίας χάριν, περιποιητικὰ καὶ ἀντιπεριποιητικὰ ὑπὸ τῶν γραμματικῶν καλοῦνται· πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἀπρόσωπα λεγόμενα ῥήματα.

η. Αἰτιατικῇ συντάσσονται τὰ ἰδίως ἢ ἀμέσως μεταβατικὰ ῥήματα. Μεταβατικὰ καλοῦνται τὰ ῥήματα τὰ τοιάνδε ἐνέργειαν δηλοῦντα, ἥτις ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰς πρόσωπον ἢ πρᾶγμα διάφορον τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸ παρὰ γραμματικοῖς ἀντικείμενον λεγόμενον, μεταβαίνει. Π. Χ. διὰ τοῦ τρέχειν δηλοῦται μὲν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ αὐτοτελές τι ἐκφαίνει, οὐδὲ πρὸς συμπλήρωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἐννοίας ἀντικείμενον ἐπιδέχεται, μεταβατικὸν οὐ λέγεται· τὰ δὲ σφάττειν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἔπεσθαι, μεταβατικὰ λέγονται ῥήματα, ἅτε ἐπ' ἄλλο τι μεταβαινούσης τῆς δι' αὐτῶν δηλουμένης ἐνεργείας, οἷον ἐν τοῖς 'σφάττω τὸν βοῦν', 'ἐπιθυμῶ σοφίας', 'δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἡγεμόνι.' Διαιρετέα δὲ ἐν τούτοις τὰ ἰδίως ἢ ἀμέσως μεταβατικὰ τῶν ἐμμέσων μεταβατικῶν ῥημάτων· ἔνεστι γὰρ διαφορὰ ἥδε. Τὰ τῇ αἰτιατικῇ συντασσόμενα ῥήματα, φύσει δραστικώτερα, ἐμφαίνουσι καὶ μεταβολήν τινα τοῦ ἀντικειμένου, διὸ καὶ ἰδίως ἢ ἀμέσως μεταβατικὰ καλοῦνται· τὰ δὲ γενικῇ ἢ δοτικῇ συντασσόμενα, μόνην τὴν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου διάθεσιν ἐκδηλοῦντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀντικειμένου οὐδεμίαν μεταβολήν, ἐμμέσως μεταβατικὰ ὑπὸ τῶν γραμματικῶν καλοῦνται. Ἕνια ῥημάτων εἴδη διπλοῦ δέονται ἀντικειμένου, ὧν τὸ κύριον, πρὸς ὃ ἰδίᾳ ἡ τοῦ ῥήματος ἐνέργεια φέρεται, κατ' αἰτιατικὴν τιθέμενον, ἄμεσον λέγεται, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ τῶν πλαγίων, ἢ καὶ κατ' ἄλλην αἰτιατικήν, ἔμμεσον. Π. Χ. ἐν τῷ 'Χριστιανοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐστι τοῖς πεινῶσι ἄρτον διδόναι', τὸ ἄρτον, τὸ μεταβολήν τινα, θέσεως δηλονότι, ὑφιστάμενον, καὶ κατ' αἰτιατικὴν τιθέμενον ἀντικείμενον, ἄμεσον λέγεται, τὸ δὲ πεινῶσι, ἔμμεσον. Δίπτωτα δὲ ταῦτα οἱ γραμματικοὶ καλοῦντες διακρίνουσι τῶν λοιπῶν, ἃ μονόπτωτα ἐκεῖνοι ὠνόμασαν.

θ. Αἰτιατικῇ καὶ γενικῇ συντάσσονται τὰ πληρωτικὰ καὶ κενωτικά, οἷον 'ζεύγη καὶ ὑπυζύγια σίτου γεμίσαντες', 'οἶμαι ταύτης ἀπαλλάξειν σὲ τῆς ὀφθαλμίας'· τὰ μνημονευτικά, οἷον 'ἀναμιμνήσκειν τινά τινος'· τὰ ἀνταλ-

λακτικὰ, οἷον 'πλείστου τιμᾶν τί'· τὰ δεόμενα τοῦ προσδιορισμοῦ τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν τι γίνεται, οἷον 'ἐπαινεῖν τινα τῆς ἀρετῆς.'

ι. Αἰτιατικῇ καὶ δοτικῇ συντάσσονται τὰ δόσεως, διηγήσεως, ἐναντιότητος σημαντικὰ, οἷον 'τὰ ἀγαθὰ διδόναι τοῖς δικαίοις', 'τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀγγέλλειν τινί', 'ἴσους ἴσοις πολεμίοις ἀντιτιθέναι.'

κ. Διπλῇ αἰτιατικῇ συντάσσονται τὰ ἱκετευτικὰ, τὰ παιδευτικὰ, τὰ ἐνδύσεως ἢ ἐκδύσεως σημαντικὰ, τὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔχοντα τοῦ εὖ ἢ κακῶς λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν.

λ. Τὰ εἰς τέος λήγοντα ῥηματικὰ διττὴν ἔχουσι τὴν σύνταξιν. Τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἰδίως μεταβατικῶν ῥημάτων καταγόμενα ἢ συμφωνοῦσι, ἐπιθέτων καὶ μετοχῶν δίκην, τῷ τοῦ λόγου ὑποκειμένῳ, οἷον 'διαφυλακτέα ἡ τάξις', ἢ τίθενται κατ' οὐδέτερον γένος, ἑνικῶς τε καὶ πληθυντικῶς, μεταβαλλομένης τῆς πρότερον ὀνομαστικῆς εἰς αἰτιατικὴν, οἷον 'διαφυλακτέον' ἢ καὶ 'διαφυλακτέα τὴν τάξιν.' Τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἐμμέσως μεταβατικῶν ῥημάτων παραγόμενα, κατὰ μόνον τὸν δεύτερον τρόπον συντάσσονται· ἰστέον ὅμως ὅτι τῶν ῥηματικῶν τούτων τὸ ἀντικείμενον κατὰ τὴν πτῶσιν τίθεται, τὴν τῷ ῥήματι οἰκείαν ἐξ οὗ παράγεται ἕκαστον, οἷον 'ἀντιληπτέον τῶν πραγμάτων', 'ἐπιχειρητέον τῷ ἔργῳ.'

Δ. ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΩΝ ΜΟΡΙΩΝ.

α. Πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ τοῦ ῥήματος ἐγκλίσεις, πλὴν τῆς ἀπαρεμφάτου, κατηγοροῦσί τι κατά τινος, προδηλότατον δ' ὡς ἑκάστη κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν αὐτῆς φύσιν καὶ δύναμιν· καὶ τὰ ἀποφατικὰ μόρια, τῇ τῶν ἐγκλίσεων δυνάμει ἑλκόμενα, ἄλλῃ ἄλλο πρέπει. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τῇ ὁριστικῇ, ὡς θετικόν τι καὶ βέβαιον παριστώσῃ, πρέπει τὸ ἀποφατικὸν οὐ, οἷον 'οὐκ ἐστι ταῦτα'· ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς τῶν ἐγκλίσεων, αἳ οὐκ ὄντως τι ὂν παριστᾶσι, ἀλλά τι ὑποτιθέμενον, ἢ προστασσόμενον, ἢ εὐκτὸν, πρέπει τὸ μή, οἷον 'μὴ ὑβρίσῃς', 'μὴ γένοιτο', 'ὦ τέκνα μὴ καταφρονεῖτε τοῦ πένητος'.

β. Ἡ ἐνιαχοῦ παράβασις τοῦ κανόνος τούτου, οὐκ οὖσα ἀλλὰ φαινομένη, κυρεῖ μάλιστα τὸ ῥηθέν. Ἐν τῷ Ὁμηρικῷ 'οὔπω

τοίους ἴδον ἀνέρας, οὐδὲ * ἴδωμαι', τὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος τῆς ὁριστικῆς ἐπέχουσα ἡ ὑποτακτική, ὄντως τι ὂν καὶ οὐχ ὑποτιθέμενον ἐξηγεῖ. Τὸ 'οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ταῦτα', καὶ παρόμοιοι λόγοι, οὐχ ὑποτιθέμενόν τι δηλοῦντες, ἀλλ' εὐγενείας ἢ χάριτος ἕνεκα τὸ τοῦ θετικοῦ βαρὺ καὶ αὐστηρὸν μετριάζοντες, τὰ ἴσα ἔχουσι λόγῳ θετικῷ· ἔστιν ἄρ' ὁ ῥηθεὶς λόγος οὐκ ἄλλος ἢ ὁ 'οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι ταῦτα'. Ἔν τε διηγήσει τίθεται οὐ μετ' εὐκτικῆς, ἡνίκα ἡ ἔγκλισις αὕτη τὰ τῆς ὁριστικῆς ἐκπληροῖ, οἷον 'λέγων ὅτι οὔπω δὴ πολλοῦ χρόνου ἡδίονι οἴνῳ ἐπιτύχοι'· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ λέγων ἐπέτυχον εἶπεν ἄν, κατ' ὁριστικήν. Ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ἡ ὁριστικὴ ἀποβάλλουσα τὴν οἰκείαν αὐτῆς θετικὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ὑποθετικὴν παρατιθεμένη, ἕλκει τὸ μή· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἰδεῖν, ὅταν ἐρωτήματα, καὶ εὐχὰς, καὶ ὑποθέσεις ἐκδηλοῖ. Οὔκ ἐστι δ' εὑρεῖν οὐδαμῶς παρὰ τῇ προστακτικῇ τὸ οὐ παρακείμενον. Τέλος δὲ παρὰ τῇ ἀπαρεμφάτῳ, καὶ μετοχῇ, κρατούντων τῶν καθόλου εἰρημένων, παράκειται οὐ ἐπὰν ὁ λόγος ἀναλυόμενος ὁριστικῇ, μὴ δὲ ἐπὰν ὑποτακτικῇ ἢ εὐκτικῇ μετατρέπηται.

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* Τὸ περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν μορίων λεγόμενον ἀληθεύει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων συνθέτων.

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